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Abstract 
This thesis consists of three essays about European banks and provides several useful policy 
implications for bank supervisors, regulators and managers.  
In the first essay, firstly, we find some evidences that size, liquidity ratio, efficiency, leverage ratio, 
tier 1 ratio, concentration ratio, capital regulatory power and supervisory power are the main 
determinants of acquirers’ performance changes after M&As. Secondly, we obtain that interest rate 
difference between distressed and non-distressed countries negatively granger-cause change of 
ROE and change of NII but not vice versa. Thirdly, we find some evidences that the financial crisis 
did have negative impacts on acquirers’ performance changes after M&As.  
In the second essay, first, we find that acquirers’ systemic risk increased significantly after M&As. 
Second, we identify that acquirers from more integrated banking markets will have higher systemic 
risk after M&As. Third, we recognize that size, product diversification, asset quality, capital ratio, 
short-term debt, bailouts, deposit insurers’ power and private monitoring index are the main 
determinants of acquirers’ systemic risk of bank M&As in Europe. Fourth, we also find some 
evidences that those variables have significantly different effects on acquirers’ systemic risks in 
post-crisis period, compared with those in pre-crisis period.   
In the third essay, firstly, we find certain evidences that the expansionary monetary policy will 
contribute to the buildup of systemic risk in banking sector in euro area in the long-term. Secondly, 
we identify that banks that have more diversified income structure, poorer asset quality, more 
deposit funding, more equity capitals and larger sizes will have higher systemic risks. Thirdly, we 
find that riskier banks will benefit more from the expansionary monetary policy.  
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1.1 Introduction to the Thesis 
In the past decades, the banking sector has been subject to many changes, such as deregulation, 
technological innovation, change of business models and change of risk profiles. Deregulation and 
technological innovation affected the way banks operate and thus changed their business models 
and risk profiles.  
A decade ago, the U.S. banking sector has been affected by the biggest global crisis since the Great 
Depression. Because the European economies were highly interconnected with the U.S. economy, 
the U.S. subprime crisis spread to the European continent. In May 2010, the European Sovereign 
Debt Crisis broke out in Greece. Both financial crises halted the process of financial integration 
and led to slowdown and recession that meant that central banks had to intervene with 
unconventional monetary policy tools (e.g. quantitative easing). 
The main theme of this thesis is financial integration in banking market. All the other themes, 
including bank M&As, acquirers’ operating performance, financial crises, acquirers’ systemic risk, 
and monetary policy changes are relevant to financial integration in banking market. First, increase 
in value and number of cross-border bank M&As indicates higher level of financial integration in 
banking market. Second, one of the benefits of financial integration in banking market could be 
the increase of acquirers’ operating performance; third, financial crises could have negatively 
impacts on the process of financial integration in banking market; fourth, one of the risks of 
financial integration in banking market could be the increase of acquirers’ systemic risk and 
financial instability in banking market; finally, the ECB used more expansionary monetary policy 
in post-crisis period and resulted in recovery of financial integration in banking market after the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis. Therefore, we highlight financial integration in banking market 
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as the key theme of this thesis.     
 
1.2   Background 
1.2.1 Recent Bank M&A Trend in Europe 
The most recent bank merger and acquisition (M&A) wave around the developed world emerged 
in the mid-1980s and culminated in the late-1990s due to the financial deregulations, technological 
advance and increased competition in major banking sectors. DeYoung et al. (2009) identified that 
the transaction values of bank M&As in Intra-Europe increased dramatically: from less than $1bn 
in 1985 to $160bn in 1999. However, the total value of M&A transactions of EU bank M&As 
decreased significantly from €123bn in 2000 to €22bn in 2013 while the number of transactions 
decreased from 81 to 4 during the same time period (Casu et al. 2015).  
Three reasons can be used to explain the significant decline of bank M&As in Europe after the 
financial crisis. Firstly, large banks had to re-evaluate their risk preference and reinforced their risk 
management so that they had lower willingness to engage in M&A deals. Secondly, banking 
authorities adopted stricter regulations to effectively monitor bank M&As (especially cross-border 
deals) to control systemic risk. Thirdly, European countries’ governments increase takeover the 
failed banks rather than use private bank M&As.  
1.2.2 The Establishment of Economic and Monetary Union 
With the significant increase in the transaction value of $159bn in Europe between 1985 and 1999, 
the degree of financial integration also increased sharply. During the pre-Euro period, the 
establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union was the precondition and catalyst of financial 
integration in Europe. Several previous studies (Vardi 2011; Casu 2015; ECB 2015) described the 
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four stages before and after the EMU was established and the process of financial integration in 
Europe. The author reports that the First Stage towards the EMU increased freedom of capital 
movement and the level of member countries’ monetary coordination while Stage Two established 
the European Monetary Institute (EMI) and strengthened the cooperation among member countries’ 
central banks. He also outlines four convergence criteria formed in Stage Two. Actually, the four 
convergence criteria are very important preconditions for the first eleven member states in Stage 
Three after the European Central Bank (ECB) was established in 1998. In Stage Three, all the 
member states gradually replaced the local currencies with Euro. In Final Stage, the Euro was the 
only official currency for those euro area countries and more European countries joined in since 
2002. It was mainly during Stage Three and the Final Stage towards EMU (1999-2007), the degree 
of financial integration in most markets (except retail banking market) in the euro area increased 
dramatically.     
1.2.3 The Process, Benefits and Risks of Financial Integration 
ECB’s series of annual reports Financial Integration in Europe analyzed the process of financial 
integration in banking market and the impacts of financial crises on financial integration. ECB 
(2005-2009) reports summarized that the euro area banking market generally experienced 
increasing integration but the euro areas retail banking markets were still highly segmented 
whereas the euro area wholesale banking markets were highly integrated before the crisis in 2008. 
However, ECB (2010-2013) reports concluded that financial crisis had a negative impact on 
financial integration so that the degree of financial integration in banking market declines over 
2009 and 2012. More recent ECB (2014, 2015) reports summarize that financial integration in 
banking market only has limited improvement because the degree of financial integration 
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increased faster in wholesale banking markets while the retail banking markets remained highly 
segmented. Finally, ECB (2016) report states that financial integration in European banking market 
moderately improved in 2015 due to monetary policy measures (e.g. asset purchase program and 
the targeted longer-term refinancing operations) and the establishment of the banking union. It also 
analyses that financial indicators of retail banking market demonstrate faster integration than 
previous years. Furthermore, there is one indispensable study (Coniglio and Prota, 2011) about the 
process of financial integration in Europe. As mentioned above, the process of financial integration 
was negatively affected by the financial crisis in 2008. Coniglio and Prota (2011) analyze how and 
why shocks affect regional convergence across countries. They argue that the less developed 
countries are more negatively affected by more developed countries. Moreover, they claim that the 
vulnerability of one country towards external financial shocks depend on this country’s social, 
economic, geographic conditions and the country-specific institutional setting factors (e.g. the 
national authorities’ responses to the crisis). Actually, these are the fundamental reasons why major 
distressed countries in euro area (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) perform much worse 
than those major non-distressed countries (Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Austria) 
in the euro sovereign debt crisis in 2010. As a result, the financial integration indicators for 
distressed countries were much worse than those for non-distressed countries during 2008 and 
2012 and the interest rate differentials between the two groups of countries were divergent. This 
decline of financial integration in euro area can be seen clearly in ECB (2013-2016)’s reports.  
In his speech at the conference for the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the European 
Monetary Institute, President of the ECB Draghi (2014) claimed that financial integration could 
have both stabilizing (benefits) and destabilizing effects (risks). He pointed out two benefits of 
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financial integration. On the one hand, the first benefit can come from increased portfolio 
diversification, reduced exposure to domestic shocks and greater income; on the other hand, the 
second benefit is thought to come from the improved allocative efficiency and improved operating 
performance. In addition, Draghi (2014) also pointed out that one of the possible risks of financial 
integration is the destabilizing effects of bank integration. The destabilizing effects of financial 
integration come from increase of bank systemic risk and bank contagion. 
1.2.4 The 2007-2009 Financial Crisis 
The process towards greater financial integration started declining during the 2007- 2009 U.S. 
Financial Crisis, while European authorities became increasingly more concerned about banks’ 
systemic risk. Bagliano and Morana (2011) explain the reason as follows: The deterioration of US 
economy and financial markets have significant effects on euro area financial convergence and 
financial stability - destabilizing US financial conditions may have contributed to destabilize euro 
area financial market. In fact, in July 2007, only six months after the first warning sign of US 
subprime crisis emerged, some European banks started to report their first losses in subprime 
mortgage markets and resulted in bank runs. Iceland, one of the member states of European 
Economic Area (EEA), experienced the collapse of its banking industry due to the failures of its 
largest three banks in 2008. According to European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA), EEA is the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area, which entered into force on 1 January 1994, which 
brings together the 28 EU member states and the three EEA EFTA states – Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Norway – in a single internal market. All major economies in EEA were negatively affected 
by the subprime crisis. Moreover, the subprime crisis was followed by another crisis: the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis over 2010 and 2012 (see Section 1.1.4).  Teixeira (2011) analyzes the 
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fundamental reasons for the decreased financial integration and increased systemic risk. He claims 
that pursuing financial market integration and safeguarding financial market stability are mutually 
incompatible. In fact, financial integration implies large banks should be involved in more cross-
border M&As and benefit from greater diversification. However, this may result in potentially 
more risks, and banks operating in areas where national legal and regulatory policies (e.g. fiscal 
policy) are unable to control the increasing risks.  
1.2.5 The European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
The subprime crisis was not even over in the US and Europe that several European economies fell 
into a sovereign debt crisis. Since the first International Monetary Fund-European Union (IMF-
EU) support program for Greece in May 2010 (Cline, 2014), it is possible to identify three stages. 
In the first stage, Greece fell in debt crisis in the early 2010s and then the crisis spread quickly to 
other periphery countries, namely Ireland and Portugal in late 2010 and early 2011. In the second 
stage, the crisis reached larger economies, namely Italy and Spain in late of 2011 and early 2012. 
In the third stage, the ECB president Mario Draghi announced to implement the program of 
Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) to purchase government bonds in the secondary market to 
resolve sovereign debt crisis in troubled countries. As reported in Cline (2014), the five troubled 
countries’ sovereign risk spreads above 10-year German bonds (benchmark) soared in 2010, 
reached the peak in 2011 and 2012, and then plunged after 2012. The extremely high sovereign 
risk spreads indicate the extreme illiquidity in financial markets of five troubled countries while 
the lower spreads confirm the improved liquidity.   
The main reasons of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis over 2010 and 2014 are extremely high 
public debt and fiscal deficits in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain. Among the main 
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reasons behind the crisis are the inability of the government to repay the sovereign debts is due to 
the collapse of the housing bubble, its contagion to the banking market and other sectors and its 
contribution to the soared fiscal deficit. The ECB adopted the extremely expansionary monetary 
policies, especially for Quantitative Easing (QE), to inject liquidity to European financial markets 
to prevent the aggravated sovereign debt crisis. As a result, the sovereign risk spreads for troubled 
countries dropped sharply since 2012.  
Cline (2014) points out that one of the policy implications is the pursuit of financial integration in 
the euro area has inherent limits. The reason is that each euro area country has its own fiscal policy 
and different interest rates for sovereign debt. This is a major obstacle to achieve high level of 
financial integration in Europe.  
Both crises provide the evidence that pursuing financial integration (encouraging cross-border 
M&As) and maintaining financial stability are two conflicting objectives in euro area. This thesis 
aims to provide another evidence to support this idea by finding the relationship between financial 
integration in European banking market and acquirers’ systemic risk changes. Furthermore, it will 
provide some recommendations how bank regulators can make trade-off between the two goals.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines each chapter’s contributions to 
the literatures. Section 3 introduces main chapters’ previews.  
 
 
1.3 Contributions to the Literature and Research Questions  
This thesis aims to discuss main contributions of each chapter and investigate several important 
research questions that are related to European banking sector. The empirical investigations are 
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carried out in Chapters 2-4 that are the three substantial chapters of this thesis.  
This thesis contributes to fill gaps in the existing literatures about the European banking sector in 
several ways. Chapter 2 offers two major contributions. Firstly, the most important contribution of 
this chapter is that it fills a gap in the literature in that, to the best of my knowledge, there is no 
similar research so far examining specifically the relationship between acquirers’ operating 
performance changes of cross-border bank M&As and banking market integration indicators. 
Secondly, this study adds more macroeconomic, industry-specific, bank regulatory, supervisory 
and deposit insurance variables into models. Therefore, it contributes to existing literatures by 
putting all five categories of variables into one model and trying to consider as many determinants 
of acquirers’ performance as possible. This will give bank regulators and managers 
recommendations on what are the factors that influence acquirers’ profitability after M&As are 
completed.  
Specifically, the main research questions of chapter 2 are as follows:  
1. What are the determinants of acquirers’ performance changes of bank M&As in Europe?  
2. Is there any positive or negative relationship between acquirers’ performance changes of cross-
border bank M&As and banking integration in Europe? 
3. What are the impacts of the 2007-2009 U.S. Financial Crisis on acquirers’ performance changes 
after M&As in Europe?  
Chapter 3 contributes to the extant literatures in two ways. First, there are many researches focus 
on banks’ systemic risk contributions since financial crisis. Nevertheless, there is only very few 
research (Weiss et al. 2014) focus on identifying determinants of systemic risk changes of bank 
M&As in Europe. This chapter adds more variables into the model and tries to identify more 
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determinants of acquirers’ systemic risk changes. This provides bank regulators specific factors 
that contribute to the increase or decrease of systemic risk so that they can adopt practical policies 
to control systemic risk and maintain financial stability. Second, another important contribution of 
this chapter is that it fills the gap that there is no research so far on examining the relationship 
between acquirers’ systemic risk changes of cross-border bank M&As and banking market 
integration indicators.  
Therefore, chapter 3 aims to answer the following three research questions:  
1. What are the determinants of acquirers’ systemic risk changes of bank M&As in Europe?  
2. Is there any positive or negative relationship between acquirers’ systemic risk changes of cross-
border bank M&As and banking integration in Europe?   
3. What are the impacts of the 2007-2009 U.S. Financial Crisis and European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis on acquirers’ systemic risk after M&As?   
Chapter 4 contributes to the existing literature by filling the following three gaps. First, there are 
no studies that focuses on examining the impact of ECB’s expansionary monetary policy on banks’ 
systemic risk measures in both non-crisis and crisis years. This is the first paper that emphasizes 
on evaluating whether the impacts of monetary policies on banks’ systemic risk in crisis and non-
crisis years are different. Second, most previous works (Kuttner 2001; Bernanke and Kuttner 2005; 
Kontonikas and Kostakis 2013; Kontonikas et al. 2013; Yin and Yang 2013; Ricci 2015; Haitsma 
et al. 2016) focused on the impacts of Fed’s and ECB’s monetary policy changes on banks’ stock 
returns rather than banks’ systemic risk changes. Third, all previous studies focused on assessing 
heterogeneous responses of banks’ stock returns towards monetary policy changes, but no previous 
study did research on investigating whether there were heterogeneous responses of banks’ systemic 
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risks towards monetary policy changes. This is also the first paper that focuses on assessing 
heterogeneous responses of banks’ systemic risks towards the expansionary monetary policy.  
More specifically, chapter 4 mainly focuses on the following research questions:  
1.  What are the impacts of the ECB’s expansionary monetary policies on banks’ systemic risk?  
2. Is there any heterogeneous response of banks towards monetary policy changes?  
3. What are the key bank-specific variables that can affect banks’ systemic risk if the ECB 
implements the expansionary monetary policies?  
 
1.4   Overall Research Objectives, Academic Importance and Policy Implications 
Based on above-mentioned research questions, this thesis has three main overall research 
objectives. Firstly, this thesis is aimed at investigating the benefits of financial integration in 
European banking market, that is, whether higher degree of financial integration in Europe leads 
to increase in acquirers’ operating performance after cross-border M&As. Secondly, this thesis 
also seeks to examine the risks of financial integration in European banking market, that is, 
whether higher degree of financial integration in Europe results in increase in acquirers’ systemic 
risk after cross-border M&As. Thirdly, this thesis aims to test whether the ECB’s expansionary 
monetary policy increases banks’ systemic risk.   
The main overall research objectives have academic importance to scholars and policy 
implications to bank regulators and supervisors. On the one hand, this thesis is the first study that 
examines both stabilizing and destabilizing effects of financial integration in European banking 
market. The main findings recommend that bank regulators and supervisors should encourage 
higher degree of financial integration in European banking market to boost acquirers’ operating 
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performance after cross-border M&As but they should pay more attention to the fact that higher 
degree of financial integration can increase acquirers’ systemic risk after M&As; on the other hand, 
this thesis further contributes to the current literature in investigating the ECB’s expansionary 
monetary policy increases banks’ systemic risk in the long term. The main finding provides policy 
implication for bank regulators and supervisors that central banks could use the expansionary 
monetary policy to achieve financial stability in the short term but should gradually quit from the 
expansionary monetary policy in the long term once financial stability is achieved.   
 
1.5 Chapter Preview and Main Methodological Issues 
The remaining thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 first seeks to identify the determinants of 
acquirers’ performance changes. In the first stage, it uses fixed-effect models that do not include 
banking integration indicators to find the determinants of acquirers’ performance changes. In the 
second stage, it employs principal component analysis (PCA) to select three most important 
banking integration indicators and uses Granger-causality tests to examine the causal relationship 
between acquirers’ performance changes in cross-border bank M&As and banking integration in 
Europe. Moreover, it uses t-tests to investigate whether financial crises have negative effects on 
acquirers’ performance changes. Finally, it employs fixed-effect models that contain banking 
integration indicators to identify more determinants of acquirers’ performance changes and check 
whether acquirers’ performance changes have positive or negative significant relationships with 
banking integration indicators.  
Chapter 3 first aims to find the determinants of acquirers’ systemic risk changes in bank M&As in 
Europe. In the first stage, it employs t-tests to investigate whether acquirers’ systemic risks 
29 
 
increase or decrease significantly. In the second stage, it uses PCA to select the three most 
important banking integration indicators and employs fixed-effect models to identify the 
determinant of acquirers’ systemic risk changes for cross-border M&As in all years. In the third 
stage, it uses fixed-effect models again to find different determinants of acquirers’ systemic risk 
changes in post-crisis and pre-crisis M&As. In the last stage, it employs p-score matching and 
fixed-effect models that include different banking integration indicators to conduct the robustness 
checks.   
Chapter 4 first aims to investigate the impacts of the ECB’s expansionary monetary policy on 
banks’ systemic risks; In the first stage, it uses Taylor rule type model to compute the standard 
Taylor rule residuals, and employs the ECB shadow rate and calculate log difference of ECB 
monthly balance sheet to represent monetary policy shocks. It adopts monthly LRMES and SRISK 
of banks in euro area from V-lab website and calculates the standardized LRMES and standardized 
SRISK as systemic risk measures. In the second stage, this chapter seeks to examine the 
heterogeneity of banks response towards monetary policy changes. Therefore, it employs the 
yearly bank-specific variables from S&P market intelligence platform. In order to investigate these 
two research questions, this chapter will use fixed-effect model that contains systemic risk measure, 
monetary policy shock, bank-specific variables and interaction terms between bank-specific 
variables and monetary policy shock. 
We will use the fixed–effect models in all chapters 2-4 as our mainline regressions and PCA in 
both chapter 2 and 3 to select most important banking integration indicators. Moreover, we will 
employ the Granger-causality test in both chapter 2 and 3 to test the causality between dependent 
and independent variables.  
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Chapter 5 summarizes the main findings in previous chapters and makes conclusions and 
implications for the whole thesis.  
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2.1 Introduction 
The most recent bank merger and acquisition (M&A) wave around the developed world emerged 
in the mid-1980s and culminated in the late-1990s due to the financial deregulations, technological 
advance and increased competition in major banking sectors. DeYoung et al. (2009) identified the 
increase in the transaction value from $1bn to $160bn between 1985 and 1999 in Europe. However, 
the total value of M&A transactions of EU bank M&As decreased significantly from €123bn in 
2000 to €22bn in 2013 while the number of transactions decreased from 81 to 4 during the same 
time period (Casu et al. 2015).  
With the increase of bank M&A deals in 1980s and 1990s, there were an increasing number of 
studies about M&A effects over short-term and medium-long-term. According to Pilloff and 
Santomero (1997) and Fiordelisi (2009), one strand of such studies evaluated the bank M&A 
effects on the banks’ operating performance in medium-long term and these studies measure the 
M&A effects by comparing profitability ratios (e.g, ROA and ROE) before and after M&As. They 
also outline many important studies since early 1980s (Rhodes 1993; Vander Vennet 1996; 
Focarelli et al. 2002; Diaz et al. 2004; Knapp et al. 2006; Cornett et al. 2006, Campa and Hernando 
et al.2006; Altunbas and Marques-Ibanez 2008; Becalli and Frantz 2009). However, according to 
DeYoung et al. (2009), the existing studies provide mixed results for the bank M&A effects on 
operating performances. Similarly, Casu et al. (2015) argue that some bank M&As may boost 
acquirers’ operating performance while others may not, therefore, the bank M&As effects on 
operating performance should be discussed on a case-by-case basis.  
Finding the determinants of acquirers’ operating performance changes of bank M&As in Europe 
is critical to stakeholders, such as shareholders, bank managers, bank regulators, depositors, 
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financial market participants, competitors, credit-rating agencies. It is especially relevant to bank 
managers and regulators because they are interested in what the key characteristics of successful 
M&A deals are and what are the factors that can influence acquirers’ operating performance. Based 
on these characteristics and factors, managers are able to find M&A deals that are more likely to 
boost operating performance while regulators can implement appropriate policies (e.g. capital 
regulatory policy and deposit insurance scheme) to ensure banks resulting from the consolidation 
process are safe and sound and customers deposits are protected in case of troubles.  
Besides the M&A effects on bank operating performance, financial integration in banking markets 
has been one of the most important developments since the Euro area and European Monetary 
Union (EMU) were introduced in 1999. Many relevant literatures (Adam et al. 2002; Cabral et al. 
2002; Baele et al. 2004; ECB 2005-2016) describe the process of financial integration in European 
banking market since the introduction of the single currency. Specifically, Adam et al. (2002) point 
out the European financial integration increased after 1999. More importantly, the ECB (2005-
2016) reports pointed out that all financial markets, including money, bond, equity and banking 
market, had generally experienced increased integration. Concerning this latter, before the 2007-
2009 Financial crisis (ECB 2005-2009), the euro area wholesale banking market activities show 
clear signs of increasing integration while the euro area retail banking market activities present 
highly fragmented. Then the financial crisis has negative impacts on financial integration and 
makes lower degree of integration in the euro area banking market between 2009 and 2012 (ECB 
2010-2013). More recently the degree of integration in banking market improved slightly in 2013 
and 2014 although it is still lower than the pre-crisis level (ECB 2014-2015). In this context, it is 
useful to note an important characteristic of integration in banking market: the wholesale banking 
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market is highly integrated while the retail banking market is still highly fragmented.  
Mario Draghi (2014), the president of the European Central Bank (ECB), explained the importance 
of financial integration at a conference celebrating the 20th anniversary of the European Monetary 
Institute in Brussels in February 2014. Draghi pointed out that the banking market integration 
could have both stabilizing and destabilizing effects. One of the stabilizing effects is boosting 
performance and one of the destabilizing effects is increasing banks’ risk-taking. Therefore, one 
of the motivations of this chapter is to examine whether there are positive or negative relationships 
between acquirers’ performance changes in cross-border bank M&As and banking market 
integration in Europe.  
This chapter aims to (1) identify the determinants of acquirers’ operating performance changes of 
bank M&As in Europe; (2) examine the relationship between acquirers’ operating performance 
changes and banking market integration in Europe and (3) investigate whether the financial crisis 
had a negative impact on the acquirers’ performance changes. Therefore, the research questions 
for this chapter are:  
1.  What are the determinants of acquirers’ performance changes of bank M&As in Europe?  
2. What is the relationship between acquirers’ performance changes of cross-border bank 
M&As and banking integration in Europe?  
3. What is the impact of the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis on acquirers’ performance changes 
after M&As?  
In this chapter, to find answers of research question 1, we will focus on several bank-specific 
variables (e.g. insolvency risk, liquidity, and diversity), deal-specific variables (e.g. geographic 
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diversification, cross-border and listed/non-listed banks), structural and regulatory variables (e.g. 
CR5/HHI, regulatory, supervisory and deposit insurer powers) and treat all macroeconomic 
variables as country-specific controlled variables. To find the answer to research question 2, we 
will use a cross-border sample and include some selected banking integration indicators in our 
empirical analysis, then conduct some post-estimation robustness tests. To investigate the answer 
of research question 3, we will divide full sample into pre-crisis and post-crisis sub-samples and 
conduct some t-tests for different performance change measures.  
The remaining Chapter 2 is organized as follows. Section2.2 provides the literature review for the 
(1) operating performance changes in bank M&As; (2) financial integration in European banking 
market; (3) bank operating performance changes and banking integration and (4) selected variables. 
Section2.3 states the key hypotheses, describes the selected samples’ characteristics and limitations, 
the data sources, and main methodological issues. Section2.4 presents, discusses and interprets the 
key empirical results. Finally, section2.5 concludes.  
 
2. 2 Literature Review 
This section will review the relevant literature focusing in particular on four aspects: operating 
performance changes in bank M&As, financial integration in European banking market, banks’ 
operating performance changes and banking integration, and, finally, literature about selected 
variables.  
 
2.2.1 Operating Performance Changes in Bank M&As  
Investigating M&As’ medium-to-long term effects on banks’ operating performance changes is 
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one important strand of M&As’ value effects on banks since early 1980s (Fiordelisi 2009). Pilloff 
and Santomero (1997) describe one of the important traditional approaches to examine the M&As’ 
medium-to-long tern effects on banks’ operating performance changes, that is, employing 
accounting data (e.g. ROA and ROE) to compare acquirers’ pre-merger and post-merger 
performances. More specifically, Beitel and Schiereck (2001) suggest that the time period can 
come from 1-3 years before the merger to 3-5 years after the merger. They argue that the most 
important strength of this approach is that it measures actual banks’ actual performance changes, 
not just investors’ expectations and responses to M&A announcements, so that it is more reliable. 
They also claim that accounting data are easily obtained and understood.  
Nevertheless, both Pilloff and Santomero (1997) and Fiordelisi (2009) argue that this approach 
still has several shortcomings. First, accounting data are inaccurate to reflect a bank’s economic 
profile and financial conditions because they can be manipulated by senior managers so they do 
not reflect the current market values. Second, the performance changes can be due to factors other 
than M&As. If the researchers do not account for these factors, they will not find the appropriate 
conclusions about merger-related performance changes.  
Although the accounting method has these disadvantages, many studies in the U.S. and Europe 
still use it to evaluate the M&A effects on banks’ operating performance （Berger and Humphrey 
1992; Pilloff 1996; Vander Vennet 1996; Focarelli 2002; Altunbas and Marques-Ibanez 2004; Diaz 
et al. 2004; Cornett et al. 2006; Knapp et al. 2006; DeLong and DeYoung 2007; and Becalli and 
Frantz 2009). Some studies focus on the U.S. bank M&As. For instance, Knapp et al. (2006) 
employ ROA, cash flow ROA, ROE and cash flow ROE to evaluate 80 US mergers with values 
exceeding $25 million over 1987 and 1998. They find that these mergers create large profits five 
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years after the mergers. Cornett et al. (2006) use multiple regressions to identify factors that 
influence change of operating cash flow return on asset (ΔOPCFROA) for 134 mergers in the US 
between 1990 and 2000. They conclude that industry-adjusted operating performance of merged 
banks increases significantly after a merger; and that large bank mergers, activity focusing mergers, 
geographically focusing mergers produce greater performance gains.  
Moreover, there are a great many studies in Europe since early 1980s. For example, Vander Vennet 
(1996) assesses 492 bank M&A deals in Europe between 1988 and 1992 by analyzing banks’ 
changes in ROA, ROE and efficiency. He divided the full sample into domestic and cross-border 
subsamples and concludes that in domestic deals the combined entities have decreasing efficiency 
levels after the mergers while in cross-border deals the combined entities display increasing 
efficiency levels. Altunbas and Marques-Ibanez (2004) use 262 bank M&A deals (207 domestic 
and 55 cross-border) in EU between 1992 and 2001 and identify the improvements in performance 
after the merger has taken place particularly in the case of cross-border M&As and the important 
differences between domestic and cross-border M&As and across strategic dimensions. Campa 
and Hernando (2006) analyze 66 bank M&As in Europe between 1998 and 2002 and find the 
substantial ROE after the M&As are completed. Beccalli and Frantz (2009) use 714 bank M&A 
deals in EU between 1991 and 2005 and find the operating performance change is positively 
related to the levels of freedom from government in the target's country, the countries with better 
regulatory quality, and deals paid in equity, and is negatively related to higher concentration in the 
banking industry and deals paid in equity. ECB (2015b) uses dynamic panel data to identify the 
main determinants that influence banks’ profitability, such as bank-specific factors, 
macroeconomic factors, and structural factors. The empirical results reveal that capital ratio, loan 
39 
 
growth ratio, retail ratio, real GDP growth rate, credit-to-GDP ratio and concentration ratio are 
positively related to banks’ profitability while bank size, loan loss provisions over total loans, cost-
to-income ratio are negatively related to banks’ profitability.  
2.2.2 Financial Integration in European Banking Market 
This sub-section will outline the extant literature about financial integration in European banking 
market. A great number of studies (Adam et al. 2002; Cabral et al. 2002; ECB 2003; Baele et al. 
2004; ECB 2005-2016; Groppe and Kashyap 2009; Casu and Girardone 2010) investigate financial 
integration in financial markets since the emergence of Euro and euro area and the establishment 
of Single Monetary Union (SMU). According to EU official website, SMU ensures free movement 
of goods, services, capital and persons across EU member countries by removing technical, legal 
and bureaucratic barriers. Therefore, the establishment of SMU is the premise of financial 
integration on EU markets. Based on these facts, most of these studies analyze the process of 
financial integration in different financial markets and develop categories of indicators to measure 
the degree of financial integration. Because the research topic of this study is banking market 
integration, we will focus on financial integration in banking market and review these literatures 
in three aspects: the definition of financial integration, the process of financial integration in 
banking market and financial integration indicators of banking market.  
2.2.2.1 Definition of Financial Integration 
ECB (2003) define financial integration as a situation that no discrimination exists between 
different economic agents whenever they access into or invest in capital on different locations. 
Baele et al. (2004) define financial integration and outline the three key characteristics that all 
potential market participants must have in order to qualify for a fully integrated market: (1) they 
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face a single set of rule when they decide to deal with those financial instruments and/or services; 
(2) they have equal access to the above-mentioned set of financial instruments and/or services; and 
(3) they are treated equally when they are active in the market. The basic theory for establishing a 
fully integrated market is “the law of one price”. If the law of one price holds, then the two same 
assets with the same expected payoff will have the same price even if they are in the different 
markets. All three above-mentioned characteristics indicate that potential market participants in 
different markets can pay the same price for purchasing the same assets because they will have 
symmetric information regarding the assets, the same entry barriers to buy the assets and be treated 
equally. More importantly, these are the rationales behind the explanations of financial integration 
indicators in banking market. We will explain this in “Financial Integration Indicators of Banking 
Market” sub-section.  
2.2.2.2 The Process of Financial Integration and the Financial Crisis 
Most studies introduce the process of financial integration in banking market. For example, ECB 
(2005-2009) reports summarize that the euro area banking market generally experienced 
increasing integration but the euro areas retail banking markets were still highly segmented 
whereas the euro area wholesale banking markets were highly integrated before the crisis in 2008. 
However, ECB (2010-2013) reports conclude that financial crisis has a negative impact on 
financial integration so that the degree of financial integration in banking market declines over 
2009 and 2012. More recent ECB (2014, 2015) reports summarize that financial integration in 
banking market only has limited improvement because the degree of financial integration 
increased faster in wholesale banking markets while the retail banking markets remained highly 
segmented. Finally, ECB (2016) report states that financial integration in European banking market 
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moderately improved in 2015 due to monetary policy measures (e.g. asset purchase program and 
the targeted longer-term refinancing operations) and the establishment of the banking union. It also 
analyses that financial indicators of retail banking market demonstrate faster integration than 
previous years. Furthermore, there is one indispensable study (Coniglio and Prota, 2011) about the 
process of financial integration in Europe. As mentioned above, the process of financial integration 
was negatively affected by the financial crisis in 2008. Coniglio and Prota (2011) analyze how and 
why shocks affect regional convergence across countries. They argue that the less developed 
countries are more negatively affected by more developed countries. Moreover, they claim that the 
vulnerability of one country towards external financial shocks depend on this country’s social, 
economic, geographic conditions and the country-specific institutional setting factors (e.g. the 
national authorities’ responses to the crisis). Actually, these are the fundamental reasons why major 
distressed countries in euro area (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) perform much worse 
than those major non-distressed countries (Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Austria) 
in the euro sovereign debt crisis in 2010. As a result, the financial integration indicators for 
distressed countries were much worse than those for non-distressed countries during 2008 and 
2012 and the interest rate differentials between the two groups of countries were divergent. This 
decline of financial integration in euro area can be seen clearly in ECB (2013-2016)’s reports.  
Rughoo and Sarantis (2014) is another study that examines the effects of the global financial crisis 
on banking integration. They follow Phillips and Sul’s (2007a) panel convergence methodology 
to evaluate the convergence process in the European retail banking industry by analyzing short-, 
intermediate- and long-term deposit rate, consumer credit rate and mortgage rate to the household 
sector between 2003 and 2011. They concluded that the global financial crisis had brought a halt 
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to the integration process in both the deposit and credit markets.  
2.2.2.3 Financial Integration Indicators of Banking (Credit) Market 
The extant literatures (Adam et al. 2002; Baele et al. 2004; Manna 2004; ECB 2005-2016; Casu 
and Girardone 2010) present three main categories of financial integration indicators of banking 
(credit) market: price-based, quantity/activity-based, and other indicators. The price-based 
indicators use some price data, such as interest rates, the standard deviation of interest rates to 
measure the degree of financial integration. Price-based indicators include interest rate 
differentials (margins) of new loans among different euro area countries (Adam et al. 2002; ECB 
2005-2016), cross-country dispersion/standard deviation of interest rates on new loans (Baele et 
al. 2004; ECB 2005-2016) and on banks’ CDS (ECB 2005-2016), β-convergence and σ-
convergence (Adam et al. 2002; Baele et al. 2004; Casu and Girardone 2010). For interest rate 
differentials and cross-country dispersion, the lower values indicate the higher degree of financial 
integration because the lower the differentials and dispersion, the higher convergence across 
countries. Casu and Girardone (2006) explain that the negative β-convergence implies the 
convergence and the more negative the β, the greater convergence; they also point out that σ-
convergence measures the speed of convergence and the more negative the σ, the faster of 
convergence.     
The quantity/activity-based indicators use banks’ different activities’ quantity data, such as the 
amount of Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs) loans: outstanding amounts by residency of 
counterparties, MFIs’ securities holdings: outstanding amounts by residency of issuers, MFIs’ 
deposits and cross-border loans, cross-border securities holdings to measure the degree of financial 
integration. For the quantity/activity based indicators, the higher values reveal more cross-border 
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activities across countries, the more free movement of capital thus higher degree of financial 
integration. Manna (2004) investigated the integration of the euro area banking systems with 
14520 observations and mainly focused on quantity/activity based indicators and introduces eight 
indicators, including share of cross-border activity, home bias, concentration of cross-border 
trading, distribution of cross-border positions, distribution of cross-border positions (adjusted for 
land sharing), access to hub banking system, cross-border activity with UK residents (out of total 
activity) and cross-border activity with UK residents (out of cross-border activity). He claimed 
that most indicators show a clear increasing integration in European banking market since the 
introduction of Euro in 1999.  
Other indicators include news-based indicators (Baele et al. 2004) and survey-based indicators 
(ECB 2005-2016). Baele et al. (2004) analyze that if the proportion of interest changes in one 
market can be explained by some common news (shocks), this market is highly integrated. 
Moreover, ECB (2005-2016) employ one survey-based indicator called changes in credit standard 
and summarize that persistent divergence of credit standards between non-distressed countries and 
distressed countries should indicate the lower degree of financial integration.   
2.2.3 Bank Operating Performance Changes and Banking Integration 
This is one specific previous study (Gropp and Kashyap 2009) that proposes a test of integration 
based on convergence in banks’ profitability. Based on “the Law of One Price” theory, Gropp and 
Kashyap (2009) first use ROA as a measure of bank integration and employ the classic partial 
adjustment equation to seek for convergence in banks’ ROA. Next, they put forward strong and 
weak definitions of integration. Finally, they analyze a sample of 36000 banks in France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, US and UK and find that both US listed and non-listed banks’ profits converge towards 
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the same target level of profitability while no evidence on non-listed banks’ profits converge to a 
common equilibrium value in Europe. Their conclusions indicate that US banking market is highly 
integrated whereas the European banking markets are far from being integrated.  
Another issue that cannot be ignored is that researchers should account for the mean reversion 
effects of post-merger bank performance so that they can measure the convergence of industry-
adjusted returns and returns and the impact of the M&A deals on industry-adjusted returns and 
returns. One specific study (Knapp et al. 2006) investigates the mean reversion effects of 
profitability on post-merger performances of 80 bank holding companies with book values exceed 
$25 million during 1997-1998. They employed mean reversion equation and used industry-
adjusted ROA (IAROA), industry-adjusted ROE (IAROE), industry-adjusted cash flow ROA 
(IACFROA) and industry-adjusted cash flow ROE (IACFROE) as variables. These new return 
measures have been adjusted by industry mean return measures and can be used to test whether 
the mean deviation tendency exists. They used the change in industry-adjusted returns from 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5 and 6 year prior to the current year as dependent variables and the industry-adjusted returns 
of 1-6 years prior to the current year as explanatory variables. Their empirical results demonstrate 
that there are significant mean reversion trends for all industry-adjusted returns. 
 
2.2.4 Literatures about Selected Variables  
In this sub-section, some literatures about selected variables, the reasons why this study chooses 
these variables and the expected signs of coefficients will be discussed.  
Firstly, this study uses a dependent variable similar to that adopted by Vander Vennet (1996), 
Cornett et al. (2006), Beccalli and Frantz (2009) and ECB (2015b) to describe performance 
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changes a dynamic setting that covers a medium-long term period starting 3 years before and 3 
years after mergers are completed. In particular, the variable is proxied by the difference between 
average post-merger ROA (ROE) and average pre-merger ROA(ROE), ΔPERROA (ΔPERROE), 
can be used as performance changes. Similarly, ECB (2015b) uses the change of ROA (i.e., ΔROAit) 
as the dependent variable. This chapter uses a dynamic analysis but still differs from Cornett et al. 
(2006) and Beccalli and Frantz (2009). Cornett et al. (2006) use both industry-adjusted operating 
pretax cash flow return on assets (OPCFROA) and ROA while Beccalli and Frantz (2009) uses the 
industry-adjusted performance ratios (e.g. industry-adjusted ROA) to calculate the performance 
changes. In this chapter, we will use standard measures of ROA and ROE without any adjustment.  
This study not only follows Vander Vennet (1996) to employ traditional performance measures of 
profitability (ROA and ROE), but also adds other performance measures, such as net interest 
margin (NIM) and net interest income (NII). Specifically, ROA is calculated by net income/total 
asset, ROE is calculated by net income/total shareholders’ equity, NIM is calculated by (interest 
income – interest expense)/total earning assets and NII is calculated by (interest income- interest 
expense).  
Secondly, for explanatory variables, Di Patti (2009) criticizes that there are very few bank-specific 
or deal-specific variables in Beccalli and Frantz (2009)’s analysis and suggests that more 
macroeconomic and regulatory variables should be added into the models. For the purpose of 
identifying more determinants, similar to Beltratti and Stulz (2012), this study additionally 
includes more macroeconomic, industry-specific, capital regulatory, bank supervisory and deposit 
insurance variables besides bank-specific and deal-specific variables. For bank-specific variables, 
acquirers’ size, liquidity, capital adequacy, financial leverage, diversity, efficiency, growth, asset 
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quality and insolvency risk will be included. Ln (TA), the natural log of acquirers’ total assets, 
representing acquirers’ size. Similar to Cornett et al. (2006) and ECB (2015b), the sign of Ln(TA) 
can be positive may be due to traditional micro-economic theory. The traditional micro-economic 
theory states that larger banks have more market power to set prices (higher loan rates and lower 
deposit rates) thus exploit higher profits. LIQ represents liquid asset/total deposit and borrowing, 
measures acquirers’ liquidity. The expected sign of LIQ should be positive because if a bank has 
higher proportion of liquid assets, it can sell liquid assets without much loss in market values, thus 
may incur fewer losses and increase its performance.  However, the expected sign of LIQ can also 
be negative because the higher the liquidity ratio, the more liquid assets a bank has, the less high-
yield assets the bank has, the lower profits banks will create. Moreover, there are two variables 
measure acquirers’ capital ratios, TIER1 and CAP, representing tier1 capital ratio and capital 
funds/total assets. The expected sign of capital ratios in ROE models can be negative because the 
more capital a bank has, the higher equity, thus may result in lower ROE. On the contrary, the 
expected sign of capital ratios and ROA can be positive because the higher capital ratios may 
indicate lower risk-weighted assets, therefore may lead to higher ROA. Similarly, Cornett et al. 
(2006) also include ΔCAP to examine if the change in capital structure indicates lower operating 
performance. Next, D/E and D/A represent debt-to-equity ratio and debt-to-asset ratio, respectively, 
are used to measure acquirers’ financial leverage. Specifically, total debt consists of short-term 
debt and long-term debt. D/E and D/A will have different and mixed effects on bank’s ROA and 
ROE. First, higher D/A will increase bank’s ROE but not necessarily increase bank’s ROA because 
ROE = ROA * (1+D/A); second, higher D/E will increase bank’s ROA but not necessarily increase 
ROE because ROA = ROE *(1+ D/E); third, higher financial leverage ratios indicate bank has 
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higher capital risk or insolvency risk, the less profits the bank may have (Casu et al. 2015). 
Consequently, the expected signs of financial leverage ratios are undetermined. ECB (2015b) 
employed equity-to-total-asset ratio to capture bank’s solvency. C/I represents cost-to-income ratio, 
is calculated by [non-interest expense/ (net interest income + non-interest income)]. It reflects a 
bank’s non-interest costs as a percentage of total income and measures a bank’s efficiency. The 
higher the C/I ratio, the less efficient a bank is, the lower profitability a bank has. Therefore, C/I 
is expected to be negatively related to ΔROA and ΔROE. ADIVERSITY and IDIVERSITY are 
two variables that measure acquirers’ diversity in business model or product diversification. 
ADIVERSITY represents acquirers’ asset diversity, is calculated as 1-|(net loans – other earnings 
assets)/total earnings assets|. Its value ranges from 0 to 1 and the higher value indicates higher 
degree of asset diversification (Laeven and Levine 2005). IDIVERSITY stands for acquirers’ 
income diversity, is calculated as 1-|(net interest income – other operating income)/total operating 
income|. Its value ranges from 0 to 1 (Laeven and Levine 2005). The expected sign of 
ADIVERSITY and IDIVERSITY can be either positive or negative because they have 
inconclusive relationship with acquirers’ operating performance. Chiorazzo et al. (2008) found 
positive relationship between income diversification and risk-adjusted returns for Italian banks 
between 1993 and 2003. On the contrary, Stiroh (2004) found that risk-adjusted returns are 
negatively related to non-interest income for U.S. banks between 1984 and 2001. Furthermore, 
Stiroh and Rumble (2006) concluded that there is no relationship between performance and income 
diversification for U.S. bank holding companies over 1997-2002. Both two variables are used as 
proxies for the bank’s business model. AGROWTH and LGROWTH are acquirers’ asset growth 
rate and loan growth rate, demonstrates acquirers’ growth. Both growth rates are expected to have 
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positive relationships with profitability because the higher asset or loan growth indicates that bank 
has more interest-generating assets and may result in greater profitability. Next, LLR, the 
abbreviation of loan loss ratio, reveals acquirers’ asset quality. The expected sign of LLR should 
be negative because the higher the loan loss ratio, the lower asset quality, the lower bank’s profits. 
Furthermore, ECB (2015b) analyzed that the negative relationship might be explained as 
worsening asset quality could result in higher costs of provisions and lower profitability. Finally, 
ZSCORE is the distance to default and is calculated as the sum of average ROA and average 
capital-to-asset ratio divided by standard deviation of ROA. The expected sign of ZSCORE is 
positive because the higher z-score shows that banks have lower insolvency risk, and this will 
result in higher operating performance for banks.  
The deal-specific variables contain three dummy variables CROSSBORDER, GEO and LIST.  
Firstly, if the M&A deal is cross-border, CROSSBORDER will be 1 and otherwise 0. According 
to Beccalli and Frantz (2009), the cross border dummy variable is positively related to change in 
ROE. Secondly, GEO represents geographic diversification. If the acquirer and the target come 
from different continents, GEO will be 1 and otherwise 0. Both CROSSBORDER and GEO are 
expected to have positive signs due to product or geographic diversification. Casu et al. (2015) list 
many value-maximizing motives for cross-border bank M&As and point out that geographic or 
product diversification enable banks to (1) reduce costs and risks (2) increase customer base and 
revenues. Thirdly, if the acquirer is a listed bank, LIST will be 1 otherwise 0. The variable LIST is 
used to examine if listed banks have greater profits than non-listed banks. 
The controlled country-specific macroeconomic variables include AGDP, AINF and AMONEY. 
AGDP is the annual real GDP growth rate (%) for acquirers’ home country one year prior to M&A 
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announcement. The expected sign of AGDP should be positive because the higher the economic 
growth rate for acquirer’s home country, the higher profits the acquirer will have. AINF is the 
inflation deflator (%) for acquirer’s home country one year prior to M&A announcement. The 
inflation is expected to negatively correlated to banks’ profits because the lower the inflation, the 
higher probability that monetary decision makers will implement expansionary monetary policy, 
and the higher expected profits for banks. AMONEY is the broad money supply (M2) growth rate 
(%) for acquirer’s home country one year prior to M&A announcement. AMONEY is expected to 
have positive relationship with banks’ profits because the higher the broad money supply growth 
rate, the more money the banks can borrow from central bank and interbank market, the more 
loans banks can lend, therefore, the more profits banks will have.  
The industry-specific variables include CR5 and HHI. The former is the concentration ratio of 5 
largest banks in the acquirer’s banking market. HHI is the abbreviation of Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index of the acquirer’s banking market. Both CR5 and HHI are typical indicators that measure 
concentration of banking market. The expected sign of CR5 or HHI could be positive due to the 
traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm. According to SCP paradigm, the 
higher the concentration of a banking market, the higher market power banks have to set higher 
loan rates and lower deposit rates, the higher banks’ profitability (Heffernan 2005).  
Finally, this chapter also follows Barth et al. (2013) to use another deposit insurance scheme 
variable DEPPOWER and two regulatory and supervisory variables REG and SUP. First, 
DEPPOWER stands for Deposit Insurer Power and measures whether the deposit insurance 
authority has the authority to make the decision to intervene in a bank. It ranges from 0 to 3 and 
the higher value indicates that the deposit insurance authority has higher authority and is more 
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powerful. Second, REG represents Capital Regulatory Index, which is the sum of Overall Capital 
Stringency and Initial Capital Stringency, measures whether the capital regulation is stringent or 
not. It ranges from 0 to 9 and the higher value indicates the greater stringency for capital regulation. 
Third, SUP stands for Official Supervisory Power and measures whether the supervisory 
authorities have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems. It ranges 
from 0 to 14 and the higher value indicates supervisory authority has greater supervisory power. 
The higher values for these three variables imply stricter regulation. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) 
argue that stricter regulation and supervision are more likely to be associated with better bank 
performance. Moreover, some previous authors (Molyneux et al.2014; Casu et al. 2015) note that 
the deposit insurance scheme may increase banks’ moral hazard problems and contribute to greater 
systemic risk, and ultimately, decrease banks’ performance. Therefore, both REG and SUP can be 
expected to have positive relationships with bank performance due to the regulation hypothesis for 
the performance of banks and DEPPOWER is expected to have negative sign. However, both REG 
and SUP can also have negative signs because the more stringent capital regulation and supervision 
can limit banks’ willingness to take risk, leading to banks’ lower profits.  
 
2.3 Hypothesis 
One important previous study (Ferguson et al. 2009) analyzed that benefits of financial integration 
come from reducing the cost of capital, enhancing competition, increasing productivity and growth, 
generating higher income and increasing consumption risk sharing. Another important previous 
literature (Draghi 2014) also analyzed benefits of financial integration in European banking market. 
In his speech at the conference for the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the European 
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Monetary Institute, President of the ECB Draghi (2014) claimed that financial integration could 
have both stabilizing (benefits) and destabilizing effects (risks). He pointed out two benefits of 
financial integration. On the one hand, the first benefit can come from increased portfolio 
diversification, reduced exposure to domestic shocks and greater income; on the other hand, the 
second benefit is thought to come from the improved allocative efficiency and improved operating 
performance. As level of financial integration increases, more productive capitals are allocated to 
most efficient banks and large cross-border banks can have higher overall operating performance. 
This principle can be applied into cross-border M&As as well. Acquirers, usually most efficient 
banks, can obtain capitals more easily and then engage in cross-border M&As to boost their 
operating performances in a more integrated banking market. It reveals that higher (lower) degree 
of banking market integration in Europe may cause higher (lower) operating performance for 
acquirers. Therefore, our hypothesis can be formulated as follows:  
Hypothesis: The increased (decreased) banking integration in Europe can improve 
(deteriorate) acquirers’ operating performances after cross-border bank M&A deals are 
completed.  
In section 2.5 Discussion of results, this chapter will present all results of main regressions and 
whether all aforementioned hypotheses tested in this study.  
 
2.4 Samples, Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
In this subsection, samples descriptions, sample selection criteria, data sources and descriptive 
statistics for all variables will be presented and discussed.  
2.4.1 Samples Descriptions, Selection Criteria 
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The full sample of this chapter consists of bank M&A deals between 1997 and 2011 whose 
acquirers come from EU 28 countries and whose targets can come from any country. The following 
are several requirements for selecting the full sample: 
(1) the M&A deals are announced between 01/01/1997 and 31/12/2011;  
(2) the acquirers must be commercial banks or savings banks from EU 28 countries; 
(3) all the deals must be completed; 
(4) the targets can be banks, bank units or banks’ assets from any country; 
(5) all money center banks, central banks and special purpose banks are excluded; 
(6) all required data for accounting or financial data for acquirers must be available.  
Please note that the samples between 2012 and 2014 are not included because acquirers’ 1-year, 
2-year and 3-year post-merger ROE, ROA, NIM and NII will be included in the main dataset. 
Originally, there are 560 deals, however, due to the data availability, some deals are excluded thus 
the final sample size is 471. This sample is important because most acquirers are large and 
systematically important banks in EU countries. Moreover, according to our calculation, the pre-
merger total assets of acquirers in this sample have approximately 60% of total assets of the 
banking sector in European banking market. Then we divide the full sample into two subsamples: 
cross-border deals and domestic deals. More specifically, there are 277 cross-border deals and 194 
domestic deals.  
In order to find the relationships between change of acquirers’ operating performance and banking 
integration indicators, the second subsample only contains cross-border bank M&A deals in the 
full sample. Moreover, the banking integration indicators are only available since 2003, therefore, 
the M&A deals between 1997 and 2002 in the full sample are excluded, and the sample size for 
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the second sample is 171. This subsample is significant because most acquirers are large and 
systematically important banks in euro area countries (and exclude acquirers in non-euro area 
countries). Moreover, according to our calculation, the pre-merger total assets of acquirers in this 
sample have approximately 70% of total assets of the banking sector in European banking market. 
The data sources come from the following multiple sources: (1) the original deal-specific data are 
downloaded from Bloomberg; (2) the acquirers’ financial data are downloaded from Bankscope; 
(3) the macroeconomic data for acquirers’ home countries are downloaded from World Bank 
Development Indicator (WDI) database; (4) the structural indicators for acquirers’ banking 
markets are downloaded from ECB Statistics Data Warehouse; (5) the regulatory and deposit 
insurance data come from databases compiled by Barth et al. (2013) and Demirguc-Kunt et al. 
(2008); (6) the financial integration indicators come from ECB publications. 
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2-1 shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in the model specifications. Most 
variables are presented in 4-digital decimals while a few variables are shown in percentages. Not 
surprisingly, the means of ΔROA (-0.0036, or -0.36%), ΔROE (-0.0589, or -5.89%.) and ΔNIM (-
0.0234, or -2.34%) and the medians of ΔROA (-0.0016, or -0.16%), ΔROE (-0.0311, or -3.11%) 
and ΔNIM (-0.0020, or -0.2%) are negative, indicating that the M&As do not enhance acquirers’ 
profitability ratios for most acquirers. On the contrary, the mean and the median of ΔNII are 
€1078.71 and €415.82, respectively. These statistics show that acquirers increased their absolute 
values of interest incomes after M&As due to increase of scales, but they did not genuinely 
increase their profitability ratios. Moreover, ΔROE (0.2047) has considerably higher standard 
deviation than ΔROA (0.0107) and ΔROE (0.0099), indicating ΔROE is much more volatile. The 
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natural log of total asset presents a high standard deviation and relatively large range, thus 
indicating that the acquirers’ size varies dramatically. The range of total assets for all acquirers are 
extremely large (6567297 – 325.1), confirming that the acquirers’ scales varied significantly. 
Surprisingly, the debt-to-equity ratio has extremely high standard deviation (7.2479) and high 
range (54.0316-0.032). This is because a few acquirers use very high leverage ratio before the 
financial crisis. The average Tier 1 capital ratio is 9%, that is much greater than Basel ш requires. 
The ranges of asset growth rate and loan growth rate are quite wide, because the minimum are -
0.2650 and -0.3284, and the maximum are 3.3841 and 9.1786, respectively.  
The mean of cross-border is also greater than 0.5, showing that more than half of the deals are 
cross-border. On the contrary, the mean of geographic diversification is only 0.1486, revealing that 
both acquirers and targets of more than 85% of deals come from Europe. Not surprisingly, 
all the means, standard deviations and ranges of macroeconomic and industry-specific variables 
are quite high because all variables except HHI are presented in percentages while HHI is 
presented at range of (0-10000). All these variables have very wide range, indicating these 
indicators in different countries vary significantly. Finally, capital regulatory index and official 
supervisory power have high mean values (6.2633 and 10.3949) while deposit insurer power has 
low mean value (0.7728). The high mean value of capital regulatory index indicates that most EU 
countries have stringent regulatory systems while the high mean value of official supervisory 
power demonstrates that banking supervisors in most EU countries have great authorities to 
supervise banks. On the contrary, the low mean value of deposit insurer power shows that deposit 
insurers in most EU countries have low authorities to make a decision to intervene in a bank.  
On the other hand, table 2-2 presents descriptive statistics for data used in Granger-causality  
55 
 
Table 2-1   Descriptive Statistics for data used in model specifications 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Median       S.D. Min. Max. 
Dependent variables      
Change of ROA 471  471 -0.0036      -0.0016     0.0107 -0.0806 0.0348 
Change of ROE 
Change of NIM 
Change of NII (mil. Euro) 
                                   
471 
461 
448 
       
-0.0589    
-0.0234      
1078.71 
 
-0.0311     0.2047 
-0.0020     0.0099      
415.82     2415        
 
-1.4014 
  -0.0344      
   -5976         
   
0.8066 
0.0763 
12377 
 
Bank-specific variables              
Natural log of total assets 
Total assets (Mil. Euro)                       
471 
471       
11.4266 
334027 
11.6581    1.9201 
115629    541270 
5.7841 
       325.1 
15.6976 
6567297 
Liquid asset / total deposit and 
borrowing 
471 0.2823 0.2402    0.1794 0.0082 0.8712 
Tier 1 capital ratio 471 0.0900 0.0820    0.0292 0.0380 0.2300 
Capital fund / total asset 471 0.0950 0.0848    0.0781 0.0199 0.9694 
Debt-to-equity ratio 471 9.4043 7.5062    7.2479 0.0320 54.0316 
Debt-to-asset ratio 471 0.4572 0.4251    0.2279 0.0032 0.9778 
Cost-to-income ratio 
Asset diversity 
Income diversity 
Asset growth rate 
471 
471 
471 
471 
0.6139 
0.6800     
0.4782 
0.1656 
0.6034    0.1377 
0.6900    0.2072 
0.4664    0.1737 
0.1092    0.2697 
0.2630 
0.0975 
0.0026 
-0.2650 
1.4870 
0.9976 
0.9877 
3.3841 
Loan growth rate 471 0.1947 0.1332    0.4887 -0.3284 9.1786 
Loan loss ratio  471 0.0301 0.0259    0.0241 0.0002 0.2222 
Z-score 
Deal-specific variables 
471 28.5558 20.8756  26.1821     -0.0032 195.7574 
Listed banks                                              471            0.8641 1         0.3430               0 1 
Geographic diversification 471 0.1486 0         0.3561           0 1 
Cross-border  471 0.5860 1         0.4931           0 1 
Macroeconomic variables               
Annual real GDP growth rate (%) 471 2.2468     2.3615   2.2775 -8.8637 10.2014 
Inflation (%)   471 2.5615 2.4351   1.5058 -1.2593 14.7061 
Money supply (M2) growth rate (%)         471 8.1799 8.1500   5.5762 -14.1900 42.3600 
Industry-specific variables                    
CR5 (%) 471 48.7669 45.04   17.5485   20.1611 99.3603 
HHI (highest 10000) 471 754.1507 587   552.8324 158 4067 
Regulatory and deposit insurance               
Capital regulatory index 471 6.2633 6      1.7390          3    9 
Official supervisory power 471 10.3949 11      2.0130          5   14 
Deposit insurer power 471 0.7728 0      0.8736          0    3 
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tests. There are 171 observations for all financial integration indicators due to the following: (1) 
all samples are cross-border M&As; (2) all acquirers should come from euro area countries 
(excluding deals whose acquirers come from UK, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, etc.); (3) data 
availability of all financial integration indicators. Not surprisingly, all the mean values of ΔROA, 
ΔROE and ΔNIM are negative show that the M&As do not boost acquirers’ profitability on average. 
ΔROE (0.2702) has much greater standard deviation than ΔROA (0.0108) and ΔNIM 
(0.0091), indicating ΔROE is more volatile than ΔROA and ΔNIM. In contrast, the mean of  
ΔNII is 1607.97, which shows acquirers increased absolute values of net interest incomes via 
cross-border M&As. For all interest rates differences on new loans to euro area non-financial 
corporations, the average values, standard deviations and ranges are not very high. For interest 
rates difference on MFI deposits for households in the euro area, as expected, all these values for 
inter-quantile are much less than those for full range across countries. In all five indicators of cross-
country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans to non-financial corporations and 
households, consumer credit indicator (DISPERSION3) has both highest mean and standard 
deviation, indicating that the interest rate for consumers is higher and more volatile than interest 
rates for house buyers and corporate clients across euro area countries. For interest rates difference 
on MFI deposits for households in the euro area, as expected, all these values for inter-quantile are 
much less than those for full range across countries.  
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Table 2-2   Descriptive Statistics for data used in Granger-causality tests 
 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
 
Dependent variables 
     
ΔROA 471        171 -0.0035 0.0108 -0.0723 0.0090 
ΔROE 
ΔNIM 
ΔNII (mil. Euro) 
171 
171       
      169        
-0.1105 
-0.0020        
1607.97     
0.2702 
    0.0091      
  3401.76 
-1.4014 
    -0.0291       
     -5976 
0.1514 
      0.0672 
  12367.67 
Banking market integration indicators      
Interest rates differences on new loans to 
euro area non-financial corporations (%) 
     
Distressed vs. non-distressed countries 
(IRDIFFERENCE1) (1) 
171 0.7578 0.3170 0.4458 2.0896 
Distressed vs. euro area average 
(IRDIFFERENCE4) (4) 
171 0.4234 0.1396 0.2432 1.0546 
Euro area average vs. non-distressed 
(IRDIFFERENCE5)  (5) 
171 0.3346 0.1854 0.2024 1.0350 
Interest rates difference on MFI deposits 
for households in the euro area (%) 
     
Full range across countries (max. – min.)  
(IRDIFFERENCE2)  (2) 
171 1.8029 0.4752 1.2656 3.7115 
Interquantile (3rd.q- 1st. q)  
(IRDIFFERENCE3)  (3) 
171 0.5291 0.1171   0.2408 1.0022 
Cross-country standard deviation of MFI  
interest rates on loans to non-financial  
corporations and households (basis points)  
Floating rate and up to 1 year initial rate 
fixation (IRF), up to EUR 1 million 
(DISPERSION2)   (6) 
Floating rate and up to 1 year IRF, over EUR 
1 million (DISPERSION5)   (9)                          
171 
 
 
      171        
45.2942 
 
 
 28.5390     
8.9335 
 
 
    7.5867 
31.5104 
 
 
    21.8312      
89.9771 
 
 
    55.3254 
Consumer credit, over 1 year and up to 5 
Year IRF (DISPERSION3)  (7) 
171 113.6424 19.4797     85.1898 155.2568 
House purchase, floating rate and up to 1 
year (DISPERSION6)   (10) 
House purchase, over 5 years and up to 10 
years  (DISPERSION4)   (8)                         
171 
 
  
      171         
33.5792 
 
 
  33.6712      
   8.5642 
 
 
   6.8999       
    25.9672 
 
 
    22.8838    
    60.7902 
 
 
    55.0650 
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Table 2-3 shows the correlations coefficients among performance change measures and banking 
integration indicators. On the one hand, change of ROA and change of ROE have very high 
correlation with each other. So they will be separated as different dependent variables in different 
regressions. There is no high correlation among other performance change measures. We expect 
change of ROE to have similar results to change of ROA, but different results to change of NIM 
and change of NII. On the other hand, all banking integration indicators except DISPERSION3 
have positive correlations with each other and negative correlations with change of ROA and 
change of ROE, but they have mixed signs for correlations with change of NII and change of NIM.  
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Table 2-3   the Correlation Coefficients among Performance Measures and Banking Integration Indicators 
 
                ΔROA          ΔROE           ΔNIM          ΔNI1              (1)                 (2)                    (3)                        (4)               (5)                (6)                (7)                (8)                (9)              (10) 
 
ΔROA     1.0000 
ΔROE     0.6104***    1.0000 
ΔNIM      0.0356          0.1042          1.0000 
ΔNII        0.0164          0.1274*        0.0332         1.0000 
 
(1)        -0.2954***   -0.2303***    0.0782         -0.0366        1.0000  
(2)        -0.4678***   -0.2828***    0.0546          0.0889        0.6940***       1.0000                                
(3)         0.2277***    0.2952***   -0.0670         -0.0692       -0.1457*          -0.3402***       1.0000 
(4)        -0.2776***   -0.1806**      0.0628         -0.0731        0.9670***       0.5847***      -0.0498 
(5)        -0.2956***   -0.2573***    0.0859         -0.0079        0.9818***       0.7459***      -0.2110*** 
 
  1.0000 
  0.9010***   1.0000                           
  (6)        -0.0894         -0.1106          0.0479         -0.1209        0.8331***       0.3535***       0.1100 1.       0.8280***   0.8013***    1.0000 
(7)        -0.3424***   -0.2054***   -0.0285          0.1009        0.2470***       0.6161***      -0.3672***       0.1834***   0.2835***   -0.0841         1.0000 
  (8)        -0.1342*       -0.1005          0.1392*       -0.0003        0.7689***       0.4763***      -0.0509       0.7144***   0.7762***    0.8266***    0.1264*       1.0000 
  (9)        -0.2808***   -0.2456***    0.0764         -0.0024        0.8741***       0.7021***      -0.3411***       0.7934***   0.8969***    0.8141***    0.2544***   0.8300***     1.0000 
 (10)       -0.2850***   -0.2292***   -0.0259        -0.1373*       0.8469***       0.6596***      -0.0085       0.8203***   0.8310***    0.8163***    0.0983         0.6590***     0.8043***  1.0000 
  
Note: ***   **  * indicate the correlation coefficient is significant at 1%,5% and 10% significance level.  
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2.4.3 Empirical Methodology 
For research question 1, in order to find acquirers’ performance changes of bank M&As, the 
difference between post-merger and pre-merger profitability of acquirers will be calculated. First 
of all, 3-year, 2-year and 1-year post-merger and pre-merger ROA,ROE,NIM and NII for acquirers  
are collected from Bankscope and the average post-merger ROA, ROE, NIM and NII and the 
average pre-merger ROA,ROE, NIM and NII are calculated, respectively. Secondly, the difference 
between the average post-merger ROA and pre-merger ROA, the difference between the average 
post-merger ROE and pre-merger ROE, the difference between the average post-merger NIM and 
pre-merger NIM and the difference between the average post-merger NII and pre-merger NII are 
computed, respectively. Thirdly, the four differences computed in the second step are used as 
dependent variables and the acquirers’ financial ratios, deal-specific variables, industry-specific 
variables, macroeconomic variables and regulatory variables are used as independent variables.  
On the one hand, for research question 1, the full samples (including both cross-border and 
domestic bank M&As) are used and the linear panel data models are employed. First, both fixed-
effect model and random-effect model can be used in this study. On the one hand, according to 
Greene (1990), the fixed-effect model can be written as follows: 
                                    (2.1) 
where μi  is the time-invariant component of the error (e.g. cross-sectional) and vit is the time-
variant component of the error (e.g. time-series). Cameron and Trivedi (2010) specified that μi is 
permitted to be correlated with any of the regressors xit and vit is assumed to be uncorrelated with 
xit  in the fixed-effect model. Therefore, it is possible that one or more regressors have correlations 
with the time-variant component of the error and they cannot be estimated by using the fixed-effect 
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model.  
On the other hand, Greene (1990) described the random-effect model as follows: 
                                                                        (2.2) 
where εi is the time-invariant component of the error (e.g. cross-sectional) and vit is the time-
variant component of the error (e.g. time-series). Cameron and Trivedi (2010) stated that εi is 
purely random and is uncorrelated with any of the regressors xit in the random-effect model. 
Consequently, all the explanatory variables, including the time-invariant variables, can be 
estimated by using the random-effect model.  
Second, either the fixed-effect model or the random-effect model can be selected by conducting 
the Hausman test (Brooks 2008; Cameron and Trivedi 2010). They stated that the Hausman test 
can be used to test to know if the time-invariant component of error is correlated with the regressors. 
Wooldridge (2010) described that the Hausman test as follows: the null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis are:  
                                                               (2.3) 
and the test statistics of the Hausman test is:  
                                     (2.4) 
If H is greater than the critical value, the null hypothesis is rejected, this means the time-invariant 
component of error is correlated with the regressors, then the estimators in fixed-effect models are 
consistent and the fixed-effect models are preferred; if H is less than the critical value, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected, this means the time-invariant component of error is uncorrelated 
with the regressors, then the estimators in both fixed-effect and random-effect models are 
consistent but random-effect estimators are more efficient, then the random-effect models are 
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preferred.  
In this study, the test statistic of the Hausman test is 61.87, which is much greater than the critical 
value and the p-value is 0.0000, therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and the fixed-effect model 
is preferred.  
For research question 1 and 2, the following fixed-effect models will be used:   
 (2.5)    
where ∆Perit is change of performance measures (i.e. ROA, ROE, NIM and NII) for acquirer i at 
time t (i = 1,2,3…N; t = 1,2,3,…T); FIit is a financial integration indicator in European banking 
market; BCit is a vector of bank-specific variables (including size, liquidity, capitalization, 
solvency, efficiency, asset/income diversification, growth, asset quality and insolvency risk); DSit 
is a vector of deal-specific variables (listed, geographic diversification and cross-border); ISit 
stands for a vector of industry-specific/structural variables (CR5, HHI); Macroit is a vector of 
macroeconomic variables (GDP growth rate, inflation and broad money supply M2 growth rate); 
and Regulati is a vector of regulatory variables (capital regulatory index, overall supervisory index 
and deposit insurer power, etc.) for country i.  Of all these variables, the main variables are 
financial integration indicator in European banking market, z-score, geographic diversification, 
cross border, CR5 and capital regulatory index while the other variables are treated as control 
variables.  
With regard to the banking integration indicators, some indicators from ECB report Financial 
Integration in Europe and the corresponding data from ECB website will be used. Specifically, the 
activity-based and price-based indicators, including interest rates on new loans to euro area non-
financial corporations, interest rates on MFI deposits for households in the euro area, cross-country 
63 
 
standard deviation of MFI interest rates on new loans to non-financial corporations and households, 
will be employed. The first two indicators are activity-based and the last two indicators are price-
based. The lower the interest rates with the significant level of convergence across countries (lower 
interest rates difference across countries) indicate higher degree of integration. Therefore, for the 
first two indicators, the difference between average interest rates for distressed countries and for 
non-distressed countries and the full range difference across countries (max minus min) will be 
calculated. In addition, the lower cross-country standard deviations of interest rates indicate higher 
degree of integration. Consequently, for the last two indicators, the original time series are kept as 
the integration indicators. Although there are at least two time-series for each indicator, only one 
or two time-series are selected. According to the announcement date of M&A, the monthly data of 
all selected banking integration indicators for all eligible deals (those deals whose acquirers come 
from 10 euro areas countries in distressed and non-distressed countries) will be input.  
Additionally, to select some most important financial integration indicators, principal component 
analysis (PCA) will be employed in this chapter. According to Jollife (1986) and Rabe-Hesketh 
and Everitt (2007), Principal Component Analysis, originally introduced by Pearson (1901) and 
Hotelling (1933), has the central idea to reduce the dimentionality of a dataset which consists of a 
large number of inter-correlated, while retaining as much as possible of the variation in the data 
set. Van Belle et al. (2004) define the first, second, third… and the kth principal components and 
point out that for each k, the first k principal components explain as much of the variability in a 
sample as may be explained by any k directions or k variables. Based on these ideas, this chapter 
now will use PCA to select several principal components that can explain most amount of 
variability in the dataset thus to reduce the number of banking integration indicators from 10 to a 
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smaller number. This chapter will follow Jolliffe’s (1986) rule to determine the number of principal 
components. In his book Principal Component Analysis, he listed four types of rules to select the 
number of principal components and pointed out that the most obvious criterion is to select a 
cumulative percentage (i.e. 80% or 90%) of total variation it is desired that the principal 
components should contribute. Specifically, formula to calculate the percentage of variation 
contributed by the first k PCs is  
                                                                                 (2.6) 
Then we need to choose a cut-off, t*, between 70% and 90% of total variation and keep the smallest 
number for k, that is m, for which tk > t*. The first m PCs can provide most information in a vector 
of variables. This chapter will also follow Rabe-Hesketh and Everitt (2007) to present the process 
of PCA by using Stata. All the results will be presented and discussed in the following section of 
Discussion of Results.   
Next, this chapter will also use mean-comparison t-tests to evaluate whether the 2007-2009 
financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis have negative impacts on acquirers’ 
performances after M&As. First, the full sample will be divided into two sub-samples: pre-crisis 
sample (1997-2006) and post-crisis sample (2007-2011); second, both post-crisis and pre-crisis 
averages of ΔROA, ΔROE, ΔNIM and ΔNII will be calculated; third, for each post-crisis and pre-
crisis average performance change, one-sample t-test will be used to test whether the average post-
crisis and pre-crisis performance changes are significantly negative, significantly positive or 
insignificant; fourth, the differences between the average post-crisis performance change and the 
average pre-crisis performance change will be computed, and finally, two-sample mean-
comparison t-tests using variables will be employed to further test whether the average post-crisis 
65 
 
performance changes are significantly lower than the average pre-crisis performance changes.  
The null and alternative hypotheses of one-sample t-test for average performance changes are:  
       H0: mean (performance change) =  0 ,   H1: mean (performance change) < 0             (2.7) 
       H0: mean (performance change) =  0 ,   H1: mean (performance change) > 0             (2.8) 
If the t-statistics is greater than the critical value or p-value is less than the critical value, the null 
hypothesis should be rejected, thus the average post-crisis and/or pre-crisis performance change is 
significantly different from 0. Furthermore, if the null hypothesis in (2.7) is rejected, the average 
post-crisis and/or pre-crisis performance change is significantly lower than 0, indicating acquirers’ 
lower performances after M&As; if the null hypothesis in (2.8) is rejected, the average post-crisis 
and/or pre-crisis performance change is significant higher than 0, indicating acquirers’ higher 
performances after M&As. If neither null hypothesis in (2.9) and (2.10) is rejected, the acquirers’ 
average post–crisis and pre-crisis performance changes do not change significantly.  
The null and alternative hypotheses of two-sample mean-comparison t-test for average 
performance changes are: 
H0: mean (post-crisis performance change) – mean (pre-crisis performance change) = 0  
H1: mean (post-crisis performance change) – mean(pre-crisis performance change) < 0 (2.9) 
H0: mean (post-crisis performance change) – mean (pre-crisis performance change) = 0  
 H1: mean (post-crisis performance change) – mean(pre-crisis performance change) > 0  (2.10)       
If the t-statistics is greater than the critical value or p-value is less than the critical value, the null 
hypothesis should be rejected, thus the average post-crisis and pre-crisis performance change are 
significantly different. If the null hypothesis in (2.9) is rejected, the average post-crisis 
performance change is significantly lower than the average pre-crisis performance change, 
66 
 
indicating financial crises have negative impacts on acquirers’ performances after M&As; if the 
null hypothesis in (2.10) is rejected, the average post-crisis performance change is significantly 
higher than the average pre-crisis performance change, indicating financial crises have positive 
impacts on acquirers’ performances after M&As. If neither null hypothesis in (2.9) and (2.10) is 
rejected, the financial crises do not have significant impacts on acquirers’ performances after 
M&As.  
On the other hand, this chapter will focus on cross-border bank M&As only and investigate 
whether acquirers’ performance changes and banking integration indicators have mutual 
relationships. To achieve this aim, in addition to including banking integration indicators in the 
main regressions, this chapter will use the Granger-causality tests. Brooks (2008) defines that he 
Granger-causality test is a statistical hypothesis test for determining whether one time series is 
useful in forecasting another. He also describes that Granger-causality tests seek to answer 
questions such as “Do changes in the first variable cause changes in the second variable?” If the 
first variable causes the second variable, then lags of the first variable should be significant in the 
equation for the second variable. If this is the case, we say that the first variable “Granger-causes” 
the second variable. If the second variable causes the first variable, lags of the second variable 
should be significant in the equation for the first variable. If both sets of lags are significant, there 
is “bi-directional causality”. If neither the second variable causes the first variable, nor the first 
variable causes the second variable, then they are independent. More specifically, in this chapter, 
the Granger-causality tests between acquirers’ performances (the first variable) and banking 
integration indicators (the second variable) will be used.  
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2.5 Discussions of Results  
In this section, we first use fixed-effect regressions as main models to investigate the 
determinants of acquirers’ performance changes after M&As. Secondly, the principal component 
analysis (PCA) will be employed to select several most important banking integration indicators. 
Thirdly, these selected indicators will be included in other fixed-effect models in cross-border 
sample to find whether they are significant with acquirers’ performance changes. Fourthly, some 
t-tests will be employed to investigate whether the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis had negative 
effects on acquirers’ performance changes after M&As. Finally, several robustness checks, 
including more fixed-effect models with different explanatory variables and Granger-causality 
tests will be used to provide further evidences for previous findings.                                                                                                                                                    
2.5.1 Determinants of Acquirers’ Performance Changes for All M&A Deals 
Table 2-4 reports the results for different specifications for change of ROE in full sample. It is 
found that Z-score is positively and significantly associated with changed in ROE in all 
specifications, which indicates that acquirers with lower risks may have higher profitability. 
However, several authors (e.g. Casu et al. 2015) argue that the Z-score depends positively on 
bank’s profitability the higher ROE may not necessarily lead to higher ROE or ROA after M&As. 
In order to investigate the relationship between acquirers’ performance changes and Z-score, more 
robustness checks will be conducted later in this section.  
Geographic diversification is found to be positively and significantly related to changes in ROE, 
suggesting that acquires whose targets come from other continents have on average been more  
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Table 2-4   Determinants of Acquirers’ change of ROE for bank M&As 
 
Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
 
 
 
Variable                                     (1)                         (2)        
                                             ∆ROE/full               ∆ROE 
                                                                        bank-specific  
              (3)  
           ∆ROE 
     bank-specific 
   macroeconomic 
          (4) 
     ∆ROE 
bank-specific 
deal-specific 
and  macro 
      (5) 
        ∆ROE  
   bank-specific 
and regulatory 
 
 
Z-score                                     0.0009**              0.0008**                         
                                                 (0.0004)               (0.0003) 
Asset diversity                         -0.0303                 -0.0376 
                                                 (0.0299)               (0.0250) 
 
           
0.0009*** 
         (0.0003) 
         -0.0372 
         (0.0252) 
 
       
 
  
  0.0008** 
 (0.0003) 
 -0.0364 
 (0.0258)   
  
         
        0.0010** 
       (0.0004) 
       -0.0320 
       (0.0327) 
Geographic diversification       0.0290*               0.0503** 
                                                 (0.0141)               (0.0188) 
          0.0479** 
         (0.0184) 
   0.0471** 
 (0.0190) 
         0.0274** 
       (0.0116) 
Cross border                            -0.0382*              -0.0503** 
                                                 (0.0215)               (0.0204) 
         -0.0583** 
         (0.0212) 
  -0.0563** 
 (0.0205) 
        -0.0294 
       (0.0210) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0040                  0.0055 
                                                 (0.0064)    (0.0071) 
          0.0049 
         (0.0070) 
   0.0066 
 (0.0073) 
         0.0022 
       (0.0066) 
Liquid ratio                              0.2382**              0.2617** 
                                                 (0.0817)               (0.0980)                      
          0.2639** 
(0.0947) 
   0.2612** 
 (0.0936) 
         0.2386** 
       (0.0853) 
Capital ratio                             -0.0986                 -0.0608  
                                                 (0.0792)               (0.0740) 
         -0.0370 
         (0.0561) 
  -0.0382 
 (0.0608) 
        -0.1077 
       (0.0896) 
Debt-to-equity                         -0.0052                 -0.0065 
                                                 (0.0043)               (0.0049) 
         -0.0066 
         (0.0052) 
  -0.0069 
 (0.0052) 
        -0.0050 
       (0.0040)     
Loan growth                             0.0033                  0.0016 
                                                 (0.0108)               (0.0116) 
          0.0025 
         (0.0105) 
   0.0040 
 (0.0112) 
         0.0013 
       (0.0114) 
Loan loss ratio                          0.3928                  0.1806  
                                                 (0.3233)               (0.5169) 
          0.2632 
         (0.4603) 
   0.2594 
 (0.4561) 
         0.3697 
       (0.3779) 
Cost-to-income                         0.0706                  0.0396 
                                                 (0.0798)               (0.0744) 
          0.0569 
         (0.0848) 
   0.0468 
 (0.0858) 
         0.0685 
       (0.0678) 
Listed banks                             -0.0231                  
                                                 (0.0265)                  
      -0.0331 
 (0.0284) 
       
Real GDP growth                     0.0172**                
                                                 (0.0069)                  
          0.0146** 
         (0.0057) 
   0.0147** 
 (0.0058) 
          
        
Inflation                                   -0.0184**               
                                                 (0.0070)                  
   -0.0252** 
   (0.0096) 
  -0.0254** 
 (0.0098) 
         
        
Money supply growth              0.0055**                 
                   (0.0024)                 
CR5                                         -0.0030***             
                                                 (0.0009) 
          0.0068** 
         (0.0027) 
   0.0067** 
 (0.0027) 
          
         
      -0.0031*** 
      (0.0010)_  
Capital regulatory index           0.0028                    
                                                 (0.0127)                  
Official supervisory index       -0.0180                   
                                                 (0.0109)                  
Deposit insurer power              -0.0381                  
                                                 (0.0250)                  
    
           0.0061 
      (0.0129) 
      -0.0238** 
      (0.0102) 
      -0.0432 
      (0.0271) 
      
Obs.                                             471                         471       471  471     471 
 
R2                                                          0.2257                    0.0941 
  
 
  
         0.1374 
  
  0.1355 
  
   0.1811 
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profitable. These results also show that acquirers involve in M&As outside Europe can have at 
least 2.9% higher ROE than peers only involved in M&As in Europe. This is expected and can be 
explained by acquirers that engage in M&As outside Europe can benefit more from geographic 
diversification and can have lower cost per unit and thus higher profitability.  
In contrast, surprisingly, the estimated coefficients of CROSSBORDER in all models are negative 
and significant, showing that acquirers engage in cross-border M&A deals have been less 
profitable. This result is unexpected, but it has economic significance. On average, the acquirers 
involve in cross-border M&As have at least 3.82% lower ROE. This result, to some extent, is 
contrast with the result of geographic diversification, can be explained by the fact that acquirers 
engage in cross-border M&As in EU28 countries rather than outside Europe do not benefit from 
geographic diversification. This makes sense because most EU countries have identical monetary 
policy and same currency and they have highly positive correlations in macroeconomic conditions 
and performance in banking markets.   
Moreover, liquidity ratio has positive and significant estimated coefficients in all models, 
indicating that if acquirers increase the liquidity ratios by 1%, their ROE will increase at least 
0.21%. This result is consistent with previous studies and can be interpreted as banks with higher 
liquidity can sell their assets more easily without loss. Additionally, both CR5 and HHI are found 
to have negative and significant estimated coefficients in all models, showing that acquirers in less 
concentrated banking markets have been more profitable. This result is consistent with the results 
in some previous studies on European banks (Kosmidou 2008, Petria et al. 2015) but contrast with 
results in other studies (ECB 2015b). For example, Kosmidou (2008) examined the determinants 
of performance of Greek banks during 1990 and 2002 and found ROAA is significantly negative 
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with concentration ratio. Similarly, Petria et al. (2015) assessed the main determinants of banks’ 
profitability in EU 27 countries over the period 2004-2011 and concluded that were negatively 
significant with HHI. These results challenge the traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
paradigm of increased banking industry concentration lowering the cost of collusion thus result in 
excess profits. One possible explanation is the competition-stability view, which argues that less 
concentration may indicate higher competition and may encourage bank managers to carry out 
better screening and monitoring activities to avoid moral hazard and adverse selection, leading to 
a better asset quality and lower non-performing loans, thus result in less loan losses and higher 
profits. In contrast, ECB (2015b) analyze the determinants of EU banks’ profitability based on 
sample of 98 banks between 1994 and 2004 and found that ROA is positively significant with both 
HHI and CR5, which supports the traditional SCP view.  
Next, asset diversity has negative but insignificant estimated coefficients in all models, suggesting 
that asset diversity is only weakly negatively related to acquirers’ performance changes. Finally, 
as expected, all coefficients of the three controlled country-specific macroeconomic variables have 
positive signs. Both real GDP growth rate and money supply growth rate in acquirers’ home 
countries are positively and significantly associated with change of ROE, indicating both 
economic growth and money supply can contribute to higher acquirers’ performance after M&As. 
The coefficient for inflation rate in the acquirers’ home countries is negatively and significant, 
demonstrating that higher inflation will result in lower acquirers’ profitability after M&As.  
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                      Table 2-5   Determinants of Acquirers’ change of NII for bank M&As 
 
 
Variable                                      (1)                          (2)        
                                               ∆NII/full                   ∆NII  
                                                                          bank-specific 
          (3)  
       ∆NII 
    bank-specific   
macroeconomic 
        (4) 
     ∆NII 
bank-specific  
deal-specific 
 and  macro 
    (5) 
       ∆NII 
 bank-specific 
and regulatory 
 
 
Z-score                                     -0.7826                   1.8259                         
                                                 (6.8261)                 (4.4336) 
Asset diversity                        -1278.97                -1471.86 
                                                (1210.95)               (1157.35) 
 
1.0172 
    (4.4159) 
   -1455.72 
   (1156.92) 
 
       
 
 0.5862  
 (4.7012) 
-1458.65 
(1162.58) 
  
   -0.2189 
   (6.9308) 
   -1302.2 
  (1210.37) 
Geographic diversification      -119.51                    452.67 
                                                 (308.02)                 (312.78) 
Cross border                             124.39                     42.69 
                                                 (187.75)                 (180.20) 
     372.44 
    (328.58) 
     116.17 
    (243.20) 
   370.99 
 (325.88) 
  122.86 
 (226.93) 
     -32.98 
   (302.67) 
     55.66 
   (132.11) 
Ln(TA)                                      268.54***             333.99*** 
                                                  (74.77)      (77.43) 
     327.31*** 
     (74.87) 
   334.85*** 
  (81.69) 
     276.78*** 
    (71.11) 
Liquid ratio                             3993.54***           4482.95*** 
                                                (1262.22)              (1334.57)                      
    4300.98*** 
(1215.72) 
  4292.76*** 
 (1210.6) 
    4144.27*** 
   (1369.73) 
Capital ratio                            -1060.38                -1910.81 
                                                (3162.26)              (3526.23) 
   -1815.34 
   (3255.44) 
 -1812.06 
(3252.25) 
    -1235.47 
   (3329.36) 
Debt-to-equity                          -39.06*                  -31.43 
                                                  (21.81)                  (23.61) 
     -29.08 
     (25.98) 
   -30.07 
  (26.70) 
     -39.85* 
    (20.58)     
Loan growth                              73.44                     90.60 
                                                 (257.07)                (237.67) 
      53.66 
    (228.89) 
    59.54 
 (232.67) 
     104.83 
   (267.23) 
Loan loss ratio                         -2124.51                -375.04  
                                                 (5571.99)              (6049.94) 
     428.03 
   (6360.29) 
   625.27 
(6505.65) 
    -3105.21 
  (4816.57) 
Cost-to-income                         -1051.5                -2256.92* 
                                                 (1069.05)              (1214.02) 
   -2017.74 
   (1199.96) 
 -2044.60 
(1222.26) 
   -1291.40 
  (1051.61) 
Listed banks                              -29.29                    
                                                  (398.99)                
      -136.71 
 (523.17) 
     
Real GDP growth                     -127.92                 
                                                  (161.31)                
   -122.91 
   (145.77) 
  -123.40 
 (144.58) 
   
Inflation                                      21.67                     
                                                   (89.17)                  
     42.28 
    (67.43) 
    43.09 
  (66.69) 
  
Money supply growth                33.11                     
                   (56.38)                 
CR5                                           -13.48            
                                                   (7.84)  
     35.15 
    (61.30) 
    35.10 
  (61.39) 
  
 
   -14.42*  
    (7.57) 
Capital regulatory index           -238.55**             
                                                   (96.34)                 
Official supervisory index        -0.9452                   
                                                   (73.45)                 
Deposit insurer power             817.317***           
                                                  (234.71)              
    
      -256.60** 
   (87.24) 
    23.16 
   (66.51) 
   827.71*** 
  (236.22) 
      
Obs.                                               448                        448  448  448       448 
 
R2                                                             0.3065                   0.2528 
  
 
  
    0.2464 
  
 0.2467 
   
   0.3093 
      
      
 
Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasitity-robust standard errors 
 
72 
 
Regressions in table 2-5 replace change of ROE with change of NII, with the same sample and 
explanatory variables in table 2-4.  These results provide further evidence for acquirers with  
higher liquidity ratios and challenges for acquirers come from more concentrated markets may 
have higher performance. Moreover, more determinants have been identified from these results.  
For example, the natural log of total asset has extremely positive significant coefficients in all 
models, showing larger acquirers may have greater net interest incomes after M&As, which 
provides evidence for economies of scale. Furthermore, all coefficients on capital regulatory index 
are negative and significant, revealing that acquirers whose home countries have less stringent 
capital regulations may have greater profits. These results are partly consistent with our previous 
findings. One possible explanation can be: if a bank regulator in one country has less regulatory 
power, it will require that banks hold less regulatory capital. Consequently, banks will be more 
willing to have risky assets and increase their profitability.  Finally, all coefficients on deposit 
insurer power are large in magnitude and show very positive significance, indicating acquirers that 
based on countries whose deposit insurers have more authorities will have much  
higher net interest incomes. Specifically, after M&As are completed, acquirers that are based on 
countries whose deposit insurers have more authorities will have about €800 more in change of 
net interest income than acquirers that are based on countries whose deposit insurers have less 
authorities. Possible explanation can be: deposit insurers will have additional authorities to 
intervene to support banks in difficulties in the resolution facilitator model; it can facilitate a 
corporate restructuring or even a merger to increase banks’ performance. (Casu et al. 2015).  
Moreover, regressions in table 2-6 replace change of ROE and change of NII with change of NIM. 
All coefficients have small magnitudes, indicating that acquirers’ change of net interest  
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Table 2-6   Determinants of Acquirers’ change of NIM for bank M&As 
 
 
Variable                                       (1)                          (2)        
                                               ∆NIM/full                ∆NIM 
                                                                          bank-specific 
          (3)  
       ∆NIM 
    bank-specific   
macroeconomic 
         (4) 
     ∆NIM 
bank-specific  
deal-specific 
 and  macro 
     (5) 
        ∆NIM 
 bank-specific 
and regulatory 
 
 
Z-score                                     0.00003*                0.00002                         
                                                (0.00001)                (0.00001) 
Asset diversity                         -0.0021                   -0.0019 
                                                 (0.0023)                 (0.0021) 
 
 0.00002* 
     (0.00001) 
      -0.0020 
      (0.0022) 
 
       
 
  0.00002*  
 (0.00001) 
  -0.0021 
  (0.0021) 
  
    0.00002* 
   (0.00001) 
    -0.0026 
    (0.0025) 
Geographic diversification      -0.0027*                 -0.0020 
                                                 (0.0015)                 (0.0013) 
Cross border                             0.0018                    0.0013 
                                                 (0.0015)                 (0.0015) 
      -0.0026* 
      (0.0014) 
       0.0019 
      (0.0015) 
   -0.0025* 
  (0.0013) 
   0.0018 
  (0.0015) 
     -0.0024 
    (0.0018) 
     0.0011 
    (0.0013) 
Ln(TA)                                     -0.0003                  -0.0001 
                                                 (0.0002)      (0.0003) 
      -0.0002 
      (0.0002) 
   -0.0003 
  (0.0002) 
    -0.00004 
    (0.0003) 
Liquid ratio                              -0.0026                  -0.0018 
                                                 (0.0027)                 (0.0029)                      
      -0.0029 
(0.0026) 
   -0.0027 
  (0.0026) 
     -0.0010 
    (0.0034) 
Capital ratio                              0.0050                    0.0033 
                                                 (0.0047)                 (0.0046) 
       0.0041 
      (0.0049) 
    0.0042 
  (0.0048) 
      0.0022 
    (0.0038) 
Debt-to-equity                           0.0001                  0.00004 
                                                (0.00007)               (0.00006) 
      0.00004 
      (0.0001) 
   0.00006 
 (0.00007) 
      0.0001 
    (0.0001)     
Loan growth                             0.00001                  0.0004 
                                                 (0.0006)                 (0.0004) 
       0.0001 
      (0.0006) 
   -0.00003 
  (0.0006) 
     -0.00002 
    (0.0006) 
Loan loss ratio                          -0.0102                  -0.0210  
                                                 (0.0146)                 (0.0168) 
      -0.0165 
      (0.0158) 
   -0.0165 
  (0.0164) 
     -0.0193 
    (0.0172) 
Cost-to-income                         0.0067*                  0.0038 
                                                 (0.0037)                 (0.0032) 
       0.0056 
      (0.0037) 
    0.0065* 
  (0.0036) 
      0.0028 
    (0.0036) 
Listed banks                              0.0028*                    
                                                 (0.0013)                
        0.0029** 
  (0.0012) 
     
Real GDP growth                    -0.0009**                 
                                                 (0.0003)                
     -0.0008** 
     (0.0003) 
   -0.0008** 
  (0.0003) 
   
Inflation                                   -0.0003                     
                                                 (0.0004)                  
     -0.0003 
     (0.0004) 
   -0.0003 
  (0.0004) 
  
Money supply growth              0.0003**                     
                   (0.0001)                 
CR5                                         -0.00001            
                                                (0.00002)  
      0.0003** 
     (0.0001) 
    0.0003*** 
  (0.0001) 
  
 
   -0.000005  
    (0.00002) 
Capital regulatory index           0.0003             
                                                 (0.0002)                 
Official supervisory index       -0.0005                   
                                                 (0.0004)                 
Deposit insurer power             -0.0007           
                                                 (0.0008)              
    
         -0.0001 
     (0.0003) 
     -0.0004 
     (0.0004) 
     -0.0008 
     (0.0011) 
      
Obs.                                               461                       461     461   461          461 
 
R2                                                             0.0266                 0.0173 
  
 
  
       0.0232 
  
  0.0257 
   
     0.0272 
      
      
 
Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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margin does not respond significantly to all independent variables. This may be explained by the 
relative small numbers of change of NIM (the mean is -0.0020 or -0.2%). In most specifications, 
z-score found to be positively related to change in NIM, providing further evidence that 
acquirers with lower insolvency risks may have higher profitability. Nevertheless, geographic 
diversification has negative and significant estimated coefficients in most models. These results 
are surprising and contrary to the previous results in specifications of change of ROE. One possible 
explanation can be: acquirers that engage in M&As outside Europe may be confronted with more 
intensive competitions from local banks, leading to decreased NIM, that is, the difference between 
the interest rate that banks earn on loans and the interest rate that banks pay on deposits declined. 
Additionally, in some models, ΔNII is negatively significant with Tier1 capital ratio, debt-to-equity 
ratio and cost-to-income ratio. These results provide some evidences for (1) acquirers with lower 
capital ratio can have higher net interest income; (2) acquirers with lower leverage ratio can have 
higher net interest income; and (3) acquirers with higher efficiency ratio can have higher net 
interest income. All these results are reasonable and consistent with the results of previous studies 
(ECB 2015b). With regard to controlled country-specific macroeconomic variables, unexpectedly, 
real GDP growth rate has negative sign, revealing that greater home countries’ macroeconomic 
growth leads to lower NIM after M&As. Finally, table 2-7 shows the results for change of ROA. 
These results provide further challenges for acquirers in more concentrated banking markets have 
been more profitable and further supports for the effects of macroeconomic variables on acquirers’ 
performance after M&As. 
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Table 2-7   Determinants of Acquirers’ change of ROA for bank M&As 
 
 
Variable                                       (1)                          (2)        
                                               ∆ROA/full               ∆ROA 
                                                                           bank-specific 
           (3)  
       ∆ROA 
    bank-specific   
macroeconomic 
          (4) 
     ∆ROA 
bank-specific  
deal-specific 
 and  macro 
     (5) 
       ∆ROA 
 bank-specific 
and regulatory 
 
 
Z-score                                     0.00002                   0.00002                         
                                                (0.00003)                (0.00002) 
Asset diversity                         -0.0020                   -0.0018 
                                                 (0.0020)                  (0.0022) 
 
0.00002 
      (0.00002) 
       -0.0017 
       (0.0018) 
 
       
 
 0.00002  
 (0.00003) 
  -0.0017 
  (0.0017) 
  
    0.00002 
   (0.00003) 
    -0.0021 
    (0.0026) 
Geographic diversification        0.0007                    0.0017 
                                                 (0.0009)                  (0.0012) 
Cross border                              0.0003                    0.0003 
                                                 (0.0014)                  (0.0013) 
        0.0016 
       (0.0011) 
       -0.0001 
       (0.0013) 
    0.0015 
  (0.0012) 
  0.00001 
  (0.0012) 
      0.0006 
    (0.0008) 
     0.0007 
    (0.0014) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0008                     0.0007 
                                                 (0.0006)       (0.0005) 
        0.0007 
       (0.0005) 
    0.0008 
  (0.0006) 
      0.0007 
    (0.0006) 
Liquid ratio                               0.0063                     0.0074 
                                                 (0.0045)                  (0.0052)                      
        0.0075 
(0.0050) 
    0.0074 
  (0.0051) 
      0.0064 
    (0.0047) 
Capital ratio                             -0.0018                    -0.0016 
                                                 (0.0034)                  (0.0034) 
       -0.0005 
       (0.0030) 
   -0.0006 
  (0.0031) 
     -0.0022 
    (0.0034) 
Debt-to-equity                          0.00007                  0.00002 
                                                (0.00005)                (0.00007) 
       0.00002 
      (0.00001) 
   0.00003 
  (0.0001) 
      0.0001* 
   (0.00004)     
Loan growth                             -0.0006                   -0.0008 
                                                  (0.0006)                 (0.0006) 
       -0.0008 
       (0.0006) 
   -0.0007 
  (0.0007) 
     -0.0007 
    (0.0005) 
Loan loss ratio                           0.0073                   -0.0043  
                                                  (0.0300)                 (0.0402) 
       -0.0006 
       (0.0356) 
   -0.0008 
  (0.0350) 
      0.0061 
    (0.0344) 
Cost-to-income                          0.0086                    0.0074 
                                                  (0.0051)                 (0.0048) 
         0.0081 
       (0.0052) 
    0.0076 
  (0.0052) 
      0.0087* 
    (0.0047) 
Listed banks                              -0.0014                    
                                                  (0.0019)                
       -0.0015 
  (0.0020) 
     
Real GDP growth                      0.0008**                 
                                                  (0.0003)                
        0.0006* 
       (0.0003) 
    0.0006** 
  (0.0003) 
   
Inflation                                     -0.0008                     
                                                  (0.0005)                  
       -0.0010 
       (0.0006) 
   -0.0010 
  (0.0006) 
  
Money supply growth                0.0002                     
                    (0.0001)                 
CR5                                          -0.00001*            
                                                 (0.00004)  
        0.0003 
       (0.0002) 
    0.0003 
  (0.0002) 
  
 
    -0.00008*  
    (0.00004) 
Capital regulatory index           -0.0004             
                                                  (0.0010)                 
Official supervisory index        -0.0005                   
                                                  (0.0006)                 
Deposit insurer power              -0.0008           
                                                  (0.0018)              
    
        - 0.0003 
     (0.0010) 
     -0.0008 
     (0.0006) 
     -0.0010 
     (0.0019) 
      
Obs.                                               471                        471     471   471          471 
 
R2                                                            0.1460                   0.0581 
  
 
  
       0.0980 
  
  0.0936 
   
     0.1025 
      
      
 
Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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Lastly, we will employ the Granger-causality tests to examine whether the lower insolvency risk 
(higher z-score) has positive relationship with each other. Table 2-8 presents the results of  
causality tests, indicating that only change of NIM granger-causes z-score and vice versa. This 
result shows that change of ROE (also change of ROA and change of NII) does not have positive 
relationship with z-score.   
 
Table 2-8   Results of granger-causality tests between performance changes and Z-score 
 
                                       Null Hypothesis F-statistics p-value 
 
(1) Z-score  does not Granger-cause ΔROA 
 
     0.3981             
 
0.6723 
 
            ΔROA  does not Granger cause  Z-score 
  
     0.3161                                                                                 
  
       
      0.7295 
   
(2) Z-score does not Granger-cause  ΔROE 
 
            ΔROE does not Granger cause  Z-score 
 
(3) Z-score does not Granger-cause  ΔNIM 
 
ΔNIM  does not Granger cause  Z-score 
 
(4) Z-score does not Granger-cause  ΔNII 
 
            ΔNII  does not Granger cause  Z-score 
 
     0.1403 
 
 
     0.7033 
 
     2.3685*      
 
 
     2.6003*                
 
     0.7725 
     
 
     0.5660 
  0.8692 
 
 
      0.4955 
 
      0.0948 
 
 
      0.0753 
 
      0.4625 
 
 
      0.5682 
Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
 
2.5.2   Selecting Banking Integration Indicators 
In this subsection, we use principal component analysis (PCA) to select several most important 
banking integration indicators.  
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Table 2-9 shows the first three principal components can explain approximately 90% of the total 
variance. In addition, figure 2-1, the scree plot of eigenvalues after PCA also reveals that the first 
three principal components have largest eigenvalues. Therefore, we select the first three principal 
components.  
                               
Table 2-9   Results of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) Variance explained 
 
 
 
 
Components 
 
Eigenvalue 
 
Proportion 
 
Cumulative 
 
Component 1 
 
6.5288 
 
0.6529 
 
0.6529 
 
Component 2 
 
1.7168 
 
0.1717 
 
0.8246 
 
Component 3 
 
0.7248 
 
0.0725 
 
0.8970 
 
Component 4 
 
0.4217 
 
0.0422 
 
0.9392 
 
Component 5 
 
0.2952 
 
0.0295 
 
0.9687 
 
Component 6 
 
0.1648 
 
0.0165 
 
0.9852 
 
Component 7 
 
0.0743 
 
0.0074 
 
0.9926 
 
Component 8 
 
0.0502 
 
0.0050 
 
0.9977 
 
Component 9 
 
0.0234 
 
0.0023 
 
1.0000 
 
 
  
Next, in table 2-10, we further report the loadings for the first three components and identify that 
the first principal component has largest absolute values for loadings for IRDIFFERENCE1, 
IRDIFFERENCE5 and DISPERSION5 while the second and the third principal components have 
largest absolute values for loadings for IRDIFFERENCE2, IRDIFFERENCE3 and 
DISPERSION3. These results indicate that PC1 can be mostly interpreted by IRDIFFERENCE1, 
IRDIFFERENCE5 and DISPERSION5 and PC2 and PC3 can be mostly explained by 
IRDIFFERENCE2, IRDIFFERENCE5 and DISPERSION5.  
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                                          Figure 2-1   Scree plot of eigenvalues after PCA 
 
Therefore, we select IRDIFFERENCE1, IRDIFFERENCE5 and DISPERSION5 as the most 
important banking integration indicators in the main regressions and use IRDIFFERENCE2, 
IRDIFFERENCE3 and DISPERSION3 as less important indicators in robustness checks.  
 
Table 2-10    the Loadings of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Comp1 
 
 
Comp2 
 
 
Comp3 
 
IRDIFFERENCE1 
 
0.3813 
 
0.0306 
 
0.0379 
 
IRDIFFERENCE5 
 
0.3807 
 
-0.0284 
 
-0.0021 
 
    DISPERSION5 
 
0.3689 
 
-0.0585 
 
-0.2466 
 
IRDIFFERENCE2 
 
0.2906 
 
-0.3878 
         
        0.2858 
 
IRDIFFERENCE3 
 
-0.0715 
 
0.5606 
         
        0.7536 
 
DISPERSION3 
 
0.1114 
 
      -0.6088 
         
        0.4918 
 
IRDIFFERENCE4 
 
0.3603 
       
       0.1078 
 
        0.0892 
 
DISPERSION2 
 
0.3365 
   
       0.3355 
   
       -0.0976 
 
DISPERSION4 
 
0.3279 
   
       0.1391 
 
       -0.1318 
 
DISPERSION6 
 
0.3480 
 
  
       0.1265 
 
        0.1070 
                         
2.5.3   Determinants of Acquirers’ Performance Changes for Cross-border M&A Deals 
In the previous section, the results of PCA show that IRDIFFERNCE1, IRDIFFERENCE5 and 
DISPERSION5 are the three most important banking integration indicators. In this subsection, the 
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sub-sample with cross-border deals will be used, moreover, these indicators will be included in all 
main regressions. However, the dummy variable CROSSBORDER will not be included in main 
regressions due to the multicollinearity (this is because all deals in this sub-sample are cross-border 
per se). 
Regressions (1) - (3) of table 2-11 estimate the relationships between change of ROE and banking 
integration indicators and the determinants of change of ROE. The sample includes only cross-
border deals between 2003 and 2011 because the data for banking integration indicators are 
available since 2003. On the one hand, there are several same results as those in main regressions 
in full sample. Z-score and liquidity ratio have positive and significant estimated coefficients while 
CR5 has negative significant coefficients. Moreover, the coefficients of asset diversity are still 
insignificant. In contrast, geographic diversification has positive but insignificant coefficients in 
regression (1) and (2) and significant coefficient in regression (3), providing some support for 
previous findings. On the other hand, there are some new significant explanatory variables. For 
instance, in all three regressions, both listed banks and official supervisory index have negative 
and significant coefficients, indicating that listed acquirers and acquirers operating in countries 
with less stringent supervision may be more profitable. These results provide evidences for 
previous findings. The former can be explained by listed banks generally larger equities thus may 
have lower ROE. The latter can be interpreted as follows: if bank supervisors have more powers 
to intervene bank managers’ decision-making, they are very probably to limit banks’ risk taking, 
therefore, banks are more likely to take lower risks and may incur fewer losses for risky assets, 
leading to greater profitability. Furthermore, IRDIFFERENCE1 has negatively economic 
significance with change of NIM, indicating that if interest rate difference  
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 Table 2-11   Determinants of Acquirers’ change of ROE and change of NII for cross-border M&As 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                   ∆ROE                 ∆ROE       
                                                         IR                           IR 
                                                     DIFFERENCE1    DIFFERENCE5    
                                                                                                                               
          (3)                       
      ∆ROE  
 
DISPERSION5 
    
          (4)                       (5) 
       ∆NII                   ∆NII 
          IR                          IR 
DIFFERENCE1 DIFFERENCE5 
     (6) 
        ∆NII  
 
DISPERSION5 
DISPERS 
 
IRDIFFERENCE1                   -0.4066*                  
                                                 (0.2154)                 
IRDIFFERENCE5                                                -0.7523 
                                                                              (0.4555) 
DISPERSION5                                                      
                                                                               
Z-score                                     0.0015**              0.0014**                         
                                                 (0.0005)               (0.0006) 
Asset diversity                         -0.0292                 -0.0251           
                                                 (0.1049)               (0.1039)                  
  
 
      
      
      
      
     -0.0117 
     (0.0066) 
      0.0010** 
     (0.0004) 
     -0.0308 
     (0.1087) 
  
 -4101.07*  
 (2100.78)             
                             -7070.76 
                             (4324.41) 
                                  
                               
   20.93*                 20.18* 
  (10.69)                (10.21) 
 -160.51                -116.26 
(1746.47)             (1756.06) 
  
        
 
 
 
   -112.99 
   (113.25) 
     16.67 
    (11.70) 
   -155.71 
  (1917.86) 
Geographic diversification       0.0485                  0.0476 
                                                 (0.0310)               (0.0298) 
      0.0518* 
     (0.0253) 
  -326.42                -331.83 
 (388.02)              (387.28) 
    -289.14 
   (327.19) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0187                  0.0201 
                                                 (0.0214)    (0.0217) 
      0.0225 
     (0.0203) 
   396.51                 411.84 
 (243.43)              (254.04) 
     435.66 
   (236.35) 
Liquid ratio                               0.3042**              0.3021** 
                                                 (0.1174)               (0.1143)                      
      0.2916** 
 (0.0956) 
   5653.24***        5610.90*** 
 (1583.96)            (1610.12) 
    5514.21*** 
  (1688.20) 
Capital ratio                             -0.0967                 -0.1046       
                                                 (0.1020)               (0.1009) 
     -0.0713 
     (0.1102) 
  -3524.49*           -3608.69* 
 (1550.94)            (1593.36) 
   -3290.16* 
  (1433.04) 
Debt-to-equity                         -0.0164                 -0.0161 
                                                 (0.0103)               (0.0102)                    
     -0.0171 
(0.0106) 
   -17.32                  -15.50 
  (29.56)                 (27.91) 
     -24.98 
    (35.44) 
Loan growth                             -0.0639                -0.0726 
                                                 (0.1764)               (0.1748)_     
     -0.0695 
     (0.1733) 
   4197.22**           4106.49* 
 (1811.20)            (1798.16) 
     4150.23* 
   (1831.09) 
Loan loss ratio                          -0.2403                -0.2315  
                                                 (0.2464)               (0.2417) 
     -0.3097 
     (0.2259) 
 17803.55***     17895.91*** 
 (1618.66)            (1604.76) 
    17161*** 
   (2010.85) 
Cost-to-income                         0.1522                  0.1525 
                                                 (0.1731)               (0.1734) 
      0.1328 
     (0.1882) 
  -1337.73              -1304.16 
 (1337.71)            (1382.06) 
    -1483.54 
   (1668.67) 
Listed banks                             -0.1799*              -0.1830* 
                                                 (0.0864)               (0.0858)            
     -0.1823* 
     (0.0840) 
     38.28                  98.08 
  (610.90)              (590.92) 
      110.40 
    (649.29) 
Real GDP growth                      0.0118                  0.0107 
                                                 (0.0174)               (0.0175) 
      0.0128 
     (0.0179) 
   -148.68               -161.23 
  (342.12)              (337.21) 
     -142.80 
    (351.18) 
Inflation                                    -0.0043                -0.0032 
                                                 (0.0233)               (0.0232) 
     -0.0122 
     (0.0216) 
     96.10                  107.69 
  (248.86)              (247.26) 
       23.10 
    (293.05) 
Money  supply  growth             0.0061                  0.0063 
                                                 (0.0077)               (0.0077) 
CR5                                          -0.0049***          -0.0048*** 
                                                 (0.0012)               (0.0012) 
Capital regulatory index           0.0195                  0.0198 
                                                 (0.0173)               (0.0173)              
Official supervisory index       -0.0298**            -0.0298*                 
                                                 (0.0128)               (0.0132)             
Deposit insurer power             -0.0480                 -0.0511 
                                                 (0.0305)               (0.0303) 
                                                                               
    
      0.0064 
     (0.0079) 
     -0.0049*** 
     (0.0012) 
      0.0244 
     (0.0152) 
     -0.0260* 
     (0.0114) 
     -0.0493 
     (0.0310) 
     81.01                   84.33 
   (89.76)                (87.27) 
    -8.23                   -7.42 
    (9.49)                  (8.77) 
 -745.24***          -742.04*** 
 (205.54)               (200.75) 
 -354.74*              -353.33* 
 (155.93)               (158.44) 
 1432.15***         1400.79*** 
 (313.91)               (313.71) 
       85.49 
     (92.00) 
      -7.60 
      (9.13) 
    -698.25** 
    (224.06) 
    -318.33* 
    (166.15) 
    1421.34*** 
    (285.40) 
      
Obs.                                             171                       171 
 
R2 0.4136 0.4212  
 
  171 
 
     0.4561 
     169                       169 
 
  0.3422                 0.3238 
   169 
 
      0.3906 
 
 
 
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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between distressed countries and non-distressed countries decreases by 1%, acquirers’ net interest 
incomes after M&A will increase by 0.41%. This result supports our hypothesis of the higher level 
of banking market integration may contribute to greater profits for acquirers after M&As. However, 
this result does not necessarily indicate banking integration and change of NIM have unidirectional 
or bidirectional relationship. To investigate whether they have negative relationships with each 
other, we will conduct Granger-causality tests in the next subsection.  
Regressions (4) – (6) replace change of ROE with NII and employ the same models and 
explanatory variables. On the one hand, these results show that z-score, liquidity ratio and official 
supervisory index have identical results as regressions (1) – (3); on the other hand, there are more 
explanatory variables are economically significant in these results. For example, 
IRDIFFERENCE1 has negatively economic significance with change of NII, indicating that if 
interest rate difference between distressed countries and non-distressed countries decreases by 1%, 
acquirers’ net interest incomes after M&A will increase by €4101.07 mil. This result further 
supports our hypothesis of the increased banking integration in Europe can improve acquirers’ 
operating performances after cross-border M&As.  
Furthermore, most results are expected and reasonable except loan loss ratio. ΔNII is positively 
significant with loan growth ratio and deposit insurer power while it is negatively significant with 
capital ratio and capital regulatory index. These results provide further evidences for (1) acquirers 
in banking markets with less stringent capital regulation may have greater profits; (2) acquirers in 
banking markets with less powerful deposit insurers may have greater profits and new evidences 
for (1) acquirers with lower capital ratio may have higher profits; (2) acquirers with higher growth 
rates may have higher profits. However, loan loss ratio has unexpected  
82 
 
 
Table 2-12 Determinants of Acquirers’ change of NIM and change of ROA for cross-border M&As 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                   ∆NIM                 ∆NIM       
                                                         IR                           IR 
                                                     DIFFERENCE1    DIFFERENCE5    
                                                                                                                               
          (3)                       
      ∆NIM  
 
DISPERSION5 
    
          (4)                       (5) 
      ∆ROA                ∆ROA 
          IR                          IR 
DIFFERENCE1 DIFFERENCE5 
     (6) 
       ∆ROA 
 
DISPERSION5 
DISPERS 
 
IRDIFFERENCE1                    0.0114 
                                                 (0.0082)                 
IRDIFFERENCE5                                                 0.0143 
                                                                              (0.0143) 
DISPERSION5                                                      
                                                                               
Z-score                                   -0.000004              0.000004                         
                                                (0.00004)              (0.00004) 
Asset diversity                          0.0022                   0.0022           
                                                 (0.0017)                (0.0017)                  
  
 
      
      
      
      
       0.0001 
     (0.0002) 
    0.000009 
    (0.00003) 
      0.0025 
     (0.0018) 
  
  -0.4059                    
  (0.0103)             
                               0.0093 
                              (0.0128) 
                                  
                               
 0.00006                0.00006 
(0.00004)             (0.00004) 
  0.0014                  0.0011 
 (0.0048)               (0.0047) 
  
        
 
 
 
     0.0002 
    (0.0002) 
     0.0001 
   (0.00004) 
     0.0011 
    (0.0049) 
Geographic diversification       -0.0040                 -0.0040 
                                                 (0.0023)                (0.0024) 
     -0.0040 
     (0.0026) 
   0.0024                  0.0024 
 (0.0019)               (0.0017) 
      0.0024 
    (0.0017) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0009*                0.0009** 
                                                 (0.0004)     (0.0003) 
      0.0008** 
     (0.0003) 
   0.0022                  0.0023 
 (0.0014)               (0.0014) 
      0.0023 
    (0.0014) 
Liquid ratio                              -0.0063                 -0.0053 
                                                 (0.0029)                (0.0036)                      
     -0.0049 
(0.0036) 
   0.0018                  0.0012 
 (0.0023)               (0.0026) 
      0.0013 
    (0.0026) 
Capital ratio                              0.0036                   0.0037       
                                                 (0.0026)                (0.0027) 
      0.0034 
     (0.0030) 
  -0.0004                 -0.0002 
 (0.0047)               (0.0051) 
     -0.0006 
    (0.0049) 
Debt-to-equity                         -0.00003               -0.00003 
                                                 (0.0001)                (0.0001)                    
    -0.00003 
(0.0001) 
  0.00004                0.00004 
 (0.0001)               (0.0001) 
      0.0001 
    (0.0001) 
Loan growth                            -0.0008                  -0.0006 
                                                 (0.0027)                (0.0027)_     
     -0.0007 
     (0.0027) 
   0.0088                  0.0088 
 (0.0078)               (0.0079) 
      0.0088 
    (0.0079) 
Loan loss ratio                         -0.0035                  -0.0038  
                                                 (0.0023)                (0.0023) 
     -0.0034 
     (0.0025) 
  -0.0049                 -0.0048 
 (0.0059)               (0.0059) 
     -0.0036 
    (0.0061) 
Cost-to-income                         0.0077                   0.0077 
                                                 (0.0053)                (0.0053) 
      0.0077 
     (0.0056) 
   0.0067                  0.0069 
 (0.0048)               (0.0048) 
      0.0072 
    (0.0050) 
Listed banks                              0.0063*                0.0063* 
                                                 (0.0029)                (0.0030)            
      0.0062* 
    (0.0030) 
  -0.0061                 -0.0060 
 (0.0045)               (0.0043) 
     -0.0060 
    (0.0043) 
Real GDP growth                     -0.0010                 -0.0010** 
                                                 (0.0003)                (0.0003) 
     -0.0011** 
     (0.0004) 
   0.0016                  0.0017 
 (0.0013)               (0.0013) 
      0.0017 
    (0.0013) 
Inflation                                     0.0008                  0.0008 
                                                 (0.0005)                (0.0005) 
      0.0008 
     (0.0006) 
   0.0004                  0.0003 
 (0.0016)               (0.0016) 
      0.0005 
    (0.0017) 
Money  supply  growth             0.0002*                0.0002 
                                                 (0.0001)                (0.0001) 
CR5                                         -0.00002               -0.00002 
                                                (0.00003)              (0.00003) 
Capital regulatory index          -0.0003                  -0.0003 
                                                 (0.0002)                (0.0002)              
Official supervisory index       -0.0012**              -0.0012**                 
                                                 (0.0004)                (0.0004)             
Deposit insurer power             -0.0021*                -0.0020* 
                                                 (0.0010)                (0.0009) 
                                                                               
    
      0.0002 
     (0.0001) 
    -0.00002 
    (0.00003) 
     -0.0003 
     (0.0002) 
     -0.0012** 
     (0.0004) 
     -0.0020* 
     (0.0009) 
  -0.0001                -0.00002 
 (0.0002)               (0.0002) 
 -0.0002***          -0.0002*** 
(0.00004)             (0.00004) 
 -0.0006                 -0.0006 
 (0.0013)               (0.0014) 
 -0.0013                 -0.0013 
 (0.0013)               (0.0012) 
 -0.0021                 -0.0021 
 (0.0031)               (0.0029) 
    -0.00002 
    (0.0002) 
    -0.0002*** 
   (0.00004) 
    -0.0007 
    (0.0014) 
    -0.0014 
    (0.0013) 
    -0.0022 
    (0.0029) 
      
Obs.                                             171                        171 
 
R2 0.0742  0.0833  
 
 
  171 
 
     0.0704 
     171                       171 
 
  0.3070                  0.2394 
   171 
 
      0.2639 
 
 
 
Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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results that it has positively significant estimated coefficients in regressions (4) – (6). One possible 
explanation can be: after some large acquirers completed their M&As, they significantly increase 
their deposits and loans, thus may increase their net interest incomes. Although the proportion of 
non-performing loans had been increasing (loan loss ratio is higher), they could still receive full 
interest payments from borrowers and thus increase net interest income. However, increase in net 
interest income does not necessarily increase the profitability ratio. If net interest income increases 
smaller percentage than total assets, total equity and total revenue, ROA, ROE and NIM should be 
lowered. All these analyses may interpret why loan loss ratio has positive coefficients for change 
of NII while has negative coefficients for all other three profitability ratios.   
Regressions (1) – (3) and regressions (4) – (6) of table 2-12  report results of change of NIM and 
change of ROA. This table has many small and a few significant coefficients and small R2, 
indicating that change of NIM and change of ROA do not respond significantly to most 
independent variables (especially Z-score and DISPERSION5). This may be explained by the 
relatively small numbers of change of NIM (the mean is -0.0020 or -0.20%) and change of ROA   
(-0.0035 or -0.35%). Regarding the results of change of NIM, official supervisory index has same 
results as it has in results of change of ROE and further supports our previous findings. 
Nevertheless, there are still contrary results. For instance, the variable listed bank has positively 
and significant when the dependent variable is the change of NIM while it has negatively 
significant coefficients for the change in ROE. One possible explanation can be that although listed 
banks generally are larger and have more market powers to price loans and deposits than non-
listed banks to earn higher net interest incomes, they still have lower profitability ratios.  
Results of change of ROA reveal that CR5 has negatively significant coefficients, providing further 
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challenges for acquirers whose countries have more concentration ratios can have higher 
performance after M&As.  
2.5.4 Relationships between Acquirers’ Performance Changes and Banking Integration 
Indicators             
As discussed in the previous subsection, even the coefficients of banking integration indicators are 
significant does not necessarily indicate the causal relationships between acquirers’ performance 
changes and banking integration indicators. To investigate such causal relationships between them, 
in this subsection, we will use Granger-causality tests.   
Table 2-13 presents results of pairwise Granger-causality tests for four performance change 
measures. On the one hand, regarding the results of change of ROE and change of ROA, most F-
statistics and p-values are significant for null hypotheses “banking integration indicator does not 
granger-cause performance change” while  most results are insignificant for null hypotheses 
“performance change does not granger-cause banking integration indicators”. Therefore, the 
former null hypotheses can be rejected and latter ones cannot be rejected. Therefore, combined 
with the results in the previous subsections, we conclude that banking integration generally has 
negative causal relationship with change of ROE and change of ROA but change of ROE and 
change of ROA do not have negative causal relationship with banking integration. Specifically, 
combined with the result in previous subsection, results of (2) provide strong evidence that lower 
interest rate difference between distressed and non-distressed countries in the euro area, which 
indicate higher level of banking integration in Europe, can contribute to higher profitability for 
acquirers after M&As.   
 
85 
 
                          Table 2-13   Results of Pairwise Granger-Causality Tests 
 
                     Null Hypothesis F-statistics p-value 
(1) Interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-financial  
Corporations between distressed and non-distressed countries does not granger 
 
 18.6429*** 
   
0.0000 
Cause ΔROA  (IRDIFFERENCE1)   
   
ΔROA does not granger cause interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-
financial corporations between distressed and non-distressed countries 
 
   0.5944        
 
     0.4418 
   
(2) Interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-financial  
Corporations between distressed and non-distressed countries does not granger   
 
   8.3520***       
 
 0.0044 
Cause ΔROE   
   
ΔROE does not granger cause interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-
financial corporations between distressed and non-distressed countries 
 
(3) Interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-financial  
corporations between distressed and non-distressed countries does not granger cause ΔNIM 
 
ΔNIM does not granger cause interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-
financial corporations between distressed and non-distressed countries 
 
(4) Interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-financial  
corporations between distressed and non-distressed countries does not granger cause ΔNII   
 
ΔNII does not granger cause interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-financial 
corporations between distressed and non-distressed countries 
 
 
   1.3399        
 
 
 
 
    0.9005                 
 
 
 
  
    3.2106 ** 
 
 
 
 
    2.9632 *                
 
 
 
 
     0.3494                
 
 0.2487 
 
 
 
 
     0.4084 
 
 
 
 
     0.0429 
 
 
 
 
      0.0545 
 
 
 
 
      0.7057 
(5) Interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-financial  
corporations between euro area average and non-distressed countries does not  
granger cause ΔROA (IRDIFFERENCE5) 
 
ΔROA does not granger cause interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-
financial corporations between euro area average and non-distressed countries       
                                                   
(6) Interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-financial                           
corporations between euro area average and non-distressed countries does not   
granger cause ΔROE                                                                                                                     
ΔROE does not granger cause interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-
financial corporations between euro area average and distressed   countries 
 
  
  18.3987***      
 
 
 
  
  12.8709*** 
 
 
   
 
    7.6676*** 
 
 
 
 
   1.1662 
 
 
       
      0.0000 
 
 
 
  
      0.0004 
 
 
 
 
0.0063 
 
 
 
 
0.2817 
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(7) Interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-financial                           
corporations between euro area average and non-distressed countries does not   
granger cause ΔNIM                                                  
                                                                        
ΔNIM does not granger cause interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-
financial corporations between euro area average and distressed   countries 
  
(8) Interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-financial                           
corporations between euro area average and non-distressed countries does not   
granger cause ΔNII                                                 
                                                                        
ΔNII does not granger cause interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-financial 
corporations between euro area average and distressed   countries 
  
(9) Full range of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for household across euro area 
countries (max – min) does not granger cause ΔROA 
(IRDIFFERENCE2) 
 
ΔROA does not granger cause full range of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for 
household across euro area countries (max – min) 
 
(10) Full range of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for household across euro area 
countries (max – min) does not granger cause ΔROE 
 
 
 
   2.6499*        
 
 
 
 
 
   2.7841*              
 
 
 
   1.8295              
  
 
 
    
    1.3613 
 
 
 
 
   31.8704***     
      
 
   
   
      0.8624     
 
 
  
   
    11.1554*** 
 
 
 
   0.0737 
 
 
 
 
 
    0.0647 
 
 
 
     0.1639 
 
 
 
 
     0.2593 
 
 
 
 
     0.0000 
 
 
 
 
     0.3544 
 
 
 
      
     0.0010 
ΔROE does not granger cause full range of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for 
household across euro area countries (max – min) 
 
(11) Full range of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for household across euro area 
countries (max – min) does not granger cause ΔNIM 
 
ΔNIM does not granger cause full range of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for 
household across euro area countries (max – min) 
  
(12) Full range of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for household across euro area 
countries (max – min) does not granger cause ΔNII 
 
ΔNII does not granger cause full range of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for 
household across euro area countries (max – min) 
  
(13) Inter-quantile of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for household across euro 
area countries (3rd – 1st ) does not granger cause ΔROA  
(IRDIFFERENCE3) 
 
ΔROA does not granger cause inter-quantile of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for 
household across euro area countries (3rd – 1st ) 
      
       0.1058 
 
 
      
       0.9433
  
 
    
       0.0729                
 
 
 
       3.3890** 
 
 
 
       0.0370                  
 
 
 
    
    15.0062***    
 
  
 
 
 
7.5010*** 
 
      
     0.7453 
 
 
     
     0.3915 
 
 
 
    0.9297 
     
 
 
     0.0362 
 
 
 
   0.9637 
 
 
      
      
    0.0002 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0068 
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(14) Inter-quantile of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for household across euro 
area countries (3rd – 1st ) does not granger cause ΔROE     
 
ΔROE does not granger cause inter-quantile of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for 
household across euro area countries (3rd – 1st ) 
 
(15) Inter-quantile of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for household across euro 
area countries (3rd – 1st ) does not granger cause ΔNIM  
 
ΔNIM does not granger cause inter-quantile of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for 
household across euro area countries (3rd – 1st ) 
  
(16) Inter-quantile of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for household across euro 
area countries (3rd – 1st ) does not granger cause ΔNIM  
 
ΔNIM does not granger cause inter-quantile of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for 
household across euro area countries (3rd – 1st ) 
  
(17) Cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans to non-financial 
institution (floating rate and up to 1 year IRF, over EUR 1 million) does not granger cause 
ΔROA (DISPERSION5) 
 
ΔROA does not granger cause cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rate on 
loans to non-financial institution (floating rate and up to 1 year IRF, over EUR 1 million)  
 
(18) Cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans to non-financial 
institution (floating rate and up to 1 year IRF, over EUR 1 million) does not granger cause 
ΔROE 
 
ΔROE does not granger cause cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rate on 
loans to non-financial institution (floating rate and up to 1 year IRF, over EUR 1 million)  
 
(19) Cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans to non-financial 
institution (floating rate and up to 1 year IRF, over EUR 1 million) does not granger cause 
ΔNIM 
 
ΔNIM does not granger cause cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rate on 
loans to non-financial institution (floating rate and up to 1 year IRF, over EUR 1 million)  
  
(20) Cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans to non-financial 
institution (floating rate and up to 1 year IRF, over EUR 1 million) does not granger cause 
ΔNII  
 
ΔNII does not granger cause cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rate on loans 
  
 
12.7637*** 
  
    
      
      0.0880     
 
 
       
       
      0.2289               
         
    
       
      0.5477 
 
 
 
      
      0.6686 
 
 
 
      2.3009 
     
 
 
      
    19.1798*** 
 
 
     
     
      0.0019 
 
 
 
      
     10.5570 
    
 
     
      
       0.1529 
 
 
 
    
       3.1632**    
   
 
 
 
        0.4627 
 
 
 
 
        0.2036 
 
 
 
 
   0.4586 
 
 
0.0005 
 
 
 
0.7671 
 
 
 
     
      0.7957 
 
 
       
      0.5793 
 
 
 
       
      0.5139 
 
 
 
      0.1035 
 
 
 
      
      0.0000 
 
 
 
 
0.9657 
 
 
 
 
0.0014 
 
 
 
 
0.6963 
 
 
 
 
      0.0449 
 
 
 
 
0.6304 
 
 
 
 
0.8160 
 
 
 
 
0.6330 
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to non-financial institution (floating rate and up to 1 year IRF, over EUR 1 million)  
  
(21) Cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans to household 
(consumer credit, over 1 year and up to 5 years IRF) does not granger cause ΔROA 
(DISPERSION3) 
 
ΔROA does not granger cause cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rate on 
loans to non-financial institution (consumer credit, over 1 year and up to 5 years IRF) 
 
(22) Cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans to household 
(consumer credit, over 1 year and up to 5 years IRF) does not granger cause ΔROE 
 
ΔROE does not granger cause cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rate on 
loans to non-financial institution (consumer credit, over 1 year and up to 5 years IRF) 
 
(23) Cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans to household 
(consumer credit, over 1 year and up to 5 years IRF) does not granger cause ΔNIM 
 
ΔNIM does not granger cause cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rate on 
loans to non-financial institution (consumer credit, over 1 year and up to 5 years IRF) 
 
(24) Cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans to household 
(consumer credit, over 1 year and up to 5 years IRF) does not granger cause ΔNII 
 
ΔNII does not granger cause cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rate on loans 
to non-financial institution (consumer credit, over 1 year and up to 5 years IRF) 
 
 
 
 
  15.1536*** 
 
 
  
    
    0.6047 
 
 
      
      
     4.7548** 
 
 
 
     2.2797 
 
 
 
     0.0899                 
 
  
       
 
     0.7323               
 
 
     
 
     1.2325                
 
         
 
     0.2219                
 
         
 
 
         
 
         
 
 
         
 
 
      
      
 
 
 
 
      0.0001 
 
 
 
 
0.4379 
 
 
 
 
0.0306 
 
 
 
0.1330 
 
 
 
0.9140 
 
 
 
 
      0.4823 
 
 
 
 
      0.2944 
 
 
 
      0.8012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
 
In contrast, most F-statistics and p-values for those null hypotheses are insignificant, showing that 
there is no evidence of a strong relationship between change of NII/change of NIM and banking 
integration indicators. These results imply that level of banking integration cannot contribute to 
acquirers’ performance changes after M&As and vice versa. In a word, all above-mentioned results 
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provide solutions for research question 2 and strong supports to hypothesis of the increased 
banking integration in Europe can improve acquirers’ operating performances after cross-border 
M&As. 
2.5.5   Effects of Financial Crisis on Acquirers’ Performance Changes after M&As 
 
In the previous subsections, we have identified several key determinants of acquirers’ performance 
changes after M&As and found that to some extent, higher level of banking integration can 
contribute to the increase of acquirers’ performance after M&As. In this subsection, we will use 
some t-tests to investigate whether 2007-2009 Financial Crisis had negative impacts on acquirers’ 
performance after M&As.  
 Panel A of table 2-14 shows that the average change of NIM is the only variable that is 
significantly negative in our pre-crisis sample. This indicates that acquirers generally could boost 
their profitability through M&As in pre-crisis period. The significant decrease in net interest 
margin for the acquirers may mainly due to ECB’s interest rate cut between 2000 and 2005. In 
contrast, panel B indicates that the average change in NII is the only variable that is significantly 
positive in post-crisis sample, demonstrating that acquirer’ profitability decline dramatically after 
M&As in post-crisis period. The significant increase in the average net interest income can be 
explained by the economies of scale, that is, through M&As, acquirers could make more deposits 
and loans and have more market powers to price the loans and deposits thus could increase interest 
income and/or reduce interest expenses. However, the average increase in net interest income still 
dropped significantly from €2490.74million in pre-crisis period to €1594.25  
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        Table 2- 14   Average changes of performance measures for pre-crisis and post-crisis samples 
Variable                                     (1)         (2) 
                                               N          ∆ROE              N        ∆ROA       
                                                                                                                    
         (3)                       
  N       ∆NIM                  
    
           (4) 
N        ∆NII  
           (mil. Euro)     
  
Panel A: pre-crisis sample 
                                           
                                              309       0.1217***         309    0.0151**               
                                                           (0.0000)                      (0.0420) 
 
 
 
 
299 -0.0027*** 
        (0.0000) 
  
 
297    2490.74*** 
          (0.0000) 
  
Panel B: post-crisis sample      
                                              
                                              162       -0.1430***       162    -0.0087***           
 
162  -0.0023***    
  
151    1594.25***        
  
                                                           (0.0000)                      (0.0000) 
 
 
Panel C: mean comparison (post-crisis – pre-crisis) 
 
                                                           -0.2646***                  -0.0078***       
                                                           (0.0000)                       (0.0000) 
 
 
          (0.0007) 
 
 
 
 
        0.0004                    
         (0.7159) 
           (0.0000) 
 
  
 
  
         -896.49*** 
         (0.0048) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
 
milion.in the post-crisis period. The results in panel C further support this finding. The difference 
between the average net interest income in pre-crisis period and the average net interest income 
in post-crisis period is -€896.40 million, which is also quite significant. Furthermore, both 
differences in average change of ROE (-0.2646) and average change in ROA (-0.0078) are negative 
and significant, while the difference in average change of NIM is slightly positive. All these results 
reveal that both acquirers’ profitability ratios and profits after M&As declined significantly in the 
post-crisis period.  
2.5.6   Robustness Checks  
In addition to the main results in previous subsections, we examine the robustness of the results 
using same model but alternative dependent and explanatory variables. On the one hand, in models 
with full sample, we replace income diversity, tier1, debt-to-asset ratio, asset growth ratio, and 
HHI with asset diversity, capital ratio, debt-to-equity ratio, loan growth ratio, and CR5, and keep 
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all dependent variables unchanged. On the other hand, in models with cross-border sample, we not 
only change the above-mentioned explanatory variables but also replace IRDIFFERENCE1, 
IRDIFFERENCE5 and DISPERSION5 with IRDIFFERENCE2,                                   
IRDIFFERENCE3 and DISPERSION3. Therefore, we expect to have more alternative 
specifications for cross-border sample. All results in robustness check are presented in table 2A-1 
to table 2A-10 in Appendix.   
First, table 2A-1 shows that change of ROE has the same results in alternative specifications as it 
has in main regressions, providing robustness for our results in table 2-4 and confirming our 
previous findings. Second, regressions in table 2A-2 reveal the similar results with regressions in 
table 2-5 for change of NII, but still have two more explanatory variables significant. In most 
alternative specifications, both tier1 and cost-to-income ratio are found to be negative and 
significant. Both results are expected and reasonable because (1) if acquirers have higher tier1 
capital ratio, they will have lower risky assets and will have lower profits; (2) if acquirers have 
higher cost-to-income ratio, they are less efficient and will have lower profits.   
Third, table 2A-3 and table 2A-4 report results of alternative specifications for change of NIM and 
change of ROA, providing quite similar findings except that cost-to-income ratio is not significant 
with change of NIM and income diversity is negatively significant with change of ROA in some 
alternative specifications. The latter results confirm the previous finding of acquirers cannot 
benefit from asset and income diversity to raise their profitability ratios. Generally speaking, the 
results of alternative specifications confirm our findings in main regressions.        
Regarding the results in alternative specifications in cross-border sample, we report them in 
different tables (table 2A-5 to table 2A-10). First, although the overall results in alternative 
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specifications are similar to those in the main regressions, there are still several different results 
for change of ROE. For instance, in table 2A-5, the estimated coefficient of IRDIFFERNECE1 is  
negative and has economic significance, indicating that if the interest rate difference between 
distressed and non-distressed countries in euro area decrease by 1%, acquirers’ ROE will increase 
by 0.4794%. This result confirms that our hypothesis holds. Moreover, all estimated coefficients 
of liquidity ratio, listed banks and official supervisory index are not significant, providing no 
further support the corresponding findings. However, deposit insurer power is found to be negative 
and significant, showing that acquirers come from countries with less powerful deposit insurers 
may have greater profitability ratio. Then z-score has identical results as those in main regressions 
and HHI has the same results as CR5 has in main regressions. Again, these results confirm our 
previous findings. If we change the banking integration indicators and estimate the same model 
again (as results presented in table 2A-7 and table 2A-9), we can find the same results for z-score, 
geographic diversification, liquidity ratio, HHI, official supervisory index and deposit insurer 
power and confirm our previous findings again.  
Second, regressions (4) – (6) of table 2A-5 demonstrate that alternative specifications of change 
of NII, providing the same results as those in main regressions. If we change the banking 
integration indicators (as results shown in table 2A-7 and table 2A-9), we find no more support for 
the negative relationship between banking integration indicators and acquirers’ performance 
changes. But we can still confirm other previous findings for bank-specific, structural and 
regulatory variables in main regressions because all other results are identical.  
Third, regressions (1) – (3) of table 2A-6 report robustness check results for change of NIM. These 
results are similar to those in main regressions, except that loan loss ratio has negatively significant 
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coefficients. If we change the banking integration indicators (as results shown in table  
2-22), the results are even more robust. All coefficients of loan loss ratio are negative and 
economically significant, showing that if an acquirer’s loan loss ratio decreases by 1%, its NIM 
will increase by at least 0.3%. The results of alternative specifications also confirm our previous 
findings of bank-specific and regulatory variables in main regressions. Finally, regressions (4) – 
(6) in table 2A-6 report the results of robustness checks of change of ROA.  HHI has negatively 
significant coefficients for all models, confirming our previous findings. In some regressions, the 
estimated coefficients of z-score and natural log of total assets are positively significant, and those 
of loan loss ratio are negatively significant. These results provide some further supports for the 
findings of (1) acquirers with lower insolvency risks may have greater profitability; (2) larger 
acquirers may have greater profitability; and (3) acquirers with higher asset quality may have 
higher profitability. If we change the banking integration indicators and estimate the same models 
again (as results reported in table 2A-8 and table 2A-10), we will find the similar results and can 
confirm some previous findings for change of ROA and change of NIM.  
 
2.6 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In this chapter, we first use different operating performance measures to investigate the 
determinants of acquirers’ performance changes after M&As between 1997 and 2011. We find the 
robust evidences that acquirers with lower insolvency risks which operate in less concentrated 
banking markets are associated with greater profitability ratios. The latter challenges the traditional 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) view that acquirers that are based in countries with more 
concentrated banking markets can have higher performance after M&As. Moreover, we can 
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provide supports for acquirers that can benefit from geographic diversification to raise ROE after 
M&As. We can also find some evidences that size, liquidity ratio, efficiency, leverage ratio, tier 1 
ratio, concentration ratio, capital regulatory power and supervisory power are the main 
determinants of acquirers’ operating performance changes after M&As. All these results give 
banks managers and regulators implications about what types of acquirers can have higher 
profitability after M&As. We recommend that acquirers (1) with lower insolvency risks, (2) 
operate in less concentrated markets; (3) that merge targets from other continents; (4) with higher 
liquidity ratio; (5) with larger size; (6) operate in markets with less stringent regulation; (7) operate 
in markets with less stringent official supervision; (8) operate in markets with less deposit insurer 
power engage in more cross-border M&A deals outside Europe to boost operating performance.  
Second, to investigate whether acquirers’ operating performance changes have relationships with 
banking integration indicators, we first use principal component analysis to select several most 
important indicators and then include all of them in regressions. We identify that interest rate 
difference between distressed and non-distressed countries in euro area (the indicator that can 
explain most variability) is the only indicator that is negatively significant with several 
performance change measures. However, it could be argued that this result is not the sufficient 
evidence for the negative relationship between acquirers’ performance changes after M&As and 
banking integration indicators. Therefore, we employ Granger-causality tests for these operating 
performance change measures. We identify that interest rate difference between distressed and 
non-distressed countries Granger-causes change of ROE and change of NII but not vice versa. 
Therefore, we can conclude that higher level of banking market integration contributes to acquirers’ 
greater performance after M&As (hypothesis). This significant finding provides implications for 
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bank regulators and managers that banking integration can boost acquirers’ performance changes 
after M&As. Therefore, we recommend that European banking regulators and supervisors should 
strengthen the Banking Union to increase level of financial integration in European banking 
market to improve acquirers’ operating performance after M&As.  
Lastly, we employ some t-tests to examine whether 2007-2009 U.S. Financial Crisis had 
negative impacts on acquirers’ performance after M&As. We further conduct mean-comparison 
t-test to assess whether the difference between the average performance change in post-crisis 
period and the average performance change in pre-crisis period is negatively significant. We 
identify that it is negatively significant and we conclude that the financial crisis did have 
negative impacts on acquirers’ performance changes after M&As.
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Appendix 
 
Table A2-1   Determinants of Acquirers’ change of ROE for bank M&As  
 
 
Variable                                  (1)    (2) 
                                              ∆ROE/full                    ∆ROE       
                                                                                bank- specific 
                                                                              
 
              (3)                       
           ∆ROE 
     banks-specific 
    macroeconomic 
           (4) 
       ∆ROE 
bank-specific 
deal-specific 
  and macro 
    (5) 
      ∆ROE 
 bank-specific 
and regulatory 
 
 
Z-score                                      0.0011**                 0.0008** 
                                                 (0.0004)                   (0.0003) 
Income diversity                      -0.0091                     -0.0077 
                                                 (0.0505)                   (0.0649) 
Geographic diversification       0.0461***                0.0618** 
                                                 (0.0137)                   (0.0212) 
 
            
           0.0008** 
          (0.0003) 
          -0.0168 
          (0.0567) 
           0.0607*** 
          (0.0186) 
  
      
     0.0007** 
    (0.0003) 
    -0.0120 
    (0.0591) 
     0.0593*** 
    (0.0185) 
  
     
    0.0010** 
   (0.0004) 
    0.0019 
   (0.0601) 
    0.0450** 
   (0.0151) 
Cross border                            -0.0450**                 -0.0571** 
                                                 (0.0203)                   (0.0203) 
          -0.0656*** 
          (0.0211) 
     -0.0639*** 
    (0.0206) 
    -0.0366* 
   (0.0207) 
Ln(TA)                                     -0.0007                     -0.0016 
                                                 (0.0084)        (0.0098) 
          -0.0026 
          (0.0098) 
     -0.0012 
    (0.0094) 
    -0.0024 
   (0.0088) 
Liquid ratio                               0.2111**                  0.2270** 
                                                 (0.0800)                   (0.0874)                    
           0.2308** 
 (0.0861) 
      0.2296** 
    (0.0859) 
     0.2098** 
   (0.0838) 
Tier 1                                        -0.2852                    -0.3803 
                                                 (0.5841)                   (0.6418) 
          -0.4720 
          (0.6263) 
     -0.5038 
    (0.6339) 
    -0.2601 
   (0.6093) 
Debt-to-asset                            -0.0267                    -0.0859 
                                                 (0.0824)                   (0.0998) 
Asset growth                             0.0185                      0.0293 
                                                 (0.0349)                   (0.0424) 
Loan loss ratio                          0.7224*                     0.5202  
                                                 (0.3949)                   (0.5764) 
          -0.0695 
          (0.1140) 
           0.0168 
          (0.0388) 
           0.6350 
          (0.5195) 
     -0.0847 
    (0.1271) 
     0.0186 
    (0.0408) 
     0.6323 
    (0.5153) 
    -0.0333 
   (0.0652) 
    0.0288 
   (0.0369) 
    0.7022 
   (0.4585) 
Cost-to-income                         0.0300                     -0.0095 
                                                 (0.0788)                   (0.0679) 
           0.0110 
          (0.0743) 
      0.0008 
    (0.0785) 
     0.0188 
   (0.0715) 
Listed banks                             -0.0196                      
                                                 (0.0301)                     
            
            
     -0.0318 
    (0.0370) 
         
Real GDP growth                     0.0182**                    
                                                 (0.0068)                     
           0.0139** 
          (0.0062) 
      0.0138** 
    (0.0063) 
  
Inflation                                   -0.0136**                   
                                                 (0.0061)                     
          -0.0194** 
          (0.0078) 
 -0.0195** 
(0.0081) 
  
Money supply growth               0.0064**                     
                   (0.0028)                     
HHI                                          -0.0001**                      
                                              (0.00003)                                      
           0.0072** 
          (0.0025) 
  0.0072** 
    (0.0024) 
     
  
 
   -0.0001** 
   (0.00003) 
Capital regulatory index           0.0046                   
                                                 (0.0110)                       
Official supervisory index       -0.0174                     
                                                 (0.0109)                                  
Deposit insurer power             -0.0478                                   
                                                 (0.0300)                               
    
       
 
     0.0072 
   (0.0107) 
   -0.0230** 
   (0.0104) 
   -0.0504 
   (0.0305) 
      
Obs.                                             471                          471 
 
R2                                                                    0.2105                     0.0733 
 
        471 
      
            0.1141 
          471 
 
       0.1128 
  471 
    
    0.1618 
 
 
 
Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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Table A2-2   Determinants of Acquirers’ change of NII for bank M&As  
 
 
 
Variable                                      (1)                         (2)        
                                               ∆NII/full                  ∆NII  
                                                                          bank-specific 
          (3)  
        ∆NII 
    bank-specific   
macroeconomic 
        (4) 
     ∆NII 
bank-specific  
deal-specific 
 and  macro 
    (5) 
       ∆NII 
 bank-specific 
and regulatory 
 
 
 
Z-score                                    -0.2309                   2.0364                         
                                                (5.6640)                 (3.7550) 
Income diversity                     -1347.68                -1424.14 
                                                (1491.45)              (1637.74) 
 
      
1.4641 
       (3.8336) 
      -1491.46 
      (1580.79) 
 
       
 
  
  0.7894 
 (4.0052) 
-1470.20 
(1571.88) 
  
   
    0.3424 
   (5.6540) 
  -1308.96 
  (1547.30) 
Geographic diversification       -77.83                    437.62 
                                                 (276.71)                (276.76) 
Cross border                              84.29                     11.44 
                                                 (237.78)                (224.59) 
        358.21 
       (301.21) 
         71.67 
       (290.13) 
   352.08 
 (290.05) 
   80.31 
 (278.46) 
     2.3649 
   (267.73) 
     24.61 
   (179.54) 
Ln(TA)                                      225.22***             279.62*** 
                                                  (62.59)      (66.09) 
       281.01*** 
       (63.23) 
   291.14*** 
  (66.28) 
     224.54*** 
    (59.88) 
Liquid ratio                             3928.27***           4521.19*** 
                                               (1360.04)               (1504.58)                      
     4378.95*** 
(1418.29) 
  4371.18*** 
(1421.63) 
    4047.39*** 
   (1430.28) 
Tier 1                                      -7535.86               -11209.55* 
                                                (5391.27)              (6155.02) 
    -11120.69* 
     (6127.20) 
  -11342* 
(6211.74) 
    -7086.93 
   (5365.06) 
Debt-to-asset                            -756.43                 -656.36 
                                                 (526.53)                (517.78) 
      -583.11 
      (579.93) 
  -674.63 
 (580.21) 
     -800.81* 
    (408.46)     
Asset growth                             913.24                   929.94 
                                                 (799.99)                (684.58) 
       802.84 
      (797.46) 
   815.56 
 (806.01) 
     1028.94 
    (736.50) 
Loan loss ratio                          -706.51                 1982.69  
                                                (5520.73)              (6061.81) 
      2778.45 
     (6704.14) 
  3026.92 
(6685.70) 
    -1948.18 
   (4665.57) 
Cost-to-income                        -1180.98              -2327.69** 
                                                  (871.84)              (1027.81) 
     -2060.53** 
      (947.29) 
 -2113.55* 
 (998.40) 
    -1413.67 
    (825.24) 
Listed banks                              -92.34                    
                                                  (397.62)                
      -229.39 
 (494.67) 
     
Real GDP growth                     -124.40                 
                                                  (165.11)                
      -118.21 
      (143.68) 
  -120.17 
 (140.74) 
   
Inflation                                       68.65                     
                                                  (100.73)                  
  83.94 
       (90.81) 
    85.42 
  (90.87) 
  
Money supply growth                 32.21                     
                    (59.39)                 
HHI                                           -0.4681*            
                                                  (0.2392)  
        34.15 
       (67.47) 
    33.78 
  (67.55) 
  
 
    -0.4936**  
     (0.2116) 
Capital regulatory index           -199.70**             
                                                   (75.08)                 
Official supervisory index           8.66                   
                                                   (80.32)                 
Deposit insurer power             778.83***           
                                                  (224.16)              
    
        -217.34*** 
     (64.85) 
      33.61 
     (74.80) 
     803.76*** 
    (238.96) 
      
Obs.                                               448                        448     448  448         448 
 
R2                                                             0.3054                   0.2523 
  
 
  
       0.2458 
  
 0.2471 
   
     0.3096 
      
      
 
Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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     Table A2-3   Determinants of Acquirers’ change of NIM for bank M&As  
 
 
Variable                                      (1)                         (2)        
                                               ∆NIM/full               ∆NIM  
                                                                          bank-specific 
          (3)  
       ∆NIM 
    bank-specific   
macroeconomic 
         (4) 
     ∆NIM 
bank-specific  
deal-specific 
 and  macro 
    (5) 
      ∆NIM 
 bank-specific 
and regulatory 
 
 
 
Z-score                                      0.00003*              0.00003                         
                                                 (0.00002)              (0.00002) 
Income diversity                        0.0013                  0.0018 
                                                  (0.0034)               (0.0036) 
 
      
0.00002 
      (0.00002) 
        0.0016 
       (0.0033) 
 
       
 
  
  0.00003 
 (0.00002) 
   0.0011 
  (0.0034) 
  
   
    0.00002 
   (0.00001) 
     0.0014 
    (0.00375) 
Geographic diversification       -0.0029*               -0.0023 
                                                  (0.0015)               (0.0014) 
Cross border                              0.0018                  0.0012 
                                                  (0.0014)               (0.0014) 
       -0.0029 
       (0.0014) 
        0.0018 
       (0.0014) 
   -0.0028* 
  (0.0014) 
   0.0017 
  (0.0014) 
     -0.0027 
    (0.0018) 
     0.0012 
    (0.0013) 
Ln(TA)                                      -0.0004                 -0.0001 
                                                  (0.0002)      (0.0002) 
       -0.0002 
       (0.0002) 
   -0.0003 
  (0.0002) 
     -0.0001 
    (0.0002) 
Liquid ratio                               -0.0021                 -0.0015 
                                                  (0.0026)                (0.0028)                      
       -0.0024 
(0.0026) 
   -0.0023 
  (0.0026) 
     -0.0005 
    (0.0032) 
Tier 1                                          0.0018                  0.0042 
                                                  (0.0151)                (0.0133) 
        0.0047 
       (0.0136) 
    0.0071 
  (0.0138) 
    -0.00004 
    (0.0136) 
Debt-to-asset                              0.0010                  -0.0007 
                                                  (0.0016)                (0.0016) 
       -0.0012 
       (0.0018) 
    0.0001 
  (0.0018) 
      0.0015 
    (0.0024)     
Asset growth                             -0.0005                  0.0007 
                                                  (0.0012)                (0.0013) 
       -0.0002 
       (0.0011) 
   -0.0004 
  (0.0012) 
     -0.0004 
    (0.0011) 
Loan loss ratio                           -0.0128                 -0.0226  
                                                  (0.0147)                (0.0164) 
       -0.0189 
       (0.0158) 
   -0.0189 
  (0.0158) 
     -0.0220 
    (0.0181) 
Cost-to-income                          0.0067                   0.0040 
                                                  (0.0039)                (0.0034) 
        0.0056 
       (0.0039) 
    0.0065 
  (0.0039) 
      0.0032 
    (0.0037) 
Listed banks                               0.0028*                    
                                                  (0.0014)                
        0.0027* 
  (0.0013) 
     
Real GDP growth                     -0.0009**                 
                                                  (0.0003)                
        -0.0008** 
        (0.0003) 
   -0.0008** 
  (0.0003) 
   
Inflation                                    -0.0003                     
                                                  (0.0004)                  
  -0.0003 
        (0.0004) 
   -0.0003 
  (0.0004) 
  
Money supply growth                0.0003***                     
                     (0.0001)                 
HHI                                        -0.0000004            
                                               (0.0000005)  
         0.0003*** 
        (0.0001) 
    0.0003*** 
  (0.0001) 
  
 
   -0.0000005  
   (0.0000005) 
Capital regulatory index             0.0003             
                                                   (0.0003)                 
Official supervisory index         -0.0005                  
                                                   (0.0003)                 
Deposit insurer power               -0.0007           
                                                   (0.0008)              
    
        -0.00002 
     (0.0003) 
     -0.0004 
     (0.0004) 
     -0.0007 
     (0.0011) 
      
Obs.                                               461                        461      461   461          461 
 
R2                                                             0.0241                   0.0148 
  
 
  
        0.0209 
  
  0.0227 
   
     0.0209 
      
      
 
Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasitity-robust standard errors 
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Table A2-4   Determinants of Acquirers’ change of ROA for bank M&As  
 
 
 
Variable                                       (1)                         (2)        
                                               ∆ROA/full               ∆ROA  
                                                                          bank-specific 
          (3)  
       ∆ROA 
    bank-specific   
macroeconomic 
        (4) 
    ∆ROA 
bank-specific  
deal-specific 
 and  macro 
    (5) 
      ∆ROA 
 bank-specific 
and regulatory 
 
 
 
Z-score                                      0.00002                 0.00002                         
                                                 (0.00003)              (0.00002) 
Income diversity                        -0.0055                 -0.0055 
                                                  (0.0031)                (0.0031) 
 
      
0.00002 
      (0.00002) 
       -0.0059* 
       (0.0031) 
 
       
 
  
  0.00002 
 (0.00003) 
  -0.0057* 
  (0.0031) 
  
   
    0.00002 
   (0.00003) 
    -0.0050 
    (0.0032) 
Geographic diversification         0.0009                  0.0018 
                                                  (0.0007)                (0.0012) 
Cross border                               0.0003                  0.0002 
                                                  (0.0014)                (0.0013) 
        0.0017 
       (0.0011) 
       -0.0001 
       (0.0013) 
    0.0017 
  (0.0011) 
  -0.0001 
  (0.0013) 
      0.0008 
    (0.0007) 
     0.0006 
    (0.0015) 
Ln(TA)                                       0.0008                  0.0007 
                                                  (0.0006)      (0.0006) 
        0.0007 
       (0.0006) 
    0.0007 
  (0.0006) 
      0.0008 
    (0.0006) 
Liquid ratio                                0.0070                  0.0078 
                                                  (0.0053)               (0.0057)                      
        0.0080 
(0.0057) 
    0.0080 
  (0.0057) 
      0.0069 
    (0.0054) 
Tier 1                                          0.0152                 0.0088 
                                                  (0.0349)               (0.0388) 
        0.0048 
       (0.0382) 
    0.0038 
  (0.0382) 
      0.0160 
    (0.0357) 
Debt-to-asset                              0.0032                  0.0015 
                                                  (0.0021)               (0.0022) 
        0.0022 
       (0.0032) 
    0.0017 
  (0.0031) 
      0.0031* 
    (0.0015)     
Asset growth                             -0.0024                 -0.0019 
                                                  (0.0020)                (0.0017) 
       -0.0025 
       (0.0020) 
   -0.0024 
  (0.0020) 
     -0.0020 
    (0.0017) 
Loan loss ratio                            0.0017                 -0.0048  
                                                  (0.0335)                (0.0424) 
        0.0002 
       (0.0383) 
    0.0001 
  (0.0381) 
      0.0011 
    (0.0369) 
Cost-to-income                          0.0092*                 0.0072 
                                                  (0.0051)                (0.0046) 
        0.0081 
       (0.0049) 
    0.0078 
  (0.0052) 
      0.0087* 
    (0.0044) 
Listed banks                              -0.0008                    
                                                  (0.0020)                
            -0.0011 
  (0.0020) 
      
Real GDP growth                       0.0008**                 
                                                  (0.0004)                
        0.0006* 
       (0.0003) 
    0.0006 
  (0.0003) 
      
Inflation                                     -0.0008                     
                                                  (0.0005)                  
 -0.0009 
       (0.0006) 
   -0.0009 
  (0.0006) 
       
Money supply growth                0.0003*                     
                     (0.0002)                 
HHI                                          -0.000003*            
                                                 (0.000001)  
        0.0003* 
       (0.0002) 
    0.0003 
  (0.0002) 
      
    
   -0.000003*  
   (0.000001) 
Capital regulatory index           -0.0004             
                                                  (0.0009)                 
Official supervisory index        -0.0004                  
                                                  (0.0005)                 
Deposit insurer power              -0.0007           
                                                  (0.0017)              
    
         -0.0003 
     (0.0010) 
     -0.0006 
     (0.0005) 
     -0.0009 
     (0.0018) 
      
Obs.                                               471                        471      471   471          471 
 
R2                                                            0.1627                   0.0643 
  
 
  
        0.1114 
  
  0.1078 
   
     0.1054 
      
      
 
Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasitity-robust standard errors 
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Table A2-5   Determinants of Acquirers’ change of ROE for cross-border M&As  
 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                   ∆ROE                 ∆ROE       
                                                         IR                           IR 
                                                     DIFFERENCE1    DIFFERENCE5    
                                                                                                                               
          (3)                       
      ∆ROE  
 
DISPERSION5 
    
          (4)                       (5) 
       ∆NII                   ∆NII 
          IR                          IR 
DIFFERENCE1 DIFFERENCE5 
    (6) 
        ∆NII  
 
DISPERSION5 
DISPERS 
 
IRDIFFERENCE1                   -0.4794*                  
                                                 (0.2276)                 
IRDIFFERENCE5                                                -0.8945 
                                                                              (0.4961) 
DISPERSION5                                                      
                                                                               
Z-score                                     0.0023**              0.0022**                         
                                                 (0.0008)               (0.0008) 
Income diversity                       0.0929                  0.0833           
                                                 (0.0792)               (0.0704)                  
  
 
      
      
      
      
     -0.0102 
     (0.0065) 
      0.0019** 
     (0.0007) 
      0.0723 
     (0.0856) 
  
 -3593.50*  
 (1815.60)             
                             -6333.59 
                             (3699.05) 
                                  
                               
   20.30*                 19.42* 
   (9.43)                  (9.35) 
 -871.63                -945.41 
(2376.67)             (2235.93) 
  
        
 
 
 
    -95.58 
    (99.49) 
     16.50 
     (9.99) 
  -1043.43 
  (2333.91) 
Geographic diversification        0.0781                 0.0763 
                                                 (0.0422)               (0.0410) 
      0.0835* 
     (0.0397) 
  -317.84                -326.02 
 (437.62)               (429.23) 
    -268.61 
   (343.32) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0110                  0.0133 
                                                 (0.0194)    (0.0198) 
      0.0152 
     (0.0175) 
   460.18                  477.95 
 (285.68)               (292.67) 
     491.94 
   (280.41) 
Liquid ratio                               0.2043*                0.2027* 
                                                 (0.1310)               (0.1270)                      
      0.1861* 
(0.1075) 
   5609.16***        5579.23*** 
 (1623.56)            (1618.48) 
    5458.19*** 
  (1664.07) 
Tier 1                                        0.6947                  0.6682       
                                                 (0.8685)               (0.8795) 
      0.6120 
     (0.8958) 
 -25640.59**        -26054.82** 
 (9203.85)             (8870.3) 
   -25819.82** 
  (9871.57) 
Debt-to-asset                            -0.1838                -0.1856 
                                                 (0.2362)               (0.2386)                    
     -0.1841 
(0.2285) 
  -1006.55              -1030.31 
 (1249.59)             (1239.32) 
   -1092.59 
  (1296.32) 
Asset growth                             0.1590                  0.1469 
                                                 (0.1174)               (0.1132)_     
      0.1530 
     (0.1032) 
   4691.95**           4608.36** 
 (1691.93)             (1676.16) 
    4622.07** 
  (1585.49) 
Loan loss ratio                           0.0449                 0.0443  
                                                 (0.0578)               (0.0488) 
      0.0120 
     (0.0417) 
  14177.76***     14177.77*** 
  (485.77)               (490.58) 
   13815.22*** 
   (974.92) 
Cost-to-income                        -0.0222                 -0.0185 
                                                 (0.1421)               (0.1420) 
     -0.0418 
     (0.1575) 
  -2205.41              -2161.41 
 (1576.17)             (1563.49) 
   -2366.04 
  (1835.10) 
Listed banks                             -0.1305                -0.1373 
                                                 (0.0799)               (0.0821)            
     -0.1301 
     (0.0789) 
   -724.93                -805.76 
  (940.16)              (905.80) 
    -774.61 
   (943.00) 
Real GDP growth                      0.0161                 0.0146 
                                                 (0.0194)               (0.0195) 
      0.0171 
     (0.0200) 
    -50.07                  -63.23 
  (325.64)              (318.64) 
     -47.15 
   (330.44) 
Inflation                                     0.0019                 0.0029 
                                                 (0.0212)               (0.0212) 
     -0.0045 
     (0.0212) 
    -22.12                  -14.45 
  (211.23)              (213.74) 
     -77.08 
   (253.62) 
Money  supply  growth             0.0050                  0.0053 
                                                 (0.0065)               (0.0066) 
HHI                                          -0.0002***           -0.0001*** 
                                                (0.00003)              (0.00003) 
Capital regulatory index          -0.0031                 -0.0024 
                                                 (0.0164)               (0.0163)              
Official supervisory index       -0.0346                 -0.0338                 
                                                 (0.0189)               (0.0192)             
Deposit insurer power             -0.0649*               -0.0674* 
                                                 (0.0320)               (0.0344) 
                                                                               
    
      0.0057 
     (0.0068) 
     -0.0001*** 
    (0.00004) 
      0.0011 
     (0.0144) 
     -0.0313 
     (0.0182) 
     -0.0701* 
     (0.0350) 
     98.80                  102.23 
   (81.25)                (79.91) 
  -0.4167                -0.3846 
  (0.3338)              (0.3139) 
 -693.12***          -687.60*** 
  (178.01)              (177.36) 
 -247.84*               -241.21 
  (130.00)              (134.79) 
 1566.77***         1548.1*** 
  (324.35)              (331.59) 
     102.55 
    (83.52) 
   -0.3953 
   (0.3308) 
   -652.81*** 
   (189.99) 
   -214.66 
   (124.29) 
  1538.87*** 
   (309.44) 
      
Obs.                                             171                       171 
 
R2 0.2940 0.2954  
 
 
  171 
 
     0.3575 
      169                      169 
 
  0.3664                 0.3496 
 169 
 
    0.4141 
 
 
 
 
Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasitity-robust standard errors 
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Table A2-6   Determinants of Acquirers’ change of NIM for cross-border M&As 
 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                   ∆NIM                 ∆NIM       
                                                         IR                           IR 
                                                     DIFFERENCE1    DIFFERENCE5    
                                                                                                                               
          (3)                       
      ∆NIM  
 
DISPERSION5 
    
          (4)                       (5) 
     ∆ROA                ∆ROA 
          IR                          IR 
DIFFERENCE1 DIFFERENCE5 
    (6) 
      ∆ROA  
 
DISPERSION5 
DISPERS 
 
IRDIFFERENCE1                    0.0112                  
                                                 (0.0080)                 
IRDIFFERENCE5                                                 0.0138 
                                                                              (0.0143) 
DISPERSION5                                                      
                                                                               
Z-score                                   -0.000002              0.000002                         
                                                (0.00004)             (0.00004) 
Income diversity                       0.0023                  0.0025           
                                                 (0.0032)               (0.0031)                  
  
 
      
      
      
      
      0.00005 
     (0.0001) 
      0.00001 
    (0.00003) 
      0.0026 
     (0.0033) 
  
  -0.0050  
  (0.0099)             
                               0.0083 
                              (0.0126) 
                                  
                               
  0.00008*             0.00007* 
 (0.00004)            (0.00004) 
  -0.0021                -0.0022 
  (0.0040)              (0.0038) 
  
        
 
 
 
     0.0001 
    (0.0002) 
    0.00008 
   (0.00004) 
    -0.0020 
    (0.0037) 
Geographic diversification       -0.0040                -0.0040 
                                                 (0.0023)               (0.0024) 
     -0.0041 
     (0.0026) 
    0.0025                 0.0025 
  (0.0020)              (0.0019) 
      0.0025 
    (0.0019) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0009*                0.0008* 
                                                 (0.0004)    (0.0004) 
      0.0008* 
     (0.0004) 
    0.0024                 0.0025* 
  (0.0014)              (0.0013) 
      0.0025* 
    (0.0013) 
Liquid ratio                               -0.0062                -0.0060 
                                                 (0.0035)               (0.0036)                      
     -0.0058 
(0.0035) 
    0.0010                 0.0006 
  (0.0033)              (0.0033) 
      0.0008 
    (0.0032) 
Tier 1                                        -0.0115                -0.0083       
                                                 (0.0234)               (0.0215) 
     -0.0047 
     (0.0234) 
    0.0570                 0.0502 
  (0.0538)              (0.0552) 
      0.0493 
    (0.0580) 
Debt-to-asset                            -0.0028                -0.0030 
                                                 (0.0033)               (0.0034)                    
     -0.0033 
(0.0034) 
    0.0043                 0.0048 
  (0.0047)              (0.0045) 
      0.0050 
    (0.0044) 
Asset growth                            -0.0024                -0.0022 
                                                 (0.0032)               (0.0032)_     
     -0.0025 
     (0.0036) 
    0.0130                 0.0132 
  (0.0087)              (0.0085) 
      0.0132 
    (0.0085) 
Loan loss ratio                          -0.0030*              -0.0032**  
                                                 (0.0013)               (0.0013) 
     -0.0033* 
     (0.0016) 
   -0.0078**           -0.0073** 
  (0.0024)              (0.0024) 
     -0.0067 
    (0.0026) 
Cost-to-income                          0.0071                 0.0071 
                                                 (0.0055)               (0.0056) 
      0.0072 
     (0.0058) 
    0.0080                 0.0080 
  (0.0055)              (0.0054) 
      0.0083 
    (0.0057) 
Listed banks                              0.0060*                0.0060* 
                                                 (0.0029)               (0.0030)            
      0.0059* 
     (0.0030) 
   -0.0046               -0.0044 
  (0.0034)              (0.0032) 
     -0.0045 
    (0.0033) 
Real GDP growth                     -0.0010***          -0.0010** 
                                                 (0.0003)               (0.0003) 
     -0.0010** 
     (0.0003) 
    0.0019                 0.0020 
  (0.0012)              (0.0013) 
      0.0019 
    (0.0013) 
Inflation                                     0.0006                 0.0006 
                                                 (0.0004)               (0.0005) 
      0.0007 
     (0.0006) 
    0.0001                0.00007 
  (0.0015)              (0.0014) 
      0.0002 
    (0.0015) 
Money  supply  growth             0.0002**             0.0002* 
                                                 (0.0001)               (0.0001) 
HHI                                       -0.0000004           -0.0000005 
                                              (0.0000008)         (0.0000007) 
Capital regulatory index          -0.0002                 -0.0002 
                                                 (0.0004)               (0.0003)              
Official supervisory index       -0.0011***           -0.0011***                 
                                                 (0.0003)               (0.0003)             
Deposit insurer power             -0.0021**             -0.0020* 
                                                 (0.0009)               (0.0009) 
                                                                               
    
      0.0002 
     (0.0001) 
   -0.0000005 
   (0.0000007) 
     -0.0002 
     (0.0003) 
     -0.0011*** 
     (0.0003) 
     -0.0019** 
     (0.0008) 
    0.00001              0.00004 
  (0.0002)              (0.0002) 
-0.000005*         -0.000004* 
(0.000002)          (0.000002) 
  -0.0011                -0.0011 
  (0.0013)              (0.0013) 
  -0.0010                -0.0010 
  (0.0013)              (0.0012) 
  -0.0014                -0.0015 
  (0.0029)              (0.0027) 
     0.00004 
    (0.0003) 
  -0.000004* 
  (0.000002) 
     -0.0011 
    (0.0014) 
     -0.0011 
    (0.0013) 
     -0.0015 
    (0.0027) 
      
Obs.                                             171                       171 
 
R2 0.0797 0.0900  
 
 
  171 
 
     0.0819 
      171                      171 
 
  0.3314                 0.2826 
  171 
 
     0.3041 
 
 
 
 
Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasitity-robust standard errors 
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Table A2-7 Determinants of Acquirers’ change of ROE for cross-border M&As 
 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                   ∆ROE                 ∆ROE       
                                                         IR                          IR    
                                                     DIFFERENCE2    DIFFERENCE3    
                                                                                                                               
          (3)                       
      ∆ROE  
       
DISPERSION3    
          (4)                       (5) 
       ∆NII                   ∆NII 
          IR                          IR 
DIFFERENCE2 DIFFERENCE3 
     (6) 
        ∆NII  
 
DISPERSION3 
DISPERS 
 
IRDIFFERENCE2                   -0.0208                 
                                                 (0.1001)                 
IRDIFFERENCE3                                                 0.4228 
                                                                              (0.2572) 
DISPERSION3                                                      
                                                                               
Z-score                                      0.0011*                0.0011**                         
                                                 (0.0005)               (0.0005) 
Asset diversity                         -0.0396                 -0.0316           
                                                 (0.0973)               (0.0979)                  
  
 
      
      
      
      
      0.0002 
     (0.0021) 
      0.0011* 
     (0.0005) 
     -0.0412 
     (0.1070) 
  
 -147.77  
 (917.45)             
                              3146.17 
                             (1916.51) 
                                  
                               
   17.55                   17.79 
  (10.96)                (10.65) 
 -255.86                -216.46 
(1830.74)             (1779.92) 
  
        
 
 
 
      8.72 
    (20.27) 
     17.68 
    (10.97) 
   -245.16 
  (1837.70) 
Geographic diversification       0.0478*                0.0600* 
                                                 (0.0215)               (0.0297) 
      0.0482* 
     (0.0223) 
  -329.61                 -243.61 
 (394.33)               (296.22) 
    -319.08 
   (395.47) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0234                  0.0252 
                                                 (0.0223)    (0.0225) 
      0.0238 
     (0.0222) 
   443.39                  457.54 
 (251.20)               (259.20) 
     454.23 
   (264.10) 
Liquid ratio                               0.2785**              0.2806** 
                                                 (0.1002)               (0.1029)                      
      0.2794** 
(0.0987) 
 5388.44**           5410.09** 
(1723.60)            (1732.56) 
    5446.31** 
  (1762.26) 
Capital ratio                             -0.0938                 -0.1194       
                                                 (0.1027)               (0.0955) 
     -0.0922 
     (0.1033) 
 -3504.65**         -3680.87** 
(1450.98)            (1472.59) 
   -3492.65** 
  (1468.91) 
Debt-to-equity                         -0.0163                 -0.0163 
                                                 (0.0105)               (0.0106)                    
     -0.0163 
(0.0104) 
   -17.26                 -16.58 
  (28.51)                (29.53) 
     -17.95 
    (28.31) 
Loan growth                            -0.0693                 -0.0389 
                                                 (0.1847)               (0.1822)_     
     -0.0669 
     (0.1863) 
   4139.33*            4367.82* 
(1878.50)            (1965.14) 
     4213.83* 
   (1904.68) 
Loan loss ratio                         -0.2285                 -0.2392  
                                                 (0.2467)               (0.2348) 
     -0.2291 
     (0.2601) 
   17919***           17832*** 
 (1803.81)           (1851.52) 
    17982*** 
   (1840.39) 
Cost-to-income                         0.1587                  0.1091 
                                                 (0.1792)               (0.1856) 
      0.1578 
     (0.1845) 
  -1244.10             -1648.44 
 (1429.63)            (1749.06) 
    -1279.41 
   (1482.27) 
Listed banks                             -0.1770*              -0.1830* 
                                                 (0.0838)               (0.0793)            
     -0.1762* 
     (0.0832) 
    -42.24                  -43.19 
  (667.58)               (627.98) 
      -35.82 
    (649.70) 
Real GDP growth                      0.0120                 0.0204 
                                                 (0.0176)               (0.0214) 
      0.0129 
     (0.0188) 
   -147.83                 -80.99 
  (357.43)               (395.60) 
     -130.67 
    (366.18) 
Inflation                                    -0.0047                -0.0150 
                                                 (0.0211)               (0.0218) 
     -0.0062 
     (0.0221) 
     90.60                   11.68 
  (259.51)              (272.14) 
       68.75 
    (258.13) 
Money  supply  growth             0.0076                  0.0061 
                                                 (0.0078)               (0.0077) 
CR5                                          -0.0049***          -0.0048*** 
                                                 (0.0012)               (0.0012) 
Capital regulatory index            0.0178                 0.0220 
                                                 (0.0193)               (0.0170)              
Official supervisory index       -0.0299**             -0.0237*                 
                                                 (0.0110)               (0.0111)             
Deposit insurer power             -0.0529*               -0.0514 
                                                 (0.0250)               (0.0283) 
                                                                               
    
      0.0076 
     (0.0081) 
     -0.0049*** 
     (0.0012) 
      0.0179 
     (0.0193) 
     -0.0292** 
     (0.0107) 
     -0.0522* 
     (0.0244) 
     96.78                   85.14 
   (80.46)                (91.88) 
    -7.88                    -7.35 
    (9.74)                  (9.72) 
 -759.85***           -730.55*** 
  (168.34)              (179.18) 
  -353.59**            -307.48* 
  (132.30)              (152.83) 
 1385.97***         1395.26*** 
  (295.59)              (292.82) 
       94.67 
     (81.15) 
      -7.54 
      (9.49) 
    -760.67*** 
    (167.01) 
    -345.19** 
    (134.47) 
    1394.63*** 
    (296.99) 
      
Obs.                                             171                       171 
 
R2 0.4378 0.5036  
 
 
  171 
 
     0.4169 
      169                      169 
 
  0.4664                 0.4510 
   169 
 
     0.4926 
 
 
 
Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasitity-robust standard errors 
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Table A2-8   Determinants of Acquirers’ performance changes for cross-border M&As  
 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                   ∆NIM                 ∆NIM       
                                                         IR                           IR 
                                                     DIFFERENCE2    DIFFERENCE3    
                                                                                                                               
          (3)                       
      ∆NIM  
 
DISPERSION3 
    
          (4)                       (5) 
      ∆ROA                ∆ROA 
          IR                          IR 
DIFFERENCE2 DIFFERENCE3 
     (6) 
       ∆ROA 
 
DISPERSION3 
DISPERS 
 
IRDIFFERENCE2                    0.0022 
                                                 (0.0039)                 
IRDIFFERENCE3                                                 -0.0143 
                                                                               (0.0105) 
DISPERSION3                                                     
                                                                               
Z-score                                     0.00001                  0.00001                         
                                               (0.000003)              (0.00004) 
Asset diversity                          0.0024                   0.0022           
                                                 (0.0018)                (0.0018)                  
  
 
      
      
      
      
     -0.0001 
     (0.0001) 
     0.00001 
    (0.00003) 
      0.0024 
     (0.0018) 
  
  -0.0099                    
  (0.0089)             
                              -0.0039 
                              (0.0167) 
                                  
                               
 0.00006                0.00006 
(0.00004)             (0.00004) 
  0.0022                  0.0012 
 (0.0047)               (0.0050) 
  
        
 
 
 
   -0.00002 
    (0.0001) 
    0.00007 
   (0.00004) 
     0.0012 
    (0.0050) 
Geographic diversification       -0.0040                 -0.0044 
                                                 (0.0026)                (0.0029) 
     -0.0040 
     (0.0026) 
   0.0023                  0.0023 
 (0.0017)               (0.0017) 
      0.0024 
    (0.0018) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0008**               0.0007** 
                                                 (0.0003)     (0.0003) 
      0.0008* 
     (0.0003) 
   0.0021                  0.0022 
 (0.0012)               (0.0014) 
      0.0022 
    (0.0013) 
Liquid ratio                              -0.0049                  -0.0050 
                                                 (0.0035)                (0.0034)                      
     -0.0053 
(0.0039) 
   0.0016                  0.0015 
 (0.0028)               (0.0025) 
      0.0014 
    (0.0024) 
Capital ratio                              0.0036                   0.0044       
                                                 (0.0031)                (0.0034) 
      0.0035 
     (0.0028) 
  -0.0011                 -0.0001 
 (0.0057)               (0.0052) 
     -0.0003 
    (0.0049) 
Debt-to-equity                         -0.00003               -0.00003 
                                                 (0.0001)                (0.0001)                    
    -0.00002 
(0.0001) 
  0.00005                0.00004 
 (0.0001)               (0.0001) 
     0.00005 
    (0.0001) 
Loan growth                             -0.0005                  -0.0017 
                                                 (0.0027)                (0.0024)_     
     -0.0010 
     (0.0026) 
   0.0080                  0.0085 
 (0.0078)               (0.0077) 
      0.0087 
    (0.0080) 
Loan loss ratio                          -0.0039                  -0.0035  
                                                 (0.0023)                (0.0024) 
     -0.0042* 
     (0.0022) 
  -0.0041                 -0.0047 
 (0.0052)               (0.0062) 
     -0.0049 
    (0.0064) 
Cost-to-income                         0.0075                   0.0092 
                                                 (0.0055)                (0.0064) 
      0.0078 
     (0.0056) 
   0.0070                  0.0072 
 (0.0052)               (0.0066) 
      0.0069 
    (0.0051) 
Listed banks                              0.0062*                0.0064* 
                                                 (0.0029)                (0.0028)            
      0.0061* 
    (0.0030) 
  -0.0064                 -0.0060 
 (0.0043)               (0.0045) 
     -0.0061 
    (0.0045) 
Real GDP growth                    -0.0010**              -0.0013* 
                                                 (0.0004)                (0.0005) 
     -0.0012** 
     (0.0004) 
   0.0013                  0.0016 
 (0.0012)               (0.0013) 
      0.0016 
    (0.0013) 
Inflation                                     0.0007                   0.0011 
                                                 (0.0006)                (0.0007) 
      0.0009 
     (0.0006) 
   0.0009                  0.0005 
 (0.0017)               (0.0017) 
      0.0004 
    (0.0016) 
Money  supply  growth             0.0002                   0.0002 
                                                 (0.0001)                (0.0001) 
CR5                                         -0.00002                -0.00002 
                                                (0.00003)               (0.00003) 
Capital regulatory index          -0.0002                  -0.0004* 
                                                 (0.0002)                 (0.0002)              
Official supervisory index       -0.0011**              -0.0014**                 
                                                 (0.0004)                 (0.0005)             
Deposit insurer power             -0.0019*                -0.0020* 
                                                 (0.0009)                 (0.0010) 
                                                                               
    
      0.0002 
     (0.0001) 
    -0.00002 
    (0.00003) 
     -0.0002 
     (0.0002) 
     -0.0012** 
     (0.0004) 
     -0.0020* 
     (0.0009) 
 -0.00005               -0.00003 
 (0.0002)               (0.0003) 
 -0.0002**            -0.0002*** 
(0.00005)             (0.00004) 
 -0.0006                 -0.0006 
 (0.0014)               (0.0015) 
 -0.0016                 -0.0014 
 (0.0013)               (0.0013) 
 -0.0024                 -0.0021 
 (0.0027)               (0.0029) 
    -0.00004 
    (0.0002) 
   -0.0002*** 
   (0.00004) 
    -0.0006 
    (0.0013) 
    -0.0013 
    (0.0013) 
    -0.0021 
    (0.0029) 
      
Obs.                                             171                        171 
 
R2 0.0710  0.0663  
 
 
  171 
 
     0.0658 
     171                       171 
 
  0.3834                  0.2734 
   171 
 
      0.3118 
 
 
 
Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasitity-robust standard errors 
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Table A2-9   Determinants of Acquirers’ performance changes for cross-border M&As 
 
  
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                   ∆ROE                 ∆ROE       
                                                         IR                           IR 
                                                     DIFFERENCE2    DIFFERENCE3    
                                                                                                                               
          (3)                       
      ∆ROE  
 
DISPERSION3 
    
          (4)                       (5) 
       ∆NII                   ∆NII 
          IR                          IR 
DIFFERENCE2 DIFFERENCE3 
    (6) 
        ∆NII  
 
DISPERSION3 
DISPERS 
 
IRDIFFERENCE2                   -0.0115                  
                                                 (0.0961)                 
IRDIFFERENCE3                                                 0.5542 
                                                                              (0.3396) 
DISPERSION3                                                      
                                                                               
Z-score                                     0.0020**              0.0019**                         
                                                 (0.0008)               (0.0007) 
Income diversity                       0.0828                  0.0584           
                                                 (0.0853)               (0.0927)                  
  
 
      
      
      
      
     -0.0004 
     (0.0015) 
      0.0020** 
     (0.0008) 
      0.0829 
     (0.0887) 
  
   174.36  
  (723.41)             
                              2610.83 
                             (1869.78) 
                                  
                               
   17.64                  17.35* 
   (9.65)                  (9.11) 
 -963.83               -1066.05 
(2390.36)             (2390.00) 
  
        
 
 
 
       9.25 
    (18.00) 
     17.65 
     (9.71) 
   -968.96 
  (2365.62) 
Geographic diversification       0.0813**              0.0923* 
                                                 (0.0337)               (0.0455) 
      0.0811* 
     (0.0340) 
  -285.91                -242.22 
 (392.00)               (360.99) 
    -280.93 
   (394.89) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0153                  0.0183 
                                                 (0.0179)    (0.0180) 
      0.0151 
     (0.0175) 
   496.99                  506.31 
 (284.31)               (286.76) 
     505.74 
   (290.55) 
Liquid ratio                               0.1865                  0.1819 
                                                 (0.1091)               (0.1088)                      
      0.1844 
(0.1080) 
  5463.45***         5455.48** 
(1674.45)             (1690.36) 
    5516.62** 
  (1686.95) 
Tier 1                                         0.3420                 0.4590       
                                                 (1.0842)               (1.0557) 
      0.3359 
     (1.0922) 
 -28391.63**       -27739.46** 
(10460.63)          (10742.68) 
   -28220** 
 (10401.36) 
Debt-to-asset                            -0.1551                -0.1851 
                                                 (0.2287)               (0.2276)                    
     -0.1542 
(0.2272) 
   -826.98                -929.87 
 (1118.65)             (1063.02) 
    -850.00 
  (1087.54) 
Asset growth                             0.1656                 0.1520 
                                                 (0.1356)               (0.1056)_     
      0.1635 
     (0.1352) 
   4763.70**           4678.76** 
 (1864.43)             (1719.92) 
    4827.17** 
  (1880.39) 
Loan loss ratio                           0.0717                 0.0034  
                                                 (0.0587)               (0.0406) 
      0.0702 
     (0.0584) 
   14372***            14054*** 
  (484.34)               (752.63) 
    14415*** 
   (474.14) 
Cost-to-income                        -0.0219                 -0.0863 
                                                 (0.1577)               (0.1491) 
     -0.0209 
     (0.1576) 
  -2188.32              -2510.99 
 (1704.56)             (1960.27) 
   -2217.66 
  (1737.94) 
Listed banks                             -0.1264                -0.1421 
                                                 (0.0782)               (0.0770)            
     -0.1264 
     (0.0782) 
   -727.40                 -761.31 
  (925.46)               (919.00) 
    -721.45 
   (922.35) 
Real GDP growth                      0.0173                 0.0276 
                                                 (0.0195)               (0.0225) 
      0.0172 
     (0.0208) 
    -35.57                     8.49 
  (351.12)               (381.47) 
     -28.73 
   (922.35) 
Inflation                                     0.0006                -0.0124 
                                                 (0.0205)               (0.0234) 
      0.0006 
     (0.0215) 
    -44.08                  -94.87 
  (220.23)               (233.72) 
     -50.11 
   (226.70) 
Money  supply  growth             0.0067                  0.0052 
                                                 (0.0068)               (0.0062) 
HHI                                          -0.0001***          -0.0002*** 
                                                (0.00004)             (0.00003) 
Capital regulatory index          -0.0038                  0.0035 
                                                 (0.0186)               (0.0140)              
Official supervisory index       -0.0355*               -0.0257               
                                                 (0.0174)               (0.0168)             
Deposit insurer power             -0.0742*               -0.0697* 
                                                 (0.0287)               (0.0329) 
                                                                               
    
      0.0068 
     (0.0069) 
     -0.0001*** 
    (0.00003) 
     -0.0036 
     (0.0186) 
     -0.0355* 
     (0.0184) 
     -0.0741** 
     (0.0294) 
    111.92                  104.26 
   (73.23)                 (81.07) 
  -0.3855                 -0.4067 
  (0.3399)               (0.3503) 
 -695.97***          -663.08*** 
  (155.87)               (161.61) 
 -245.72*                -207.01 
  (109.86)               (113.54) 
 1508.57***         1517.92*** 
  (325.10)               (317.56) 
     109.52 
    (74.78) 
   -0.3658 
   (0.3228) 
   -701.40*** 
   (153.61) 
   -243.42* 
   (109.04) 
  -1512.14*** 
   (318.84) 
      
Obs.                                             171                       171 
 
R2 0.3717 0.4430  
 
 
  171 
 
     0.3740 
      169                      169 
 
  0.5001                 0.4701 
 169 
 
    0.5064 
 
 
 
 
Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasitity-robust standard errors 
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Table A2-10   Determinants of Acquirers’ performance changes for cross-border M&As 
 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                   ∆NIM                 ∆NIM       
                                                         IR                           IR 
                                                     DIFFERENCE2    DIFFERENCE3    
                                                                                                                               
          (3)                       
      ∆NIM  
 
DISPERSION3 
    
          (4)                       (5) 
     ∆ROA                 ∆ROA 
          IR                          IR 
DIFFERENCE2 DIFFERENCE3 
    (6) 
      ∆ROA  
 
DISPERSION3 
DISPERS 
 
IRDIFFERENCE2                    0.0023                  
                                                 (0.0041)                 
IRDIFFERENCE3                                                -0.0138 
                                                                              (0.0102) 
DISPERSION3                                                      
                                                                               
Z-score                                     0.00001                 0.00001                         
                                                (0.00003)              (0.00004) 
Income diversity                       0.0024                   0.0031           
                                                 (0.0034)                (0.0031)                  
  
 
      
      
      
      
     -0.0001 
     (0.0001) 
    0.000005 
    (0.00003) 
      0.0027 
     (0.0031) 
  
  -0.0088  
  (0.0083)             
                              -0.0023 
                              (0.0173) 
                                  
                               
  0.00007*             0.00008 
 (0.00004)            (0.00004) 
  -0.0016                -0.0021 
  (0.0034)              (0.0033) 
  
        
 
 
 
    -0.00001 
    (0.00008) 
     0.00008* 
    (0.00004) 
     -0.0022 
     (0.0038) 
Geographic diversification       -0.0040                -0.0043 
                                                 (0.0026)               (0.0028) 
     -0.0041 
     (0.0026) 
    0.0024                 0.0024 
  (0.0018)              (0.0018) 
       0.0025 
     (0.0019) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0008                  0.0007 
                                                 (0.0005)    (0.0004) 
      0.0007 
     (0.0004) 
    0.0008                 0.0025* 
  (0.0036)              (0.0013) 
       0.0025* 
     (0.0013) 
Liquid ratio                               -0.0058                -0.0057 
                                                 (0.0035)               (0.0034)                      
     -0.0062 
(0.0038) 
    0.0541                 0.0008 
  (0.0581)              (0.0033) 
       0.0007 
     (0.0030) 
Tier 1                                        -0.0035                -0.0062       
                                                 (0.0219)               (0.0253) 
     -0.0042 
     (0.0231) 
    0.0049                 0.0527 
  (0.0042)              (0.0598) 
       0.0530 
     (0.0592) 
Debt-to-asset                            -0.0035                -0.0027 
                                                 (0.0034)               (0.0032)                    
     -0.0032 
(0.0038) 
    0.0123                 0.0047 
  (0.0088)              (0.0041) 
       0.0046 
     (0.0042) 
Asset growth                            -0.0023                -0.0022 
                                                 (0.0037)               (0.0034)_     
     -0.0031 
     (0.0037) 
   -0.0075**             0.0131 
  (0.0028)              (0.0086) 
       0.0129 
     (0.0088) 
Loan loss ratio                         -0.0036**             -0.0019  
                                                 (0.0015)               (0.0013) 
     -0.0038** 
     (0.0015) 
    0.0082                -0.0073 
  (0.0057)              (0.0041) 
      -0.0076** 
     (0.0029) 
Cost-to-income                         0.0071                  0.0087 
                                                 (0.0057)               (0.0063) 
      0.0074 
     (0.0057) 
   -0.0047                 0.0083 
  (0.0033)              (0.0071) 
       0.0081 
     (0.0056) 
Listed banks                              0.0059*                0.0063* 
                                                 (0.0029)               (0.0028)            
      0.0058* 
     (0.0030) 
   -0.0047               -0.0045 
  (0.0033)              (0.0034) 
      -0.0046 
     (0.0034) 
Real GDP growth                     -0.0010***          -0.0013* 
                                                 (0.0003)               (0.0005) 
     -0.0011** 
     (0.0004) 
    0.0016                 0.0019 
  (0.0012)              (0.0012) 
       0.0019 
     (0.0012) 
Inflation                                     0.0005                 0.0010 
                                                 (0.0005)               (0.0006) 
      0.0008 
     (0.0006) 
    0.0006                 0.0001 
  (0.0015)              (0.0015) 
       0.0001 
     (0.0015) 
Money  supply  growth             0.0002                 0.0002* 
                                                 (0.0001)               (0.0001) 
HHI                                       -0.0000005           -0.0000003 
                                              (0.0000007)         (0.0000008) 
Capital regulatory index          -0.0002                 -0.0004 
                                                 (0.0004)               (0.0003)              
Official supervisory index       -0.0010**             -0.0013***                 
                                                 (0.0003)               (0.0003)             
Deposit insurer power             -0.0018**             -0.0020** 
                                                 (0.0007)               (0.0010) 
                                                                               
    
      0.0002* 
     (0.0001) 
   -0.0000006 
   (0.0000007) 
     -0.0002 
     (0.0003) 
     -0.0011*** 
     (0.0003) 
     -0.0019** 
     (0.0008) 
   0.00002               0.00003 
  (0.0003)              (0.0003) 
-0.000004*         -0.000004* 
(0.000002)          (0.000002) 
  -0.0011               -0.0011 
  (0.0014)              (0.0015) 
  -0.0013               -0.0011 
  (0.0013)              (0.0013) 
  -0.0017               -0.0015 
  (0.0026)              (0.0027) 
      0.00003 
     (0.0003) 
  -0.000004* 
  (0.000002) 
    -0.0011 
    (0.0013) 
    -0.0010 
    (0.0013) 
    -0.0015 
    (0.0027) 
      
Obs.                                             171                       171 
 
R2 0.0795 0.0749  
 
 
  171 
 
     0.0782 
      171                      171 
 
  0.3927                 0.3132 
  171 
 
     0.3353 
 
 
 
 
Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasitity-robust standard errors.  
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Chapter 3  
 
Systemic Risk and Bank M&As in Europe: 
Determinants and Relationships with Banking 
Markets Integration 
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3.1 Introduction 
In recent years, European banking regulators have been considering the adoption of stricter 
policies to effectively monitor cross-border bank M&A deals. A systematically important bank 
(SIB) is a bank that is interconnected to many other financial institutions and whose failure 
may result in a financial crisis. Molyneux et al. (2014) quote Petrovic and Tutschu’s (2009) 
argument that many conglomerates like the SIBs in operating major EU economies were 
rescued during the crisis and were naturally recognized as “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) institutions 
because their failures would have resulted in increased systemic risk and financial instability.  
The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis that followed 
significantly affected the bank M&As trend in the EU. Casu et al. (2015) illustrate that both 
the number and the value of EU banks’ M&As increased over 2004 and 2007 but generally 
declined over 2008 and 2013. The number of transactions rose dramatically from 45 in 2004 
to the peak of 180 in 2007 and plunged to 5 in 2013. Meanwhile, the transaction value increased 
steadily from approximately €57bil in 2004 to €81bil in 2007 and then declined to €22bil in 
2013.  
Based on the aforementioned trends for bank M&As in Europe, the effects of bank 
consolidation on banking stability is one of the most important and controversial topics since 
the financial crises broke out. Several recent studies (Heffernan 2005; Weiss et al. 2014; Casu 
et al. 2015) analyze the banks’ M&As’ effects on systemic risk and point out that the existing 
literature provides no consistent evidence. On the one hand, all bank M&As and particularly 
cross-border operations, can increase the diversification benefits thus reducing banks’ 
individual risk including systemic risk. On the other hand, Molyneux et al. (2014), Weiss et al. 
(2014) and Casu et al. (2015) note that M&As will increase banks’ size thus enabling banks to 
exploit safety net subsidies because of their TBTF status. Moreover, these TBTF banks are 
more likely to increase their systemic risk contributions if they default in financial crisis. This 
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will potentially increase the instability of whole financial/banking system. Casu et al. (2015) 
provide evidence that large banks that follow more aggressive diversification strategies by 
M&As may increase in risk taking.  
A related issue is financial and banking integration (see chapter 2 for more details on how to 
measure it). In theory there are many benefits deriving from integrated markets and in practice 
one way to boost integration is to via cross-border merger operations. Several ECB publications 
describe the process of banking integration in Europe over the past decade. Since 2005, each 
year the ECB (2005-2015) has been publishing detailed reports on Financial Integration in 
Europe. It appears that the euro area retail banking markets remain highly fragmented whereas 
the wholesale banking markets show clear signs of increasing integration since the 
establishment of Monetary Union with a single currency of the euro in 1999. Furthermore, 
these reports also summarize that the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 had a very significant and 
negatively effect on the process of banking market integration. Specifically, the figures reported 
in ECB (2005-2009) show that the euro area banking market generally experienced increasing 
integration before the crisis in 2008. In the next period, the ECB (2010-2013) reports conclude 
that the degree of financial integration in banking market declined sharply over 2009 and 2012. 
Finally, the two most recent ECB reports (2014, 2015) summarize that financial integration in 
banking market shows only limited improvement after 2012 and does not reach the pre-crisis 
level.  
Based on the above-mentioned background, this chapter seeks to (i) investigate whether 
acquirers’ systemic risks increased after bank M&As are completed; (ii) explore the impact of 
the U.S. Subprime Crisis and Euro Sovereign Debt Crisis on acquirers’ systemic risk after 
M&As are completed; (iii) identify the determinants of acquirers’ systemic risk changes after 
bank M&As are completed; and (iv) examine the relationships between acquirers’ systemic 
risk changes in cross-border bank M&As and banking market integration in Europe. 
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The rest of Chapter 3 is organized as follows. Section3.2 provides a literature review for the (1) 
systemic risk changes in bank M&As; (2) systemic risk changes and banking integration; (3) 
systemic risk measures; and (4) selected variables. Section3.3 reports the key hypotheses and 
describes the data samples’ characteristics and limitations, data sources and methodology used 
for the empirical analysis. Section3.4 presents, discusses and interprets key empirical results. 
Finally, Section3.5 provides the main conclusions.  
 
3.2 Literature Review 
This section offers a selected review of relevant literatures from four interrelated topics that 
are important for our analysis, in particular: systemic risk in bank M&As (subsection 3.2.1), 
systemic risk and banking integration (subsection3.2.2), systemic risk measures and selected 
variables (subsection 3.2.3).  
3.2.1 Systemic Risk Changes in Bank M&As 
This sub-section will outline current literatures about systemic risk changes in bank M&As 
from two aspects: definition of systemic risk (subsubsection 3.2.1.1) and systemic risk changes 
in bank M&As (subsubsection 3.3.1.2).  
3.2.1.1 Definition of Systemic Risk 
Exsiting literature provides a variety of definitions of systemic risk. One strand of literature 
(Billio et al. 2012; Hull 2015) mainly focuses on the interconnectedness among financial 
institutions. For example, Billio et al. (2012, p.536) state that: “ Systemic risk involves the 
financial system, a collection of interconnected institutions that have mutually beneficial 
business relationships through which illiquidity, insolvency, and losses can quickly propagate 
during periods of financial crisis.” Therefore, systemic risk can be defined as the risk that the 
failure of one or more financial institutions will cause the failure of other interconnected 
financial institutions. Similarly, Hull (2015) defines systemic risk as the risk that default by 
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one financial institution will lead to default by other financial institutions and threat financial 
stability. Unlike idiosyncratic risk, systemic risk relates risk to a great many of connected 
financial institutions or the entire financial system rather than an individual institution. The 
buildup of high systemic risk in the banking system resulted in bank runs in the 2007-2009 U.S. 
Subprime Crisis. Another strand of literature (De Nicolo et al. 2002; ECB 2009; Forque and 
Langsam 2013) mainly emphasizes its negative effects on real economy. For instance, De 
Nicolo et al. (2002) point out that systemic risk is “the risk that an event (shock) will trigger a 
loss of economic value or confidence in, and attendant increases in uncertainty about, a 
substantial portion of the financial system that is large enough to, in all probability, have 
significant adverse effects on the real economy. Moreover, ECB (2009) combines the systemic 
risk with its negative effects on economy and defines systemic risk as “the risk of threats to 
financial stability that impair the functioning of a large part of the financial system with 
significant adverse effects on the broader economy”. Similarly, Fouque and Langsam (2013) 
define systemic risk as the risk of a disruption of the market’s ability to facilitate the flows of 
capital that results in the reduction in the global GDP growth.  
Overall, the negative effects of increasing systemic risk on the real economy can be very serious. 
From increasing financial instability in the banking system, to decreasing aggregate demand 
and capital flows in financial markets, hence affecting real GDP growth rate, with potential 
negative effects on the labor market if unemployment also soars and income growth rate 
declines.    
3.2.1.2   Systemic Risk and Bank M&As  
Several studies (Amihud et al. 2002; Weiss et al. 2013; Weiss et al. 2014) focus on systemic 
risk changes in bank M&As. However, evidence is mixed about whether bank M&As 
significantly affect systemic risk changes. For example, Amihud et al. (2002) analyze a sample 
of 214 mergers where the acquirers’ stock are publicly traded between 1985 and 1998 in the 
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U.S. and conclude there is no evidence that cross-border merging banks add to the risk exposure 
of either domestic or host country regulators. Nevertheless, Weiss et al. (2013) study 440 bank 
mergers with bidders predominantly located in the US, Canada, EU, Norway, Switzerland, 
Turkey, Some Asian and Latin American countries and find that bank mergers significantly 
increase in the contribution of acquirers, targets and their competitors to financial instability. 
Similarly, Weiss et al. (2014) evaluate different samples of banks in four different continents 
during the Mexico Peso crisis, Asian crisis, LTCM crisis (the more-than-one-billion-dollar fund 
of Long-Term Capital Management nearly collapsed the global financial system in late 1998 
due to its highly leveraged trading strategies), Dotcom, 9/11, subprime and Lehman and find 
that bank-specific characteristics, regulatory variables and deposit insurance schemes can 
explain large portions of banks’ systemic risk changes. The latter two studies focus on the 
destabilizing effects of bank consolidations in financial crises and confirm the destabilizing 
effects of banking consolidation exist.  
3.2.2   Systemic Risk Changes and Banking Integration 
Another important relationship is the one between systemic risk and banking integration. Lim 
et al. (2015) use a sample of 36 country-pair large banks in Asia-Pacific region between Q4 
1997 and Q1 2010 to identify whether bank integration in Asia-Pacific region reduces cross-
border systemic risk and investigate the long-term effect of bank integration on systemic risk. 
They find strong evidences that increasing banking integration raises cross-border systemic 
risk between a country-pair and banking integration has a long-term effect on the increasing 
cross-border systemic risk over time. Their findings strongly support the cost side of banking 
integration. Fecht et al. (2012) analyze three cases (banks with an undiversified portfolio, banks 
with a safe portfolio and banks with a diversified portfolio) and find evidence of both benefits 
and costs of financial integration. On the one hand, the benefits of financial integration are (i) 
integration weakly decreases the probability of individual banking crises and (ii) it improves 
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welfare due to greater specialization in banking markets. On the other hand, the cost of financial 
integration is that it may increase the systemic risk of the banking sector and thus it is more 
likely to result in a banking contagion. In this chapter, we will examine whether any cost of 
financial integration exists in pre-crisis and post-crisis periods in section 3.4.2.  
Regarding banking integration indicators, apart from those described in chapter 2, a recent 
study (Fernandez and Ausina 2015) construct different indicators based on the structure of 
current relations between banking markets. The authors define and calculate distance-corrected 
and distance uncorrected degree of banking openness (DBO), degree of bank connectedness 
(DBC), degree of total bank connectedness (DTBC) and degree of banking integration (DBI), 
respectively. Based on these component indicators, they finally calculate weighted global 
indicators. They analyze the level of banking integration of 22 countries between 2003 and 
2011 and find that banking markets in most countries experience increasing banking integration 
between 2003 and 2007 and then a drop between 2007 and 2011. They also conclude that the 
Financial Crisis 2007-2009 had negative impacts on global banking integration and increased 
systemic risk in banking markets.  
3.2.3   Systemic Risk Measures  
Another strand of literature about systemic risk changes is using different systemic risk 
measures based on different types of data. With regard to the types of data used for 
measurement, Freixas et al. (2015) divide systemic risk measures into measures based on 
fundamentals and measures based on market data. We will discuss both categories of systemic 
risk measures in more detail in the next two subsections. 
3.2.3.1 Measures Based on Fundamentals 
One type of systemic risk measure based on fundamental is the systemic risk measure 
calculated via contingent claim approach (CCA), a method based on banks’ assets, liabilities 
and equity price. Lehar (2005) follows Merton’s (1973) model and interprets equity as a call 
119 
 
option on a bank’s asset. He first uses Merton’s (1973) model (Maximum Likelihood Estimate) 
to derive bank’s asset values and employ Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) 
model to obtain asset correlations. Second, he employs Monte Carlo simulations (based on 
Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM, is a continuous-time stochastic process in which the 
logarithm of the randomly varying quantity follows a Brownian motion with drift) to predict 
future bank asset values and compare them with their liabilities according to different criteria 
to construct the systemic risk indexes: Systemic Risk Index based on Values (SIV) and 
Systemic Risk Index based on Number of Banks (SIN). Moreover, Freixas et al. (2015) discuss 
other measures based on fundamentals, such as sectoral measures (e.g. excessive credit growth 
and leverage, asset price booms) and interbank liquidity networks. The authors argue that 
although these measures are easily obtained, and to some extent, can provide early warning 
signals in banking sector and the economic condition, they may not measure systemic risk 
buildup appropriately and therefore may provide incorrect signals for economic downturn. In 
order to address this limitation, in recent years, scholars have created several most commonly 
used measures based on market data. We will discuss these measures in next subsection.  
3.2.3.2 Measures Based on Market Data 
Depending on the different types of market data used, systemic risk measures based on market 
data can be further divided into several categories. They include measures about (i) extreme 
equity returns, for instance, ①lower tail dependence (LTD, Nelson 2006; Schmidt and 
Stadtmuller 2006; Ruenzi and Weigert 2011; Weiss et al. 2013; Weiss et al. 2014), ②using 
copula functions to estimate several systemic risk measures (Joint Probability of Distress, JPoD 
and Banking Stability Index, BSI, Segoviano and Goodhart 2009; Probability of Default, PD, 
Kleinow and Moreira 2016), ③systemic/marginal expected shortfall (SES/MES, Acharya et al. 
2010; Weiss et al. 2013; Weiss et al. 2014), and ④sharpley value (Drehmann and Tarashev 
2013);(ii) co-risk management, for example, conditional value at risk conditional expected 
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shortfall (CoVaR and CoES, Adrian and Brunnermeier 2011); (iii) conditional capital shortfall 
(SRISK, Brownless and Engle 2016); (iv) variance decomposition and interconnectedness, for 
instance, ①Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and ②Granger-causality (Billio et.al. 2012) 
and (v) CDS or CDO spreads, indexes and tranches, for example, ①Distress Insurance 
Premium (DIP, Huang, Zhou and Zhu 2009, Huang et.al. 2010, Black et.al. 2016) and ②using 
a linearized three-jump model to estimate systemic risk spreads (Bhansali at.al. 2008; 
Rodrigez-Moreno and Pena 2010). Other systemic risk measures include the Joint Probability 
of Distress (JPoD) and Banking Stability Index (BSI) (Segoviano and Goodhart 2009) and 
CATFIN based on three different VaR and ES measures (Allen et.al. 2012). Allen et al. (2012) 
forecasted macroeconomic downturns six months into future using out-of-sample tests 
conducted with U.S., European, and Asian bank data derived a brand new measure of aggregate 
systemic risk called CATFIN. We will discuss these systemic risk measures and the relevant 
literature in more details in the following paragraphs in this subsection.  
Specifically on market-based systemic risk measures, there are two measures about “co-risk 
management”. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) propose CoVaR and CoES, the VaR and the 
ES of a bank (or the whole system) conditional on some credit events (e.g. default or bank 
contagion) of the whole system (or another bank). They analyze a sample of 1226 institutions 
at least 260 weeks of asset return data (an average length of 645 weeks) between 1986Q1 and 
2010Q4 and use quantile regression and time variation associated with systemic state variables 
to estimate ΔCoVaR and Forward-ΔCoVaR to capture a bank’s systemic risk change or 
systemic risk contribution to the whole system. They find that Forward-ΔCoVaR can predict 
systemic risk buildups in advance but ΔCoVaR cannot. Moreover, they also recognize two 
merits for ΔCoVaR. First, it focuses on the contribution of each bank to overall systemic risk. 
Second, it captures the risk spillovers from institution to institution across the whole financial 
network. Both of them can provide useful information for bank regulators and senior managers. 
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Nevertheless, other scholars argue that ΔCoVaR still has several drawbacks. For example, 
Billio et al. (2012) claims that ΔCoVaR implies lower estimates of systemic risk until after a 
volatility spike occurs. Second, Huang et al. (2010) point out that ΔCoVaR cannot appropriately 
aggregate the systemic risk contributions of individual banks because VaR is not additive. 
Therefore, individual banks’ systemic risk contributions cannot be simply added up to obtain 
the aggregated systemic risk. This is consistent with Acharya et al.’s (2010) analysis that VaR 
is not a coherent risk measure. Third, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) claim that the weekly 
contemporaneous CoVaR is pro-cyclical and cannot identify systemic risk build-up and thus 
cannot predict the systemic crisis in advance. They propose a remedy to address this drawback: 
constructing Forward-∆CoVaR to replace ∆CoVaR. They point out that Forward ΔCoVaR can 
capture systemic risk buildup thus can predict systemic crisis in advance.   
In order to provide a remedy for the second drawback of ΔCoVaR, many studies also propose 
several other systemic risk measures based on extreme value theory (EVT). For instance, 
Acharya et al. (2010) use SES/MES, OLS regression and probit regression analysis to study 
102 financial institutions between July 2007 and December 2008. According to Acharya et al 
(2010), SES evaluates the amount a bank’s equity falls below its target level if aggregate 
banking capital is less than target level while MES measures the individual bank’s marginal 
risk contribution to the overall banking system if the overall market experiences moderately 
tail risk. They conclude that MES appear to be able to predict the financial firms with the worst 
contributions in the systemic crisis. MES has two advantages over other systemic risk measures. 
First, MES is simple to compute and easy for regulators to consider. Second, ES is a coherent 
risk measure and is more robust than VaR. However, Weiss et al. (2013) claim two 
disadvantages of MES. First, it is only based on the left tail of the market’s marginal 
distribution but ignores the right tail of the market’s distribution. This means MES cannot be 
used to predict the extreme good results (e.g. when overall market experiences significant 
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increase). Second, it does not capture the true tails of the return distribution because it only 
measures the moderate tail risk. If the overall market or the specific bank experiences extremely 
negative return, ES is more likely to underestimate the bank’s true systemic risk.  
Some studies (Nelson 2006; Schmidt and Stadtmuller 2006; Ruenzi and Weigert 2011) propose 
Lower Tail Dependence (LTD) to correct the second drawback of MES. Nelson (2006) defines 
LTD as the probability that an observation of the random variables joint distribution will lie in 
the distribution’s extreme lower tail. Therefore, compared to MES, LTD is more likely to 
accurately estimate the bank’s true systemic risk. On the one hand, Schmidt and Stadtmuller 
(2006) propose non-parametric method (tail copulae without parameter to estimate the lower 
dependence coefficient. On the other hand, Ruenzi and Weigert (2011) employ a parametric 
method (asymptotically lower tail, upper tail dependent and independent copula functions with 
other basic copula parameters) to estimate lower and upper tail dependence coefficients. Weiss 
et al. (2013) compare the two methods and claim that using parametric method (e.g. different 
copula) to calculate LTD may suffer from the model risk due to misuse of copula function. Two 
studies (Acharya et al. 2010; Weiss et al. 2013) summarize three advantages of LTD. First, it 
measures the left tail of the respective joint distribution. Second, it allows for easy averaging 
over the different financial sectors and market regimes. Third, it exactly captures tail 
probability in the extreme tail of the market’s and individual bank’s joint distribution which 
has systemic risk. Due to these advantages, using LTD to measure systemic risk, to some extent, 
can alleviate the problem of underestimating real systemic risk contribution of a particular bank 
or banking system.  
Besides these measures, one specific study employs more advanced copula function, the 
Consistent Information Multivariate Density Optimizing (CIMDO)-copula method, to recover 
the banking system’s multivariate density (BSMD) and then estimate two new systemic risk 
measures in banking system, the Joint Probability of Distress (JPoD) and Bank Stability Index 
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(BSI). They argue that the non-parametric method (CIMDO-copula) has a key advantage over 
other standard risk models: it captures adequate default (distress) dependence (both linear and 
non-linear) and can change at different points of the economic cycle. This is a desirable 
property for systemic risk measures because it enables bank regulators and managers to 
accurately quantify and timely monitor the actual systemic risk buildup in a particular banking 
system and banks in different time periods. Furthermore, they claim that CIMDO-copula 
maintains all the benefits of the copula approach but avoids drawbacks for standard parametric 
copula functions: it addresses the copula choice problem, avoids the imposition of constant 
correlation parameter assumptions and appears to be more robust in the tail of the density. 
Lastly, they point out the economic interpretations for JPoD and BSI: the JPoD represents the 
probability of the banks in the system becoming distressed and captures changes in the (linear 
and non-linear) distress dependence among the banks while the BSI reflects the expected 
number of banks becoming distressed given that at least one bank has become distressed. Both 
measures can provide significant economic meanings for systemic risk changes in banking 
systems.  
Unlike the systemic risk measures that focus on tail risk or extreme loss, SRISK measures the 
expected capital shortfall conditional on s systemic risk event. Brownless and Engle (2016) use 
SRISK to measure a bank’s contribution to the undercapitalization of the financial system in 
case of a crisis. They compare SRISK with other market-based measures and find SRISK 
considers joint dependence among banks and their size and leverage. They point out that the 
sum of SRISK across all banks measures the overall systemic risk in the entire financial system 
and can also be thought as the total amount if capital that government would have to provide 
to bailout the financial system. They further identify that SRISK improves predicting the Fed 
capital injections during the crisis and it provides early warning signals of distress in indicators 
of real activity. However, they also propose that this measure does not use off-balance sheet 
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information and may not appropriately capture the true asset structure of a firm. Generally, 
from bank regulators’ and researchers’ perspectives, SRISK has much more advantages than 
disadvantages, therefore, it has been widely employed in recent studies to quantify and monitor 
the systemic risk contribution of an individual SIFI and systemic risk change of a banking 
system over time.    
Apart from the aforementioned systemic risk measures, other studies (Bhansali et al. 2008; 
Huang et al. 2009; Huang et al. 2010; Allen et al. 2012; Billio et al. 2012; Drehmann and 
Tarashev 2013; Black et al. 2016; Kleinow and Moreira 2016) propose several other systemic 
risk measures to complement them after financial crisis in 2008. Most of these measures are 
calculated based on market data that can be obtained relatively easily. For example, Huang et 
al. (2009) and Huang et al. (2010) use single-name CDS spreads to calculate Distress Insurance 
Premium (DIP) and marginal DIP to identify systematically important banks and find that the 
elevated systemic risk in the banking sector is initially driven by the rising /insolvency risk 
premium and later by heightened liquidity risk premium. They define DIP is a risk-neutral 
based measure that captures the insurance premium to cover distressed losses in a banking 
market and marginal DIP is banks’ marginal contribution to the hypothetical distress insurance 
premium of the banking market. In addition, they also find that the marginal contribution of 
individual banks to the systemic risk is mostly determined by its size, although correlation and 
default probability also matters. They further point out that, similar to MES, DIP is additive 
and can appropriately aggregate the systemic risk contributions of individual institutions. 
However, Billio et al. (2012) claim that DIP implies lower estimates of systemic risk after a 
volatility spike occurs. Moreover, Bhansali et al. (2008) and Roidrigez-Moreno and Pena (2010) 
use CDO indexes and their tranches and employ a linearized three-jump model to estimate the 
intensities and jump sizes to each Poisson counter. They further decompose the CDO indexes 
into three different spreads, idiosyncratic, systematic and systemic spreads and argue that the 
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systemic spread represents the systemic risk in the whole banking system. Billio et al. (2012) 
propose two more systemic risk measures, principal component analysis (PCA) and Granger-
causality networks. They state that PCA measures both the contribution and the exposure of an 
institution to the overall risk of the system given a strong common component across the returns 
of all institutions while Granger-causality tests can significantly identify the networks of 
Granger-causal relationships among all financial institutions. They find that both PCA and 
Granger-causality networks can measure correlation directly and unconditionally and can be 
used to gauge the degree of connectedness of financial system. However, only Granger-
causality can capture higher-order causal relationships.  
Drehmann and Tarashev (2013) use another commonly used method Sharpley Value and define 
two specific applications of the Sharpley Value: participation approaches (PA) and generalized 
contribution approach (GCA). They recognize that Sharpley value measures a bank’s systemic 
risk change when it joins any subsystem. As two applications of Sharpley Value, PA measures 
a bank’s systemic importance by the expected losses the bank generates in systemic events 
while GCA captures the risk that a bank generates on its own as well as the bank’s systemic 
risk contribution to each subsystem. Moreover, they point out that Sharpley Value has several 
desirable properties thus it can attribute individual systematically important banks’ systemic 
importance to the banking systems or subsystems with different systemic risk measures (e.g. 
VaR and ES). Nevertheless, they conclude that the measured systemic importance of individual 
banks can differ materially across approaches (PA and CGA) so that researchers should choose 
appropriate methods to address the question at hand.  
Finally, these systemic risk measures based on market data also have some disadvantages.  
Freixas et al. (2015) emphasize two limitations: first, most systemic risk measures based on 
market data require detailed data that are not readily available (e.g. the equity prices for some 
private-owned and unlisted banks). Second, these measures can underestimate real systemic 
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risk as they also incorporate the potential bailouts from taxpayers and the liquidity assistance 
from central banks. In some periods of time, especially after governments announce some 
important bailouts or expansionary monetary policy measures, the SIFIs’ equity prices can 
surge dramatically to distort the real systemic risk buildup. To alleviate these limitations, they 
further propose that researchers should use a combination of measures to track different aspects 
of systemic risk over time and across institutions and markets. Many recent studies (Segoviano 
and Goodhart 2009; Rodrigez-Moreno and Pena 2010; Allen et al. 2012; Weiss et al. 2013; 
Bostandzic et al. 2014; Weiss et al. 2014; Black et al. 2016; Berger et al. 2016) have employed 
different systemic risk measures to follow their suggestion. In this chapter, we will also employ 
a combination of different systemic risk measures as dependent variables in main regressions 
and robustness checks.  
3.2.3.3   Systemic Risk Sensitivity and Systemic Risk Contribution 
There is another method to classify most existing systemic risk measures. All above-mentioned 
systemic risk measures can be used to evaluate (1) each individual bank’s systemic risk changes 
conditional on systemic events occur in the whole banking system and (2) each individual 
bank’s systemic risk contribution to the whole banking system conditional on individual shock. 
Kleinow and Moreira (2016) distinguish the first one from the second one and define the first 
one as systemic risk sensitivity and second one as systemic risk contribution. They also 
categorize several most commonly used measures, such as MES, SRISK, LTD and CCA, into 
systemic risk sensitivity and other measures, including ΔCoVaR, Co-risk and Granger causality 
into systemic risk contribution. Actually, some specific systemic risk measures, such as 
ΔCoVaR, can be interpreted as either systemic risk sensitivity or systemic risk contribution. 
According to Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), ΔCoVaRsystem│i  denotes the VaR of the whole 
banking system conditional on the distress of a particular bank i while ΔCoVaRi│system denotes 
the VaR of a particular bank i conditional on a specific systemic event occurs in the banking 
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system. According to Kleinow and Moreira (2016), the former should be included as systemic 
risk contribution and the latter as systemic risk sensitivity. Based on definitions, systemic risk 
sensitivity measures the negative effects of system-level events on individual banks while 
systemic risk contribution measures the negative effects of bank-level events on the whole 
banking system. In this chapter, we will investigate both systemic risk sensitivity (MES, LTD) 
and systemic risk contribution (∆CoVaR) and calculate both bank-level and system-level 
systemic risk changes after M&As. 
3.2.4 Literatures about Selected Variables 
In this sub-section, we review the main literature relating to the variables that will be included 
in our empirical models and we will discuss the reasons why we select these variables as well 
as the expected signs of the estimated coefficients.  
This study follows Weiss et al. (2014) to compute the dependent variable: systemic risk change, 
that is calculated the difference between acquirers’ post-merger systemic risk during 11 days 
and 180 days after deal completion and pre-merger systemic risk during 180 days and 11 days 
prior to deal announcements. In addition to the methodology of Weiss et al. (2014), for the 
purposes of our empirical analysis, we will not only calculate change of MES and change of 
LTD but also compute change of ΔCoVaR. 
Most recently, Kleinow et al. (2017) compute and compare four alternative measures: MES, 
Co-Risk, ΔCoVaR and LTD of U.S. banks, non-depository institutions and insurance 
companies between 2005 and 2014. They conclude that the results vary significantly within 
and between banks, non-depository financial institutions and insurance companies. They also 
find that MES, LTD and ΔCoVaR increased considerably during two crises and decreased 
significantly after crises for all three segments. Therefore, in this study we expect acquirers’ 
MES, LTD and ΔCoVaR to increase significantly after M&As in both US Subprime Crisis and 
European Debt Crisis and rise much more significantly in two financial crises than in the non-
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crisis period.   
In terms of explanatory variables, this study employs bank-specific variables, deal-specific 
variables and macroeconomic, industry-specific and regulatory variables. Bank-specific 
variables include the following: acquirers’ size, liquidity, capital adequacy, financial leverage, 
profitability, asset diversity, asset quality, insolvency risk and valuation. Ln (TA), the natural 
log of acquirers’ total assets, represents acquirers’ size. Previous papers had mixed results for 
the relationship between systemic risk and bank size. Laeven et al. (2016) find that systemic 
risk is positively associated with bank size in a sample consists of 412 deposit-taking 
institutions whose assets in excess of US$ 10bil. at the end of 2006 from 56 countries. They 
find that this result is consistent with the view that large banks can acquire or merge with other 
banks to become “too-big-to-fail” or “too-systematically important-to-fail” banks, thus 
enabling them to exploit the safety net subsidies and create moral hazard problems. These large 
banks are found to pay less attention to the risks they take and increase their systemic risk to 
the whole banking system. On the contrary, Weiss et al. (2014) obtain the different results that 
larger acquirers have lower systemic risk after M&As are completed. They find that larger 
acquirers can use M&As to increase their contributions to financial instability and confirm the 
“concentration-fragility” hypothesis. In this chapter, we will test the “too-big-to-fail” and 
“concentration-fragility” hypotheses and expect acquirers’ size to be positively associated with 
acquirers’ systemic risk changes after M&As.  
LIQ is measured as liquid asset/total deposit and borrowing and represents the acquirers’ 
liquidity. The expected sign of the variable LIQ is negative because banks with a higher 
proportion of liquid assets, in case of trouble they can sell them to meet the liquidity 
requirements set by banking regulators. Therefore, they will have lower probability to 
experience liquidity problems and have lower systemic risk contribution to the banking system. 
TIER1 is acquirers’ core capital ratio, indicating their capital adequacy. It is reasonable to 
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expect a negative sign for TIER1 because if acquirers have a higher capital ratio, they will have 
more capital to cover the expected and unexpected losses, thus leading to decreased systemic 
risk contribution to the banking system. Bostandzic et al. (2014) analyze the effect of capital 
on the global systemic risk of international banks between 1999 and 2012 and find that banks 
with higher Tier1 capital ratio have lower systemic risk contributions to global banking markets. 
Similarly, Laeven et al. (2016) calculate systemic risk measures for more than 1000 financial 
institutions across 32 countries between July 2007 and December 2008 and find that systemic 
risk is inversely related to Tier1 capital ratio alone. These results are consistent with the 
traditional view that more well-capitalized banks have lower systemic risk. E/A represents 
equity-to-asset ratio, and it is used to measure financial leverage. Higher E/A indicates lower 
financial leverage and higher equity to cover the risk asset exposures. Banks with lower 
leverage ratio have lower insolvency risk and lower systemic risk contribution to banking 
system. Therefore, the expected sign of E/A should be negative. ROA measures acquirers’ 
profitability and has an expected negative sign. If acquirers have higher profitability ratio, they 
will have higher earnings relative to their size and may have higher retained earnings to cover 
incurred and potential losses, consequently, they will have lower systemic risk contributions to 
banking system. ADIVERSITY is the variable that measure acquirers’ diversity in business 
model (product diversification). ADIVERSITY represents acquirers’ asset diversity, is 
calculated as 1-|(net loans – other earnings assets)/total earnings assets|. Its value ranges from 
0 to 1 and the higher value indicates higher degree of asset diversification (Laeven and Levine 
2005). The expected sign of ADIVERSITY is negative because acquirers with higher diversity 
in their business models are more likely to benefit from diversification and thus lower their 
systemic risk contributions to banking system. SHORTTERM is short-term debt/total liability, 
is a measure of banks’ reliance on short-term funding. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) argue 
that banks’ greater dependence on short-term funding expose themselves more to liquidity risk 
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thus lead to higher systemic risk contributions to banking system if they make more deposits. 
Consequently, we expect SHORTTERM to be positively related to acquirers’ systemic risk. 
Next, NPL, the abbreviation of non-performing loan ratio, reveals acquirers’ asset quality. The 
expected sign of NPL is positive as acquirers with better asset quality are less likely to 
experience losses and have lower systemic risk contributions to banking system. Furthermore, 
NONINTEREST represents non-interest income/total income, is a measure of income diversity. 
The expected sign of NONINTEREST can be negative or positive. On the one hand, if 
acquirers have higher proportion of non-interest income, they are more likely to benefit from 
diversification and may have lower systemic risk contributions to the banking system. 
Bostandzic et al. (2014) find some evidence to support this view. However, on the other hand, 
higher proportion of non-interest income can indicate that acquirers may take more risk to 
increase non-interest income and may result in higher systemic risk to banking system. 
Brunnermeier et al. (2012) identify the evidence to support this viewpoint. ZSCORE is the 
distance to default and is calculated as the sum of average ROA and average capital-to-asset 
ratio divided by standard deviation of ROA. The expected sign of ZSCORE is negative because 
the higher z-score indicates that banks have lower insolvency risk and that should be associated 
with lower systemic risk contributions to the banking system.  Finally, PB represents the price-
to-book ratio, another form of market value-to-book value ratio, is a measure of acquirers’ 
valuation. Keeley (1990) analyzed that banks with greater charter value (Acharya (1996) 
defined the charter value of a bank as the value that would be foregone due to a bank closure) 
can have more incentives to increase capital ratio and limit their risk taking thus will have more 
capital to cover losses and have lower systemic risk. Therefore, we expect acquirers’ PB to be 
negatively related to systemic risk.  
The deal-specific variables contain three dummy variables CROSSBORDER, GEO and 
SYSTEMATIC. Firstly, CROSSBORDER will be 1 if the M&A deal is cross-border and 
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otherwise 0. Secondly, GEO represents geographic diversification. GEO is 1 if the acquirer and 
the target come from different continents and otherwise 0. GEO differs from CROSSBORDER 
because cross-border deals are deals whose acquirers and targets can come from different EU 
countries while GEO contains deals whose acquirers must come from EU countries and targets 
must come from other continents. Both CROSSBORDER and GEO are expected to have 
negative signs due to product or geographic diversification. Casu et al. (2015) list many value-
maximizing motives for cross-border bank M&As and point out that geographic or product 
diversification enable banks to diversify their idiosyncratic risk thus lower their systemic risk 
contributions to banking system. SYSTEMATIC is another dummy variable that equals to 1 if 
the acquirer is a systematically important bank and 0 otherwise. We obtain information from 
the European Banking Authority (EBA) website to determine whether the acquirer is a 
systematically important bank or not. We expect SYSTEMATIC to be positively related to 
acquirers’ systemic risk because the failure of one or more systematically important banks may 
cause the failure of one or more other interconnected financial institutions and increase 
systemic risk to banking system.    
The controlled country-specific macroeconomic variables include AGDP, AINF and AMONEY. 
AGDP is the annual real GDP growth rate (%) for acquirers’ home country one year prior to 
M&A announcement. The expected sign of AGDP should be negative because the higher 
economic growth rate for the acquirer’s home country results in the acquirers’ higher profits 
and lower idiosyncratic risks, thus reducing their contribution to the systemic risk of the 
banking system. AINF is the inflation deflator (%) for the acquirer’s home country one year 
prior to the M&A announcement. The inflation is expected to positively correlated to banks’ 
profits because the lower the inflation, the higher probability that monetary decision makers 
will implement expansionary monetary policy and the higher expected profits and lower 
idiosyncratic risk for banks, and lower systemic risk to banking system. Weiss et al. (2014) 
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found that inflation is positive and significantly related to systemic risk in LTCM, Dotcom, 
Subprime and Lehman Brother crises. AMONEY is the broad money supply (M2) growth rate 
(%) for the acquirer’s home country one year prior to the M&A announcement. AMONEY is 
expected to have a positive relationship with banks’ systemic risk because the higher the broad 
money supply growth rate, the more money the banks can borrow from central bank and 
interbank market, the more loans banks can lend, therefore, banks can take more risks and 
increase their systemic risk to banking system. 
The industry-specific variable is CR5/HHI. CR5 is the concentration ratio of the 5 largest banks 
in acquirer’s banking market. It is computed as sum of total assets of the 5 largest banks divided 
by sum of total assets of all banks in the same banking market and ranges from 0 to 1. HHI is 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, is calculated as the sum of squared market shares of a 
country’s domestic and foreign banks, ranging from 0 to 10000. Both variables are used for 
measuring degree of concentration in banking market, and higher values indicate higher 
concentration. CR5 and HHI are two different measures of concentration because the former 
calculates the market share of the largest five banks while the latter calculates the squared 
market share of all banks. We employ HHI as an alternative measure to CR5 to examine 
whether higher concentration is positively or negatively related to acquirers’ systemic risk 
changes after the M&As. If higher concentration is positively related to acquirers’ systemic 
risk changes after M&As, then “concentration-fragility” hypothesis will hold; on the contrary, 
if higher concentration is negatively related to acquirers’ systemic risk changes after M&As, 
then “concentration-stability” hypothesis will hold (Berger et al. 2004;Boyd et al.2006).  
This chapter also follows Barth et al. (2013) to use another deposit insurance scheme variable 
DEPPOWER and two regulatory and supervisory variables REG and SUP. First, DEPPOWER 
stands for Deposit Insurer Power and measures whether the deposit insurers have the authorities 
to make the decision to intervene in banks. It ranges from 0 to 3 and the higher value indicates 
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that the deposit insurance authority has higher authority and is more powerful. Second, REG 
represents Capital Regulatory Index, which is the sum of Overall Capital Stringency and Initial 
Capital Stringency, measures whether the capital regulation is stringent or not. It ranges from 
0 to 9 and the higher value indicates the greater stringency for capital regulation. Third, SUP 
stands for Official Supervisory Power and measures whether the supervisory authorities have 
the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems. It ranges from 0 to 14 
and the higher value indicates supervisory authority has greater supervisory power. The higher 
value for DEPPOWER indicates that deposit insurers are more likely to implement deposit 
insurance scheme well and the higher values for REG and SUP show stricter regulation. Some 
previous studies (Molyneux et.al.2014; Casu et.al. 2015) observe that the presence of a deposit 
insurance scheme may increase banks’ moral hazard problems and contribute to greater 
systemic risk while stricter regulation may require banks to limit risk taking and thus lower 
systemic risk. On the one hand, both REG and SUP can also have negative signs because the 
more stringent capital regulation and supervision can limit banks’ willingness to take risk, 
leading to banks’ lower idiosyncratic risk and lower systemic risk in the banking system. On 
the other hand, DEPPOWER has a positive sign because deposit insurers from acquirers’ home 
countries are more powerful, these countries are more likely to have better deposit insurance 
implementation, then moral hazard problems are more likely to rise, banks may take higher 
risks and finally contribute to higher systemic risk that could affect entire banking system. 
Therefore, both REG and SUP can be expected to be negatively associated with acquirers’ 
systemic risk changes after M&As due to the regulation hypothesis for the banks’ risk-taking 
while DEPPOWER is expected to have a positive relationship with the acquirers’ systemic risk 
changes after M&As. 
More regulatory variables are added into baseline model. Firstly, BAILOUT is another dummy 
variable that equals to 1 if an acquirer is bailout recipient in the US Subprime Crisis or the 
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European Sovereign Debt Crisis and otherwise equals to 0. Berger et al. (2016) use difference-
in-difference analysis and find that US Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) reduces the 
systemic risk significantly. Therefore, we expect BAILOUT to be negatively related to the 
acquirers’ systemic risk to banking system. Secondly, Private Monitoring represents the private 
monitoring index, which measures the incentives and capabilities provided by regulators or 
supervisors to encourage private investors to monitor banks, ranging from 0 to 12. If the 
regulatory and supervisory authorities have more incentives and capabilities to encourage 
private investors to monitor banks, these latter will be less willing to take on more risk and thus 
will be less likely to transmit systemic risk to banking system. Therefore, the private monitoring 
index should have negative relationship with acquirers’ systemic risk. Bostandzic et al. (2014) 
find that systemic risk is inversely related to private monitoring index. Finally, Moral Hazard 
represents the moral hazard index, which captures the degree to which moral hazard exists, 
ranging from 0 to 3. Higher values indicate greater mitigation of moral hazard. The moral 
hazard index can be either positive or negative related to acquirers’ systemic risk. If deposit 
insurance schemes reduce depositors’ incentives to monitor banks, moral hazard problem 
increases, then the index is low, and banks will have higher systemic risk after M&As. In this 
case, the moral hazard index is negative related to banks’ systemic risk. Bostandzic et al. (2014) 
identify that the Moral Hazard Index is positively associated with systemic risk. On the contrary, 
if deposit insurance can significantly reduce banks’ systemic risk to banking system, then the 
moral hazard index is positively related to banks’ systemic risk after M&As.  
 
3.3 Hypotheses  
The ECB Financial Integration reports (2005-2017) describe that level of banking integration 
in Europe increased prior to financial crises, then decreased during financial crises and 
recovered after financial crises. This historical trend indicates negative impact of financial 
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crises on banking integration in Europe. ECB reports also found that as level of banking 
integration increases, systemic risk in banking sector increased gradually after M&A deals are 
completed in pre-crisis period and contributed to buildup of financial instability and finally 
resulted in financial crises. In addition, Draghi (2014) also points out that one of the possible 
risks of financial integration is the destabilizing effects of bank integration. The destabilizing 
effects of financial integration come from increase of bank systemic risk and bank contagion. 
This may be interpreted as follows: acquirers from more integrated markets become even larger 
and more interconnected after M&As thus may have higher systemic risk. It indicates that 
acquirers from more integrated banking markets may have higher systemic risk after mergers 
thus contribute to financial instability. Therefore, the hypothesis of this chapter can be 
formulated as follows:  
Hypothesis: Acquirers from more (less) integrated banking markets will have higher 
(lower) systemic risk after M&As.  
 
 
3.4 Samples, Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
3.4.1 Sample and Data Source 
The full sample used in this study consists of bank M&A deals carried out between 1997 and 
2015 whose acquirers are headquartered in EU 28 countries and whose targets can come from 
any country. Specifically, the following are the steps used for selecting the full sample for this 
empirical analysis: 
(1) the M&A deals are announced between 01/01/1997 and 31/12/2015;  
(2) the acquirers must be commercial banks or savings banks from EU 28 countries; 
(3) all the deals must be completed; 
(4) acquirers must be listed banks; 
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(5) the targets must be banks from any country; 
(6) all money center banks, central banks and special purpose banks are excluded; 
(7) all required data for accounting or financial data for acquirers must be available.  
Originally, we identified 657 deals, however, due to data availability, around half of the deals 
had to be excluded from the final sample that is 322 deals. Moreover, to investigate whether 
the U.S. Subprime Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis have positive or negative 
impacts on acquirers’ systemic risk after M&As are completed, in this study we will further 
create three subsamples: 202 deals in the non-crisis subsample (1997-2006 and 2014-2015), 71 
deals in the US Subprime Crisis subsample (2007-2009) and 49 deals in the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis subsample (2010-2013). We find the second and third subsamples have 
relatively small sample sizes. According to Brooks (2008), a sample size that is too small 
reduces the statistical power of the empirical models, that is, a sample size that is too small 
increases the likelihood of a Type II error that skews the results, which reduces the reliability 
of results of empirical models.   
In order to investigate the relationships between acquirers’ systemic risk changes and banking 
integration indicators, we use a smaller sample that only contains cross-border bank M&A 
deals in the full sample. Moreover, the banking integration indicators are only available since 
2003, therefore, the M&A deals between 1997 and 2002 in the full sample are excluded, and 
the sample size for the second sample is 113.  
The data are drawn from the following multiple sources: (1) the original deal-specific data are 
downloaded from Bloomberg; (2) the acquirers’ stock price data are obtained from DataStream; 
(3) the required data in calculating ΔCoVaR are obtained from Bloomberg and DataStream; (4) 
the acquirers’ financial data are downloaded from FitchConnect; (5) the macroeconomic data 
for acquirers’ home countries are downloaded from World Bank Development Indicator (WDI) 
database and DataStream; (6) the structural indicators for acquirers’ banking markets are 
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downloaded from ECB Statistics Data Warehouse; (7) the regulatory and deposit insurance data 
come from databases compiled by Barth et al. (2013) and Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2008); (8) the 
financial integration indicators come from ECB publications. 
3.4.2   Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3-1 demonstrates descriptive statistics for the variables used in the fixed-effect models. 
As expected, the average values for the change of MES (0.0024), change of ΔCoVaR (4.0609) 
and change of LTD (0.0026) and the medians of change of MES (0.0017),  and change of LTD 
(0.0067) are positive, indicating that the acquirers’ systemic risk increase after M&As are 
completed. On the contrary, the median value for the change of ΔCoVaR is negative (-0.0892). 
Moreover, change of ΔCoVaR (20.5379) has considerably higher the standard deviation than 
change in MES (0.0101) and change of LTD (0.0329), indicating that change of ΔCoVaR is 
much more volatile than the other two systemic risk measures. The natural log of total asset 
has a relatively high standard deviation and large range, showing that the acquirers’ size varies 
dramatically in our sample. The range of total assets for all acquirers is extremely large 
(1.47*107 – 370.8). Surprisingly, the minimum values of equity-to-asset ratio and return on asset 
are negative. The average Tier 1 capital ratio is 9.15%, is much greater than that Basel ш 
requires (i.e. how much). The minimum value of non-interest income/total income is negative 
(-0.2286), indicating a hefty non-interest loss; on the contrary, another acquire has 86% of its 
total income from non-interest income. Similarly, all acquirers have varied asset diversity 
(minimum 0.0976 and maximum 0.9943) and Z-score (minimum -1.2872 and maximum 
341.15). With regard to deal-specific variables, the mean of cross-border is approximately 
equal to 0.6, showing that more than half of the deals are cross-border. On the contrary, the 
mean of geographic diversification is only 0.1304, revealing that both acquirers and targets of 
about 87% of deals come from Europe. Not surprisingly, the mean of systemic important is 
0.5723, demonstrating that more than half of the acquirers are recognized as systematic  
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Table 3-1   Descriptive Statistics for data used in model specifications 
 
 
Variable 
 Obs.  Mean Median         S.D. Min.  Max. 
Dependent variables      
Change of MES 471  320  0.0024       0.0017        0.0101  -0.0472 0.0429 
Change of ∆CoVaR 
Change of LTD 
                        
 
315 
306 
    
 4.0609          
 0.0026 
-0.0892       20.5379 
 0.0067        0.0329      
 
     -52.2836 
     -0.1713      
    
   
168.43 
0.0813 
 
Bank-specific variables              
Price-to-book ratio 305   1.8747  1.6600        1.2280      -1.9800 9.4600 
Total assets (Mil .Euro) 322  447987  129010      1251223  370.8 1.47*107 
Natural log of total assets 322 5.0466   5.1106        0.8127 2.5691 7.1683 
Liquid asset/total deposit and borrowing 322 0.2487   0.2150        0.1611 0.0309 0.8428 
Equity-to-asset ratio 322 0.0642 0.0604        0.0329 -0.033 0.1946 
Return on asset 322 0.0088 0.0079        0.0133      -0.0467 0.1092 
Non-interest income/total income 314 0.4184 0.3985        0.1789  -0.2286 0.8602 
Non-performing loan ratio 
Short-term debt/total liability         
Tier 1 capital ratio 
Asset diversity 
306 
321      
308             
301 
0.0538 
0.6514        
0.0915        
0.6600 
0.0348        0.0675         
0.6621        0.1878       
0.0830        0.0321      
0.6740        0.2004 
0.0018         
0.0089          
0.0200 
0.0976 
0.5100 
0.9900 
0.2898 
0.9943 
Z-score 
 
Deal-specific variables 
302  23.9729 19.4250       28.1947      -1.2872 341.151 
Cross-border                                             322            0.6025 1             0.4901                0 1 
Geographic diversification 322 0.1304 0             0.3373            0 1 
Systemic important  322 0.7733 1             0.4194            0 1 
 
Macroeconomic variables 
              
Annual real GDP growth rate (%) 317 2.0443     2.3615        2.6484  -8.8637 10.2014 
Inflation (%)   317 2.3851 2.3495        1.8755   -2.539 14.7061 
Money supply (M2) growth rate (%)         276 7.9354 8.1820        5.5962   -14.1900 48.4212 
 
Industry-specific variables 
                   
CR5(%) 316          52.2347     51.84         17.1714       18.946          98.880 
      
Regulatory and deposit insurance               
Capital regulatory index 322  6.3509 7             1.7377            3      9 
Official supervisory power 322  9.9627  10            2.0352            5     13 
Deposit insurer power 
Moral hazard index                                  
Private monitoring index                          
Bailout  
322 
297         
295          
322           
 0.8478 
 1.4781            
 8.4271            
0.6770          
1             0.8602 
  2             0.5816          
  8             0.9797                           
    1             0.4683      
           0 
       0 
6          
           0                 
     3 
     2 
11 
 1 
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important banks. Next, all the means, standard deviations and ranges of macroeconomic and 
industry-specific variables are high because all variables except HHI are presented in 
percentages while HHI is presented at range of (0-10000). All these variables have very wide 
range, suggesting that these indicators in different countries vary significantly. For regulatory 
and deposit insurance variables, capital regulatory index and official supervisory power have 
high mean values (6.4321 and 10.3102) while deposit insurer power has low mean value 
(0.8148). The high mean value of capital regulatory index indicates that most EU countries 
have stringent regulatory systems while the high mean value of official supervisory power 
demonstrates that banking supervisors in most EU countries have great authorities to supervise 
banks. Most EU countries have low authorities to decide to intervene in a bank. Finally, the 
dummy variable BAILOUT has mean value of 0.5892, revealing that most acquirers are bailout 
recipients in two financial crises. On the other hand, table 3-2 shows the descriptive statistics 
for data used in Granger-causality tests (see subsection 3.4.4 for more methodological details). 
There are 113 observations for all financial integration indicators due to (1) all samples are 
cross-border M&As; (2) all acquirers should come from euro area countries (excluding deals 
whose acquirers come from UK, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, etc.); (3) data availability of all 
financial integration indicators. Not surprisingly, all the mean values of change of MES, change 
of ΔCoVaR and change of LTD are positive, showing that acquirers’ systemic risk generally 
increase after M&As are completed. Change of ΔCoVaR (30.6149) has much greater standard 
deviation than change of MES (0.0079) and table 3-2 shows the descriptive statistics for data 
used in Granger-causality tests (see subsection 3.4.4 for more methodological details). There 
are 113 observations for all financial integration indicators due to (1) all samples are cross-
border M&As; (2) all acquirers should come from euro area countries (excluding deals whose 
acquirers come from UK, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, etc.); (3) data availability of all financial 
integration indicators. Not surprisingly, all the mean values of change of MES, change of  
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Table 3-2   Descriptive Statistics for data used in Granger-causality tests 
 
Variable  Obs. Mean       M.d.      S.D. Min. Max. 
 
Dependent variables 
     
Change of MES 471    113           0.0037    0.0028      0.0079     -0.0169 0.0351 
Change of ∆CoVaR 
Change of LTD 
 
  113       
  113               
             
 6.3147    0.2036       
 0.0116    0.0125   
 
 30.6149    
    0.0344 
     -214.47        
     -0.1713 
    168.43    
      0.1866 
Banking market integration indicators      
Interest rates differences on new loans to 
euro area non-financial corporations (%) 
     
Distressed vs. non-distressed countries 
(IRDIFFERENCE1) (1) 
 113 0.8173     0.6774 0.4333 0.4458  2.552 
Distressed vs. euro area average 
(IRDIFFERENCE4) (4) 
 113 0.4568     0.4043 0.2053 0.2432 1.3120 
Euro area average vs. non-distressed 
(IRDIFFERENCE5)  (5) 
 113 0.3607     0.2710 0.2325 0.2024   1.24 
Interest rates difference on MFI deposits 
for households in the euro area (%) 
     
Full range across countries (max. – min.)  
(IRDIFFERENCE2)  (2) 
 113 1.8133     1.6729 0.5048 1.2656 3.3525 
Interquantile (3rd.q- 1st. q)  
(IRDIFFERENCE3)  (3) 
 113 0.5403     0.5528 0.1143   0.2408 0.8277 
Cross-country standard deviation of MFI  
interest rates on loans to non-financial  
corporations and households (basis points)  
Floating rate and up to 1 year initial rate 
fixation (IRF), up to EUR 1 million 
(DISPERSION2)   (6) 
Floating rate and up to 1 year IRF, over EUR 
1 million (DISPERSION5)   (9)                          
 113 
 
 
 113        
 48.62       44.64 
 
 
 30.39       26.49 
   18.4179 
 
 
   11.6811 
31.5104 
 
 
    22.0213      
132.6137 
 
 
     75.9859 
Consumer credit, over 1 year and up to 5 
Year IRF (DISPERSION3)  (7) 
 113 117.62     116.02  22.7752     86.8699   178.974 
House purchase, floating rate and up to 1 
year (DISPERSION6)   (10) 
House purchase, over 5 years and up to 10 
years  (DISPERSION4)   (8)                         
 113 
 
  
 113         
 33.57       29.65 
 
 
 34.88       32.94     
    8.8866 
 
 
    8.7507      
    25.9672 
 
 
    25.2518    
    62.3227 
 
 
    67.4132 
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ΔCoVaR (30.6149) has much greater standard deviation than change of MES (0.0079) and 
change of LTD (0.0344), revealing that change of ΔCoVaR is much more volatile than change 
of MES and change of LTD. For all interest rates differences on new loans to euro area non-
financial corporations, the mean values, standard deviations and ranges are not extremely high. 
For interest rates difference on Monetary Financial Institution (MFI, is defined as financial 
institution whose major businesses are to take deposits from and to grant loans to other financial 
institutions) deposits for households in the euro area, as expected, all these values for inter-
quantile are much less than those for full range across countries. In all five indicators of cross-
country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans to non-financial corporations and 
households, consumer credit indicator (DISPERSION3) has both highest mean and standard 
deviation, indicating that the interest rate for consumers is higher and more volatile than interest 
rates for house buyers and corporate clients across euro area countries. For interest rates 
difference on MFI deposits for households in the euro area, as expected, all these values for 
inter-quantile are much less than those for full range across countries.  
Table 3-3 presents correlation coefficients among systemic risk measures and independent 
variables. First, all three changes of systemic risk measures have weak correlations with all 
independent variables, indicating that endogeneity problem is less likely to exist in the  
baseline models. Second, all three changes of systemic risk measures have weak correlations 
with each other, showing that they are to some extent heterogeneous. Third, ROA has high 
correlations with other balance sheet-related (such as price-to-book ratio, natural log of total 
asset, equity-to-asset ratio and short-term debt ratio) and macroeconomic (such as GDP, 
inflation rate and money supply growth rate) variables. This is because ROA is correlated to 
bank’s assets, liabilities and equities and can be affected by macroeconomic conditions. Fourth, 
natural log of total asset has high correlation with some bank-specific variables (such as 
liquidity ratio, equity-to-asset ratio, return on asset, short-term debt ratio) and regulatory 
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variables (such as deposit insurer power, private monitoring index, capital regulatory index and 
bailout). This is because large banks may have different accounting ratios from medium and 
small banks and are more likely to be subject to more banking regulations. These results may 
indicate multicollinearity problem in the baseline models. In order to test if the 
multicollinearity problem exists in baseline models, we calculate Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) for all variables. We find the VIFs for all variables are less than 10, and the average VIF 
of the baseline model is 1.78. These results indicate no multicollinearity exists in the baseline 
models. 
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Table 3-3   Correlation Coefficients among Systemic Risk Measures and Independent Variables 
 
                        ΔMES          ΔLTD     Δ (ΔCoVaR)      PB             lnTA               LIQ                EA                  ROA          NPL      Short-term debt    TIER1     Non-interest    Cross-border       GEO 
 
ΔMES            1.0000 
ΔLTD             0.1148***    1.0000 
Δ(ΔCOVaR)  0.2699***   -0.0064**    1.0000 
PB                  0.0689         -0.0433        0.1182        1.0000 
 
lnTA              0.1580***    0.1865**   -0.0478**   -0.5565***  1.0000  
LIQ               0.0128          0.0701*     -0.0498       -0.2521        0.4737***        1.0000                                
EA            -0.0788**    -0.0186*     0.0671   0.2096***   -0.4454***     -0.3346           1.0000        ROA            
-0.0937          0.0519        0.0461       0.5389***  -0.6000***     -0.3130            0.5692*** 
NPL             -0.0402        0.0307       -0.0739     -0.1857***    0.0205***       0.0013             0.3562*** 
  1.0000 
 -0.1800***   1.0000                           
Short-term   0.0196        -0.1221         0.1029       0.3749*       0.5444***      0.4789***      0.4597*** 1.       0.5728*        0.0602***    1.0000 
TIER1          0.0418         0.1063          -0.0070        -0.0546*** -0.0297***    0.0389            0.6291***       0.0836         0.4894***      0.1578***       1.0000 
Non-interest -0.1283       0.0686**      -0.0210        -0.0112       0.1832***      0.3922***     -0.2793*    -0.1456***  -0.0962***    -0.2979**        -0.2841***  1.0000 
Cross-border 0.0375*    -0.0029***     0.0405**     0.0292       0.1241***     0.0310***      -0.0182**     0.0467          0.0880***    -0.0177            0.0724***  -0.0873***      1.0000 
GEO              0.0891        0.0743          -0.0501        -0.0823      0.1269***      -0.2050          -0.0780      -0.0900         -0.0497           0.0072            0.0599        -0.0574**        0.0481***     1.0000 
  
Note: ***   **  * indicate the correlation coefficient is significant at 1%,5% and 10% significance level.  
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Table 3-3  Correlation Coefficients among Systemic Risk Measures and Independent Variables (Continued) 
 
                        ΔMES          ΔLTD     Δ (ΔCoVaR)      PB             lnTA               LIQ            EA                       ROA          NPL      Short-term debt    TIER1     Non-interest    Cross-border       GEO 
 
Zscore           -0.0099          0.0681      -0.0670         -0.1422       -0.0449            -0.0968       -0.0498         
Systematic     0.1455          0.0660        0.0959**     -0.0125*      0.2708***      0.1351*       0.0099****          
GDP               0.0732         -0.1130        0.0414          0.5476***  -0.2205           0.0785***  0.0795***          
Inflation        0.0610           0.0625       0.0994          0.4415***  -0.3322***    -0.0239***  0.1412***        
 
 
    -0.0222      -0.0855**     -0.1020          -0.1160            0.0015          -0.1799               0.0145 
 
     0.0640      0.0927**        0.2174*        0.0932***        0.0050          0.4373***         0.1100*    
 
   0.5183***  0.2473***     0.2700           -0.0667***     0.0257***      0.0818***        -0.0820   
   
   0.5329*** -0.1860***      0.2342            -0.0850            0.0411**         -0.0577           -0.0860  
Moneysupply 0.2314         -0.1808       0.1747          0.4143        -0.1814           0.2641        0.0292         0.2421       -0.0320          0.0642            -0.0344          0.1330              0.0127           -0.0912** 
CR5               -0.0723         -0.1021       0.1668**      0.2729        -0.3092***     0.0577*     -0.0530                                          0.1236 -0.2439***   0.2822***      -0.0440***     0.0751***         -0.1139          -0.1541***  
Deppower      0.0026         0.1547*      0.0057         -0.1782         0.4099***      0.3737*     -0.3824***                 
REG               0.1386           0.2404       0.0704       -0.1552*        0.4240*          0.4028       -0.3286 
SUP               0.1752           0.1161      -0.0116        -0.2583*        0.2149            0.0641*       -0.0014 
-0.2378       -0.1437        -0.1392             0.0398          0.1320            0.1336***        0.2557*** 
  -0.2670      -0.0489***   -0.1489             0.0308         -0.0408              0.1951*          0.0609** 
  -0.1358**   0.0977        -0.2454***      -0.1484***     0.1864**         -0.0968*         -0.2566***                           
Moralhazard 0.0696          0.0381       0.1250         0.0844***     0.1794            0.2983***    -0.0767 1.       -0.2054        0.0909*     -0.3791***       0.0469          0.1408               -0.0768          -0.0934***                   
Monitoring    0.0617         -0.0045      -0.0925       -0.2021**      0.5409***      0.5511***   -0.4082*       -0.3363       0.0236        -0.2540            -0.0240          0.2703**         0.2560***        0.1465***                
Diversity       -0.0529*       -0.1306      -0.1314       -0.0194*        0.1405**       -0.1032        -0.2592***     -0.1381      -0.2968**    -0.0309**        -0.1631          0.0383             -0.0239            -0.0524 
Bailout           -0.0954          0.1835       0.0874       -0.0820*       0.3882***       0.1121        -0.1503***     -0.3669       0.0968        -0.1173***     -0.0383***     0.2183             -0.0301            -0.0846 
IRDIFF1        -0.1052          0.0673     -0.1884**   -0.4542***    -0.0872          -0.2632***   0.1452       -0.1654**   0.3172*        0.1281            0.2912***     -0.2967***       -0.0057             0.1212 
  
Note: ***   **  * indicate the correlation coefficient is significant at 1%,5% and 10% significance level.  
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Table 3-3    Correlation Coefficients among Systemic Risk Measures and Independent Variables (Continued) 
 
                       Zscore         Systemic    GDP        Inflation      Moneysupply       CR5         Deppower                   REG        SUP        Moralhazard   Monitoring    Diversity          Bailout      IRDIFF1 
 
Zscore            1.0000           
Systematic    -0.2861*        1.0000  
GDP              -0.1118           0.1218       1.0000           
Inflation        -0.0093         -0.0139       0.5186***   1.0000    
 
 
 
         
 
    
   
       
Moneysupply -0.1124         0.1328       0.5125         0.5186        1.0000               
CR5               -0.1792***    -0.0426      0.2022*       0.1511       -0.0424       1.0000                                                        
Deppower    -0.2715*         0.3054*** -0.0270       -0.0493       -0.1663       0.2709*             1.0000                 
REG              -0.3237         0.2588**   -0.0161       -0.0051*       -0.0783      0.2458*            0.7318***                     
SUP                0.3119**    -0.0891***  -0.1179**     0.0389         0.0403      -0.4500***      -0.5131***            
   
 1.0000 
-0.3035**    1.0000 
Moralhazard -0.4477***  -0.1757      -0.0097          0.0121         0.0333       -0.0039             0.1628 1.    0.2824         -0.1916*      1.0000                                
Monitoring    -0.2268         0.3601***  -0.0472*     -0.1755         0.1501      -0.1481***       0.6428***    0.4973***  -0.2589***   0.1057***       1.0000            
Diversity       -0.1642**      -0.0574         0.0525**    -0.2160      -0.1014        0.0499            0.1544   0.0214**     0.0035       -0.2344**         0.1474            1.0000              
Bailout          -0.0755**       0.1120***  -0.1883**    -0.2898*** -0.2018       0.0611            0.1346***   0.2938***   0.1421***  0.1582***        0.1998            0.0799               1.0000              
IRDIFF1        0.1123           0.0100       -0.5139***   -0.3548*** -0.5871*** -0.0579           0.1691**     0.0821*      -0.1784       -0.2787***        0.0600           -0.0523*             0.0100***       1.0000 
  
Note: ***   **  * indicate the correlation coefficient is significant at 1%,5% and 10% significance level.  
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3.5 Empirical Methods  
3.5.1 Systemic Risk 
For answering research question 1, the acquirers’ systemic risk changes of bank M&As will be 
calculated as, the difference between acquirers’ post-merger (as in Acharya et al. (2010), Adrian 
and Brunnermeier (2011) and Weiss et al. (2014)) and pre-merger systemic risk measures. 
Specifically, first, calculate marginal expected shortfall (MES) by following Acharya et al. 
(2010) and Weiss et al. (2014) define marginal expected shortfall as how an individual bank’s 
risk taking contributes to banking system’s overall risk. They realize 
bank i’s MES as the mean net equity loss of the bank during the worst 5% banking index’s 
returns as described in equation (1):  
                               MESi5%:= - E[ W1 W0 ∣I5%]                                                (3.1) 
where  W1 and  W0 are market values at end and beginning of period, respectively. 
Specifically, Acharya et al. (2010) and Weiss et al. (2014) estimate bank i’s MES by calculating 
the average log returns on the bank’s stocks conditional on those days that the market 
experienced downward movements in [T1,T2] in equation (2):  
                               MES5%i:[T1,T2] = 
1
#𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑖𝑛 [𝑇1,𝑇2] 
*𝚺t: system is in its 5% tailRit                      (3.2) 
where Rit  is the return on bank i'’s stock return at time t. In this study we will adopt Weiss et.al. 
(2014) to calculate acquirers’ change of MES in equation (3): 
                                ∆MESi5% : = MES5%i:[+11,+180] - MES5%i:[-180,-11]                                (3.3) 
where ∆MESi5%   is acquirer i’s systemic risk change in 5% significance level, MES5%i: [+11, +180]  
is  acquirer i’s MES between 11 days and 180 days after deal completion in 5% significance 
level, MES5%i: [-180, -11]  is acquirer i’s MES between 180 days and 11 days prior to deal 
announcements in 5% significance level.  
Second, we follow Schmidt and Stadtmuller (2006) and Weiss et al. (2014) to compute lower 
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tail dependence (LTD). Nelsen (2006) defines lower dependence tail coefficient as the 
probability that both bank’s stock return and banking index’s return lie in the extreme tail 
jointly:                  LTD1,2 :  =  (X1,X2) = lim
𝑛→∞
 P(X2 ≤F-12(u)∣ X1 ≤F-11(u))                     (3.4) 
Schmidt and Stadtmuller (2006) use non-parametric method to calculate the tail copula 
function in equation (3.5):  
                                               ΛL(x,y): = lim
𝑡→∞
𝑡𝐶(𝑥/𝑡, 𝑦/𝑡)                                            (3.5) 
They also define lower tail dependence coefficient as follows: 
                                                           LTD1,2 = ΛL(1,1)                                          (3.6) 
They first employ GARCH (1,1) model and Maximum-likelihood Estimation with t-
distribution to compute the residuals for acquirers’ and banking index’s log returns (X(1); Y(1)), 
(X(2); Y(2)) …(X(m); Y(m)). They also suppose the two time-series are independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.) random vectors with distribution function F having marginal distribution 
functions G, H and Copula C. Then they let Cm denote the empirical copula by equation (7): 
                                        Cm (u,v) = Fm (G-1m(u), H-1m(v)), (u,v)’[0,1]2
                    
        (3.7)
 
where Fm , Gm and Hm are empirical distributions corresponding to F,  G, H.  
Moreover, let Rm1(j) and Rm2(j) (j =1,2,…m) denote the rank of the observations X(j) and Y(j) in 
the sample. They finally define a non-parametric estimator for the lower tail copula in equation 
(8): 
                                                    ?̂?L(x,y):= 
𝑚
𝑘
 Cm (
𝑘𝑥
𝑚
,
𝑘𝑦
𝑚
) ≈ 
1
𝑘
 ∑ 1𝑚𝑗=1                             (3.8) 
with some parameter k {1,2,…m} to be chosen by the use of plateau-finding algorithm. Frahm 
et al. (2005) describe the plateau-finding algorithm in two steps. First, the map k →?̂? k is 
smoothed by a simple box kernel with bandwidth b N, the means of 2b + 1 successive points 
of ?̂? 1, …?̂? n  lead to the new smoothed map ?̅? 1 …?̅? n-2b, b = ⌊0.005𝑛⌋ such that each moving 
average consists of approximately 1% of the data. In the second step, a plateau of length m = 
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⌊√𝑛 − 2𝑏⌋ is defined as a vector pk  = (?̅?k …, ?̅?k+m-1), k = 1, …, n -2b – m + 1.  The algorithm 
stops at the first plateau pk which elements fulfil the condition 
                                                 ∑ |?̅?k − ?̅?1 |𝑘+𝑚−1𝑖=𝑘+1   ≤ 2σ                                                     (3.9) 
where σ represents the standard deviation of ?̅?1 …?̅?n-2b.  Then the LTD estimate is set to  
                                              LTD1,2 = ?̂?L(k) = 
1
𝑚
∑ ?̅?k + i − 1𝑚𝑖=1                                       (3.10) 
Therefore, this chapter will follow Weiss et.al. (2014) to calculate acquirers’ change of LTD as 
follows: 
                                   ∆LTDi5% : = LTD5%i:[+11,+180] - LTD5%i:[-180,-11]                           (3.11) 
where ∆LTDi5% is acquirer i’s systemic risk change in 5% significance level, LTD5%i: [+11, +180] 
is acquirer i’s LTD between 11 days and 180 days after deal completion in 5% significance 
level, LTD5%i: [-180, -11]  is acquirer i’s MES between 180 days and 11 days prior to deal 
announcements in 5% significance level.  
Similar to chapter 2, the linear panel data models will be used in this chapter. The results of 
Hausman test show that test statistic is 131.38, which is much greater than the critical value, 
and the p-value is 0.0000. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and fixed-effect model is 
preferred.  
Third, in this study we will follow Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) to compute Conditional 
Value at Risk (CoVaR) and ΔCoVaR. They define CoVaRj|iq the of institution j (or financial 
system) conditional on some event C(Xi) of institution i. CoVaRj|iq is defined by the q-quantile 
of the conditional probability distribution:    
                                              Pr (Xj ≤  CoVaRqj|C(Xi) | C(Xi) )  = q                           (3.12) 
They denote institution i’s systemic risk contribution institution j (or financial system) by 
                           ΔCoVaRj|iq =  CoVaRqj|Xi=VaR i(q) -  CoVaRqj|Xi=Median i(q)
                           (3.13) 
                       ΔCoVaRj|systemq = CoVaRqj|system=VaR(q) -  CoVaRqj|system=Median(q)
                  (3.14) 
ΔCoVaRj|systemq denotes the difference between the VaR of institution i conditional on the 
149 
 
distress of the financial system and the VaR of institution i conditional on the median state of 
the financial system on qth-quantile. ΔCoVaRj|systemq indicates institution j’s increase in value-
at-risk in the case of financial crisis and measures the extent to which an individual institution 
is affected by systemic financial events.   
Next, in order to analyze the risk effects on acquirers, after we have calculated the acquirers’ 
systemic risk changes after M&As, we divide the full sample into several different sub-samples 
based on different bank-specific and deal-specific characteristics (e.g. crisis, geographic 
diversification and bank size) and conduct t-tests to statistically verify whether acquirers’ 
systemic risk increase significantly after M&As. We conduct one-sample t-tests to examine (1) 
whether financial crises have negative impacts on acquirers’ systemic risk after M&As; (2) 
whether acquirers in cross-border and domestic deals increase systemic risk significantly after 
M&As; and (3) whether large acquirers (total asset > €500 billion), medium acquirers (€50 
billion < total asset <  €500 billion ) and  small acquirers (total asset < €50 billion) increase 
systemic risk significantly after M&As. We also conduct two-sample t-tests to investigate 
whether (1) the U.S. Subprime Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis have more 
significant negative impact on acquirers (i.e. increase acquirers’ systemic risk more 
significantly); and (2) acquirers in cross-border deals have more significant systemic risk.  
Firstly, the full sample will be divided into three sub-samples as described in subsection 3.3.2; 
secondly, the acquirers’ average of change of MES, ΔCoVaR and LTD will be calculated; 
thirdly, for each average systemic risk change, one-sample t-test will be used to test whether 
acquirers’ average change of each systemic risk measure in each subsample significantly 
negative, significantly positive or insignificant; fourthly, (1) the difference between the average 
change of each systemic risk measure in the U.S. Subprime Crisis and the average change of 
each systemic risk measure in non-crisis subsample and (2) the difference between the average 
of each systemic risk measure in European Sovereign Debt Crisis and the average change of 
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each systemic risk measure in non-crisis subsample, will be computed, and finally, two-sample 
mean-comparison t-tests using variables will be employed to further test whether the average 
systemic risk changes in the U.S. Subprime Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis are 
significantly lower than the average systemic risk changes in the non-crisis subsample.  
The null and alternative hypotheses of one-sample t-test for average systemic risk changes are:  
       H0: mean (systemic risk change) =  0 ,   H1: mean (systemic risk change) < 0     (3.15) 
       H0: mean (systemic risk change) =  0 ,   H1: mean (systemic risk change) > 0     (3.16) 
If the t-statistics is greater than the critical value or p-value is less than the critical value, the 
null hypothesis should be rejected, thus the average systemic risk change in each subsample is 
significantly different from 0. Furthermore, if the null hypothesis in (3.15) is rejected, the 
systemic risk change in each subsample is significantly lower than 0, indicating acquirers’ 
lower systemic risks after M&As; if the null hypothesis in (3.16) is rejected, the average 
systemic risk change in each subsample is significant higher than 0, indicating acquirers’ higher 
systemic risks after M&As. If neither null hypothesis in (3.17) and (3.18) is rejected, the 
acquirers’ average systemic risk changes in each subsample do not change significantly.  
The null and alternative hypotheses of two-sample mean-comparison t-test for average 
systemic risk changes are: 
H0: mean (US Subprime Crisis systemic risk change) – mean (non-crisis systemic risk 
change) = 0  
H1: mean (US Subprime Crisis systemic risk change) – mean (non-crisis systemic risk 
change) < 0                                                                                                                         (3.17) 
 
H0: mean (US Subprime Crisis systemic risk change) – mean (non-crisis systemic risk 
change) = 0  
H1: mean (US Subprime Crisis systemic risk change) – mean (non-crisis systemic risk 
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change) > 0                                                                                                                         (3.18) 
 
H0: mean (European Sovereign Debt Crisis systemic risk change) – mean (non-crisis systemic 
risk change) = 0  
H1: mean (European Sovereign Debt Crisis systemic risk change) – mean (non-crisis systemic 
risk change) < 0                                                                                                                  (3.19) 
 
H0: mean (European Sovereign Debt Crisis systemic risk change) – mean (non-crisis systemic 
risk change) = 0  
H1: mean (European Sovereign Debt Crisis systemic risk change) – mean (non-crisis systemic 
risk change) > 0                                                                                                                 (3.20) 
If the t-statistics is greater than the critical value or p-value is less than the critical value, the 
null hypothesis should be rejected, thus the average systemic risk changes in the U.S. Subprime 
Crisis and non-crisis periods are significantly different. If the null hypothesis in (3.17) is 
rejected, the average systemic risk change in the U.S. Subprime Crisis is significantly lower 
than the average systemic risk change in non-crisis period, indicating the U.S. Subprime Crisis 
has positive impacts on acquirers’ systemic risks after M&As; if the null hypothesis in (3.18) 
is rejected, the average systemic risk change in the U.S. Subprime Crisis is significantly higher 
than the average systemic risk change in non-crisis period, indicating the U.S. Subprime Crisis 
has negative impacts on acquirers’ systemic risks after M&As. If neither null hypothesis in 
(3.17) and (3.18) is rejected, the U.S. Subprime Crisis does not have significant impacts on 
acquirers’ systemic risks after M&As.  
Similarly, if the t-statistics is greater than the critical value or p-value is less than the critical 
value, the null hypothesis should be rejected, thus the average systemic risk changes in the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis and non-crisis periods are significantly different. If the null 
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hypothesis in (3.19) is rejected, the average systemic risk change in the European Sovereign 
Debt Crisis is significantly lower than the average systemic risk change in non-crisis period, 
indicating the European Sovereign Debt Crisis has positive impacts on acquirers’ systemic risks 
after M&As; if the null hypothesis in (3.20) is rejected, the average systemic risk change in the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis is significantly higher than the average systemic risk change 
in non-crisis period, indicating the European Sovereign Debt Crisis has negative impacts on 
acquirers’ systemic risks after M&As. If neither null hypothesis in (3.19) and (3.20) is rejected, 
the European Sovereign Debt Crisis does not have significant impacts on acquirers’ systemic 
risks after M&As. The similar t-test procedures will be conducted for cross-border/domestic 
subsamples and large/medium/small subsamples.  
To conduct research question 3, that is, to identify the main determinants of acquirers’ systemic 
risk changes after M&A operations, the following fixed-effect models will be used:  ΔSYSit= 
α + β1 *lnTAit + β2*Bailoutit  + β3*BSit + β4*DSit  + β5*ISit   + β6* Macroit   +β7*Regulati + 
(μi + νit)                                                                                              (3.21) 
where ∆SYSit is change of systemic risk measures (i.e. MES, ∆CoVaR, LTD) for acquirer i at 
time t (i = 1,2,3…N; t = 1,2,3,…T); lnTAit  is acquirers’ natural log of total asset, Bailoutit  is  a 
dummy variable that is 1 if acquirers are bailout recipients and  0 if acquirers are not bailout 
recipients; BSit is a vector of bank-specific variables (including liquidity ratio, leverage ratio, 
performance, asset quality, debt ratio, capital ratio, income diversity, asset diversity, insolvency 
risk and valuation); DSit is a vector of deal-specific variables (geographic diversification, cross-
border, systematic importance); ISit stands for a vector of industry-specific/structural variables 
(CR5, HHI); Macroit is a vector of macroeconomic variables (GDP growth rate, inflation and 
broad money supply M2 growth rate); and Regulati is a vector of regulatory variables (capital 
regulatory index, overall supervisory index and deposit insurer power, moral hazard index, 
private monitoring index) for country i.  Of all variables, the main variables are natural log of 
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total assets, bailout, asset diversity and non-performing loan/total loan while other variables 
are treated as control variables.  
3.5.2   Principal Component Analysis  
Additionally, as we did in the previous chapter, to select some most important financial 
integration indicators, we will also use principal component analysis (PCA) in this chapter . 
According to Jollife (1986) and Rabe-Hesketh and Everitt (2007), Principal Component 
Analysis, originally introduced by Pearson (1901) and Hotelling (1933), has the central idea to 
reduce the dimentionality of a dataset which consists of a large number of inter-correlated, 
while retaining as much as possible of the variation in the data set. Van Belle et al. (2004) 
define the first, second, third… and the kth principal components and point out that for each k, 
the first k principal components explain as much of the variability in a sample as may be 
explained by any k directions or k variables. Based on these ideas, we will use PCA to select 
several principal components that can explain most amount of variability in the dataset thus to 
reduce the number of banking integration indicators from 10 to a smaller number e will follow 
Jolliffe’s (1986) rule to determine the number of principal components. In his book Principal 
Component Analysis, he listed four types of rules to select the number of principal components 
and pointed out that the most obvious criterion is to select a cumulative percentage (i.e. 80% 
or 90%) of total variation it is desired that the principal components should contribute. 
Specifically, formula to calculate the percentage of variation contributed by the first k PCs is  
                                                                          (3.22) 
Then we need to choose a cut-off, t*, between 70% and 90% of total variation and keep the 
smallest number for k, that is m, for which tk > t*. The first m PCs can provide most information 
in a vector of variables. This chapter will also follow Rabe-Hesketh and Everitt (2007) to 
present the process of PCA by using Stata. All the results will be presented and discussed in 
the following section of Discussion of Results (section 3.5).   
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3.5.3 Systemic Risk and Financial Integration 
Furthermore, to examine the relationship between acquirers’ systemic risk changes and 
banking integration indicators, this chapter will employ the following fixed-effect model 
ΔSYSit= α + β1 *lnTAit + β2*Bailoutit + β3*FIit + β4*BSit + β5*DSit + β6*ISit  + β7* Macroit   
+ β8*Regulati + (μi + νit)                                                                          (3.23) 
where FIit is a financial integration indicator in European banking market. Of all variables, 
main variables are financial integration indicator in banking market, natural log of total assets, 
bailout, asset diversity and non-performing loan/total loan while other variables are treated as 
control variables.  
With regard to the banking integration indicators, some indicators from ECB report Financial 
Integration in Europe and the corresponding data from ECB website will be used. Specifically, 
the activity-based and price-based indicators, including interest rates on new loans to euro area 
non-financial corporations, interest rates on MFI deposits for households in the euro area, 
cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on new loans to non-financial 
corporations and households, will be employed. The first two indicators are activity-based and 
the last two indicators are price-based. The lower the interest rates with the significant level of 
convergence across countries (lower interest rates difference across countries) indicate higher 
degree of integration. Therefore, for the first two indicators, the difference between average 
interest rates for distressed countries and for non-distressed countries and the full range 
difference across countries (max minus min) will be calculated. In addition, the lower cross-
country standard deviations of interest rates indicate higher degree of integration. Consequently, 
for the last two indicators, the original time series are kept as the integration indicators. 
Although there are at least two time-series for each indicator, only one or two time-series are 
selected. According to the announcement date of M&A, the monthly data of all selected 
banking integration indicators for all eligible deals (those deals whose acquirers come from 10 
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euro areas countries in distressed and non-distressed countries) will be employed.  
3.5.4 Granger-causality Test   
The significance of coefficients of banking integration indicators does not necessarily indicate 
the causal relationships between change of systemic risk and financial integration indicators. 
In order to investigate whether they have causal relationships, we will also employ the Granger-
causality tests in this chapter. Brooks (2008) defines that the Granger-causality test is a 
statistical hypothesis test for determining whether one time series is useful in forecasting 
another. He also describes that Granger-causality tests seek to answer questions such as “Do 
changes in the first variable cause changes in the second variable?” If the first variable causes 
the second variable, then lags of the first variable should be significant in the equation for the 
second variable. If this is the case, we say that the first variable “Granger-causes” the second 
variable. If the second variable causes the first variable, lags of the second variable should be 
significant in the equation for the first variable. If both sets of lags are significant, there is “bi-
directional causality”. If neither the second variable causes the first variable, nor the first 
variable causes the second variable, then they are independent. We will adopt these rules to 
determine whether the systemic risk has causal relationship with banking integration indicator.  
3.5.5   Propensity Score Matching 
We follow Weiss et.al (2014) to use propensity score matching as robustness check to provide 
further evidence to support the hypothesis that acquirers’ systemic risk increase significant after 
M&As. We examine the hypothesis by building a control group of non-merging banks and 
estimate the changes in the non-merging banks’ MES, LTD and ΔCoVaR around mergers. We 
first match the combined banks with non-merging banks based on the merging banks’ pre-
merger total assets and market-to-book ratio; secondly, we match each acquiring bank in the 
post-merger to a non-merging bank based on post-merger total assets and market-to-book ratio; 
thirdly, the propensity score on total assets and market-to-book ratio via probit model  and 
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retrieve the predicted probability; and fourthly, we use nearest-neighbor matching: treated 
merging bank is matched to non-treated non-merging bank such that 
                                    | pmerging – pnon-merging | = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {| pmerging – pk |}                                 (3.24) 
and finally we calculate MES, LTD, and ΔCoVaR of acquirerpre-merger, combinedpre-merger, 
combinedpost-merger for merging banks and non-merging banks.  
 
3.6   Discussion of Results 
3.6.1   Acquirers’ Systemic Risk Changes after M&As  
To investigate whether systemic risk increased or decreased significantly after the bank M&As, 
we first compute the acquirers’ average changes of all three systemic risk measures after bank 
M&As. The results in table 3-4 demonstrate that all three systemic risk measures increase 
significantly after M&As for all acquirers. Evidence shows that the average change of acquirers’ 
MES is statistically significant at 1% significance level and on average, acquirers increase MES 
by approximately by 0.24% after M&As. Similarly, on average, acquirers increase LTD by 
about 0.26% after M&As. Finally, the average change of acquirers’ ∆CoVaR is 4.0609 and is 
statistically significant at 1% significance level. It shows that on average, acquirers increase 
∆CoVaR by more than 4 after M&As.  
We then additionally calculate the average systemic risk changes for the acquirers’ competitors. 
To do so we select all peer banks in EU 28 countries that do not engage in M&As as competitors. 
We find that both MES and LTD of competitors increase significantly while change of ∆CoVaR 
increases insignificantly. Furthermore, we conduct t-tests of mean difference between acquirers 
and their competitors for all three systemic risk measures and all results are acquirers and their 
competitors for all three systemic risk measures and all results are insignificant. These results 
demonstrate that both acquirers and their competitors suffer the same extent from the increase 
in systemic risk.  
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Table 3-4     Systemic Risk Changes after M&As   
 
      Change of MES      Change of LTD Change of ∆CoVaR 
Acquirers          0.0024*** 
        (0.0000) 
          0.0026* 
         (0.0837) 
   4.0609***                               
(0.0003) 
Acquirers’ 
competitors 
         0.0032*** 
        (0.0021) 
          0.0051* 
         (0.0879) 
         3.7662 
        (0.8537) 
Acquirers  vs. 
competitors 
        -0.0008 
        (0.7334) 
         -0.0025 
         (0.7268) 
         4.0048 
        (0.4687) 
M&A deals in crisis 
period vs. deals in 
non-crisis period 
         0.0040*** 
        (0.0009) 
          0.0033 
         (0.2043) 
         7.8591*** 
        (0.0024) 
M&A deals in the US 
crisis vs. deals in non-
crisis period 
         0.0061*** 
        (0.0000) 
          0.0069* 
         (0.0846) 
        15.6881*** 
        (0.0001) 
M&A deals in the 
European crisis vs. 
non-crisis period 
         0.0007 
        (0.3632) 
         -0.0226 
         (0.6590) 
         4.1134*** 
        (0.0095) 
 
3.6.2 Acquirers’ Systemic Risk Changes after M&As Based on Different Characteristics  
In order to find whether the U.S. Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis have 
significantly negative impacts on acquirers’ systemic risks, we then use t-tests of average 
differences of three systemic risk measures between (1) M&A deals in crisis period and M&A 
deals in non-crisis period; (2) M&A deals in the U.S. Financial Crisis and M&A deals in non-
crisis period; and (3) M&A deals in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis and M&A deals in 
non-crisis period. These results show that (1) acquirers in crisis period have more significant 
increase in MES and ∆CoVaR than acquirers in non-crisis period; (2) the U.S. Financial Crisis 
has much more significantly negative impact on acquirers’ systemic risks than the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis. Results in table 3-5 provide further evidences for the financial crises 
have much more significantly negative impacts on acquirers’ systemic risks. Acquirers’ average 
MES, LTD and ∆CoVaR increased by 0.49%, 0.39% and 9.0508 in crisis period while they 
only rose by 0.09%, 0.17% and 1.1917 in non-crisis period. These results demonstrate that 
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acquirers in crisis period have much higher systemic risk increases 
than acquirers in non-crisis period. Therefore, both financial crises have a significant negative 
impact on banks, but the U.S. financial crisis appears more detrimental than the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis. This finding is reasonable because the U.S. Financial Crisis is a global 
Table 3-5   Systemic Risk Changes after M&As in Crisis and Non-Crisis Periods 
 
 mean(change of 
MES) 
mean(change of 
LTD) 
Mean(change of 
∆CoVaR) 
Crisis            0.0049*** 
          (0.0000) 
          0.0039* 
         (0.0852) 
         9.0508*** 
         (0.0003) 
Non-crisis            0.0009* 
          (0.0598) 
          0.0017 
         (0.2226) 
         1.1917 
         (0.1271) 
 
crisis while the European Debt Crisis is a regional crisis. The former is more contagious than 
the later.  
We then divide the full sample into several sub-samples and calculate the changes of systemic 
risk measures after bank M&As to identify some determinants of acquirers’ systemic risk  
changes. Firstly, we calculate the systemic risk changes for acquirers with different sizes. 
We divide the full sample into three sub-samples: large banks (assets > €500bn), medium banks 
(€50bn<assets<€500bn) and small banks (assets< €50bn).  
Table 3-6 shows that large acquirers are characterized by significantly greater increases in 
systemic risk than medium and small acquirers. Large acquirers increased MES, LTD and 
∆CoVaR by 0.47%, 0.61% and 6.2338, while medium and small acquirers increased three 
systemic risk measures by much smaller percentages (small acquirers’ LTD even decreased 
by 0.22%). These results can provide first evidences for larger acquirers will have higher 
systemic risks after M&As. One possible explanation can be: larger acquirers can merge 
other banks and become even larger and “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF). This enables them to 
exploit safety-net subsidies and creates moral hazard problem. Therefore, our evidence seems 
159 
 
Table 3-6   Systemic Risk Changes for Banks with Different Sizes 
 
 mean(change of 
MES) 
mean(change of 
LTD) 
Mean(change of 
∆CoVaR) 
Large banks 
(Assets > €500bn) 
           0.0047***  
          (0.0001) 
           0.0061** 
          (0.0447) 
            6.2338*** 
           (0.0058) 
Medium banks 
(€50bn - €500bn) 
 
           0.0028*** 
          (0.0010) 
           0.0039* 
          (0.0812) 
            3.0982** 
           (0.0127) 
Small banks 
(Assets < €50bn) 
           0.00001 
          (0.4939) 
          -0.0022 
          (0.7244) 
            3.8546* 
           (0.0772) 
 
to suggest that larger acquirers will take more risks and contribute higher systemic risks to the 
banking system.  
Next, we compute the average changes of acquirers’ systemic risks in cross-border and 
domestic M&A deals and the average differences of acquirers’ systemic risk changes between 
cross-border and domestic deals. Table 3-7 reports acquirers’ changes of all three systemic risk 
measures in cross-border and domestic M&As. We find that acquirers in cross-border  
Table 3-7    Systemic Risk Changes for Cross-border and Domestic M&As 
 
 mean(change of 
MES) 
mean(change of 
LTD) 
Mean(change of 
∆CoVaR) 
Cross-border            0.0032*** 
          (0.0000) 
          0.0065*** 
          (0.0047) 
           6.1858*** 
           (0.0001) 
Domestic 
 
           0.0011* 
          (0.0994) 
          -0.0036 
          (0.1071) 
            0.7205 
           (0.2932) 
Cross-border 
Vs. domestic 
           0.0021** 
          (0.0312) 
          0.0101*** 
          (0.0035) 
 
            5.4653*** 
           (0.0054) 
 
deals have much more significant systemic risk increases than acquirers in domestic deals. For 
cross-border M&As, diversification benefits can be partly offset by shifts to higher-risk 
portfolio and/or greater operational risks, then acquirers in cross-border M&As may have more 
significant systemic risk increases than acquirers in domestic M&As. On the contrary, Weiss 
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et. al. (2014) finds that acquirers in domestic M&As more significant systemic risk increases 
than acquirers in cross-border M&As. Our findings are different from those in Weiss et.al. 
(2014) and we believe that this could be possibly due to the fact that: (1) there are more cross-
border M&As in EU countries while more domestic M&As in North America; (2) acquirer’s 
bank size in EU countries is generally much larger than acquirer’s bank size in North America.   
Finally, we investigate whether acquirers in periphery countries have higher systemic risk 
increases than acquirers in core countries. Table 3-8 presents acquirers’ changes of all three 
systemic risk measures for M&As in periphery countries and core countries. Surprisingly, we 
find that acquirers in core countries have much higher systemic risk increases than acquirers in 
periphery countries. One possible explanation can be that acquirers in core countries may be 
more interconnected with other banks than acquirers in periphery countries.  
Table 3-8   Systemic Risk Changes for M&As in Periphery and Core Countries 
 
 mean(change of 
MES) 
mean(change of 
LTD) 
Mean(change of 
∆CoVaR) 
Periphery countries            0.0013** 
          (0.0489) 
           0.0010 
          (0.3557) 
            1.9536* 
           (0.0820) 
Core countries 
 
           0.0033** 
          (0.0104) 
           0.0041 
          (0.1903) 
            9.4248*** 
           (0.0033) 
Periphery 
Vs. core 
          -0.0020 
          (0.8995) 
          -0.0031 
          (0.7195) 
           -7.4712*** 
           (0.0217) 
 
3.6.3 Selecting Banking Integration Indicators 
In this subsection, we will employ principal component analysis (PCA) （as described in 
subsection 3.4.2）to select several banking integration indicators that can explain most 
variability in the models. Table 3-9 shows that the first three principal components can explain 
more than 91% of the total variance. In addition, figure 3-1 illustrates the scree plot of 
eigenvalues after PCA also reveals that the first three principal components have largest 
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eigenvalues. Therefore, we select the first three principal components.  
             Table 3-9   Results of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) Variance explained 
 
 
Components 
 
Eigenvalue 
 
Proportion 
 
Cumulative 
 
Component 1 
 
7.0002 
 
0.7000 
 
0.7000 
 
Component 2 
 
1.4052 
 
0.1405 
 
0.8405 
 
Component 3 
 
0.7378 
 
0.0738 
 
0.9143 
 
Component 4 
 
0.4514 
 
0.0451 
 
0.9595 
 
Component 5 
 
0.1680 
 
0.0168 
 
0.9763 
 
Component 6 
 
0.1149 
 
0.0115 
 
0.9878 
 
Component 7 
 
0.0856 
 
0.0086 
 
0.9963 
 
Component 8 
 
0.0250 
 
0.0025 
 
0.9988 
 
Component 9 
 
0.0117 
 
0.0012 
 
1.0000 
                                 
Figure 3-1   Scree plot of eigenvalues after PCA 
 
 
Next, in table 3-10, we further report the loadings for the first three components and identify 
that the first principal component has largest absolute values for loadings for 
IRDIFFERENCE1 (interest rate difference on new loans to non-financial corporations between 
distressed and non-distressed countries), IRDIFFERENCE5 (interest rate difference on new 
loans to euro area non-financial corporations between euro area average and non-distressed 
countries) and DISPERSION5 (cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans 
to non-financial corporations and households), while the second principal component has 
0
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largest absolute values for loadings for IRDIFFERENCE3 (interquantile of interest rate 
difference on MFI deposits for households in the euro area) , IRDIFFERENCE2 (full range of 
interest rate difference on MFI deposits for households in the euro area) and 
DISPERSION3(cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans to non-
financial corporations and households). These results indicate that PC1 can be mostly  
 
Table 3-10   the Loadings of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Comp1 
 
 
Comp2 
 
 
Comp3 
 
IRDIFFERENCE1 
 
0.3724 
 
0.0431 
 
-0.0370 
 
IRDIFFERENCE5 
 
0.3721 
 
-0.0237 
 
-0.0513 
 
    DISPERSION5 
 
0.3619 
 
-0.0131 
 
-0.0249 
 
IRDIFFERENCE2 
 
0.2523 
 
     -0.5013 
         
       -0.0073 
 
IRDIFFERENCE3 
 
        0.0769  
 
0.7183 
         
        0.3488 
 
DISPERSION3 
 
0.2061 
 
     -0.3559 
         
        0.8293 
 
IRDIFFERENCE4 
 
0.3609 
       
      0.1181 
 
       -0.0204 
 
DISPERSION2 
 
0.3484 
   
      0.2605 
   
        0.0429 
 
DISPERSION4 
 
0.3472 
   
      0.1126 
 
       -0.0711 
 
DISPERSION6 
 
0.3230 
 
  
     -0.0954 
 
       -0.4227 
 
interpreted by IRDIFFERENCE1, IRDIFFERENCE5 and DISPERSION5 while PC2 can be 
mostly explained by IRDIFFERENCE3, IRDIFFERENCE2 and DISPERSION3.  
Therefore, we select IRDIFFERENCE1, IRDIFFERENCE5 and DISPERSION5 as the most 
important banking integration indicators in the main regressions and use IRDIFFERENCE2, 
IRDIFFERENCE3 and DISPERSION3 as less important indicators in robustness checks.  
3.6.4   Determinants of Acquirers’ Systemic Risk Changes for Cross-border M&As 
To identify more determinants of acquirers’ systemic risk changes after M&As, we employ the 
panel data model. As we discussed in subsection 3.4.1, we use Hausman test to determine that 
fixed-effect model is preferred to random-effect model.  
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Table 3-11 presents the results of fixed-effect models that examine the determinants of 
acquirers’ changes of MES. Regressions (1) – (3) report the results of full models with banking 
integration indicators. IRDIFFERENCE1 has significantly negative relationships with ∆MES 
while DISPERSION5 does not have significant relationship with ∆MES. Lower interest rate 
differentials and higher cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans indicate 
higher level of banking integration and more cross-border flows for banks. Acquirers can take 
more risks via bank M&As, therefore, acquirers have higher systemic risk contributions to 
banking sector after M&As. These results provide partial support for the destabilizing effects 
of banking integration (hypothesis). Asset diversity is statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level and is negatively related to ∆MES in regressions (1) and (2). If acquirers’ 
asset diversity increases by 1%, their MES will decrease by more than 1%. These results offer 
support to our previous finding and indicate that product diversification tends to reduce 
individual bank risk and hence indirectly decreasing the systemic risk contributions to the 
banking system. Price-to-book ratio (or market value-to-book value ratio) is positively related 
to ∆MES, demonstrating that the directors’ hubris (higher price-to-book ratio indicates that 
banks’ directors assume excessive risks to increase banks values) may result in banks to take 
higher risky M&As and thus increases acquirers’ systemic risk contributions to banking sector. 
These results are consistent with those results of Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011). They found 
that low-risk banks increase their risk after a merger.  
Surprisingly, non-performing loan ratio is statistically significant at 1% significance level and 
is negatively related to ∆MES. One possible explanation could be that banks that are less 
focused on traditional deposit taking and lending business are more likely to take exposures 
that carry systemic risks.  
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Table 3-11   Determinants of Acquirers’ changes of MES for Cross-border M&As 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                   ∆MES                 ∆MES      
                                                         IR                           IR 
                                                     DIFFERENCE1    DIFFERENCE5    
                                                      Full                     Full                                                
          (3)                       
      ∆MES  
 
DISPERSION5 
        Full 
        (4)                        (5) 
      ∆MES                 ∆MES 
           IR                           IR 
        DIFF1                    DIFF3 
   Bank-specific        Bank-specific                                
   (6) 
      ∆MES 
 
DISPERSION5 
 Bank-specific 
DISPERS 
Banking integration                 -0.0151*              -0.0097* 
                                                 (0.0083)               (0.0055) 
Asset diversity                         -0.0110**            -0.0104** 
                                                 (0.0055)               (0.0051) 
Non-performing loan               -0.0182***          -0.0167*** 
                                                 (0.0057)               (0.0065) 
Tier 1 Capital                            0.0924**              0.0889 
                                                 (0.0412)               (0.0520) 
      0.0001 
     (0.0003) 
     -0.0118*** 
     (0.0045) 
     -0.0732** 
     (0.0334) 
      0.0855** 
     (0.0367) 
   -0.0212**             -0.0431*** 
  (0.0003)               (0.0125) 
  -0.0070*              -0.0072** 
  (0.0037)               (0.0035) 
  -0.0533*                -0.0580** 
  (0.0286)               (0.0278) 
   0.0658* 0.0711**          
(0.0348)                 (0.0343) 
    0.0001 
  (0.0003) 
  -0.0065* 
  (0.0151) 
  -0.0339 
  (0.0297) 
   0.0655* 
  (0.0365) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0061**              0.0059 
                                                 (0.0030)    (0.0039) 
      0.0049* 
     (0.0203) 
    0.0028*               0.0027* 
  (0.0015)               (0.0015) 
    0.0038** 
  (0.0016) 
PB                                             0.0031*                0.0036* 
                                                 (0.0018)               (0.0020) 
Moral hazard  index                  0.0035                  0.0045* 
                                                 (0.0023)               (0.0023) 
Liquid ratio                              -0.0133                 -0.0145 
                                                 (0.0082)               (0.0124)                      
      0.0018 
     (0.0016) 
      0.0028  
     (0.0018) 
     -0.0093 
(0.0066) 
    0.0001                  0.0001 
  (0.0014)               (0.0013) 
                                
                               
  -0.0040                 -0.0043  
  (0.0047)               (0.0046) 
    0.0008 
  (0.0014) 
    
   
   -0.0048 
   (0.0050) 
Equity-to-asset                         -0.0384                 -0.0349       
                                                 (0.0634)               (0.0932) 
     -0.0640 
     (0.0585) 
   -0.0727                 -0.0755 
  (0.0514)               (0.0507) 
    -0.0841 
   (0.0538) 
ROA                                         -0.1887                 -0.1758 
                                                 (0.2609)               (0.2153)                    
      0.1326 
(0.2236) 
    0.0269                  0.0156 
  (0.1898)               (0.1876) 
     0.0676 
   (0.1986) 
Short-term debt                         0.0178**              0.0179* 
                                                 (0.0086)               (0.0101)    
      0.0163** 
     (0.0077) 
    0.0078                  0.0066 
  (0.0062)               (0.0061) 
     0.0079 
   (0.0066) 
Non-interest income                 -0.0062                -0.0071  
                                                 (0.0060)               (0.0042) 
     -0.0019 
     (0.0052) 
   -0.0054                 -0.0057 
  (0.0046)               (0.0045) 
    -0.0058 
   (0.0048) 
Z-score                                      0.0001                  0.0001 
                                                 (0.0001)               (0.0001) 
     -0.0001 
     (0.0001) 
    0.0001                  0.0001 
  (0.0001)               (0.0001) 
      0.0001 
    (0.0001) 
Cross-border                            -0.0041                 -0.0026 
                                                 (0.0047)               (0.0044)            
     -0.0007 
     (0.0037) 
                                                  
     
Geographic diversification       0.0015                   0.0025 
                                                 (0.0025)               (0.0032) 
Systemic importance                0.0008                   0.0023 
                                                 (0.0046)               (0.0036) 
Bailout                                     -0.0144***           -0.0143*** 
                                                 (0.0041)               (0.0035) 
Real GDP growth                      0.0009                 0.0009 
                                                 (0.0010)               (0.0009) 
      0.0012 
     (0.0021) 
     -0.0034 
     (0.0036) 
     -0.0061** 
     (0.0030) 
      0.0018 
     (0.0008) 
                      
                   
                      
                 
                   
 
  
Inflation                                    -0.0013                -0.0016*** 
                                                 (0.0009)               (0.0004) 
     -0.0026*** 
     (0.0008) 
    
Money  supply  growth             0.0001                  0.0001 
                                                 (0.0001)               (0.0001) 
CR5                                           0.0001                  0.0011 
                                                 (0.0001)               (0.0001) 
Capital regulatory index           0.0012                  0.0011 
                                                 (0.0010)               (0.0008)              
Official supervisory index        0.0023**              0.0026***                 
                                                 (0.0009)               (0.0007)             
Deposit insurer power             -0.0021                 -0.0014 
                                                 (0.0021)               (0.0020) 
Private monitoring index          0.0025*                0.0024                                                     
                                                 (0.0015)               (0.0020) 
      0.0001 
     (0.0001) 
      0.0001 
     (0.0001) 
      0.0006 
     (0.0001) 
      0.0020*** 
     (0.0008) 
      0.0028 
     (0.0018) 
      0.0007 
     (0.0012) 
                       
 
  
Obs.                                             100                       100                      
 
R2                                                                      0.1457                 0.2814 
  100 
 
     0.1256                                                                   
   100                         100 
  
0.1014 0.2076                
  100 
 
    0.1016 
 
 
     
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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Another unexpected result is Tier1 capital ratio is negatively related to ∆MES. This indicates 
that acquirers with higher Tier1 capital ratio will have higher systemic risks after M&As. Our 
results are different from results in previous studies (Bostandzic et.al. 2014; Laeven et.al. 2016). 
One possible explanation for our unexpected results is that banks that have high capital ratios 
are more exposed in unregulated parts of the banking business (e.g. off-balance sheet and 
derivatives). In addition, the BIS report (2013) argues that despite adequate capital 
ratio, many banks still experienced difficulties because they did not manage their liquidity risks 
in a prudent manner in crisis years. Therefore, they increased their individual risks and 
increased their systemic risk contributions to banking system. We have quite interesting 
findings in regression models (1) - (3). The dummy for Bailout is statistically significant at 1% 
significance level and is negatively related to ∆MES. These results are consistent with results 
in Berger et.al (2016), indicating that acquirers that receive bailouts will have lower MES after 
bank M&As. Berger et.al.(2016) claim that government rescue troubled banks for the purpose 
of maintaining financial stability and reducing the costs associated with bank failures.  
Moreover, short-term debt ratio is positively related to ∆MES, showing that acquirers that rely 
more on short-term debts will have higher MES after M&As. These results are expected 
because banks that use more short-term debts (more traditional banks) as their sources of funds 
will have higher solvency risk, thus will have higher systemic risk contributions to banking 
system.  
In regressions (1) and (3), the natural log of total asset is positively related to ∆MES. This result 
supports the previous finding that larger acquirers have higher systemic risks after M&As. 
Larger banks are able to become even larger and “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) after M&As. This 
enables them to exploit safety-net subsidies and creates moral hazard problem, indicating that 
larger banks are more likely to take more risk and will contribute higher systemic risk to 
banking sector. However, our result differs from that in Weiss et al. (2014). Weiss et al. (2014) 
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find that total asset is negatively significant with ∆MES for international banks. The difference 
can be explained by the different samples for the two studies: Weiss et al. (2014) has 
international banks while we have European banks. Models (4) - (6) in table 3-11 constitute 
baseline regressions that only contain banking integration indicators and bank-specific 
variables. They have similar results as regressions (1) - (3), except that short-term debt ratio 
and price-to-book ratio are not significant related with ∆MES. These results provide more 
evidences for previous findings that (1) acquirers with higher asset diversity, (2) smaller 
acquirers and (3) acquirers from less integrated markets will have lower systemic risk after 
M&As. 
Regressions (1) – (3) in table 3-12 are regressions which exclude macroeconomic, structural 
and regulatory variables. They have similar results as the full models, except that non-   interest 
income/total income is negative significant with ∆MES and short-term debt/total liabilities is 
not significant with ∆MES. These results do not change our previous conclusions and provide 
more evidences for acquirers with higher product diversification will have lower systemic risk 
contributions after M&As.  
Regressions (4) – (6) in table 3-12 constitute regressions that only include bank-specific, deal-
specific and regulatory variables. These regressions have two differences from the regressions 
above. First, in regressions (4) and (6), capital regulatory index is positively significant with 
∆MES. This indicates that acquirers from countries with more stringent capital requirements 
will have higher systemic risk contributions to banking system. These results are unexpected, 
but can be explained as follows: if a country requires banks to have higher capital ratio, banks 
will comply with capital regulations and will hold extra capital, but they may manage liquidity 
risks in a less prudent manner, thus leading to higher systemic risk contributions to banking 
system. Second, in regression (5), equity-to-asset ratio is negatively  
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 Table 3-12    Determinants of Acquirers’ changes of MES for Cross-border M&As 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                   ∆MES                 ∆MES      
                                                         IR                           IR 
                                                     DIFFERENCE1    DIFFERENCE5    
                                               Bank-specific     Bank-specific 
                                                Deal-specific      Deal-specific 
 
         (3)                       
      ∆MES  
 
DISPERSION5 
Bank-specific 
 Deal-specific 
         (4)                        (5) 
      ∆MES                 ∆MES 
           IR                           IR 
        DIFF1                    DIFF3 
   Deal-specific         Deal-specific                                
  Regulatory            Regulatory                               
 
 
 
 
 
         
  (6) 
      ∆MES 
 
DISPERSION5 
Deal-specific 
DISPERS 
Banking integration                 -0.0145**            -0.0346*** 
                                                 (0.0064)               (0.0103) 
Asset diversity                         -0.0086*              -0.0102* 
                                                 (0.0041)               (0.0046) 
Non-performing loan               -0.0492                -0.0582* 
                                                 (0.0322)               (0.0316) 
Tier 1 Capital                            0.0661                  0.0619 
                                                 (0.0484)               (0.0498) 
      0.0001 
     (0.0004) 
     -0.0097** 
     (0.0048) 
     -0.0478 
     (0.0310) 
      0.0615 
     (0.0506) 
   -0.0139*              -0.0340** 
  (0.0066)               (0.0161) 
  -0.0065                -0.0066 
  (0.0058)               (0.0047) 
  -0.0614*              -0.0651* 
  (0.0323)               (0.0337) 
   0.0913* 0.0927**            
(0.0416)                 (0.0423) 
    0.0001 
  (0.0004) 
  -0.0065* 
  (0.0061) 
  -0.0529 
  (0.0311) 
  0.0888* 
  (0.0431) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0057**              0.0082** 
                                                 (0.0025)    (0.0030) 
      0.0091*** 
     (0.0026) 
    0.0032*                0.0030 
  (0.0015)               (0.0025) 
    0.0041** 
  (0.0013) 
PB                                             0.0013                  0.0026* 
                                                 (0.0010)               (0.0012) 
Moral hazard  index                                               
                                                                               
Liquid ratio                              -0.0064                 -0.0086 
                                                 (0.0071)               (0.0080)                      
      0.0033** 
     (0.0040) 
        
      
     -0.0103 
(0.0079) 
    0.0011                  0.0010 
  (0.0014)               (0.0018) 
   0.0017                  0.0017 
  (0.0020)               (0.0019)            
  -0.0075                 -0.0071  
  (0.0090)               (0.0070) 
    0.0020 
  (0.0019) 
   0.0018 
  (0.0024) 
   -0.0092 
   (0.0097) 
Equity-to-asset                         -0.0643                 -0.0434       
                                                 (0.0620)               (0.0677) 
     -0.0398 
     (0.0686) 
   -0.1075                 -0.1081* 
  (0.0691)               (0.0639) 
    -0.1022 
   (0.0720) 
ROA                                          0.0034                 -0.1639 
                                                 (0.2008)               (0.2068)                    
     -0.1663 
(0.1976) 
    0.0521                  0.0346 
  (0.2766)               (0.2286) 
     0.0383 
   (0.3006) 
Short-term debt                         0.0115                  0.0151 
                                                 (0.0126)               (0.0105)     
      0.0154 
     (0.0097) 
    0.0124                  0.0121 
  (0.0146)               (0.0082) 
     0.0131 
   (0.0145) 
Non-interest income                -0.0071**             -0.0074***  
                                                 (0.0020)               (0.0023) 
     -0.0068* 
     (0.0032) 
   -0.0056                -0.0058 
  (0.0036)               (0.0056) 
    -0.0059 
   (0.0311) 
Z-score                                      0.0001                  0.0001 
                                                 (0.0001)               (0.0001) 
     -0.0001 
     (0.0001) 
    0.0001                  0.0001 
  (0.0001)               (0.0001) 
     0.0001 
   (0.0001) 
Cross-border                            -0.0058                 -0.0046 
                                                 (0.0035)               (0.0029)            
     -0.0037 
     (0.0032) 
                                                  
     
Geographic diversification       0.0008                  -0.0006 
                                                 (0.0021)               (0.0020) 
Systemic importance               -0.0023                 -0.0034 
                                                 (0.0026)               (0.0026) 
Bailout                                     -0.0066**             -0.0066* 
                                                 (0.0029)               (0.0029) 
Real GDP growth                                                   
                                                                               
      0.0001 
     (0.0001) 
     -0.0023 
     (0.0029) 
     -0.0069** 
     (0.0025) 
       
      
                      
                   
                      
                 
                   
 
  
Inflation                                                                 
                                                                               
      
 
    
Money  supply  growth                                           
                                                                              
CR5                                                                        
                                                                              
Capital regulatory index                                        
                                                                                           
Official supervisory index                                                      
                                                                                          
Deposit insurer power                                           
                                                                               
Private monitoring index                                                                                            
                                                                              
       
       
       
 
                       
 
 
 
   0.0006**             0.0006 
  (0.0002)              (0.0009) 
   0.0009                 0.0008 
  (0.0007)              (0.0008) 
  -0.0016               -0.0018 
  (0.0013)              (0.0019) 
   0.0010                 0.0010 
  (0.0017)              (0.0012) 
  
 
 
 
   0.0007* 
  (0.0003) 
   0.0011 
  (0.0008) 
  -0/0011 
  (0.0011) 
   0.0008 
  (0.0019) 
 
Obs.                                             105                       105                      
 
R2                                                                     0.2674                 0.2834 
         
  105 
 
     0.2356                                                                   
  
101                       101 
  
0.2373 0.2539              
  
101 
 
    0.2087 
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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and significantly related to ∆MES. This is an expected result and one possible explanation is 
banks with lower leverage ratios are able to limit their risk takings and therefore reduce their 
systemic risk contributions to banking system. Overall, most results in these regressions 
confirm previous findings and presented in table 3-12. 
Regressions (1) - (3) in table 3-13 are baseline models only constitute bank–specific and 
macroeconomic variables. In these regressions, only interest rate differences, asset diversity 
and the natural log of total assets are significant related to ∆MES. These results further support 
our three hypotheses.  
Regressions (4) – (6) in table 3-13 exclude all regulatory variables. These results are very 
similar to the results in models with bank-specific and deal-specific variables, except that 
macroeconomic variables, such as money supply growth rate and inflation, have some 
explanatory powers to acquirers’ systemic risks changes after M&As. These results show that 
acquirers from countries with higher money supply growth rate and lower inflation rate will 
have higher systemic risks after M&As. One possible explanation is both higher money supply 
growth rate and lower inflation rate indicate expansionary monetary policy, which may result 
in financial instability in banking system. All other significant results mainly confirm our 
previous findings.   
Table 3A-1 presents the results of fixed-effect models that examine the determinants of 
acquirers’ changes of LTD (see in the Appendix). Regressions (1) – (3) report the results of full 
models with banking integration indicators. Only IRDIFFERENCE5 is negatively related to 
∆LTD, indicating that if interest rate differences on new loans to euro area non-financial 
corporations between euro area average and non-distressed countries narrows, acquirers’ 
systemic risk will increase after M&As. Asset diversity is negatively related to ∆LTD only in 
regression (1), revealing that acquirers with higher product diversification will have lower 
systemic risks after M&As. In addition, one interesting result is that results in regressions (1) 
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Table 3-13   Determinants of Acquirers’ changes of MES for Cross-border M&As 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                   ∆MES                 ∆MES      
                                                         IR                           IR 
                                                     DIFFERENCE1   DIFFERENCE5    
                                               Bank-specific    Bank-specific 
                                             Macroeconomic       Macro 
 
         (3)                       
      ∆MES  
 
DISPERSION5 
Bank-specific 
 Macro 
         (4)                        (5) 
      ∆MES                 ∆MES 
           IR                           IR 
        DIFF1                    DIFF3 
   Bank-specific         Bank-specific                                
 Deal-specific          Deal-specific                      
Macroeconomic         Macro 
 
 
 
 
 
         
  (6) 
      ∆MES 
 
DISPERSION5 
Bank-specific 
  Deal-specific 
DISPERS 
Banking integration                 -0.0137*              -0.0324** 
                                                 (0.0080)               (0.0155) 
Asset diversity                         -0.0083*              -0.0083** 
                                                 (0.0042)               (0.0042) 
Non-performing loan               -0.0466                -0.0492 
                                                 (0.0314)               (0.0312) 
Tier 1 Capital                            0.0560                  0.0563 
                                                 (0.0408)               (0.0404) 
      0.0001 
     (0.0005) 
     -0.0087** 
     (0.0038) 
     -0.0407 
     (0.0294) 
      0.0577 
     (0.0576) 
   -0.0161*              -0.0374*** 
  (0.0076)               (0.0106) 
  -0.0107**            -0.0109** 
  (0.0047)               (0.0046) 
  -0.0777**            -0.0814** 
  (0.0327)               (0.0322) 
   0.0603                  0.0617 
  (0.0555)               (0.0550) 
    0.0001 
  (0.0004) 
  -0.0106** 
  (0.0047) 
  -0.0678** 
  (0.0305) 
   0.0605 
  (0.0558) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0051***            0.0049** 
                                                 (0.0019)    (0.0019) 
      0.0061*** 
     (0.0017) 
    0.0072*                0.0071* 
  (0.0034)               (0.0035) 
    0.0081** 
  (0.0030) 
PB                                             0.0013                  0.0012 
                                                 (0.0016)               (0.0015) 
Moral hazard  index                                               
                                                                               
Liquid ratio                              -0.0073                 -0.0072 
                                                 (0.0061)               (0.0060)                      
      0.0019 
     (0.0016) 
        
      
     -0.0092 
(0.0079) 
    0.0029**              0.0028* 
  (0.0013)               (0.0013) 
                      
                             
  -0.0061                 -0.0063  
  (0.0090)               (0.0091) 
    0.0035* 
  (0.0016) 
    
   
   -0.0081 
   (0.0084) 
Equity-to-asset                         -0.0452                 -0.0443       
                                                 (0.0556)               (0.0551) 
     -0.0426 
     (0.0739) 
   -0.0374                 -0.0370 
  (0.0798)               (0.0789) 
    -0.0335 
   (0.0817) 
ROA                                          0.0286                  0.0027 
                                                 (0.2347)               (0.2333)                    
      0.0268 
(0.2037) 
   -0.1064                 -0.1356 
  (0.2083)               (0.1980) 
    -0.1071 
   (0.1992) 
Short-term debt                         0.0069                  0.0065 
                                                 (0.0072)               (0.0072)   
      0.0072 
     (0.0126) 
    0.0144                  0.0141 
  (0.0115)               (0.0120) 
     0.0137 
   (0.0113) 
Non-interest income                 -0.0043                -0.0048  
                                                 (0.0055)               (0.0055) 
     -0.0035 
     (0.0044) 
   -0.0052**             -0.0056** 
  (0.0021)               (0.0021) 
    -0.0047* 
   (0.0026) 
Z-score                                      0.0001                  0.0001 
                                                 (0.0001)               (0.0001) 
      0.0001 
     (0.0001) 
    0.0001                  0.0001 
  (0.0001)               (0.0001) 
     0.0001 
   (0.0001) 
Cross-border                                             
                                                                           
    -0.0056                 -0.0056 
  (0.0034)               (0.0031)           
    -0.0048 
   (0.0037)  
Geographic diversification                          
                                                                 
Systemic importance                                
                                                                 
Bailout                                                     
                                                                 
Real GDP growth                      0.0007                0.0006              
                                                 (0.0008)              (0.0007)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
     0.0009* 
    (0.0005) 
   -0.0014                 -0.0017 
  (0.0022)               (0.0021) 
  -0.0021                 -0.0023 
  (0.0033)               (0.0033) 
  -0.0060*               -0.0060* 
  (0.0032)               (0.0032) 
   0.0004                  0.0004 
  (0.0006)               (0.0006) 
    -0.0008 
   (0.0023) 
   -0.0014 
   (0.0036) 
   -0.0059* 
   (0.0030) 
    0.0006 
   (0.0004) 
Inflation                                    -0.0009              -0.0008               
                                                 (0.0008)              (0.0008)    
    -0.0011 
    (0.0006) 
   -0.0008                -0.0007 
  (0.0005)               (0.0005) 
    -0.0010** 
   (0.0004) 
Money  supply  growth             0.0001                0.0001 
                                                 (0.0001)              (0.0001)   
CR5                                                             
                                                                              
Capital regulatory index                                        
                                                                                           
Official supervisory index                                                      
                                                                                          
Deposit insurer power                                           
                                                                               
Private monitoring index                                                                                            
                                                                              
     0.0001 
    (0.0001) 
       
 
    0.0001***           0.0001*** 
  (0.00001)             (0.00001) 
  -0.0001                -0.0001 
  (0.0001)               (0.0001) 
     0.0001** 
   (0.00005) 
    -0.0001 
   (0.0001) 
 
Obs.                                             104                       104                      
 
R2                                                                     0.2278                 0.2410 
         
  104 
 
     0.1995                                                                   
  
104                        104 
  
0.3069 0.3221              
  
104 
 
    0.2684 
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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and (2) are different from results in regression (3). In contrast, results in regressions (1) and (2) 
provide further evidence for previous findings. This indicates that regressions that include 
interest rate differences provide more robust evidence than that rely on the cross-country 
standard deviations of MFI interest rates on loans. This may be interpreted as follows: 
compared to the cross-country standard deviations of MFI interest rates on loans, interest rate 
differences on different loans are better indicators to quantify the degree of banking integration 
and are more sensitive to systemic risk measures. Generally, these results partly confirm our 
previous findings. Price-to-book ratio is positively related to ∆LTD, providing more confirming 
evidence for directors’ hubris may lead banks to take higher-risky M&As and make greater 
systemic risk contributions to banking sector. Finally, the natural log of total assets is positively 
related to ∆LTD. It offers further supports to the conjecture that larger acquirers have higher 
systemic risks after M&As. 
Regressions (4) - (6) in table 3A-1 report results of regressions that only contain bank-specific 
variables (see in the Appedix). In all these regressions, banking integration indicators are not 
significant with ∆LTD, thereby not providing support to our previous finding that acquirers 
from more integrated banking markets may have higher systemic risk after M&As. Asset 
diversity is significantly negative related to ∆LTD in all three regressions, showing that 
acquirers having higher product diversification will have lower systemic risk after M&As. The 
natural log of total assets is significantly positive related to ∆LTD, providing further evidences 
for larger acquirers will have higher systemic risk contributions to banking sector. Surprisingly, 
ROA is positively significant with ∆LTD. On possible explanation can be: banks that had high 
profitability in previous year may manage risk in a less prudent manner and thus increase 
systemic risks. 
Regressions (1) - (3) in table 3A-2 constitute regressions with bank-specific and deal-specific 
variables (see in the Appendix). These regressions have similar results as regressions in 
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previous table, except that equity-to-asset ratio is negatively related to ∆LTD. This result can 
be explained by acquirers with higher capital ratio and lower leverage ratio will limit their risk 
takings and thus reduce their systemic risk contributions to banking sector.   
In regressions (4) – (6) in table 3A-2, we only use bank-specific and regulatory variables (see 
in the Appendix). These regressions have similar results as previous one, except that private 
monitoring index is significantly negative related to ∆LTD. These results are expected and 
indicate that acquirers from countries that require more banks’ private monitoring will have 
lower systemic risks after M&As.  
Models (1) – (3) in table 3A-3 report the results from including bank-specific and 
macroeconomic variables (see in the Appendix). One different result is that systematic 
importance is negative significantly related to ∆LTD, indicating that systematic important 
acquirers will have lower systemic risk after M&As. Systematic important acquirers are more 
interconnected to other financial institutions, thus, they have higher systemic risk contributions 
to banking  system. 
Regressions (4) – (6) in table 3A-3 constitute regressions with bank-specific, deal-specific and 
macroeconomic variables (see in the Appendix). These regressions also have similar results as 
previous regressions and provide important evidences for our previous findings. However, 
banking integration indicators are not significant related to ∆LTD in these regressions while 
they are significantly negative related to ∆MES in most regressions. This shows that ∆MES 
regressions provide more robust evidences to support our previous finbdings than ∆LTD 
regressions.  
Table 3A-4 presents the results of fixed-effect models that investigate the determinants of 
acquirers’ changes of ∆CoVaR (see in the Appendix). Regressions (1) – (3) report results of 
full models with banking integration indicators. Banking integration indicator is significantly 
negatively related to changes of ∆CoVaR in regression (2) but not in regression (1). This result 
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indicates that lower interest rate differences on new loans to euro area non-financial 
corporations between distressed and non-distressed countries, higher level of banking 
integration, acquirers will have higher systemic risks after M&As.  Asset diversity is 
significantly negative related to changes of ∆CoVaR in regressions (1) and (3) but not in 
regression (2). These results partly support our previous findings that acquirers from more 
integrated banking markets (hypothesis) and acquirers with less diversified assets will have 
higher systemic risk contributions after M&As. However, natural log of total assets are not 
significant with change of ∆CoVaR.  Moral hazard index is negatively related to change of 
∆CoVaR, partly confirming our previous findings that acquirers from countries having more 
severe moral hazard problem will have higher systemic risks after M&As. Short-term debt 
ratios have significantly positive relationship with change of ∆CoVaR. Acquirers that rely more 
on short-term debt financing will have higher systemic risks after M&As. In regression (1), 
cross-border is positively significant with change of ∆CoVaR. This result is expected and partly 
supports our previous finding that acquirers that engage in cross-border M&As will have higher 
systemic risk contributions after M&As. One possible explanation can be: if acquirers engage 
in more cross-border M&As, they will have more cross-border inflows and outflows and are 
more interconnected with financial institutions in other countries, therefore, they will have 
more systemic risk contributions to banking system after the cross-border M&As. Similar to 
previous regressions, surprisingly, non-performing loan ratio is negatively significant related 
to change of ∆CoVaR in regressions (1) and (2). This can be explained by banks having high 
proportion of non-performing loans will manage liquidity risk in a more prudent manner. 
Bailout is negatively significant with change of ∆CoVaR in regressions (1) and (2), indicating 
that acquirers receive bailouts will have lower systemic risk after M&As. In regression (3), 
official supervisory index is significantly negative related to change of ∆CoVaR. This result is 
expected and one possible explanation can be: if the banking supervisor authorities have more 
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powers to take actions against banks to correct problems, banks will limit risk takings and thus 
will reduce systemic risks contributions to banking system. Deposit insurance power index is 
also positively significant related to change of ∆CoVaR, partly confirming our previous 
findings that acquirers from countries which deposit insurers are more powerful will have 
higher systemic risks after M&As.  
Regressions (4) – (6) in table 3A-4 constitute regressions with bank-specific variables (see in 
the Appendix). Asset diversity is negatively significant related to change of ∆CoVaR, providing 
more robust evidences for our previous findings. Similar to the results in previous regressions, 
non-performing loan ratio is negatively significant related to change of ∆CoVaR. In regression 
(4), another unexpected result is that ROA is positively significant related to change of ∆CoVaR, 
implying that acquirers that had higher profitability in previous year may not manage risks in 
a more prudent manner and may have higher systemic risks after M&As.  
Regressions (1) – (3) in table 3A-5 demonstrate the results of regressions with bank-specific 
and deal-specific variables (see in the Appendix). Asset diversity, non-performing loan ratio 
and short-term debt ratios are significant in all three regressions while banking integration 
indicators are not significant in all three regressions, providing more robust evidences for our 
previous findings. Bailout is negatively significant related to change of ∆CoVaR in regressions 
(1) and (2), revealing that acquirers that receive bailouts will have lower systemic risks after 
M&As.  
In regressions (4) – (6) of table 3A-5, we use deal-specific and regulatory variables (see in the 
Appendix). Non-performing loan ratio is negatively related to change of ∆CoVaR in regression 
(2), partly support our previous findings. Moral hazard index is negatively significant related 
to change of ∆CoVaR, partly confirming our previous findings that acquirers from countries 
having more severe moral hazard problem will have higher systemic risks after M&As. Short-
term debt ratios have significantly positive relationship with change of ∆CoVaR in all three 
174 
 
regressions, implying that acquirers that rely more on short-term debt financing will have 
higher systemic risks after M&As.  
Regressions (1) – (3) of table 3A-6 present results of the regressions with bank-specific and 
macroeconomic variables (see in the Appendix). Asset diversity is negatively significant with 
change of ∆CoVaR in all three regressions. These results are consistent with our previous 
findings and provide more robust evidences for acquirers with more asset diversity will have 
lower systemic risks after M&As. In addition, non-performing loan ratio is negatively 
significant with change of ∆CoVaR, implying that acquirers that had high non-performing loan 
ratio may manage risk in a prudent manner in upcoming years, therefore, reducing their 
systemic risks after M&As. However, banking integration indicators and natural log of total 
assets are not significant with change of ∆CoVaR in all three regressions.  
Regressions (4) – (6) of table 3A-6 use bank-specific, deal-specific and macroeconomic 
variables (see in the Appendix). Asset diversity has weakly negative significant coefficients (at 
10% significance level) in all three regressions, further confirming our previous findings. Non-
performing loan ratio is only negatively significant with change of ∆CoVaR in regression (5), 
partly supporting our previous findings that acquirers that had lower asset quality in the past 
year will have lower systemic risks after M&As. Furthermore, short-term debt ratio is weakly 
positive related to change of ∆CoVaR in regressions (4) and (5), providing further evidences 
for acquirers rely more on short-term debt will have lower systemic risks after M&As.  
Finally, bailout is significantly positive related to change of ∆CoVaR in regressions (4) and (5). 
These results imply that acquirers that receive bailouts will have lower systemic risk 
contributions to banking system and further confirm our previous findings. In order to examine 
whether acquirers of post-crisis M&A deals have different significant variables from acquirers 
of pre-crisis M&A deals, we then use the fixed-effect models for post-crisis and  
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   Table 3-14   Determinants of Acquirers’ Changes of MES for M&As in Post-crisis and Pre-crisis Periods 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                Post-crisis           Pre-crisis 
                                                   ∆MES                 ∆MES      
                                                
                                                No integration      No integration 
                                                                                     
                                                                                                                         
          (3)                       
    Post-crisis 
      ∆MES  
          IR 
DIFFERENCE1 
        
         (4)                        (5) 
      Pre-crisis           Post-crisis 
        ∆MES                 ∆MES 
            IR                            IR 
DIFFERENCE1   DIFFERENCE5              
                                                   
    (6) 
    Pre-crisis 
      ∆MES 
         IR 
DIFFERENCE5 
Banking integration                                
                                                  
Asset diversity                         -0.0114                 -0.0051** 
                                                 (0.0120)               (0.0022) 
Non-performing loan                0.0242                 -0.0186 
                                                 (0.0417)               (0.0124) 
Tier 1 Capital                           -0.0098                  0.0992*** 
                                                 (0.0229)               (0.0277) 
     -0.0259 
     (0.0189) 
     -0.0127 
     (0.0186) 
     -0.3166 
     (0.2128) 
      0.1128 
     (0.0908) 
   -0.0187                  -0.0452 
  (0.0232)                (0.0517) 
   0.0039                  -0.0116 
  (0.0072)                (0.0233) 
  -0.0567                 -0.3125* 
  (0.0693)                (0.1514) 
   0.0450 0.0873**           
(0.0693)                  (0.0341) 
     -0.0643 
   (0.0524) 
    -0.0044 
   (0.0066) 
    -0.0570 
    (0.0277) 
     0.0218 
    (0.0756) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0038                  0.0030 
                                                 (0.0034)    (0.0039) 
     -0.0020 
     (0.0076) 
    0.0029                   0.0002 
  (0.0087)                (0.0100) 
      0.0012 
    (0.0095) 
PB                                            -0.0050                  0.0029 
                                                 (0.0055)               (0.0017) 
Moral hazard  index                 -0.0006                -0.0004 
                                                 (0.0049)               (0.0013) 
Liquid ratio                              -0.0145*                0.0051 
                                                 (0.0065)               (0.0070)                      
      0.0014 
     (0.0062) 
     -0.0021  
     (0.0055) 
     -0.0099 
(0.0189) 
    0.0024*                 0.0020 
  (0.0007)                (0.0050) 
    0.0021                 -0.0028        
  (0.0016)                (0.0036)            
   0.0011                  -0.0086  
  (0.0133)                (0.0112) 
      0.0020 
    (0.0010) 
     0.0019 
    (0.0015) 
     0.0027 
    (0.0127) 
Equity-to-asset                         -0.0823*              -0.0734       
                                                 (0.0362)               (0.0381) 
     -0.0785 
     (0.2977) 
   -0.0430                  -0.0291 
  (0.0664)                (0.2923) 
     -0.0172 
    (0.0718) 
ROA                                          0.2588*               -0.0165 
                                                 (0.1238)               (0.1320)                    
      0.3195 
(0.8342) 
   -0.3201                   0.2136 
  (0.1770)                (0.9079) 
     -0.4115 
    (0.2067) 
Short-term debt                        -0.0082                 0.0173*** 
                                                 (0.0140)               (0.0047)    
     -0.0190 
     (0.0300) 
    0.0311**              -0.0171 
  (0.0054)                (0.0241) 
      0.0311** 
    (0.0061) 
Non-interest income                  0.0081                -0.0152**  
                                                 (0.0073)               (0.0062) 
      0.0232 
     (0.0163) 
   -0.0006                   0.0205 
  (0.0054)                (0.0074) 
      0.0025 
    (0.0058) 
Z-score                                      0.00001               -0.0001 
                                                 (0.00001)            (0.00006) 
    -0.00007 
     (0.0003) 
   0.00003                 -0.0001 
 (0.00009)               (0.0004) 
     0.00003 
    (0.0001) 
Cross-border                             0.0080**             -0.0027* 
                                                 (0.0024)               (0.0014)            
      0.0077 
     (0.0057) 
   -0.0009                   0.0081 
  (0.0033)                (0.0051)          
     -0.0016 
    (0.0035) 
Geographic diversification       0.0044                  0.0011 
                                                 (0.0029)               (0.0015) 
Systemic importance                -0.0025                -0.0027 
                                                 (0.0044)               (0.0024) 
Bailout                                       0.0031                -0.0019 
                                                 (0.0027)               (0.0018) 
Real GDP growth                      0.0006                -0.0005 
                                                 (0.0007)               (0.0004) 
     -0.0036 
     (0.0039) 
     -0.0132 
     (0.0185) 
     -0.0019 
     (0.0124) 
     -0.0047 
     (0.0040) 
   -0.0008                   0.0040  
  (0.0017)                (0.0073) 
  -0.0004                  -0.0172 
  (0.0042)                (0.0133) 
  -0.0134***            -0.0026 
  (0.0021)                (0.0134) 
   0.0005                  -0.0045** 
  (0.0012)                (0.0017) 
     -0.0006 
    (0.0012) 
    -0.0004 
    (0.0035) 
    -0.0132** 
    (0.0025) 
     0.0007 
    (0.0015) 
Inflation                                     0.0005                 0.0004 
                                                 (0.0010)               (0.0006) 
     -0.0007 
     (0.0026) 
    0.0002                  -0.0006 
  (0.0012)                (0.0015) 
      0.0005 
    (0.0011) 
Money  supply  growth            -0.0002                0.00001* 
                                                 (0.0003)             (0.000005) 
CR5                                          0.00004              -0.00002 
                                                 (0.0001)             (0.00006) 
Capital regulatory index          -0.0019                 0.0032 
                                                 (0.0013)              (0.0006)              
Official supervisory index        0.0013                 0.0015                 
                                                 (0.0015)              (0.0010)             
Deposit insurer power             -0.0037                 0.0023 
                                                 (0.0031)              (0.0021) 
Private monitoring index         -0.0002                -0.0008                                                     
                                                 (0.0018)              (0.0007) 
      0.0012 
     (0.0008) 
     0.00003 
     (0.0002) 
      0.0023 
     (0.0041) 
      0.0044* 
     (0.0023) 
     -0.0031 
     (0.0057) 
     -0.0039 
     (0.0038) 
   0.00001                  0.0012 
 (0.00001)               (0.0008) 
  0.00003                 0.00004 
 (0.00007)               (0.0001) 
   0.0013***             0.0023 
  (0.0002)                (0.0025) 
   0.0018                   0.0042 
  (0.0011)                (0.0034) 
   0.0005                  -0.0029 
  (0.0011)                (0.0070) 
  0.0004                  -0.0040*** 
  (0.0016)                (0.0010) 
      0.0001** 
   (0.00003) 
    0.00002 
   (0.00007) 
     0.0014** 
    (0.0003) 
     0.0020 
    (0.0013) 
     0.0006 
    (0.0013) 
     0.0010 
    (0.0019) 
Obs.                                              47                        53                      
 
R2                                                                      0.3285                 0.2083 
     47 
 
     0.1580                                                                   
   53                          47 
  
0.5864 0.1797                
   53 
 
    0.6036 
 
 
     
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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pre-crisis periods. Table 3-14 and table 3-15 report the results of fixed-effect models for 
acquirers’ changes of MES for M&As in post-crisis and pre-crisis periods. Regressions (1) - 
(2) present results of ΔMES models that exclude banking integration indicators. We find 
several different results between two models. For instance, cross-border is positively 
significant with ΔMES in pre-crisis model while it is negatively significant with 
ΔMES in post-crisis model.  These results indicate that acquirers that engage in cross-border 
M&As have higher MES than acquirers that engage in domestic M&As in post-crisis period, 
while acquirers that engage in cross-border M&As have lower MES than acquirers that engage 
in domestic M&As in pre-crisis period. This implies that acquirers cannot reduce MES via 
cross-border M&As in crisis period while they can achieve this objective via cross- border 
M&As in pre-crisis period.  Moreover, non-performing loan ratio, tier 1 capital ratio, price-to-
book ratio, liquidity ratio, return on asset, short-term debt ratio, non-interest income ratio, z-
score, money supply growth rate, capital regulatory index and deposit insurer power have 
opposite signs in post-crisis  and pre-crisis models. These are expected results and can be 
explained by the fact that (1) acquirers in post-crisis period had different bank-specific 
accounting ratios from acquirers in pre-crisis period; (2) many EU countries changed their 
monetary policies; and (3) the banking regulators and supervisors change the regulatory and 
supervisory policies.  As we expected, both asset diversity and natural log of total asset have  
same and expected signs in two models. These results partly provide further evidences for our 
previous findings.   
Regressions (3) - (6) in table 3-14 and (1) - (6) in table 3-15 report results of MES models that 
contain different banking integration indicators. Although all banking integration indicators 
have identical negative signs with ΔMES, only two of them are significant with ΔMES. These 
results only show limited evidences for our hypothesis . Many independent variables have 
different signs with ΔMES between post-crisis and pre-crisis models that 
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   Table 3-15 Determinants of Acquirers’ Changes of MES for M&As in Post-crisis and Pre-crisis Periods 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                Post-crisis           Pre-crisis 
                                                   ∆MES                 ∆MES      
                                                 
                                                     DISPERSION5     DISPERSION5 
                                                                                     
                                                                                                                         
          (3)                       
    Post-crisis 
      ∆MES  
           IR 
DIFFERENCE2 
        
         (4)                        (5) 
      Pre-crisis           Post-crisis 
        ∆MES                 ∆MES 
             IR                             
DIFFERENCE2    DISPERSION3         
                                                   
    (6) 
    Pre-crisis 
      ∆MES 
          
DISPERSION3 
Banking integration                  0.0010                  0.0007 
                                                 (0.0011)               (0.0005) 
Asset diversity                          0.0071                 -0.0039 
                                                 (0.0109)               (0.0072) 
Non-performing loan               -0.1564                 -0.0567 
                                                 (0.1354)               (0.0272) 
Tier 1 Capital                            0.1300                  0.0450 
                                                 (0.0936)               (0.0693) 
     -0.0003 
     (0.0057) 
      0.0041 
     (0.0172) 
     -0.1567 
     (0.1230) 
      0.0815 
     (0.0358) 
   -0.0090***           -0.00002 
  (0.0008)                (0.0003) 
  -0.0005                   0.0043 
  (0.0058)                (0.0139) 
  -0.0731                 -0.1616 
  (0.0355)                (0.1351) 
   0.0949 0.0824**            
(0.0621)                  (0.0327) 
    -0.0001* 
  (0.00004) 
    -0.0009 
    (0.0057) 
    -0.0691 
    (0.0339) 
    0.1112 
    (0.0721) 
Ln(TA)                                     -0.0084                  0.0029 
                                                 (0.0098)    (0.0087) 
     -0.0046 
     (0.0096) 
    0.0074                  -0.0048 
  (0.0077)                (0.0073) 
      0.0081 
    (0.0083) 
PB                                             0.0076                  0.0024* 
                                                 (0.0006)               (0.0007) 
Moral hazard  index                 -0.0022                 0.0021 
                                                 (0.0034)               (0.0016) 
Liquid ratio                              -0.0070                  0.0011 
                                                 (0.0113)               (0.0133)                      
      0.0071*** 
     (0.0018) 
     -0.0021  
     (0.0037) 
     -0.0062 
(0.0109) 
    0.0028***             0.0070 
  (0.0003)                (0.0051) 
   0.0041                  -0.0019        
  (0.0005)                (0.0016)            
  -0.0046                  -0.0065  
  (0.0157)                (0.0163) 
      0.0031 
    (0.0004) 
     0.0036*** 
    (0.0006) 
    -0.0058 
    (0.0167) 
Equity-to-asset                         -0.3361                -0.0430       
                                                 (0.3996)               (0.0664) 
     -0.2230 
     (0.2859) 
   -0.1104*                 -0.2183 
  (0.0351)                (0.2974) 
     -0.0931* 
    (0.0298) 
ROA                                          1.1748                 -0.3200 
                                                 (0.9001)               (0.1700)                    
      0.9045 
(0.7867) 
   -0.2264***             0.9072 
  (0.0138)                (0.7033) 
     -0.2593 
    (0.0597) 
Short-term debt                        -0.1564                 0.0311** 
                                                 (0.1354)               (0.0054)    
     -0.0359 
     (0.0232) 
    0.0334***            -0.0349 
  (0.0029)                (0.0290) 
      0.0321*** 
    (0.0038) 
Non-interest income                  0.0157                -0.0006  
                                                 (0.0103)               (0.0054) 
      0.0102 
     (0.0094) 
   -0.0109*                 0.0109 
  (0.0038)                (0.0078) 
     -0.0112** 
    (0.0020) 
Z-score                                      0.0003                 0.00003 
                                                 (0.0003)              (0.00007) 
      0.0002 
     (0.0003) 
   0.00009                  0.0002 
 (0.00004)               (0.0002) 
     0.00008 
   (0.00004) 
Cross-border                             0.0075                 -0.0009 
                                                 (0.0053)               (0.0033)            
      0.0072 
     (0.0055) 
    0.0009                   0.0081 
  (0.0011)                (0.0056)          
      0.0006 
    (0.0008) 
Geographic diversification        0.0055                -0.0008 
                                                 (0.0063)               (0.0017) 
Systemic importance                -0.0038                -0.0004 
                                                 (0.0200)               (0.0042) 
Bailout                                       0.0073                -0.0134*** 
                                                 (0.0109)               (0.0021) 
Real GDP growth                     -0.0060**             0.0005 
                                                 (0.0025)               (0.0012) 
      0.0057 
     (0.0065) 
     -0.0099 
     (0.0119) 
      0.0055 
     (0.0110) 
     -0.0052* 
     (0.0023) 
   -0.0001                   0.0058  
  (0.0039)                (0.0057) 
   0.0019                  -0.0105 
  (0.0031)                (0.0172) 
  -0.0127***             0.0050 
  (0.0015)                (0.0173) 
  -0.0003                 -0.0053** 
  (0.0006)                (0.0019) 
      0.0001 
    (0.0034) 
     0.0010 
    (0.0034) 
    -0.0127*** 
    (0.0012) 
    -0.0003 
    (0.0006) 
Inflation                                    -0.0023***           0.0002 
                                                 (0.0007)               (0.0012) 
     -0.0020 
     (0.0009) 
   -0.0008                 -0.0020* 
  (0.0015)                (0.0009) 
     -0.0010 
    (0.0018) 
Money  supply  growth             0.0023                0.00001* 
                                                 (0.0007)             (0.000004) 
CR5                                           0.0001                0.00003 
                                                (0.00007)             (0.00007) 
Capital regulatory index          0.00007                 0.0013 
                                                 (0.0017)               (0.0002)              
Official supervisory index        0.0075                  0.0018                 
                                                 (0.0021)               (0.0011)             
Deposit insurer power              0.0038                  0.0005 
                                                 (0.0019)               (0.0011) 
Private monitoring index         -0.0042*               0.0004                                                     
                                                 (0.0022)               (0.0016) 
      0.0019 
     (0.0008) 
      0.0001 
    (0.00006) 
      0.0001 
     (0.0016) 
      0.0064* 
     (0.0027) 
      0.0024 
     (0.0041) 
     -0.0036 
     (0.0024) 
   0.00001**              0.0019 
(0.000002)              (0.0003) 
  0.00004                  0.0001 
 (0.00004)              (0.00008) 
   0.0013***             0.0003 
  (0.0002)                (0.0038) 
   0.0010                   0.0065*** 
  (0.0013)                (0.0009) 
  -0.0006                   0.0025 
  (0.0008)                (0.0031) 
  -0.0014                  -0.0037* 
  (0.0011)                (0.0019) 
     0.00006** 
   (0.00002) 
    0.00007 
   (0.00004) 
     0.0012*** 
   (0.00008) 
     0.0011 
    (0.0013) 
    -0.0002 
    (0.0009) 
    -0.0013 
    (0.0010) 
Obs.                                              47                        53                      
 
R2                                                                      0.1743                 0.5864 
     47 
 
     0.3413                                                                   
   53                          47 
  
0.4878 0.3256                
   53 
 
    0.4273 
 
 
     
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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include different banking integration indicators, but they have same signs with ΔMES in post-
crisis models (or pre-crisis models) that contain different banking integration indicators. These 
are reasonable results because many variables are heterogeneous in post-crisis and pre-crisis 
periods.  
Tables 3A-7 and 3A-8 present the results of acquirers’ changes of LTD for M&As in post- crisis 
and pre-crisis periods (see in the Appendix). Similar to the results of MES models,  
the results of LTD models show that many independent variables have different signs with ∆LTD 
in post-crisis and pre-crisis models. For example, different banking integration indicators have 
opposite signs with LTD. For example, IRDIFFERENCE1 and IRDIFFERENCE5 are 
negatively significant related to ∆LTD while DISPERSION5 is positively related to ∆LTD in 
post-crisis models. These results indicate that the higher interest rate differences on loans and 
deposits of euro area banking market and lower cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest 
rates on loans to non-financial corporations and households lead to lower LTD after M&As. The 
first result is consistent with our previous findings while the second result is not. This can be 
explained by the fact the interest rate difference and cross-country standard deviation of MFI 
interest rates on loans are two heterogeneous banking integration indicators. Moreover, price-
to-book ratio, liquidity ratio, short-term debt ratio, non-interest income ratio, z-score cross-
border, geographic diversification, systematic importance, bailout, inflation, money supply 
growth rate and concentration ratio have opposite signs with ∆LTD in post-crisis and pre-crisis 
models. This can be interpreted by the fact that bank-specific accounting ratios, bank-specific 
variables and regulatory variables are different in post-crisis and pre-crisis periods.  
However, there are still some independent variables that have same signs with ∆LTD. For 
instance, asset diversity and non-performing loan ratio are negatively significant related to 
∆LTD, indicating that acquirers with higher product diversification and lower asset quality will 
have lower LTD. These results provide further evidences for our previous findings.  ROA is also 
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negatively significant related to ∆LTD, showing that acquirers having higher profitability will 
have lower LTD. In addition, capital regulatory index is positively significant related to ∆LTD 
while official supervisory index is negatively significant related to ∆LTD. These results reveal 
that acquirers from countries with less stringent capital regulation and more stringent 
supervision will have lower LTD. If acquirers are required to hold higher level of capital, they 
may manage liquidity risk in a less prudent manner, acquirers will have higher systemic risk 
contributions to banking system. If acquirers are subject to more stringent supervision, acquirers 
will have lower systemic risk contributions to banking system.  
Tables 3A-9 and 3A-10 report the results of acquirers’ changes of ∆CoVaR for M&As in post-
crisis and pre-crisis periods (see in the Appendix). First, we find that interest rate differences are 
positively significant related to change of ∆CoVaR in post-crisis models. These results are 
different from previous finding and indicate that the higher interest rate differences on loans in 
the euro area banking market (or the lower level of banking integration), the higher 
acquirers’∆CoVaR after M&As. Nevertheless, on the contrary, the cross-country standard 
deviation of MFI interest rates on loans to non-financial institution (floating rate and up to 1 
year IRF, over EUR 1 million) is negatively significant related to change of ∆CoVaR in pre-
crisis model (regression (2) in table 3A-10). This is consistent with our previous finding of the 
destabilizing effect of banking integration (hypothesis). Moreover, asset diversity is negatively 
significant related to change of ∆CoVaR in regression (1) in tables 3A-9 and 3A-10. These 
results partly provide further evidences for acquirers with higher asset diversity will have lower 
systemic risk after M&As. Moral hazard index is positively significant related to change of 
∆CoVaR in all models with banking integration indicators. These results demonstrate that the 
deposit insurance scheme creates higher moral hazard problem but reduce acquirers’ systemic 
risks after M&As. This result is consistent with Bostandzic et al. (2014).  
Similar to the results in ∆MES and ∆LTD models, many other variables have opposite signs in 
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post-crisis and pre-crisis models. For example, capital regulatory index is negatively significant 
related to change of ∆CoVaR in some post-crisis models while it is positively significant related 
to change of ∆CoVaR in some pre-crisis models. These results show that acquirers from 
countries with more stringent capital regulation have lower systemic risk in pre-crisis period 
while acquirers from countries with less stringent capital regulation have lower systemic risk in 
post-crisis period. This is a surprising result because it implies that the more stringent capital 
regulation works better in M&A deals in pre-crisis years than in M&As in post-crisis years. In 
pre-crisis years, more stringent capital regulation is more likely to result in lower systemic risk; 
however, in post-crisis years, more stringent capital regulation does not necessarily lead to lower 
systemic risk. This can be interpreted as follows: if banks Are required to comply with more 
stringent capital requirement in the phase of systemic risk buildup in non-crisis years, SIFIs will 
have more capitals to cover expected and unexpected losses and thus will have lower individual 
risks and lower systemic risk contributions to banking system; however, after the financial crisis 
breaks out, if banks are required to raise more capitals, their profitability ratios (e.g. ROE and 
ROA) may be lowered; moreover, some banks may conduct less prudent manner in liquidity 
risk management after they raise more capitals from financial markets. Under these 
circumstances, banks may have higher systemic risks even if they comply with more stringent 
capital regulations and have higher capital ratios. Interestingly, these interpretations can also be 
used to explain the contradictory results of tier 1 capital ratio in post-crisis and pre-crisis models.  
In summary, for all three systemic risk measures, there are a number of explanatory variables 
that have opposite signs in post-crisis and pre-crisis models. This is because these variables, 
including some bank-specific variables, deal-specific variables, macroeconomic variables and 
regulatory variables, change significantly and have very different effects on acquirers’ systemic 
risk changes. This indicates that it is really necessary for us to compare the results of post-crisis 
models with the results of pre-crisis models.  
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3.6.5 Relationships between Acquirers’ Systemic Risk Changes and Banking Integration 
Indicators 
As discussed in the subsection 3.4.4, the significant coefficients of banking integration 
indicators do not necessarily indicate the causal relationships between acquirers’ systemic risk 
changes and banking integration indicators. In this subsection, we will use the Granger- 
causality tests to investigate such causal relationships between acquirers’ systemic risk banking 
integration indicators, they will have causal relationships with banking integration indicators; 
if banking integration indicators granger-cause acquirers’ systemic risk changes, they will have 
causal relationships with acquirers’ systemic risk changes as well. However, if neither one 
granger-causes the other, they will not have causal relationships with each other. Table 3-16 
presents results of pairwise Granger-causality tests for changes of three systemic risk measures. 
Most results are not significant, indicating that most systemic risk measures do not have causal 
relationships with most banking integration indicators. We only have a few significant results 
for the Granger-causality tests. For example, interest rate difference on new loans to euro area 
non-financial corporations between distressed and non-distressed countries granger causes 
change of ∆CoVaR, indicating that lower interest rate difference causes higher ∆CoVaR. 
Change of MES granger causes interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-financial 
corporations between euro area average and non-distressed countries, showing that higher MES 
causes lower interest rate difference. The similar result is that higher MES causes lower interest 
rate difference on new loans to euro area non-financial corporations between euro area average 
and non-distressed countries.  Moreover, change of LTD granger causes the full range of 
interest rate difference on MFI deposits for household across euro area countries (max.- min.), 
revealing that higher LTD causes lower interest rate difference on  
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                    Table 3-16   Results of Pairwise Granger-Causality Tests 
                     Null Hypothesis F-statistics p-value 
(1) Interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-financial  
corporations between distressed and non-distressed countries does not granger 
 
      2.3195 
   
  0.1033 
cause ΔMES  (IRDIFFERENCE1)   
   
ΔMES does not granger cause interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-
financial corporations between distressed and non-distressed countries 
 
      1.4433        
 
        0.2408 
   
(2)  Interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-financial  
corporations between distressed and non-distressed countries does not granger   
 
      0.0022       
 
   0.9978 
cause ΔLTD   
   
ΔLTD does not granger cause interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-
financial corporations between distressed and non-distressed countries 
 
(3) Interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-financial  
corporations between distressed and non-distressed countries does not granger cause 
change of ΔCoVaR 
 
Change of ΔCoVaR does not granger cause interest rate difference on new loans to euro 
area non-financial corporations between distressed and non-distressed countries 
 
(4) Interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-financial  
corporations between euro area average and non-distressed countries does not  
granger cause ΔMES (IRDIFFERENCE5) 
 
ΔMES does not granger cause interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-
financial corporations between euro area average and non-distressed countries       
 
 
      0.3211      
 
 
 
 
      2.9302*                
 
 
 
  
      0.9619 
 
 
 
 
      1.9677                
 
 
 
 
      2.5093*                
 
   0.7261 
 
 
 
 
       0.0578 
 
 
 
 
       0.3855 
 
 
 
 
      0.1448 
 
 
 
 
      0.0861 
(5)Interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-financial  
corporations between euro area average and non-distressed countries does not  
granger cause ΔLTD 
 
ΔLTD does not granger cause interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-
financial corporations between euro area average and non-distressed countries       
                                                   
(6)Interest rate difference on new loans to euro area non-financial                           
corporations between euro area average and non-distressed countries does not   
granger cause Change of ΔCoVaR       
                                                                                                               
Change of ΔCoVaR does not granger cause interest rate difference on new loans to euro 
area non-financial corporations between euro area average and distressed  countries 
 
(7)Full range of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for household across euro area 
  
       0.0282    
 
 
 
  
       0.7448 
 
 
   
 
       2.1073 
 
 
 
 
       0.6605 
 
 
 
       
 
       
      0.9722 
 
 
 
  
      0.4774 
 
 
 
 
      0.1267 
 
 
 
   
      0.5188 
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countries (max – min) does not granger cause ΔMES (IRDIFFERENCE2) 
                                                                        
ΔMES does not granger cause full range of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for 
household across euro area countries (max – min) 
 
 
(8)Full range of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for household across euro area 
countries (max – min) does not granger cause ΔLTD 
                                                                        
ΔLTD does not granger cause full range of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for 
household across euro area countries (max – min) 
  
(9) Full range of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for household across euro area 
countries (max – min) does not granger cause Change of ΔCoVaR       
 
 
Change of ΔCoVaR does not granger cause full range of interest rate difference on MFI 
deposits for household across euro area countries (max – min) 
 
(10) Inter-quantile of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for household across euro 
area countries (3rd – 1st ) does not granger cause ΔMES (IRDIFFERENCE3) 
 
 
        0.9595        
 
 
 
 
       3.3451**              
 
 
 
    
        0.1895              
  
 
 
    
       2.7008* 
 
 
 
       1.7579    
      
 
   
   
       0.7081     
 
 
  
   
       4.2921** 
      
   0.3864 
 
 
 
 
   0.0390 
 
 
   
  
   0.8277 
 
 
 
    
  0.0720 
 
 
 
  0.1774 
 
 
 
   
  0.4949 
 
 
 
    
  0.0161 
ΔMES does not granger cause inter-quantile of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for 
household across euro area countries (3rd – 1st ) 
 
(11) Inter-quantile of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for household across euro 
area countries (3rd – 1st ) does not granger cause ΔLTD 
 
ΔLTD does not granger cause inter-quantile of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for 
household across euro area countries (3rd – 1st ) 
  
(12) Inter-quantile of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for household across euro 
area countries (3rd – 1st ) does not granger cause Change of ΔCoVaR       
 
Change of ΔCoVaR does not granger cause inter-quantile of interest rate difference on MFI 
deposits for household across euro area countries (3rd – 1st ) 
  
(13) Cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans to non-financial 
institution (floating rate and up to 1 year IRF, over EUR 1 million) does not granger cause 
ΔMES (DISPERSION5) 
 
ΔMES does not granger cause cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rate on 
loans to non-financial institution (floating rate and up to 1 year IRF, over EUR 1 million) 
 
(14) Cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans to non-financial 
 
       0.0421                   
 
 
 
      
       1.5756 
 
 
 
       0.3066                
 
 
 
       1.7579                   
 
 
  
 
       0.7081                  
 
 
  
       1.2405               
 
 
 
 
 
       0.9917                 
 
 
 
        
 
 0.9588 
 
 
 
 
  0.2241 
 
 
 
 0.7383 
 
 
 
 0.1774 
 
 
 
 
 0.4949 
 
 
 
 0.2934 
 
 
 
 
 
0.3743 
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institution (floating rate and up to 1 year IRF, over EUR 1 million) does not granger cause 
ΔLTD 
 
ΔLTD does not granger cause cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rate on                 
loans to non-financial institution (floating rate and up to 1 year IRF, over EUR 1 million)           
 
(15) Cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans to non-financial 
institution (floating rate and up to 1 year IRF, over EUR 1 million) does not granger cause 
Change of ΔCoVaR 
 
Change of ΔCoVaR does not granger cause cross-country standard deviation of MFI 
interest rate on loans to non-financial institution (floating rate and up to 1 year IRF, over 
EUR 1 million)  
  
(16) Cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans to household 
(consumer credit, over 1 year and up to 5 years IRF) does not granger cause ΔMES 
(DISPERSION3) 
 
ΔMES does not granger cause cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rate on 
loans to non-financial institution (consumer credit, over 1 year and up to 5 years IRF) 
  
(17) Cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans to household 
(consumer credit, over 1 year and up to 5 years IRF) does not granger cause ΔLTD  
 
ΔLTD does not granger cause cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rate on loans 
to non-financial institution (consumer credit, over 1 year and up to 5 years IRF) 
  
(18) Cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans to household 
(consumer credit, over 1 year and up to 5 years IRF) does not granger cause Change of  
ΔCoVaR 
 
Change of ΔCoVaR does not granger cause cross-country standard deviation of MFI 
interest rate on loans to non-financial institution (floating rate and up to 1 year IRF, over 
EUR 1 million)  
 
       0.6818 
 
 
 
 
 
       0.7166 
 
 
 
       2.3197 
 
 
 
 
 
       0.2374 
 
 
 
 
 
       0.2333 
 
 
 
 
 
       1.1640 
 
 
 
       0.3450 
 
 
 
       0.2936 
 
 
 
  
       0.1012 
 
 
 
 
       1.2042      
            
                         
   0.5080 
 
 
 
 
 
   0.4909 
 
 
 
   0.1033 
 
 
 
 
 
   0.7891 
 
 
 
 
 
   0.7923 
 
 
 
 
 
   0.3162 
 
 
 
   0.7090 
 
 
 
   0.7462 
 
 
 
 
   0.9039 
 
 
 
 
   0.3040 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
 
deposits. Finally, inter-quantile of interest rate difference on MFI deposits for household across 
euro area countries (3rd. – 1st.) granger causes change of MES, showing that lower interest rate 
difference causes higher MES. 
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3.6.6   Robustness Checks 
One may argue that the previous finding that “acquirers’ systemic risks increase significantly 
after M&As” is not sufficient to conclude that “acquirers increase their systemic risks due to 
M&As”. One can argue that acquirers’ systemic risks increase due to the destabilizing effects 
of financial crises. To find more robust evidences to support our previous finding, we conduct 
p-score matching method to match merging group with non-merging group and examine 
whether merging group increases systemic risk after M&As while non-merging group does not 
increase systemic risk. 
In p-score matching, the average differences in p-scores are relatively small, indicating a  
good matching between merging banks and non-merging banks. Table 3-17 presents the 
systemic risk changes for merging and non-merging banks. Panel A shows that all three 
systemic risk measures increase significantly after M&As for acquirers and combined banks. 
On the contrary, panel B indicates that all three systemic risk measures decreased significantly 
for matched non-merging banks in the same time periods. These results provide robust 
evidences for systemic risk increases due to bank M&As. 
Additionally, we investigate the robustness of the main results by using the same fixed-effect 
models and the same dependent variables but with different explanatory variables. On the one 
hand, we employ different banking integration indicators, that is, we replace 
IRDIFFERENCE1, IRDIFFERENCE5 and DISPERSION5 with IRDIFFERENCE2, 
IRDIFFERENCE3 and DISPERSION3; on the other hand, we use different bank-specific, 
deal-specific, macroeconomic, structural and regulatory variables in different regressions.  
Table 3-18, table 3-19 and table 3-20 report the results of fixed-effect models with MES as 
dependent variable and different explanatory variables. The estimated coefficients of banking  
integration indicators and asset diversity are negative while the estimated coefficients of natural 
log of total asset are positive. If acquirers have 1% higher asset diversity, their 
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Table 3-17   Systemic Risk Changes for Merging and Non-merging banks 
 
 
Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
 
marginal expected shortfall will decrease by approximate 0.75%-1%. Moreover, if acquirers’ 
sizes increase by 1%, their marginal expected shortfall will decrease by about 0.55%.  
In addition, table 3A-11, table 3A-12 and table 3A-13 present results of fixed-effect models 
with ∆LTD as dependent variables and different explanatory variables (see in the Appendix). 
These results provide more robust evidences for smaller and more asset-diversified acquirers 
will have lower systemic risks after M&As. If acquirers’ asset diversity increases by 1%, their 
lower tail dependences will decrease by more than 2%; moreover, if acquirers’ natural log of 
total assets increase by 1%, their systemic risks will increase by about 2% - 4%.  
Next, table 3A-14, table 3A-15 and table 3A-16 demonstrate results of fixed-effect models with 
change of ∆CoVaR as dependent variables and different explanatory variables (see in the 
Appendix). These results partly confirm our previous findings that (1) acquirers from more 
integrated banking markets (2) acquirers having less asset diversity will have higher systemic 
  N Acquirerpre-
merger 
Combinedpre-
merger 
Combinedpost-
merger 
 ΔAcquirer ΔCombined 
PanelA: 
Acquirer+ 
Target 
      
MES 321   0.022    0.018    0.025   0.003*** 
 (0.012) 
 0.007*** 
(0.003) 
LTD 307   0.823    0.804    0.853   0.003*** 
 (0.005) 
0.0049*** 
(0.002) 
ΔCoVaR 315 15.3238  19.5644  20.0832  4.2406** 
 (0.015) 
4.5188*** 
(0.008) 
       
PanelB: 
Matched non-
merging 
banks 
      
MES 640     0.016   0.008   -0.008*** 
(0.008) 
LTD 640     0.752   0.648  -0.104*** 
(0.006) 
ΔCoVaR 640   18.3248 17.0815  -1.2433*** 
(0.005) 
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Table 3-18   Determinants of Acquirers’ Changes of MES for Cross-border M&As 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                   ∆MES                 ∆MES      
                                                         IR                           IR 
                                                     DIFFERENCE3    DIFFERENCE2    
                                                     Full                      Full                                            
          (3)                       
      ∆MES 
 
DISPERSION3 
         Full                        
        (4)                       (5) 
    ∆MES                ∆MES 
        IR                           IR 
     DIFF3                    DIFF2 
Bank-specific     Bank-specific                    
    (6) 
      ∆MES 
 
DISPERSION3 
DISPERS
Banking integration                  -0.0097                -0.0048 
                                                 (0.0099)               (0.0031) 
Asset diversity                         -0.0104*               -0.0103* 
                                                 (0.0056)               (0.0055) 
Non-performing loan               -0.0967***           -0.1004*** 
                                                 (0.0360)               (0.0356) 
Tier 1 Capital                            0.0889**              0.0904** 
                                                 (0.0420)               (0.0415) 
     -0.0001 
     (0.0001) 
     -0.0093 
     (0.0056) 
     -0.0919** 
     (0.0365) 
      0.0881 
     (0.0420) 
 -0.0119                -0.0071** 
(0.0100)               (0.0030) 
-0.0084*              -0.0079** 
(0.0042)               (0.0040) 
-0.0374                 -0.0425  
(0.0305)               (0.0298) 
 0.0675* 0.0638                    
(0.0397)               (0.0387) 
   -0.0001 
  (0.0001) 
  -0.0075* 
  (0.0041) 
  -0.0350 
  (0.0306) 
0.0651 
  (0.0398) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0059*                0.0060* 
                                                 (0.0031)    (0.0031) 
      0.0057* 
     (0.0031) 
  0.0054***          0.0048*** 
(0.0018)               (0.0018) 
    0.0054*** 
  (0.0018) 
PB                                             0.0036*                0.0037** 
                                                 (0.0018)               (0.0018) 
Moral hazard  index                  0.0045*                0.0038 
                                                 (0.0023)               (0.0023) 
Liquid ratio                              -0.0145*               -0.0135 
                                                 (0.0084)               (0.0082)                      
      0.0040** 
     (0.0018) 
      0.0046*  
     (0.0024) 
     -0.0145* 
(0.0084) 
  0.0014                 0.0016 
(0.0015)               (0.0015) 
                 
  
 -0.0097                 -0.0093  
 (0.0059)               (0.0266) 
    0.0019 
  (0.0015) 
 
 
   -0.0093 
   (0.0059) 
Equity-to-asset                         -0.0349                -0.0538       
                                                 (0.0648)               (0.0644) 
     -0.0371 
     (0.0646) 
  -0.0606                 -0.0713 
 (0.0528)               (0.0516) 
    -0.0614 
   (0.0529) 
ROA                                         -0.1758                -0.1464 
                                                 (0.2660)               (0.2620)                    
     -0.1772 
(0.2657) 
  -0.0420                 -0.0186 
 (0.2097)               (0.2034) 
    -0.0411 
   (0.2104) 
Short-term debt                         0.0179**              0.0173** 
                                                 (0.0087)               (0.0086)_     
      0.0178** 
     (0.0087) 
   0.0086                  0.0073 
 (0.0070)               (0.0069) 
     0.0083 
   (0.0070) 
Non-interest income                 -0.0071                -0.0071  
                                                 (0.0061)               (0.0060) 
     -0.0070 
     (0.0061) 
  -0.0059                 -0.0070 
 (0.0051)               (0.0050) 
    -0.0056 
   (0.0052) 
Z-score                                      0.0001                  0.0001 
                                                 (0.0001)               (0.0001) 
      0.0001 
     (0.0001) 
   0.0001                  0.0001 
 (0.0001)               (0.0001) 
     0.0001 
   (0.0001) 
Cross-border                            -0.0026                 -0.0032 
                                                 (0.0048)               (0.0047)            
     -0.0028 
     (0.0047) 
    
Geographic diversification        0.0025                 0.0017 
                                                 (0.0025)               (0.0025) 
Systemic importance                 0.0023                 0.0012 
                                                 (0.0046)               (0.0046) 
Bailout                                      -0.0143***          -0.0132*** 
                                                 (0.0042)               (0.0042) 
Real GDP growth                      0.0009                 0.0008 
                                                 (0.0011)               (0.0010) 
      0.0027 
     (0.0025) 
      0.0023 
     (0.0046) 
     -0.0141*** 
     (0.0042) 
      0.0008 
     (0.0011) 
    
Inflation                                    -0.0016                -0.0013 
                                                 (0.0009)               (0.0009) 
     -0.0015 
     (0.0010) 
    
Money  supply  growth            -0.0001                 0.0001 
                                                 (0.0001)               (0.0001) 
CR5                                           0.0001                  0.0001 
                                                 (0.0001)               (0.0001) 
Capital regulatory index           0.0011                  0.0012 
                                                 (0.0010)               (0.0010)              
Official supervisory index        0.0026                  0.0023**                 
                                                 (0.0009)               (0.0009)             
Deposit insurer power             -0.0014                 -0.0019 
                                                 (0.0021)               (0.0021) 
Private monitoring index          0.0024                  0.0022                                                     
                                                 (0.0015)               (0.0015) 
      0.0001 
     (0.0001) 
      0.0001 
     (0.0001) 
      0.0013 
     (0.0010) 
      0.0027*** 
     (0.0009) 
     -0.0016 
     (0.0021) 
      0.0027* 
     (0.0015) 
    
      
Obs.                                             100                       100 
 
R2 0.2814 0.2729  
 
  100 
 
     0.2647 
       105                       105 
 
    0.1829                  0.2217 
  105 
 
     0.1798 
 
 
 
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively. 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
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Table 3-19    Determinants of Acquirers’ Changes of MES for Cross-border M&As 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                   ∆MES                 ∆MES      
                                                         IR                           IR 
                                                     DIFFERENCE3    DIFFERENCE2   
                                               Bank-specific     Bank-specific 
                                                Deal-specific      Deal-specific 
 
         (3)                       
      ∆MES  
 
DISPERSION3 
Bank-specific 
 Deal-specific 
         (4)                        (5) 
      ∆MES                 ∆MES 
           IR                           IR 
        DIFF3                    DIFF2 
   Bank-specific         Bank-specific                                
  Regulatory            Regulatory                               
 
 
 
 
 
         
  (6) 
      ∆MES 
 
DISPERSION3 
  Bank-specific 
DISPERS 
Banking integration                 -0.0141*               -0.0072** 
                                                 (0.0074)                (0.0026) 
Asset diversity                         -0.0110**              -0.0106** 
                                                 (0.0044)                (0.0043) 
Non-performing loan               -0.0494                  -0.0560 
                                                 (0.0287)                (0.0312) 
Tier 1 Capital                            0.0613                   0.0603 
                                                 (0.0504)                (0.0473) 
     -0.0001 
     (0.0001) 
     -0.0098** 
     (0.0043) 
     -0.0467 
     (0.0259) 
      0.0590 
     (0.0491) 
   -0.0086                -0.0076** 
  (0.0069)               (0.0031) 
  -0.0073                -0.0067 
  (0.0057)               (0.0047) 
  -0.0502                -0.0605* 
  (0.0286)               (0.0330) 
   0.0821* 0.0886**             
(0.0429)                 (0.0419) 
   -0.0001 
  (0.0001) 
  -0.0062 
  (0.0048) 
  -0.0503 
  (0.0341) 
 0.0851* 
  (0.0432) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0088**               0.0084** 
                                                 (0.0029)     (0.0029) 
      0.0088** 
     (0.0028) 
    0.0036**              0.0035 
  (0.0013)               (0.0025) 
    0.0036 
  (0.0026) 
PB                                             0.0030**               0.0032** 
                                                 (0.0013)                (0.0010) 
Moral hazard  index                                               
                                                                               
Liquid ratio                              -0.0108                  -0.0105 
                                                 (0.0080)                (0.0077)                      
      0.0035** 
     (0.0014) 
        
      
     -0.0100 
(0.0078) 
    0.0018                  0.0018 
  (0.0016)               (0.0017) 
   0.0020                  0.0019 
  (0.0023)               (0.0019)            
  -0.0095                 -0.0080  
  (0.0091)               (0.0069) 
    0.0022 
  (0.0017) 
   0.0020 
  (0.0020) 
   -0.0092 
  (0.0071) 
Equity-to-asset                         -0.0375                  -0.0527       
                                                 (0.0728)                (0.0627) 
     -0.0399 
     (0.0703) 
   -0.0900                 -0.1223* 
  (0.0719)               (0.0638) 
    -0.0970 
  (0.0654) 
ROA                                         -0.2004                  -0.1448 
                                                 (0.2199)                (0.1624)                    
     -0.1857 
(0.2014) 
    0.0014                  0.0659 
  (0.2950)               (0.2268) 
     0.0061 
  (0.2354) 
Short-term debt                         0.0151                   0.0142 
                                                 (0.0101)                (0.0102)_     
      0.0149 
     (0.0096) 
    0.0125                  0.0122 
  (0.0144)               (0.0081) 
     0.0128 
  (0.0083) 
Non-interest income                -0.0072**              -0.0081**  
                                                 (0.0026)                (0.0027) 
     -0.0068** 
     (0.0023) 
   -0.0071                 -0.0069 
  (0.0033)               (0.0056) 
    -0.0058 
  (0.0057) 
Z-score                                     0.00001                 0.00001 
                                                (0.00005)              (0.00004) 
      0.00001 
    (0.00005) 
   0.00004                0.00003 
 (0.00008)             (0.00009) 
    0.00005 
 (0.00009) 
Cross-border                            -0.0037                  -0.0041 
                                                 (0.0032)                (0.0029)            
     -0.0039 
    (0.0033) 
                                                  
     
Geographic diversification      -0.0001                  -0.0008 
                                                 (0.0021)                (0.0023) 
Systemic importance               -0.0023                  -0.0033 
                                                 (0.0032)                (0.0027) 
Bailout                                     -0.0072**              -0.0065* 
                                                 (0.0027)                (0.0025) 
Real GDP growth                                                   
                                                                               
    -0.00002 
     (0.0022) 
     -0.0025 
     (0.0028) 
     -0.0068** 
     (0.0028) 
       
      
                      
                   
                      
                 
                   
 
  
Inflation                                                                 
                                                                               
      
 
    
Money  supply  growth                                           
                                                                              
CR5                                                                        
                                                                              
Capital regulatory index                                        
                                                                                           
Official supervisory index                                                      
                                                                                          
Deposit insurer power                                           
                                                                               
Private monitoring index                                                                                            
                                                                              
       
       
       
 
                       
 
 
 
   0.0004                 0.0006 
  (0.0004)              (0.0009) 
   0.0012                 0.0009 
  (0.0008)              (0.0007) 
  -0.0016               -0.0018 
  (0.0013)              (0.0019) 
   0.0008                 0.0008 
  (0.0018)              (0.0012) 
  
 
 
 
   0.0007 
  (0.0009) 
   0.0011 
  (0.0008) 
  -0/0011 
  (0.0019) 
   0.0010 
  (0.0013) 
 
Obs.                                             105                       105                      
 
R2                                                                     0.2540                 0.2870 
         
  105 
 
     0.2473                                                                   
  
  101                     101 
  
0.2112 0.2672               
  
101 
 
    0.2228 
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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Table 3-20   Determinants of Acquirers’ Changes of MES for Cross-border M&As 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                        (2) 
                                                   ∆MES                 ∆MES      
                                                         IR                           IR 
                                                     DIFFERENCE3    DIFFERENCE2   
                                               Bank-specific     Bank-specific 
                                             Macroeconomic  Macro 
 
         (3)                       
      ∆MES  
 
DISPERSION3 
Bank-specific 
 Macro 
         (4)                        (5) 
      ∆MES                 ∆MES 
           IR                           IR 
        DIFF3                    DIFF2 
   Bank-specific         Bank-specific                                
 Deal-specific          Deal-specific                      
Macroeconomic      Macro 
 
 
 
 
 
         
   (6) 
      ∆MES 
 
DISPERSION3 
Bank-specific 
  Deal-specific 
DISPERS 
Banking integration                 -0.0120                -0.0065** 
                                                 (0.0077)               (0.0025) 
Asset diversity                         -0.0098**            -0.0089** 
                                                 (0.0037)               (0.0036) 
Non-performing loan               -0.0423                -0.0464 
                                                 (0.0257)               (0.0300) 
Tier 1 Capital                            0.0588                  0.0564 
                                                 (0.0584)               (0.0546) 
    -0.00006 
    (0.00008) 
     -0.0087** 
     (0.0036) 
     -0.0392 
     (0.0237) 
      0.0561 
     (0.0566) 
   -0.0134                -0.0070** 
  (0.0100)               (0.0031) 
  -0.0115**            -0.0109** 
  (0.0044)               (0.0046) 
  -0.0759**             -0.0814** 
  (0.0346)               (0.0322) 
   0.0614 0.0617                      
(0.0404)                 (0.0550) 
  -0.00006 
 (0.00007) 
  -0.0107** 
  (0.0045) 
  -0.0648** 
  (0.0358) 
0.0586 
  (0.0417) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0057**             0.0051** 
                                                 (0.0019)    (0.0021) 
      0.0058** 
     (0.0020) 
    0.0080***            0.0074*** 
  (0.0028)               (0.0028) 
    0.0081*** 
  (0.0028) 
PB                                             0.0016                  0.0017 
                                                 (0.0014)               (0.0012) 
Moral hazard  index                                               
                                                                               
Liquid ratio                              -0.0093                 -0.0089 
                                                 (0.0078)               (0.0072)                      
      0.0020 
     (0.0015) 
        
      
     -0.0090 
(0.0074) 
    0.0038**              0.0033** 
  (0.0016)               (0.0016) 
                      
                             
  -0.0082                 -0.0063  
  (0.0065)               (0.0091) 
    0.0037** 
  (0.0017) 
    
   
   -0.0082 
   (0.0067) 
Equity-to-asset                         -0.0436                 -0.0555       
                                                 (0.0821)               (0.0748) 
     -0.0438 
     (0.0791) 
   -0.0502                 -0.0370 
  (0.0557)               (0.0789) 
    -0.0340 
   (0.0570) 
ROA                                          0.0184                  0.0246 
                                                 (0.1949)               (0.1647)                    
      0.0066 
(0.1846) 
   -0.0987                 -0.1356 
  (0.2411)               (0.1980) 
    -0.1227 
   (0.2500) 
Short-term debt                         0.0069                  0.0061 
                                                 (0.0127)               (0.0127)_     
      0.0068 
     (0.0121) 
    0.0136                  0.0141 
  (0.0081)               (0.0120) 
     0.0136 
   (0.0084) 
Non-interest income                 -0.0039                -0.0055  
                                                 (0.0034)               (0.0036) 
     -0.0036 
     (0.0032) 
   -0.0061                 -0.0061 
  (0.0053)               (0.0057) 
    -0.0049* 
   (0.0059) 
Z-score                                     0.00004                0.00003 
                                                (0.00004)             (0.00003) 
     0.00004 
    (0.00004) 
   0.00006                0.00004 
 (0.00007)             (0.00007) 
     0.00002 
  (0.00007) 
Cross-border                                             
                                                                           
    -0.0049                 -0.0056 
  (0.0045)               (0.0031)           
    -0.0048 
   (0.0046)  
Geographic diversification                          
                                                                 
Systemic importance                                
                                                                 
Bailout                                                     
                                                                 
Real GDP growth                      0.0008                0.0006              
                                                 (0.0007)              (0.0006)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
     0.0008 
    (0.0007) 
   -0.0017                 -0.0017 
  (0.0022)               (0.0021) 
  -0.0026                 -0.0023 
  (0.0038)               (0.0033) 
  -0.0057*              -0.0060* 
  (0.0034)               (0.0032) 
   0.0004                  0.0004 
  (0.0008)               (0.0006) 
    -0.0008 
   (0.0022) 
   -0.0017 
   (0.0039) 
   -0.0060* 
   (0.0035) 
    0.0005 
   (0.0008) 
Inflation                                    -0.0011               -0.0008               
                                                 (0.0006)              (0.0006)    
   -0.0010 
    (0.0006) 
   -0.0008                -0.0007 
  (0.0008)               (0.0005) 
    -0.0009 
   (0.0009) 
Money  supply  growth            0.00004*             0.00005*** 
                                                (0.00002)            (0.00001)   
CR5                                                             
                                                                              
Capital regulatory index                                        
                                                                                           
Official supervisory index                                                      
                                                                                          
Deposit insurer power                                           
                                                                               
Private monitoring index                                                                                            
                                                                              
    0.00004** 
   (0.00002) 
       
 
   0.00009                0.00009 
 (0.00009)             (0.00009) 
 -0.00006               -0.00006 
 (0.00006)             (0.00001) 
    0.00008 
   (0.00009) 
   -0.00004 
   (0.00007) 
 
Obs.                                             104                     104                      
 
R2                                                                     0.2130                0.2423 
         
    104 
 
     0.2072                                                                   
  
 104                        104 
  
0.3156 0.3221                
  
104 
 
    0.2757 
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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risks after M&As but no further evidence for larger acquirers will have higher systemic risks 
after M&As. For example, if acquirers increase asset diversity by 1%, their ∆CoVaR will 
decrease by more than 0.24. In addition, if the inter-quantile of interest rate difference on MFI 
deposits for household across euro area countries (3rd – 1st) increase by 0.01% (1 bp), acquirers’ 
change of ∆CoVaR will decrease by approximate 0.5. However, we conduct granger-causality 
tests again and find no causal relationships between acquirers’ systemic risk measures and the 
three alternative banking integration indicators. 
Finally, other results in  robustness checks partly provide evidences for our previous findings 
that acquirers (1) with lower asset quality in previous year; (2) with lower capital ratio in 
previous year; (3) with lower price-to-book ratio; (4) that not rely much on short-term debt; (5) 
that receive bailouts; (6) from countries whose deposit insurers are more powerful and (7) from 
countries that encourage investors to engage in more private monitoring will have lower 
systemic risks after M&As. 
 
3.7 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In this chapter, we first calculate the average changes of acquirers’ MES, LTD and ∆CoVaR 
and use t-tests to investigate whether systemic risk increased or decreased significantly after 
M&As. We find that acquirers’ MES, LTD and ∆CoVaR increased significantly after M&As, 
thereby providing support to our first research question. This result can be explained as follows: 
acquirers’ increase their size via M&As and become TBTF banks, therefore, they are more 
likely to be bailout. Once bank managers have this expectation, they are more likely to take 
riskier activities and increase banks’ systemic risk.  
We then compute the average changes of peer banks’ MES, LTD and ∆CoVaR. We find that 
both MES and LTD of competitors increase significantly while change of ∆CoVaR increases 
insignificantly. We employ t-test again to demonstrate that merging banks and their competitors 
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suffer the same extent from the increase in systemic risks. Our findings provide implications 
for bank supervisors and regulators that M&As are not the only factor that affect significantly 
acquirers’ systemic risks. We use more t-tests to find that the two financial crises had a 
significantly negative impact on acquirers’ systemic risks, and the U.S. Financial Crisis had 
more negative impacts on acquirers’ systemic risks than the European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
(research question 2).   This result is expected as the former is the global financial crisis while 
the latter is the regional financial crisis. It is reasonable that the former had more pronounced 
effects than the latter.   
In addition, to find more robust evidences for acquirers’ increases in systemic risks due to bank 
M&As, we conduct an important robustness check by using propensity score matching. 
Specifically, we match merging banks with non-merging banks based on total assets and 
market-to-book ratio and compute the average changes of three systemic risk measures for 
acquirers, combined banks and non-merging banks. We find that all three systemic risk 
measures increase significantly for acquirers and combined banks while they decreased 
significantly for non-merging banks. These results provide robust evidences for acquirers and 
policy implications for bank regulators and supervisors that increase systemic risks due to bank 
M&As. We recommend that bank regulators and supervisors should scrutinize bank M&A 
deals in order to achieve financial stability in European banking market.   
To test whether banks with different characteristics will have different systemic risks after 
M&As, we divide the full sample into different sub-samples based on different characteristics. 
We also find that (1) large acquirers have higher systemic risks after M&As than small and 
medium-sized acquirers; (2) acquirers that engage in cross-border M&As have higher systemic 
risks after M&As than acquirers that engage in domestic M&As; (3) acquirers from core 
countries have higher systemic risks after M&As than acquirers from periphery countries 
(research question 3). All these findings give bank regulators, supervisors and managers the 
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implications about which characteristics can significantly affect acquirers’ systemic risks after 
M&As. We recommend that regulators and supervisors should approve domestic M&As whose 
acquirers are large banks headquartered in periphery countries.  
We next turn to employ fixed-effect models to identify more determinants of acquirers’ 
systemic risk changes after M&As (research question 3). First, we find strong evidences for 
the hypothesis that acquirers with higher asset diversity will have lower systemic risks after 
M&As. This important finding implies that product diversification can contribute to lower 
bank-specific risk and achieve financial stability. Second, we also find some evidences for the 
hypothesis that larger acquirers will have higher systemic risks after M&As. This implies that 
exploitation of safety-net subsidies hypothesis holds. Large acquirers can engage in M&As to 
become even larger and are eligible for “too-big-to-fail” banks, then they are able to receive 
safety-net subsidies. This worsens moral hazard problem and enables banks to take more risks, 
and finally, leads to banks’ higher systemic risk contributions to banking system. Third, we 
identify some evidences for acquirers from more integrated banking markets may have higher 
systemic risk after M&As. This implies that the destabilizing effect of banking integration to 
some extent exists. This may be explained as follows: acquirers from more integrated markets 
become even larger and more interconnected after M&As thus may have higher systemic risk. 
Besides these findings, we further identify that systemic risk measures are significant with 
several variables, indicating that acquirers with different characteristics in the previous year 
will have different systemic risk after M&As this year. We find evidences for acquirers (1) with 
lower asset quality in previous year; (2) with lower capital ratio in previous year; (3) with lower 
price-to-book ratio; (4) that not rely much on short-term debt; (5) that receive bailouts; (6) from 
countries whose deposit insurers are more powerful and (7) from countries that more encourage 
investors to engage in private monitoring will have lower risks after M&As this year. These 
findings provide implications for European banking regulators what types of bank mergers in 
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this year are more likely to contribute to financial stability next year. Bank regulators may ask 
banks that engage in large cross-border M&As to hold relatively higher capital and liquidity 
than other banks.  
Finally, we use both post-crisis and pre-crisis sub-samples to conduct fixed-effect models for 
all three systemic risk measures. We include and exclude banking integration indicators in the 
models. First, we find that a number of explanatory variables have opposite signs with three 
systemic risk measures. These results imply that those variables have significantly different 
effects on acquirers’ systemic risks in post-crisis period, compared with those in pre-crisis 
period.  Therefore, banking regulators, supervisors and managers should scrutinize changes of 
those variables and take different actions to reduce acquirers’ systemic risks before crisis and 
after crisis.  
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Appendix 
Table 3A-1   Determinants of Acquirers’ changes of LTD for Cross-border M&As 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                   ∆LTD                 ∆LTD      
                                                         IR                           IR 
                                                     DIFFERENCE1    DIFFERENCE5    
                                                     Full                      Full                                            
          (3)                       
      ∆LTD 
 
DISPERSION5 
         Full                        
        (4)                       (5) 
    ∆LTD                 ∆LTD 
        IR                           IR 
     DIFF1                    DIFF 
Bank-specific     Bank-specific                    
   (6) 
      ∆LTD  
 
DISPERSION5 
DISPERS
Banking integration                 -0.0503                -0.0778* 
                                                 (0.0355)               (0.0377) 
Asset diversity                         -0.0301**            -0.0328 
                                                 (0.0140)               (0.0289) 
Non-performing loan               -0.1233*              -0.0758 
                                                 (0.0591)               (0.0560) 
Tier 1 Capital                            0.3470*                0.3264* 
                                                 (0.1556)               (0.1525) 
     -0.0009 
     (0.0009) 
     -0.0262 
     (0.0151) 
     -0.0659 
     (0.0824) 
      0.1184 
     (0.1120) 
 -0.0842                -0.0716 
(0.0356)               (0.0686) 
-0.0337*              -0.0344* 
(0.0187)               (0.0187) 
-0.0706                 -0.0736  
(0.1362)               (0.1366) 
 0.3684** 0.3707**                    
(0.1770)                 (0.1771) 
    0.0005 
  (0.0016) 
  -0.0346* 
  (0.0190) 
  -0.0532 
  (0.1366) 
0.3711* 
  (0.1782) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0404**              0.0397** 
                                                 (0.0154)    (0.0168) 
      0.0181 
     (0.0133) 
  0.0240***          0.0240*** 
(0.0084)               (0.0084) 
    0.0269*** 
  (0.0081) 
PB                                             0.0121**              0.0122** 
                                                 (0.0047)               (0.0051) 
Moral hazard  index                 -0.0115*              -0.0084 
                                                 (0.0096)               (0.0101) 
Liquid ratio                               0.0157                  0.0063 
                                                 (0.0743)               (0.0748)                      
      0.0080 
     (0.0055) 
      0.0027  
     (0.0076) 
      0.0346 
(0.0339) 
   0.0035                 0.0036 
(0.0068)               (0.0068) 
                 
  
 -0.0295                 -0.0306  
 (0.0267)               (0.0266) 
    0.0052 
  (0.0067) 
 
 
   -0.0355 
   (0.0266) 
Equity-to-asset                         -0.3903                -0.3424       
                                                 (0.2200)               (0.1959) 
     -0.2026 
     (0.1886) 
  -0.3563                 -0.3572 
 (0.2401)               (0.2402) 
    -0.3455 
   (0.2440) 
ROA                                          2.1159                  2.0492 
                                                 (2.0372)               (1.9247)                    
      1.4011 
(1.4867) 
  2.1341**             2.0996** 
 (0.9571)               (0.9597) 
     2.1469** 
   (0.9689) 
Short-term debt                         0.0191                 0.0179 
                                                 (0.0612)               (0.0621)_     
      0.0295 
     (0.0285) 
  -0.0122                -0.0132 
 (0.0314)               (0.0314) 
    -0.0109 
   (0.0322) 
Non-interest income                  0.0053                 0.0014  
                                                 (0.0251)               (0.0254) 
     -0.0129 
     (0.0401) 
   0.0101                  0.0095 
 (0.0231)               (0.0231) 
     0.0115 
   (0.0235) 
Z-score                                     -0.0005                -0.0003 
                                                 (0.0002)               (0.0002) 
      0.0002 
     (0.0004) 
  -0.0002                -0.0002 
 (0.0003)               (0.0003) 
    -0.0002 
   (0.0003) 
Cross-border                             0.0052                  0.0099 
                                                 (0.0333)               (0.0345)            
      0.0016 
     (0.0171) 
    
Geographic diversification       -0.0002                 0.0022 
                                                 (0.0091)               (0.0082) 
Systemic importance                -0.0296                -0.0247 
                                                 (0.0229)               (0.0269) 
Bailout                                       0.0044                  0.0031 
                                                 (0.0198)               (0.0176) 
Real GDP growth                     -0.0062                -0.0063 
                                                 (0.0040)               (0.0043) 
      0.0063 
     (0.0085) 
     -0.0203 
     (0.0220) 
      0.0173 
     (0.0128) 
     -0.0023 
     (0.0043) 
    
Inflation                                     0.0049                 0.0040 
                                                 (0.0030)               (0.0031) 
      0.0028 
     (0.0020) 
    
Money  supply  growth             0.0001                  0.0001 
                                                 (0.0001)               (0.0001) 
CR5                                          -0.0003                 -0.0003 
                                                 (0.0005)               (0.0005) 
Capital regulatory index           0.0067                  0.0063 
                                                 (0.0059)               (0.0043)              
Official supervisory index       -0.0028                 -0.0020                 
                                                 (0.0041)               (0.0033)             
Deposit insurer power             -0.0008                  0.0023 
                                                 (0.0068)               (0.0070) 
Private monitoring index         -0.0177*               -0.0174                                                     
                                                 (0.1550)               (0.0102) 
      0.0001 
     (0.0001) 
     -0.0003 
     (0.0003) 
      0.0044* 
     (0.0023) 
      0.0012 
     (0.0016) 
      0.0073* 
     (0.0040) 
      -0.0122 
     (0.0062) 
    
      
Obs.                                              95                         95 
 
R2 0.0916 0.2076  
 
  95 
 
     0.1016 
       100                       100 
 
    0.3001                  0.2915 
  100 
 
     0.1244 
 
 
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively. 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
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           Table 3A-2   Determinants of Acquirers’ changes of LTD for Cross-border M&As 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                   ∆LTD                 ∆LTD      
                                                         IR                           IR 
                                                     DIFFERENCE1    DIFFERENCE5    
                                               Bank-specific     Bank-specific 
                                                Deal-specific      Deal-specific 
 
         (3)                       
      ∆LTD  
 
DISPERSION5 
Bank-specific 
 Deal-specific 
         (4)                        (5) 
      ∆LTD                  ∆LTD 
           IR                           IR 
        DIFF1                    DIFF5 
   Deal-specific         Deal-specific                                
  Regulatory            Regulatory                               
 
 
 
 
 
         
  (6) 
      ∆LTD 
 
DISPERSION5 
Deal-specific 
DISPERS 
Banking integration                  0.0030                 -0.0992 
                                                 (0.0072)               (0.0679) 
Asset diversity                         -0.0428**            -0.0437** 
                                                 (0.0187)               (0.0187) 
Non-performing loan               -0.0781                  0.0005 
                                                 (0.1383)               (0.1389) 
Tier 1 Capital                            0.3540**              0.3591** 
                                                 (0.1740)               (0.1742) 
     -0.0006 
     (0.0016) 
     -0.0411** 
     (0.0191) 
     -0.0602 
     (0.1402) 
      0.3581** 
     (0.1767) 
   -0.0536                -0.0312 
  (0.0692)               (0.0361) 
  -0.0292                -0.0289 
  (0.0207)               (0.0206) 
  -0.1115                 -0.1113 
  (0.1453)               (0.1446) 
   0.4148** 0.4144**              
(0.1809)                 (0.1806) 
    0.0003 
  (0.0016) 
  -0.0292 
  (0.0211) 
  -0.0871 
  (0.1443) 
0.4047** 
  (0.1816) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0335***            0.0333*** 
                                                 (0.0110)    (0.0110) 
      0.0356*** 
     (0.0111) 
    0.0310***            0.0309*** 
  (0.0113)               (0.0113) 
    0.0330*** 
  (0.0111) 
PB                                             0.0030                  0.0030 
                                                 (0.0072)               (0.0072) 
Moral hazard  index                                               
                                                                               
Liquid ratio                              -0.0208                 -0.0228 
                                                 (0.0269)               (0.0268)                      
      0.0051 
     (0.0071) 
        
      
     -0.0259 
(0.0272) 
    0.0075                  0.0073 
  (0.0075)               (0.0074) 
   0.0008                  0.0009 
  (0.0083)               (0.0083)            
  -0.0100                 -0.0086  
  (0.0311)               (0.0312) 
    0.0091 
  (0.0072) 
   0.0009 
  (0.0084) 
   -0.0148 
   (0.0310) 
Equity-to-asset                         -0.4121*               -0.4148*       
                                                 (0.2393)               (0.2396) 
     -0.4197* 
     (0.2455) 
   -0.4325                 -0.4359 
  (0.2778)               (0.2776) 
    -0.4129 
   (0.2799) 
ROA                                          2.9727***            2.9216*** 
                                                 (0.9966)               (0.9990)                    
      3.0691*** 
(1.0290) 
    2.0697**              2.0996** 
  (1.0153)               (1.0134) 
     2.0815** 
   (1.0239) 
Short-term debt                         0.0131                  0.0112 
                                                 (0.0338)               (0.0338)_     
      0.0074 
     (0.0348) 
    0.0101                  0.0111 
  (0.0355)               (0.0355) 
     0.0110 
   (0.0361) 
Non-interest income                  0.0010                  0.0005  
                                                 (0.0229)               (0.0230) 
      0.0003 
     (0.0236) 
    0.0151                  0.0152 
  (0.0245)               (0.0244) 
     0.0156 
   (0.0246) 
Z-score                                     -0.0004                -0.0004 
                                                 (0.0003)               (0.0003) 
     -0.0003 
     (0.0003) 
   -0.0002                 -0.0002 
  (0.0004)               (0.0004) 
    -0.0002 
   (0.0004) 
Cross-border                            -0.0154                 -0.0149 
                                                 (0.0249)               (0.0249)            
     -0.0179 
     (0.0257) 
                                                  
     
Geographic diversification       0.0008                   0.0002 
                                                 (0.0092)               (0.0093) 
Systemic importance               -0.0406**             -0.0403** 
                                                 (0.0158)               (0.0158) 
Bailout                                      0.0139                  0.0141 
                                                 (0.0132)               (0.0132) 
Real GDP growth                                                   
                                                                               
      0.0021 
     (0.0093) 
     -0.0377** 
     (0.0159) 
      0.0150 
     (0.0136) 
       
      
                      
                   
                      
                 
                   
 
  
Inflation                                                                 
                                                                               
      
 
    
Money  supply  growth                                           
                                                                              
CR5                                                                        
                                                                              
Capital regulatory index                                        
                                                                                           
Official supervisory index                                                      
                                                                                          
Deposit insurer power                                           
                                                                               
Private monitoring index                                                                                            
                                                                              
       
       
       
 
                       
 
 
 
   0.0057                 0.0055 
  (0.0038)              (0.0038) 
   0.0010                 0.0010 
  (0.0034)              (0.0033) 
  -0.0001                0.00002 
  (0.0083)              (0.0082) 
  -0.0129**           -0.0130** 
  (0.0054)              (0.0054) 
  
 
 
 
   0.0059 
  (0.0038) 
   0.0014 
  (0.0034) 
   0.0010 
  (0.0083) 
  -0.0130** 
  (0.0054) 
 
Obs.                                             100                       100                      
 
R2                                                                     0.3770                 0.3684 
         
  100 
 
     0.5251                                                                   
  
  96                        96 
  
0.4693 0.4605              
  
 96 
 
    0.4607 
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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Table 3A-3   Determinants of Acquirers’ changes of LTD for cross-border M&As 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                        (2) 
                                                   ∆LTD                  ∆LTD      
                                                         IR                           IR 
                                                     DIFFERENCE1    DIFFERENCE5    
                                               Bank-specific     Bank-specific 
                                             Macroeconomic       Macro 
 
         (3)                       
      ∆LTD  
 
DISPERSION5 
Bank-specific 
 Macro 
         (4)                        (5) 
      ∆LTD                  ∆LTD 
           IR                           IR 
        DIFF1                    DIFF5 
   Bank-specific         Bank-specific                                
 Deal-specific          Deal-specific                      
Macroeconomic      Macro 
 
 
 
 
 
         
  (6) 
      ∆LTD 
 
DISPERSION5 
  Bank-specific 
  Deal-specific 
DISPERS 
Banking integration                 -0.0558                -0.1046 
                                                 (0.0362)               (0.0695) 
Asset diversity                         -0.0261                -0.0271 
                                                 (0.0189)               (0.0189) 
Non-performing loan               -0.1335                -0.1376 
                                                 (0.1383)               (0.1388) 
Tier 1 Capital                            0.3535*                0.3568* 
                                                 (0.1799)               (0.1800) 
      0.0001 
     (0.0017) 
     -0.0278 
     (0.0194) 
     -0.1074 
     (0.1403) 
      0.3577* 
     (0.1831) 
   -0.0613                -0.1129 
  (0.0372)               (0.0717) 
  -0.0357*              -0.0367* 
  (0.0200)               (0.0046) 
  -0.0145                -0.0879 
  (0.0265)               (0.1615) 
   0.3349* 0.3406*               
(0.1836)                 (0.1839) 
   -0.0006 
  (0.0017) 
  -0.0106** 
  (0.0353) 
  -0.0588 
  (0.1638) 
0.3397* 
  (0.1874) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0235***            0.0235*** 
                                                 (0.0085)    (0.0085) 
      0.0277*** 
     (0.0083) 
    0.0357***            0.0352*** 
  (0.0129)               (0.0130) 
    0.0381*** 
  (0.0131) 
PB                                             0.0050                  0.0051 
                                                 (0.0068)               (0.0068) 
Moral hazard  index                                               
                                                                               
Liquid ratio                              -0.0204                -0.0221 
                                                 (0.0267)               (0.0265)                      
      0.0074 
     (0.0067) 
        
      
     -0.0286 
(0.0269) 
    0.0043                  0.0043 
  (0.0075)               (0.0075) 
                      
                             
  -0.0249                 -0.0268  
  (0.0294)               (0.0294) 
    0.0066 
  (0.0075) 
    
   
   -0.0301 
   (0.0300) 
Equity-to-asset                         -0.3182                -0.3195       
                                                 (0.2496)               (0.2498) 
     -0.3149 
     (0.2584) 
   -0.3311                 -0.3351 
  (0.2646)               (0.2651) 
    -0.0345 
   (0.2743) 
ROA                                          1.8958*               1.8399 
                                                 (1.1018)               (1.1068)                    
      2.0341* 
(1.1333) 
    2.4891**              2.4286* 
  (1.1918)               (1.1986) 
     2.7653** 
   (1.2410) 
Short-term debt                        -0.0170                -0.0187 
                                                 (0.0319)               (0.0318)_     
     -0.0192 
     (0.0328) 
    0.0058                  0.0032 
  (0.0374)               (0.0373) 
    -0.0026 
   (0.0382) 
Non-interest income                 -0.0116                -0.0125  
                                                 (0.0247)               (0.0248) 
     -0.0076 
     (0.0254) 
   -0.0145                 -0.0148 
  (0.0265)               (0.0265) 
    -0.0127 
   (0.0273) 
Z-score                                     -0.0002                -0.0002 
                                                 (0.0003)               (0.0003) 
     -0.0002 
     (0.0003) 
   -0.0003                 -0.0003 
  (0.0003)               (0.0003) 
    -0.0003 
   (0.0003) 
Cross-border                                             
                                                                           
    -0.0152                 -0.0148 
  (0.0263)               (0.0263)           
    -0.0186 
   (0.0272)  
Geographic diversification                          
                                                                 
Systemic importance                                
                                                                 
Bailout                                                     
                                                                 
Real GDP growth                     -0.0049               -0.0049              
                                                 (0.0034)              (0.0034)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    -0.0040 
    (0.0035) 
    0.0011                  0.0007 
  (0.0101)               (0.0102) 
  -0.0315                -0.0310 
  (0.0188)               (0.0188) 
   0.0045                  0.0051 
  (0.0158)               (0.0158) 
  -0.0035                 -0.0035 
  (0.0039)               (0.0039) 
     0.0035 
   (0.0101) 
   -0.0289 
   (0.0192) 
    0.0071 
   (0.0161) 
   -0.0028 
   (0.0039) 
Inflation                                     0.0058                0.0059              
                                                 (0.0037)              (0.0037)    
     0.0047 
    (0.0037) 
    0.0042                  0.0042 
  (0.0040)               (0.0040) 
     0.0030 
   (0.0040) 
Money  supply  growth             0.0001                0.0001 
                                                 (0.0001)              (0.0001)   
CR5                                                             
                                                                              
Capital regulatory index                                        
                                                                                           
Official supervisory index                                                      
                                                                                          
Deposit insurer power                                           
                                                                               
Private monitoring index                                                                                            
                                                                              
     0.0001 
    (0.0001) 
       
 
    0.0001                  0.0001 
  (0.00001)             (0.00001) 
   0.0002                  0.0002 
  (0.0001)               (0.0003) 
     0.0001 
   (0.00001) 
    0.0002 
   (0.0003) 
 
Obs.                                              99                        99                      
 
R2                                                                     0.1929                 0.1869 
         
    99 
 
     0.2248                                                                   
  
  99                          99 
  
0.3258 0.3341                
  
  99 
 
    0.3110 
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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Table 3A-4   Determinants of Acquirers’ changes of ∆CoVaR for Cross-border M&As 
 
 
Variable                                            (1)                          (2) 
                                                   Diff(∆CoVaR)       Diff(∆CoVaR)      
                                                              IR                             IR 
                                                     DIFFERENCE1    DIFFERENCE5   
                                                            Full                         Full                                                
          (3)                         
Diff(∆CoVaR)     
 
DISPERSION5 
         Full 
       (4)                          (5) 
 Diff(∆CoVaR)     Diff(∆CoVaR)                     
          IR                          IR 
       DIFF1                  DIFF5 
  Bank-specific      Bank-specific                            
     (6) 
Diff(∆CoVaR)                     
 
DISPERSION5 
DISPERS
Banking integration                -20.0013               -59.5039** 
                                                (18.5995)              (20.4261) 
Asset diversity                         -27.2760**           -24.1939 
                                                (13.0355)              (16.5158) 
Non-performing loan             -140.0882***       -164.4337* 
                                                (69.2805)              (86.1474) 
Tier 1 Capital                           25.1907                 41.0434 
                                               (173.8788)             (148.895) 
       -1.5805  
      (1.0661) 
     -34.0036* 
      (17.5652) 
      -151.732 
      (135.967) 
      -17.8233 
      (106.682) 
  -48.8444*            -75.7230 
  (26.8549)            (48.8987) 
 -23.9963*            -23.8126** 
  (10.8507)            (10.3884) 
 -196.089*            -194.359** 
  (93.6400)            (87.2982) 
   1.7535  -7.3599           
(81.0663)                 (84.64) 
   -1.6373 
  (1.3418) 
  -25.2492* 
  (12.2512) 
  -132.029 
  (92.9432) 
   -4.1213 
  (85.8880) 
Ln(TA)                                     -5.8790                  -5.0092 
                                                (18.2606)     (16.5231) 
       -4.1907 
      (17.1025) 
    1.1216                 0.7663 
  (5.8565)              (5.9379) 
    -2.3319 
   (7.7034) 
PB                                            -4.8659*                -4.0154 
                                                 (2.2675)                (3.2063) 
Moral hazard  index                -15.1504*              -13.1048* 
                                                 (7.7581)                 (6.3537) 
Liquid ratio                             -20.2325                -16.5120 
                                                (33.1348)               (33.5009)                      
       -0.8815 
       (3.9387) 
       -3.4348 
       (2.7457) 
       -19.3097 
(29.0108) 
    5.2607                 4.7304 
  (6.2066)              (5.9199) 
   
   
   14.8752               15.7876 
  (19.6314)            (18.9019) 
     3.9864 
   (6.0026) 
   
   
   19.6150 
  (19.8346) 
Equity-to-asset                        -97.4989               -133.4948       
                                               (471.9956)             (457.5966) 
       256.0179 
       (222.581) 
   -230.8216           -219.8644 
  (148.8481)          (149.9227) 
   -197.7029 
  (167.4737) 
ROA                                        1084.034               1196.876 
                                               (2080.723)             (1994.146)                    
       -808.248 
(626.922) 
    1172.68**           1170.611 
   (431.142)             (431.62) 
    1058.792 
  (499.9187) 
Short-term debt                        30.8960**             29.1375* 
                                                (11.5360)               (10.7079)_     
        30.3784 
       (17.9548) 
     -20.359               -18.2028 
   (12.2499)            (12.3233) 
    -27.6905 
   (17.0250) 
Non-interest income                 -1.8389                   1.3384  
                                                (22.2368)               (19.1519) 
       -17.8233 
       (106.682) 
     -17.0563             -16.3019 
   (12.5697)            (12.6253) 
    -18.2190 
   (12.3920) 
Z-score                                     -0.1023                  -0.2048 
                                                 (0.3043)                 (0.3433) 
        -0.1805 
        (0.2830) 
      0.1400                 0.1318 
    (0.2672)              (0.2708) 
      0.1437 
   (0.2893) 
Cross-border                             8.4765*                  5.3764 
                                                 (4.5268)                 (4.8644)            
         9.5343 
      (5.9341) 
    
Geographic diversification      -2.8511                   -4.4097 
                                                 (4.2394)                 (5.8397) 
Systemic importance                1.5864                   -0.2923 
                                                (13.9897)               (11.8135) 
Bailout                                     -24.4425**            -25.7700** 
                                                 (8,3277)                 (8.9643) 
Real GDP growth                     2.7351                    2.7406 
                                                 (7.1043)                 (6.4379) 
        -0.2294 
        (2.3904) 
        -0.1805 
        (0.2830) 
        -0.9116 
        (5.6239) 
         3.0176 
        (3.1724) 
    
Inflation                                   -9.0294*                 -8.7635* 
                                                 (4.8558)                 (4.4920) 
       -5.6312** 
        (2.0826) 
    
Money  supply  growth             1.6306                    1.7545 
                                                 (1.3169)                 (1.2089) 
CR5                                           0.1564                    0.1334 
                                                 (0.4727)                 (0.3839) 
Capital regulatory index          -5.1344                   -4.5294 
                                                 (4.0662)                 (3.2397)              
Official supervisory index       -5.4461                   -5.2083                 
                                                 (4.3648)                 (4.3680)             
Deposit insurer power              16.3561                 14.9017 
                                                 (13.8919)              (13.6718) 
Private monitoring index          -5.7097                 -6.1164                                                     
                                                  (4.3648)               (4.4714) 
       -0.0001** 
        (0.0001) 
         0.0440 
        (0.3002) 
        -1.2340 
        (1.7461) 
        -6.5507* 
        (2.0053) 
        13.9055* 
        (6.4047) 
        -1.7002 
        (2.1879) 
    
      
Obs.                                              99                          99 
 
R2 0.0531  0.0829  
 
       99 
 
          0.1032 
       124                        124 
 
    0.3298                   0.3491 
   124 
 
      0.2797 
 
 
 
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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  Table 3A-5   Determinants of Acquirers’ changes of ∆CoVaR for Cross-border M&As 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                          (2) 
                                              Diff(∆CoVaR)       Diff(∆CoVaR) 
                                                         IR                            IR 
                                                DIFFERENCE1    DIFFERENCE5    
                                               Bank-specific         Bank-specific 
                                                Deal-specific      Deal-specific 
 
         (3)                
Diff(∆CoVaR) 
 
DISPERSION5 
Bank-specific 
 Deal-specific 
           (4)                            (5) 
Diff(∆CoVaR)          Diff(∆CoVaR) 
           IR                           IR 
        DIFF1                    DIFF5 
   Deal-specific         Deal-specific                                
  Regulatory            Regulatory                               
 
 
 
 
 
         
     (6) 
Diff(∆CoVaR) 
 
DISPERSION5 
Deal-specific 
DISPERS 
Banking integration                 -12.8651               -31.9604 
                                                 (11.8055)              (23.3591) 
Asset diversity                        -27.7484*              -28.0174* 
                                                 (13.227)                (13.2080) 
Non-performing loan             -163.0712**        -166.5224*** 
                                                 (52.7359)              (51.1559) 
Tier 1 Capital                           35.3728                 36.6559 
                                                (50.8820)               (51.1049) 
      -0.0992 
     (0.6136) 
     -27.2702* 
     (12.7711) 
   -158.6101** 
    (50.3205) 
     37.0667 
    (50.5573) 
   -9.6609                 -24.702 
 (30.7465)               (60.1150) 
 -20.9005                -23.6141 
 (16.0638)               (17.5516) 
-198.3343              -210.2001* 
(121.2041)             (124.5583) 
  -6.3480                  -6.1706 
  (155.7565)           (156.6581) 
   -0.0849 
  (1.4241) 
 -23.1874 
 (17.8898) 
-203.2654 
 (124.419) 
  -7.9824 
(156.8213) 
Ln(TA)                                     -3.9089                  -4.0317 
                                                 (9.8880)      (9.7670) 
     -3.4269 
     (9.6670) 
    2.5792                   2.7788 
  (9.3552)                (9.4269) 
    3.4768 
  (9.2802) 
PB                                            -4.0211                  -4.1321 
                                                 (3.4209)                (3.3814) 
Moral hazard  index                                               
                                                                               
Liquid ratio                              -23.1545               -23.2340 
                                                 (21.3107)              (26.9868)                      
      -3.4661 
     (3.0606) 
        
      
     -24.1534 
(26.2853) 
   -2.4665                  -2.3389 
  (6.4648)                (6.5033) 
 -11.5014*               10.1522 
  (6.2068)                (7.1102)            
  -8.9235                  -8.2191  
  (25.8363)             (25.9874) 
   -1.6148 
  (6.2620) 
  10.2903 
  (7.1140) 
  -9.3843 
  (26.2289) 
Equity-to-asset                          69.549                  69.9229       
                                               (133.3202)             (131.0572) 
      67.6040 
    (145.1636) 
    97.0622    94.8216  
(235.1745)            (236.4666) 
    96.7447 
 (237.5305) 
ROA                                       -301.6257              -318.7771 
                                               (1050.022)             (1051.081)                    
     -293.784 
(1109.613) 
  -485.5305            -518.1896 
  (840.61)              (846.8331) 
  -506.1029 
 (850.4683) 
Short-term debt                        15.4895***          15.2851*** 
                                                 (3.5657)                 (3.6361)_     
     14.4657** 
     (4.7637) 
   55.7858*               56.5612* 
 (29.3172)               (30.4707) 
    50.7009* 
  (30.6911) 
Non-interest income                 -0.8514                  -1.1068  
                                                 (11.1494)              (10.8524) 
     -1.1564 
     (13.0425) 
    -9.5163                  -9.5562 
  (20.7565)               (20.8562) 
    -9.8469 
  (20.9118) 
Z-score                                     -0.2154                  -0.2173 
                                                 (0.3551)                (0.3549) 
     -0.2163 
     (0.3484) 
    -0.2168                  -0.1316 
  (0.3554)                 (0.3341) 
    -0.1251 
   (0.3358) 
Cross-border                            -2.2424                  -2.2766 
                                                 (6.1543)                (5.9213)            
     -2.0126 
    (6.3752) 
                                                  
     
Geographic diversification       -5.8263                 -6.1156 
                                                 (5.4096)                (5.4335) 
Systemic importance                 3.5696                  3.2828 
                                                 (13.3163)              (13.3270) 
Bailout                                     -18.3092*              -18.2874** 
                                                  (6.3014)                (6.1853) 
Real GDP growth                                                   
                                                                               
     -5.4428 
     (5.3572) 
      4.2235 
    (14.4715) 
    -18.5165 
     (6.4098) 
       
      
                      
                   
                      
                 
                   
 
  
Inflation                                                                 
                                                                               
      
 
    
Money  supply  growth                                           
                                                                              
CR5                                                                        
                                                                              
Capital regulatory index                                        
                                                                                           
Official supervisory index                                                      
                                                                                          
Deposit insurer power                                           
                                                                               
Private monitoring index                                                                                            
                                                                              
       
       
       
 
                       
 
 
 
  -2.0533                -2.2360 
  (3.1288)              (3.1794) 
   1.0709                 1.0276 
  (2.8050)              (2.8236) 
   4.7367                 4.4668 
  (7.0276)              (7.0978) 
  -3.8153                -4.0542 
  (4.5912)              (4.6468) 
  
 
 
 
  -2.1823 
  (3.1826) 
   1.1678 
  (2.8372) 
   4.8943 
  (7.0856) 
  -4.1700 
  (4.6785) 
 
Obs.                                             104                       104                      
 
R2                                                                     0.1910                 0.2446 
         
  104 
 
     0.1431                                                                   
  
  100                      100 
  
0.3002 0.3186               
  
100 
 
    0.1827 
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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Table 3A-6   Determinants of Acquirers’ changes of ∆CoVaR for Cross-border M&As 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                            (2) 
                                             Diff(∆CoVaR)         Diff(∆CoVaR)      
                                                         IR                            IR 
                                                DIFFERENCE1    DIFFERENCE5    
                                               Bank-specific        Bank-specific 
                                             Macroeconomic     Macro 
 
         (3)                     
Diff(∆CoVaR)  
 
DISPERSION5 
Bank-specific 
 Macro 
         (4)                              (5) 
Diff(∆CoVaR)         Diff(∆CoVaR) 
           IR                           IR 
        DIFF1                    DIFF5 
  Bank-specific    Bank-specific                               
Deal-specific          Deal-specific                      
Macroeconomic      Macro 
 
 
 
 
 
         
  (6) 
Diff(∆CoVaR) 
 
DISPERSION5 
Bank-specific 
Deal-specific 
DISPERS 
Banking integration                 -12.5263              -27.2012 
                                                 (25.9589)            (51.3988) 
Asset diversity                        -33.1959**           -33.2767** 
                                                 (14.1304)             (14.0762) 
Non-performing loan              -188.203**          -190.0046** 
                                                 (70.0634)             (67.9447) 
Tier 1 Capital                            35.2323                35.5536 
                                                (124.0992)           (124.5881) 
     -0.2192 
     (0.6238) 
    -32.8775** 
    (14.4132) 
  -186.3897** 
    (72.4281) 
     38.7465 
   (126.0179) 
  -10.6058                -25.6634 
 (22.8666)               (46.6979) 
 -32.0317*              -32.1911* 
 (15.0225)               (19.0716) 
-164.4068              -168.3878* 
 (91.5883)               (91.2651) 
  67.0010 67.6245                 
(113.9478)              (113.4784) 
   -0.4514 
  (1.4475) 
 -31.2829* 
 (16.9463) 
-164.1509 
(133.9209) 
71.2415 
(155.7166) 
Ln(TA)                                       1.3009                  1.2056 
                                                  (9.6662)     (9.4989) 
      1.9683 
     (9.8875) 
   -2.2579                  -2.3966 
 (15.1439)               (15.1201) 
   -1.9126 
 (10.6067) 
PB                                              0.2326                  0.2030 
                                                  (3.7038)               (3.6968) 
Moral hazard  index                                               
                                                                               
Liquid ratio                               -12.3871              -12.3922 
                                                  (27.4286)             (26.9487)                      
      0.8561 
     (2.9117) 
        
      
    -13.5265 
(24.3611) 
   -3.6176                   -3.6776 
  (3.3008)                 (3.3537) 
                      
                             
 -22.0884                -21.9864  
 (42.2645)               (41.8719) 
   -3.1374 
  (6.2744) 
    
   
  -22.3819 
  (27.0715) 
Equity-to-asset                           84.7601               86.1828       
                                                 (254.5881)           (256.1492) 
     77.4114 
   (264.5865) 
   12.6685                  13.8146 
(274.4223)               (274.22) 
     0.3779 
  (220.887) 
ROA                                         -124.1365           -146.6594 
                                                 (1180.966)           (1213.877)                    
    -87.8974 
(1220.44) 
  323.6224                299.8667 
(1523.828)             (1554.618) 
   394.7264 
 (958.7018) 
Short-term debt                          35.9371               35.6509 
                                                  (22.9528)             (22.4473)_     
     35.0374 
    (23.2340) 
   22.3167*                22.2389* 
 (12.1275)                (11.9520) 
    20.4059 
  (31.7051) 
Non-interest income                   -7.5007                -7.9223  
                                                   (20.3667)            (19.7683) 
     -7.8181 
    (23.3277) 
    0.2742                   -0.0223 
 (20.4048)               (19.8527) 
    -1.0117 
  (22.4266) 
Z-score                                        -0.2347               -0.2360 
                                                    (0.3356)              (0.3344) 
     -0.2371 
     (0.3182) 
   -0.2220                   -0.2239 
  (0.3700)                 (0.3681) 
    -0.2175 
   (0.2685) 
Cross-border                                             
                                                                           
    -1.1885                   -1.1706 
  (3.6595)                 (3.4449)           
    -1.9497 
 (17.6592)  
Geographic diversification                          
                                                                 
Systemic importance                                
                                                                 
Bailout                                                     
                                                                 
Real GDP growth                       -1.4624               -1.4696              
                                                   (6.4887)              (6.4793)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    -1.5034 
    (6.7223) 
   -5.8033                   -6.0116 
  (4.9283)                 (4.8524) 
  -1.3783                   -1.5044 
 (19.4357)                (19.3659) 
 16.3554***           16.3056*** 
  (2.4531)                 (2.4801) 
  -0.7879                  -0.7887 
  (7.0143)                 (7.0092) 
    -5.6425 
   (8.3446) 
   -1.3981 
  (14.6767) 
   16.8345 
  (13.1158) 
   -0.9151 
   (3.4639) 
Inflation                                      -2.2405               -2.1803              
                                                   (1.2682)              (1.2699)    
  -2.3758* 
    (1.3030) 
   -3.3428**              -3.2833* 
  (1.4756)                 (1.4991) 
    -3.4441 
  (3.1782) 
Money  supply  growth              -0.6747               -0.6884 
                                                   (1.1726)              (1.1938)   
CR5                                                             
                                                                              
Capital regulatory index                                        
                                                                                           
Official supervisory index                                                      
                                                                                          
Deposit insurer power                                           
                                                                               
Private monitoring index                                                                                            
                                                                              
    -0.6359 
    (0.9804) 
       
 
   -0.0663                  -0.0841 
  (1.7887)                 (1.8051) 
   0.0691                    0.0664 
  (0.3446)                 (0.3455) 
    -0.0434 
  (1.0070) 
    0.0773 
  (0.2594) 
 
Obs.                                                  103                    103                      
 
R2                                                                           0.1377                0.1381 
         
103 
 
     0.1360                                                                   
  
  103                          103 
  
0.1740 0.1747                
  
  103 
 
    0.1738 
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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    Table 3A-7  Determinants of Acquirers’ Changes of LTD for M&As in Post-crisis and Pre-crisis Periods 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                Post-crisis           Pre-crisis 
                                                   ∆LTD                 ∆LTD      
                                                 
                                                       No integration     No integration 
                                                                                     
                                                                                                                         
          (3)                       
    Post-crisis 
      ∆LTD  
          IR 
DIFFERENCE1 
        
       (4)                        (5) 
    Pre-crisis           Post-crisis 
       ∆LTD                 ∆LTD 
           IR                            IR 
DIFFERENCE1   DIFFERENCE5              
                                                   
    (6) 
    Pre-crisis 
      ∆LTD 
         IR 
DIFFERENCE5 
Banking integration                                
                                                  
Asset diversity                         -0.0110                 -0.0258* 
                                                 (0.0178)               (0.0134) 
Non-performing loan                0.0175                 -0.1103** 
                                                 (0.0798)               (0.0400) 
Tier 1 Capital                            0.1250                  0.1520 
                                                 (0.1721)               (0.1303) 
     -0.0210*** 
     (0.0029) 
     -0.1099** 
     (0.0431) 
     -0.8985*** 
     (0.1698) 
      0.3075 
     (0.2327) 
   -0.0947                  -0.1672** 
  (0.0798)                (0.0673) 
  -0.0362                  -0.1166** 
  (0.0427)                (0.0436) 
  -0.0978**              -0.9706*** 
  (0.0305)                (0.2110) 
   0.3932 0.2416            (0.2739)                  
(0.1743) 
     -0.2925 
   (0.2091) 
    -0.0377 
   (0.0383) 
    -0.1021* 
    (0.0385) 
0.3055 
    (0.3245) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0199                  0.0104 
                                                 (0.0200)    (0.0101) 
      0.0605* 
     (0.0308) 
    0.0199                   0.0675* 
  (0.0270)                (0.0215) 
      0.0124 
    (0.0288) 
PB                                             0.0067                  0.0049 
                                                 (0.0069)               (0.0049) 
Moral hazard  index                 -0.0059                -0.0082 
                                                 (0.0086)               (0.0072) 
Liquid ratio                              -0.0121                 0.0242 
                                                 (0.0346)               (0.0136)                      
     -0.0210*** 
     (0.0029) 
     -0.0337**  
     (0.0138) 
     -0.1021*** 
(0.0254) 
    0.0102                  -0.0223*** 
  (0.0044)                (0.0043) 
  -0.0178                 -0.0356**        
  (0.0085)                (0.0116)            
   0.0626**              -0.1025***  
  (0.0181)                (0.0215) 
      0.0084 
    (0.0053) 
    -0.0182 
    (0.0082) 
     0.0694** 
    (0.0199) 
Equity-to-asset                         -0.0697                 0.3013       
                                                 (0.2558)               (0.2845) 
      1.1683 
     (0.8216) 
    0.8798                   1.4095 
  (0.4080)                (0.7809) 
      0.9666* 
    (0.3771) 
ROA                                         -0.4868                -1.4665 
                                                 (0.5419)               (1.0293)                    
     -6.8438*** 
(1.7851) 
   -3.3285**              -7.5702*** 
  (0.8584)                (1.6342) 
     -3.7058** 
    (0.8806) 
Short-term debt                         0.0215                 0.0124 
                                                 (0.0358)               (0.0425)    
     -0.0684 
     (0.1140) 
    0.0333                  -0.0596 
  (0.0460)                (0.1092) 
      0.0337 
    (0.0437) 
Non-interest income                 -0.0371                 0.0103  
                                                 (0.0312)               (0.0266) 
     -0.0128 
     (0.0348) 
    0.0272                  -0.0165 
  (0.0626)                (0.0184) 
      0.0387 
    (0.0698) 
Z-score                                      0.0002**             -0.0002 
                                                (0.00007)              (0.0005) 
     -0.0011 
     (0.0010) 
   0.00009                 -0.0013 
  (0.0005)                (0.0010) 
     0.00009 
   (0.00005) 
Cross-border                            -0.0046                 -0.0169 
                                                 (0.0136)               (0.0150)            
     -0.0056 
     (0.0057) 
    0.0474                  -0.0081 
  (0.0576)                (0.0055)          
      0.0460 
    (0.0549) 
Geographic diversification       0.0274**             -0.0127 
                                                 (0.0107)               (0.0107) 
Systemic importance                -0.0102                -0.0101 
                                                 (0.0207)               (0.0210) 
Bailout                                       0.0130                -0.0088 
                                                 (0.0141)               (0.0185) 
Real GDP growth                     -0.0013                -0.0047 
                                                 (0.0040)               (0.0041) 
      0.0029 
     (0.0087) 
      0.0830 
     (0.0620) 
      0.0018 
     (0.0472) 
     -0.0051 
     (0.0102) 
   -0.0068                   0.0031  
  (0.0136)                (0.0075) 
  -0.0328                   0.0730 
  (0.0282)                (0.0613) 
  -0.0290                  -0.0034 
  (0.0349)                (0.0458) 
  -0.0049                  -0.0039 
  (0.0099)                (0.0091) 
     -0.0058 
    (0.0140) 
    -0.0323 
    (0.0297) 
    -0.0277 
    (0.0341) 
    -0.0042 
    (0.0093) 
Inflation                                     0.0130**             0.0030 
                                                 (0.0049)               (0.0033) 
      0.0353*** 
     (0.0038) 
   -0.0066*                 0.0363*** 
  (0.0024)                (0.0027) 
     -0.0054* 
    (0.0019) 
Money  supply  growth            -0.0016                0.00004* 
                                                 (0.0027)              (0.00002) 
CR5                                          -0.0002                -0.0003** 
                                                 (0.0003)               (0.0001) 
Capital regulatory index           0.0015                  0.0010 
                                                 (0.0041)               (0.0033)              
Official supervisory index       -0.0027                 -0.0009                 
                                                 (0.0053)               (0.0022)             
Deposit insurer power               0.0023                 0.0050 
                                                 (0.0156)               (0.0115) 
Private monitoring index         -0.0062                 -0.0061                                                     
                                                 (0.0073)               (0.0051) 
     -0.0036 
     (0.0023) 
      0.0004 
     (0.0003) 
      0.0374*** 
     (0.0021) 
     -0.0237*** 
     (0.0025) 
     -0.0545*** 
     (0.0065) 
     -0.0145 
     (0.0093) 
   0.00001                 -0.0038 
 (0.00001)               (0.0021) 
  -0.0006                  0.0004* 
  (0.0004)                (0.0002) 
  0.00004                  0.0385*** 
  (0.0075)                (0.0013) 
  -0.0019                  -0.0255*** 
  (0.0104)                (0.0029) 
   0.0257*                -0.0566*** 
  (0.0095)                (0.0044) 
  -0.0227                  -0.0147 
  (0.0139)                (0.0084) 
     0.00001 
   (0.00003) 
    -0.0007 
    (0.0004) 
     0.0003 
    (0.0073) 
    -0.0011 
    (0.0095) 
     0.0263* 
    (0.0084) 
    -0.0204 
    (0.0131) 
Obs.                                              106                       101                      
 
R2                                                                      0.2278                  0.2138 
  45 
 
     0.1237                                                                   
    50                          45 
  
0.3790 0.1133                
   50 
 
    0.432 
 
 
     
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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   Table 3A-8   Determinants of Acquirers’ Changes of LTD for M&As in Post-crisis and Pre-crisis Periods 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                Post-crisis           Pre-crisis 
                                                   ∆LTD                 ∆LTD      
                                                  
                                                    DISPERSION5     DISPERSION5 
                                                                                     
                                                                                                                         
          (3)                       
    Post-crisis 
      ∆LTD  
          IR 
DIFFERENCE2 
        
       (4)                        (5) 
    Pre-crisis           Post-crisis 
       ∆LTD                 ∆LTD 
           IR                            IR 
DIFFERENCE2   DISPERSION3             
                                                   
    (6) 
    Pre-crisis 
      ∆LTD 
         IR 
DISPERSION3 
Banking integration                  0.0020***           -0.0006 
                                                 (0.0005)               (0.0034) 
Asset diversity                         -0.0538                -0.0322 
                                                 (0.0333)               (0.0475) 
Non-performing loan               -0.3790                -0.1396 
                                                 (0.0798)               (0.1105) 
Tier 1 Capital                            0.3183                  0.5394 
                                                 (0.2118)               (0.2654) 
     -0.0055 
     (0.0148) 
     -0.0315 
     (0.0451) 
     -0.1358 
     (0.0581) 
      0.5531 
     (0.2105) 
    0.0341                   0.0002 
  (0.0119)                (0.0005) 
  -0.0092                  -0.0565 
  (0.0336)                (0.0436) 
   0.0054                  -0.2647 
  (0.3899)                (0.3821) 
   0.1127 0.1958             (0.1420)                  
(0.1994) 
      0.0001 
    (0.0002) 
    -0.0347 
    (0.0464) 
    -0.1219 
    (0.0518) 
0.5138 
    (0.2500) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0405                  0.0315 
                                                 (0.0266)    (0.0227) 
      0.0328 
     (0.0230) 
    0.0459                   0.0491 
  (0.0141)                (0.0256) 
      0.0279 
    (0.0269) 
PB                                            -0.0029                  0.0120* 
                                                 (0.0078)               (0.0044) 
Moral hazard  index                 -0.0323*              -0.0146 
                                                 (0.0135)               (0.0115) 
Liquid ratio                              -0.0101***            0.0462 
                                                 (0.0229)               (0.0255)                      
      0.0115* 
     (0.0041) 
     -0.0137  
     (0.0088) 
      0.0400** 
(0.0098) 
    0.0086                  -0.0004 
  (0.0081)                (0.0132) 
  -0.0297***            -0.0342**        
  (0.0042)                (0.0105)            
-0.1219***              -0.0997***  
  (0.0205)                (0.0223) 
      0.0107 
    (0.0053) 
    -0.0146 
    (0.0102) 
     0.0479*** 
    (0.0057) 
Equity-to-asset                          0.4680                  0.6545       
                                                 (0.2558)               (0.4056) 
      0.6774* 
     (0.2777) 
    0.5518                   0.6182 
  (0.6868)                (0.9430) 
      0.6781* 
    (0.2684) 
ROA                                         -4.6519*               -2.6114 
                                                 (2.3088)               (1.1375)                    
     -2.8378 
(1.3211) 
   -4.7368**              -5.2129* 
  (1.6412)                (2.3296) 
     -2.7044 
    (1.5674) 
Short-term debt                        -0.1468                  0.0269 
                                                 (0.0962)               (0.0601)    
      0.0304 
     (0.0614) 
   -0.1843                  -0.1600 
  (0.0574)                (0.0877) 
      0.0280 
    (0.0634) 
Non-interest income                 -0.0481**             0.0476  
                                                 (0.0149)               (0.0522) 
      0.0086 
     (0.0503) 
   -0.1002                  -0.0746 
  (0.0186)                (0.0229) 
      0.0176 
    (0.0570) 
Z-score                                     -0.0001                 0.0002 
                                                 (0.0011)               (0.0004) 
      0.0003 
     (0.0005) 
    0.0005                  -0.0001 
  (0.0012)                (0.0010) 
      0.0002 
    (0.0005) 
Cross-border                            -0.0046                  0.0476 
                                                 (0.0136)               (0.0522)            
     -0.0053 
     (0.0118) 
    0.0513                  -0.0081 
  (0.0618)                (0.0055)          
      0.0510 
    (0.0634) 
Geographic diversification       0.0092**             -0.0109 
                                                 (0.0028)               (0.0123) 
Systemic importance                 0.1204                -0.0295 
                                                 (0.0581)               (0.0332) 
Bailout                                       0.0312                -0.0224 
                                                 (0.0437)               (0.0359) 
Real GDP growth                     -0.0086                -0.0059 
                                                 (0.0081)               (0.0117) 
     -0.0101 
     (0.0084) 
     -0.0277 
     (0.0312) 
     -0.0241 
     (0.0400) 
     -0.0061 
     (0.0114) 
    0.0125                   0.0095  
  (0.0035)                (0.0037) 
   0.1129                   0.1191 
  (0.0480)                (0.0482) 
   0.0348                   0.0353 
  (0.0258)                (0.0395) 
  -0.0083                  -0.0037 
  (0.0037)                (0.0104) 
     -0.0116 
    (0.0115) 
    -0.0290 
    (0.0297) 
    -0.0233 
    (0.0405) 
    -0.0051 
    (0.0119) 
Inflation                                     0.0307***          -0.0089 
                                                 (0.0062)               (0.0073) 
     -0.0098 
     (0.0064) 
    0.0291                  0.0313*** 
  (0.0050)                (0.0058) 
     -0.0085 
    (0.0054) 
Money  supply  growth            -0.0004                0.00004 
                                                 (0.0012)              (0.00004) 
CR5                                           0.0008                 -0.0007 
                                                 (0.0001)               (0.0008) 
Capital regulatory index           0.0300                  0.0003 
                                                 (0.0047)               (0.0087)              
Official supervisory index       -0.0149***           -0.0049                 
                                                 (0.0032)               (0.0113)             
Deposit insurer power             -0.0340***            0.0220 
                                                 (0.0066)               (0.0154) 
Private monitoring index         -0.0139                 -0.0268                                                     
                                                 (0.0073)               (0.0142) 
     0.00004 
    (0.00004) 
     -0.0007 
     (0.0005) 
     0.00007 
     (0.0070) 
     -0.0048 
     (0.0091) 
      0.0230 
     (0.0088) 
     -0.0274 
     (0.0142) 
    0.0024                  -0.0013 
  (0.0014)                (0.0012) 
   0.0014***             0.0009* 
  (0.0003)                (0.0002) 
  0.0266***              0.0275** 
  (0.0049)                (0.0093) 
 -0.0102**               -0.0179*** 
  (0.0037)                (0.0289) 
  -0.0168*                -0.0355*** 
  (0.0071)                (0.0076) 
  -0.0130***            -0.0121 
  (0.0030)                (0.0078) 
     0.00004 
   (0.00003) 
    -0.0008 
    (0.0006) 
     0.0001 
    (0.0072) 
    -0.0042 
    (0.0095) 
     0.0235* 
    (0.0078) 
    -0.0263 
    (0.0151) 
Obs.                                               45                        50                      
 
R2                                                                      0.2587                  0.2561 
    45 
 
      0.2593                                                                   
    50                          45 
  
0.2320 0.2941               
    50 
 
     0.2828 
 
 
     
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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          Table 3A-9    Determinants of Acquirers’ Changes of ΔCoVaR for M&As in Post-crisis and Pre-crisis Periods 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                Post-crisis           Pre-crisis 
                                                ∆CoVaR              ∆CoVaR      
                                                
                                                     No integration       No integration 
                                                                                     
                                                                                                                         
          (3)                       
    Post-crisis 
    ∆CoVaR  
          IR 
DIFFERENCE1 
        
       (4)                        (5) 
    Pre-crisis           Post-crisis 
    ∆CoVaR             ∆CoVaR 
           IR                            IR 
DIFFERENCE1   DIFFERENCE5              
                                                   
    (6) 
    Pre-crisis 
    ∆CoVaR 
         IR 
DIFFERENCE5 
Banking integration                                
                                                  
Asset diversity                        -25.3159**             -6.4685 
                                                (10.2654)               (5.1648) 
Non-performing loan              -25.6569             -130.9929*** 
                                               (119.8766)            (36.8054) 
Tier 1 Capital                        -142.7711**           261.3825 
                                                (49.7973)            (111.0577) 
    106.3122* 
     (53.0057) 
     -32.3246 
     (43.6610) 
     2867.684*** 
     (740.748) 
    -515.5343** 
    (148.6457) 
  23.23182               176.9831** 
  (24.1263)               (79.7377) 
  -1.8633                  -39.6380 
  (5.0064)                 (34.8505) 
-144.3412             2820.729*** 
 (83.6337)                (617.0371) 
  538.4478** -409.669**              
(166.1659)              (142.3072) 
     51.1900 
   (66.4694) 
    -1.8540 
    (5.3505) 
  -140.8287 
   (82.8497) 
536.3667** 
   (150.487) 
Ln(TA)                                      2.7329                  8.1377 
                                                 (4.5220)    (7.3692) 
       8.3538 
    (15.6712) 
   -25.9426                   0.2037 
 (29.6812)                (13.8676) 
    -25.4261 
   (28.4931) 
PB                                             5.9145                  4.3662 
                                                 (8.8914)               (2.4499) 
Moral hazard  index                  4.6515                  3.3454 
                                                 (9.1283)                (2.3539) 
Liquid ratio                               7.3635                  -2.8381 
                                                (14.0395)               (8.4895)                      
     64.6736** 
    (22.0260) 
     62.7103***  
     (7.1722) 
    -70.4592* 
(33.8662) 
   -3.5146                  61.1369** 
  (2.5088)                 (18.4703) 
  24.7313***          64.8425***        
  (1.1397)                 (5.7599)            
  -31.4125                -76.0288*  
  (25.5757)                (31.6429) 
     -3.2805 
    (2.1311) 
    24.2646*** 
    (0.7582) 
   -30.7119 
   (24.4061) 
Equity-to-asset                         44.3167                -63.2267       
                                                (62.9364)             (125.9195) 
   -2764.996** 
   (994.0552) 
    87.0802                -2930.18** 
 (202.3463)             (845.7958) 
     84.1014 
  (189.5358) 
ROA                                        120.7145              -289.7285 
                                               (237.1389)            (624.9752)                    
     9406.045** 
(2979.646) 
   -705.394               9706.163** 
 (871.3821)            (2889.446) 
   -666.6198 
  (818.6078) 
Short-term debt                        16.1237                 30.2927 
                                                (11.7280)              (18.4794)    
    -228.3484 
   (148.6457) 
   22.4192*              -232.6215* 
  (9.1660)               (103.1799) 
     22.5623* 
    (8.9904) 
Non-interest income                 -2.6497                -28.5826  
                                                 (9.3758)               (22.9905) 
    -106.059 
    (56.9144) 
 -51.8469***           -93.1066* 
  (6.0096)                (46.7413) 
    -52.2130*** 
    (3.5366) 
Z-score                                      0.0661**              -0.1014 
                                                 (0.0214)                (0.0954) 
      2.1933* 
     (1.0634) 
    0.1721                  2.1790** 
  (0.1746)                (0.8897) 
      0.1615 
    (0.1690) 
Cross-border                            12.1773***           -7.6631 
                                                 (3.0942)                (4.1666)            
     10.0832** 
    (4.1983) 
    24.6615               11.5334** 
  (23.0708)              (5.0204)          
     24.3784 
   (23.3794) 
Geographic diversification       -2.8315                  4.2426 
                                                 (4.0464)                (3.2906) 
Systemic importance                -6.5218                  9.3970 
                                                 (4.4742)                (9.5110) 
Bailout                                      19.4142*               3.6186 
                                                 (9.0631)                (3.4804) 
Real GDP growth                      0.8787                 -5.0857 
                                                 (2.4757)                (3.2148) 
     15.2078 
     (9.3540) 
     98.6684 
    (73.1868) 
    162.6528*** 
    (32.0384) 
     68.5731*** 
     (6.8876) 
    5.7232*                13.3394  
  (2.2498)                 (8.2870) 
  17.6375*               113.514 
  (5.8246)                (67.1977) 
  -6.7365               164.0718*** 
  (8.7710)                (24.8864) 
-13.0115***         -82.3664*** 
  (1.3779)                (10.4186) 
      5.6793* 
    (2.3288) 
    17.1847* 
    (5.7045) 
    -7.2123 
    (8.8583) 
  -12.9626*** 
    (1.4414) 
Inflation                                   -4.8793*                 0.5840 
                                                 (2.2189)                (0.0033) 
    -53.6945*** 
     (5.9966) 
   -7.4326                -53.7977*** 
  (3.6629)                (5.1269) 
     -7.3233 
    (3.4644) 
Money  supply  growth            -0.1922                  0.4312 
                                                 (0.9095)                (0.2355) 
CR5                                           0.3391                  0.1644 
                                                 (0.2409)                (0.1096) 
Capital regulatory index          -9.2594**              2.2514 
                                                 (3.0248)                (1.0335)              
Official supervisory index        5.0710***           -2.8375**                 
                                                 (0.5965)                (1.1474)             
Deposit insurer power              10.7104**            -6.1028* 
                                                 (3.1308)                (2.8031) 
Private monitoring index         -8.3499                 -5.1833*                                                     
                                                 (6.2559)                (2.2602) 
      4.2150* 
     (2.0018) 
      3.2553*** 
     (0.8063) 
     -82.7304*** 
     (12.5390) 
      18.7742** 
      (5.6569) 
      63.8843** 
     (22.1978) 
      -4.4405 
      (9.3651) 
    8.6207***            3.8967** 
  (0.8048)                (1.5669) 
   0.4819                  3.1890*** 
  (0.2247)                (0.7112) 
7.5099**              -82.3664*** 
  (2.0390)                (10.4186) 
   9.9731                 19.2868*** 
  (4.5975)                (5.1093) 
   0.6588                 62.1839** 
  (3.5344)               (22.1766) 
-1.3656                  -3.9200 
  (4.8026)                (8.1800) 
      8.4903*** 
    (0.8485) 
     0.4907 
    (0.2254) 
     7.4300** 
    (1.9898) 
     9.8456 
    (4.4676) 
     0.5793 
    (3.4723) 
    -1.3525 
    (4.4402) 
Obs.                                              107                       105                      
 
R2                                                                      0.2587                  0.2385 
   47 
 
      0.1118                                                                   
    52                          47 
  
0.3712 0.1239               
   52 
 
    0.3707 
 
 
     
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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Table 3A-10    Determinants of Acquirers’ Changes of ΔCoVaR for M&As in Post-crisis and Pre-crisis Periods 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                Post-crisis           Pre-crisis 
                                                 ∆CoVaR             ∆CoVaR      
                                                 
                                                      DISPERSION5     DISPERSION5                                                                                   
                                                                                                                         
          (3)                       
    Post-crisis 
    ∆CoVaR  
          IR 
DIFFERENCE2 
        
       (4)                         (5) 
    Pre-crisis             Post-crisis 
    ∆CoVaR               ∆CoVaR 
           IR                             
DIFFERENCE2 DISPERSION3              
                                                   
    (6) 
    Pre-crisis 
    ∆CoVaR 
 
DISPERSION3 
Banking integration                  0.1738                -1.4708*** 
                                                 (2.5301)               (0.2352) 
Asset diversity                       -102.3215**          -3.2683 
                                               (32.6570)               (7.1436) 
Non-performing loan           2203.078***           166.4583                  
                                                (500.52)               (88.9268) 
Tier 1 Capital                         -380.078               483.4405** 
                                              (199.2634)            (121.3248) 
    -16.0475 
    (14.5787) 
   -123.9404*** 
    (28.3936) 
2107.573*** 
   (474.3855) 
    -412.4303* 
   (189.5607)   
   11.6757**              -0.2315 
  (2.8027)                 (0.7000) 
  -5.2039              -105.7945*** 
  (6.4667)                (25.7747) 
 -119.4039              2110.262**      
(89.6010)               (666.2249) 
441.2334** -383.0560*                
(154.0361)              (192.445) 
      0.1448 
   (0.1234) 
    -5.0337 
   (5.8770) 
  -125.2383 
   (92.9915) 
426.4409 
  (190.3864) 
Ln(TA)                                    19.0938               -30.8053 
                                               (19.0781)             (24.4818) 
     27.2966 
    (25.2003) 
  -31.3784                  19.7463 
 (28.1683)                (16.056) 
    -32.4818 
   (31.1320) 
PB                                           40.8151**            -2.1630 
                                               (15.5761)               (1.4070) 
Moral hazard  index                62.4401***         22.7755*** 
                                                (6.7505)               (1.2453) 
Liquid ratio                            -85.3394**          -15.4015 
                                               (26.0942)             (23.2340)                      
     36.1886** 
    (13.7596) 
     62.3115***  
     (4.8326) 
    -81.0718** 
(29.9444) 
   -3.9981                   37.3493* 
  (1.8350)                (19.1210) 
  20.8223***          65.1936***        
  (1.3487)                (7.3088)            
  -18.6197             -88.3550***  
  (30.5616)             (22.5187) 
     -4.4545 
    (2.5528) 
    21.7542 
    (1.4156) 
   -18.1150 
   (35.2056) 
Equity-to-asset                      -2177.656*             74.6724       
                                               (987.9492)           (180.5839) 
   -1980.746* 
   (849.8798) 
   137.9324             -2047.509 
 (225.9248)           (1088.164) 
    122.8432 
  (221.9797) 
ROA                                       6990.516**          -556.4743 
                                               (2764.264)           (702.9052)                    
    6186.852* 
(2921.593) 
  -661.7572             6785.543* 
 (853.8000)           (2930.386) 
   -650.8082 
  (750.0212) 
Short-term debt                      -157.958               17.7330** 
                                               (84.8660)              (5.1826)    
    -135.929 
   (103.3738) 
   19.9810*             -138.0276 
  (7.4299)              (136.0731) 
     21.5156* 
    (7.3918) 
Non-interest income               -51.2761*           -44.8228***  
                                               (25.4328)              (3.3038) 
    -48.8292 
    (31.9136) 
  -37.2810*              -41.789 
  (5.7437)               (51.2678) 
    -37.7908** 
    (8.7970) 
Z-score                                      1.0740                 0.0517 
                                                 (0.9575)              (0.1732) 
      0.7577 
     (0.8200) 
    0.0813                   0.9875 
  (0.1545)                (0.8270) 
      0.0912 
    (0.1868) 
Cross-border                            -15.3247              18.4777 
                                                 (18.3384)           (20.6690)            
    -17.2354 
    (16.4783) 
    20.7013               -16.3502 
  (19.6811)              (17.4558)          
     21.4279 
   (19.7200) 
Geographic diversification        6.2516                3.6674 
                                                 (7.4081)              (4.7353) 
Systemic importance                85.7208              14.0922* 
                                                 (63.5462)            (4.9888) 
Bailout                                      132.4413***       -5.2754 
                                                 (24.5406)            (11.5780) 
Real GDP growth                    70.4226***         -13.1711*** 
                                                 (6.6893)               (1.7868) 
      5.5624 
     (7.9785) 
     81.0002 
    (60.5140) 
    127.3856*** 
    (20.0230) 
     74.3027*** 
     (3.4004) 
     5.1401                  6.6983  
  (5.1245)                (9.0092) 
   14.4872                74.9806 
   (6.2704)               (89.0382) 
   -6.4714               124.2486** 
   (9.4548)               (39.9390) 
-11.2995***          69.2402*** 
  (1.1835)                (8.4987) 
      4.6969 
    (4.2419) 
    15.7569* 
    (5.8659) 
    -6.6673 
    (9.4456) 
   -11.5052*** 
    (1.3913) 
Inflation                                   -48.3078***         -5.3887 
                                                 (4.8359)               (3.9176) 
     -46.5488*** 
     (5.2189) 
   -5.2010                -47.9066*** 
  (4.6771)                (5.0258) 
     -5.0676 
    (5.5569) 
Money  supply  growth             1.3699                9.0282*** 
                                                 (1.8767)               (1.1489) 
CR5                                           2.8793***           0.3660* 
                                                 (0.6143)               (0.1335) 
Capital regulatory index         -73.9515***          8.1158** 
                                                 (10.6319)             (2.0983)              
Official supervisory index        10.6294              10.3774*                 
                                                  (6.3010)              (4.3542)             
Deposit insurer power               41.1878              -0.2491 
                                                 (23.7521)             (1.8530) 
Private monitoring index          -5.4036                -0.4039                                                     
                                                  (5.4827)               (4.5059) 
     -0.2947 
     (2.1480) 
      2.8289*** 
     (0.5136) 
    -73.8548*** 
     (9.7108) 
      6.5857 
     (4.4534) 
     32.2187 
    (18.5433) 
     -3.9983 
     (2.9431) 
    7.6829***             1.3115 
  (0.9095)                (0.7262) 
   0.4253                   2.8396*** 
  (0.1947)                (0.6732) 
   7.2236**            -71.6698*** 
  (1.9802)                (13.8906) 
   9.9989*                11.0239** 
  (4.0890)                (4.1069) 
   0.7271                  40.0134* 
  (2.0961)                (20.3251) 
  1.3227                  -5.3790 
  (4.7143)                (5.0100) 
      7.8858*** 
    (0.8228) 
     0.3913 
    (0.2663) 
     7.4061** 
    (1.9532) 
    10.0842* 
    (4.1944) 
     0.5371 
    (2.2851) 
     1.1432 
    (5.4366) 
Obs.                                               47                         52                      
 
R2                                                                      0.1822                  0.3064 
    47 
 
      0.1808                                                                   
    52                         47 
  
0.3223 0.1896               
    52 
 
     0.2956 
 
 
     
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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Table 3A-11   Determinants of Acquirers’ Changes of LTD for Cross-border M&As 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                   ∆LTD                  ∆LTD      
                                                         IR                           IR 
                                                     DIFFERENCE3    DIFFERENCE2    
                                                     Full                      Full                                            
          (3)                       
      ∆LTD 
 
DISPERSION3 
         Full                        
        (4)                       (5) 
    ∆LTD                 ∆LTD 
        IR                           IR 
     DIFF3                    DIFF2 
Bank-specific     Bank-specific                    
   (6) 
      ∆LTD  
 
DISPERSION3 
DISPERS
Banking integration                 -0.0778*               -0.0022 
                                                 (0.0451)               (0.0188) 
Asset diversity                         -0.0328                 -0.0266 
                                                 (0.0252)               (0.0264) 
Non-performing loan               -0.0758                 -0.0940 
                                                 (0.1622)               (0.0772) 
Tier 1 Capital                            0.3264*                0.3432** 
                                                 (0.1866)               (0.1339) 
     -0.0003 
     (0.0003) 
     -0.0258 
     (0.0258) 
     -0.0706 
     (0.0556) 
      0.3335** 
     (0.1369) 
 -0.1048**              0.0006 
(0.0433)               (0.0138) 
-0.0431**             -0.0338* 
(0.0185)               (0.0189) 
-0.0590                 -0.0550  
(0.1316)               (0.1369) 
 0.3694** 0.3718**                    
(0.1694)               (0.1784) 
   -0.0004 
  (0.0003) 
  -0.0350* 
  (0.0186) 
  -0.0459 
  (0.1351) 
0.3591** 
  (0.1766) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0397***            0.0397** 
                                                 (0.0145)    (0.0154) 
      0.0382** 
     (0.0153) 
  0.0246***          0.0267*** 
(0.0078)               (0.0083) 
    0.0254*** 
  (0.0080) 
PB                                             0.0122                 0.0147** 
                                                 (0.0082)               (0.0050) 
Moral hazard  index                 -0.0084                -0.0092 
                                                 (0.0108)               (0.0109) 
Liquid ratio                               0.0068                  0.0114 
                                                 (0.0383)               (0.0705)                      
      0.0148** 
     (0.0047) 
     -0.0084  
     (0.0106) 
      0.0087 
(0.0742) 
  0.0026                  0.0054 
(0.0065)               (0.0067) 
                 
  
 -0.0366                -0.0346  
 (0.0256)              (0.0266) 
    0.0062 
  (0.0066) 
 
 
   -0.0337 
   (0.0262) 
Equity-to-asset                         -0.3424                -0.3895       
                                                 (0.2981)               (0.1622) 
     -0.3817* 
     (0.1918) 
  -0.3229                -0.3545 
 (0.2336)              (0.2427) 
    -0.3443 
   (0.2394) 
ROA                                          2.0493                  2.3542 
                                                 (1.2658)               (1.9741)                    
      2.2228 
(1.8626) 
  1.8868**             2.1795** 
 (0.9366)              (0.9635) 
     2.0145** 
   (0.9611) 
Short-term debt                         0.0179                  0.0151 
                                                 (0.0410)               (0.0661)_     
      0.0155 
     (0.0641) 
  -0.0113               -0.0128 
 (0.0305)              (0.0317) 
    -0.0131 
   (0.0312) 
Non-interest income                  0.0014                 0.0054  
                                                 (0.0279)               (0.0121) 
      0.0038 
     (0.0240) 
   0.0079                 0.0106 
 (0.0224)              (0.0234) 
     0.0112 
   (0.0230) 
Z-score                                     -0.0003                -0.0003 
                                                 (0.0005)               (0.0002) 
     -0.0003 
     (0.0001) 
  -0.0001               -0.0002 
 (0.0003)              (0.0003) 
    -0.0001 
   (0.0003) 
Cross-border                             0.0099                  0.0059 
                                                 (0.0283)               (0.0348)            
      0.0073 
     (0.0331) 
    
Geographic diversification        0.0022                 0.0033 
                                                 (0.0117)               (0.0097) 
Systemic importance                -0.0247                -0.0239 
                                                 (0.0222)               (0.0232) 
Bailout                                       0.0031                  0.0066 
                                                 (0.0191)               (0.0175) 
Real GDP growth                     -0.0063                -0.0062 
                                                 (0.0047)               (0.0043) 
      0.0037 
     (0.0066) 
     -0.0241 
     (0.0243) 
      0.0061 
     (0.0190) 
     -0.0064 
     (0.0042) 
    
Inflation                                     0.0040                  0.0037 
                                                 (0.0043)               (0.0034) 
      0.0041 
     (0.0035) 
    
Money  supply  growth            0.00002                0.00002 
                                                (0.00004)             (0.00002) 
CR5                                          -0.0003                 -0.0003 
                                                 (0.0004)               (0.0005) 
Capital regulatory index           0.0063                  0.0074 
                                                 (0.0045)               (0.0057)              
Official supervisory index       -0.0020                 -0.0014                 
                                                 (0.0042)               (0.0037)             
Deposit insurer power               0.0023                  0.0014 
                                                 (0.0094)               (0.0059) 
Private monitoring index         -0.0174**             -0.0177                                                     
                                                 (0.0070)               (0.0103) 
      0.00002 
    (0.00003) 
     -0.0003 
     (0.0006) 
      0.0074 
     (0.0054) 
     -0.0012 
     (0.0040) 
      0.0009 
     (0.0075) 
     -0.0168 
     (0.0112) 
    
      
Obs.                                              95                         95 
 
R2 0.2076 0.2022  
 
   95 
 
     0.2094 
       100                       100 
 
    0.2809                  0.3352 
  100 
 
     0.4290 
 
 
 
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively. 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
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Table 3A-12   Determinants of Acquirers’ Changes of LTD for Cross-border M&As 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                       (2) 
                                                   ∆LTD                 ∆LTD      
                                                         IR                           IR 
                                                     DIFFERENCE3    DIFFERENCE2   
                                               Bank-specific     Bank-specific 
                                                Deal-specific      Deal-specific 
 
         (3)                       
      ∆LTD  
 
DISPERSION2 
Bank-specific 
 Deal-specific 
         (4)                        (5) 
      ∆LTD                  ∆LTD 
           IR                           IR 
        DIFF3                   DIFF2 
   Deal-specific         Deal-specific                                
  Regulatory            Regulatory                               
 
 
 
 
 
         
  (6) 
      ∆LTD 
 
DISPERSION2 
Deal-specific 
DISPERS 
Banking integration                 -0.0933**             -0.0036 
                                                 (0.0433)               (0.0128) 
Asset diversity                         -0.0504***          -0.0419** 
                                                 (0.0188)               (0.0190) 
Non-performing loan               -0.0591                 -0.0101 
                                                 (0.1355)               (0.1395) 
Tier 1 Capital                            0.3540**              0.1747 
                                                 (0.1714)               (0.1698) 
     -0.0003 
     (0.0003) 
     -0.0418** 
     (0.0188) 
      0.0625 
     (0.1145) 
      0.1298 
     (0.1567) 
   -0.0836*                0.0048 
  (0.0435)               (0.0132) 
  -0.0331*               -0.0280 
  (0.0190)               (0.0208) 
  -0.0684                 -0.0863 
  (0.1355)               (0.1437) 
   0.3837** 0.4064**                
(0.1760)                 (0.1812) 
   -0.0022* 
  (0.0013) 
  -0.0326 
  (0.0204) 
  -0.1409 
  (0.1429) 
0.4676** 
  (0.1805) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0349***            0.0218** 
                                                 (0.0107)    (0.0104) 
      0.0227** 
     (0.0102) 
    0.0321***            0.0333*** 
  (0.0107)               (0.0111) 
    0.0311*** 
  (0.0109) 
PB                                             0.0035                  0.0038 
                                                 (0.0070)               (0.0069) 
Moral hazard  index                                               
                                                                               
Liquid ratio                              -0.0309                  0.0073 
                                                 (0.0262)               (0.0250)                      
      0.0072 
     (0.0063) 
        
      
      0.0075 
(0.0248) 
    0.0063                  0.0092 
  (0.0070)               (0.0072) 
   0.0021                  0.0009 
  (0.0073)               (0.0084)            
  -0.0155                 -0.0145  
  (0.0296)               (0.0308) 
    0.0065 
  (0.0072) 
   0.0003 
  (0.0082) 
  -0.0109 
  (0.0301) 
Equity-to-asset                         -0.3682                -0.3301       
                                                 (0.2363)               (0.2440) 
     -0.3040 
     (0.2397) 
   -0.3669                 -0.4060 
  (0.2709)               (0.2804) 
   -0.4632* 
  (0.2732) 
ROA                                          2.6100                  1.9655** 
                                                 (0.9978)               (0.9866)                    
      1.6982* 
(0.9672) 
    1.9022*                2.0880** 
  (0.9871)               (1.0187) 
    1.9525** 
  (0.9993) 
Short-term debt                         0.0123                  0.0205 
                                                 (0.0332)               (0.0334)_     
      0.0235 
     (0.0332) 
    0.0127                  0.0104 
  (0.0338)               (0.0356) 
    0.0046 
  (0.0350) 
Non-interest income                  0.0002                 -0.0065  
                                                 (0.0226)               (0.0227) 
     -0.0081 
     (0.0221) 
    0.0120                  0.0160 
  (0.0238)               (0.0246) 
    0.0166 
  (0.0240) 
Z-score                                     -0.0003                -0.0001 
                                                 (0.0003)               (0.0003) 
      0.00001 
     (0.0003) 
   -0.0002                 -0.0001 
  (0.0004)               (0.0004) 
   -0.0002 
  (0.0004) 
Cross-border                            -0.0119                 -0.0044 
                                                 (0.0246)               (0.0194)            
     -0.0015 
     (0.0192) 
                                                  
     
Geographic diversification       0.0009                  0.0056 
                                                 (0.0091)               (0.0089) 
Systemic importance               -0.0360**             -0.0311** 
                                                 (0.0154)               (0.0149) 
Bailout                                       0.0095                 0.0151 
                                                 (0.0132)               (0.0114) 
Real GDP growth                                                   
                                                                               
      0.0065 
     (0.0086) 
     -0.0306** 
     (0.0148) 
      0.0135 
     (0.0113) 
       
      
                      
                   
                      
                 
                   
 
  
Inflation                                                                 
                                                                               
      
 
    
Money  supply  growth                                           
                                                                              
CR5                                                                        
                                                                              
Capital regulatory index                                        
                                                                                           
Official supervisory index                                                      
                                                                                          
Deposit insurer power                                           
                                                                               
Private monitoring index                                                                                            
                                                                              
       
       
       
 
                       
 
 
 
   0.0048                 0.0060 
  (0.0037)              (0.0038) 
   0.0005                 0.0014 
  (0.0033)              (0.0034) 
   0.0021                 0.0011 
  (0.0080)              (0.0083) 
  -0.0131**           -0.0131** 
  (0.0052)              (0.0054) 
  
 
 
 
   0.0048 
  (0.0038) 
   0.0003 
  (0.0033) 
  -0/0021 
  (0.0082) 
  -0.0131** 
  (0.0053) 
 
Obs.                                             100                       100                      
 
R2                                                                     0.2833                  0.2601 
         
  100 
 
     0.2561                                                                   
  
  96                        96 
  
0.3713 0.5082              
  
 96 
 
    0.3686 
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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    Table 3A-13   Determinants of Acquirers’ changes of LTD for Cross-border M&As 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                        (2) 
                                                   ∆LTD                   ∆LTD      
                                                         IR                            IR 
                                                     DIFFERENCE3    DIFFERENCE2    
                                               Bank-specific     Bank-specific 
                                             Macroeconomic  Macro 
 
         (3)                       
      ∆LTD  
 
DISPERSION3 
Bank-specific 
 Macro 
         (4)                        (5) 
      ∆LTD                  ∆LTD 
           IR                           IR 
        DIFF3                   DIFF2 
   Bank-specific         Bank-specific                                
 Deal-specific          Deal-specific                      
Macroeconomic      Macro 
 
 
 
 
 
         
  (6) 
      ∆LTD 
 
DISPERSION3 
  Bank-specific 
  Deal-specific 
DISPERS 
Banking integration                 -0.1014**             -0.0015 
                                                 (0.0431)               (0.0249) 
Asset diversity                         -0.0369*               -0.0362* 
                                                 (0.0187)               (0.0173) 
Non-performing loan               -0.1104                 -0.0536 
                                                 (0.1345)               (0.0825) 
Tier 1 Capital                            0.3582**              0.3359** 
                                                 (0.1762)               (0.1495) 
     -0.0004 
     (0.0004) 
     -0.0368* 
     (0.0183) 
     -0.0257 
     (0.0728) 
      0.3207* 
     (0.1537) 
   -0.1008**             -0.0015 
  (0.0447)               (0.0249) 
  -0.0444**            -0.0362* 
  (0.0200)               (0.0172) 
  -0.0384                -0.0536 
  (0.1571)               (0.0824) 
   0.3311* 0.3359**                
(0.1806)                 (0.1495) 
   -0.0004 
  (0.0003) 
  -0.0368* 
  (0.0202) 
  -0.0257 
  (0.1626) 
0.3207* 
  (0.1857) 
Ln(TA)                                      0.0255***            0.0382* 
                                                 (0.0080)    (0.0174) 
      0.0385** 
     (0.0151) 
    0.0392***            0.0382* 
  (0.0127)               (0.0174) 
    0.0385*** 
  (0.0130) 
PB                                             0.0048                  0.0065 
                                                 (0.0066)               (0.0054) 
Moral hazard  index                                               
                                                                               
Liquid ratio                              -0.0304                -0.0316 
                                                 (0.0257)               (0.0357)                      
      0.0074 
     (0.0055) 
        
      
     -0.0333 
(0.0370) 
    0.0049                  0.0065 
  (0.0073)               (0.0055) 
                      
                             
  -0.0380                 -0.0316  
  (0.0288)               (0.0357) 
    0.0074 
  (0.0075) 
    
   
   -0.0333 
   (0.0295) 
Equity-to-asset                         -0.2900                -0.3310*       
                                                 (0.2448)               (0.1513) 
     -0.3133 
     (0.1834) 
   -0.2799                 -0.3310* 
  (0.2611)               (0.1513) 
    -0.3133 
   (0.2673) 
ROA                                          1.7935                 2.6659 
                                                 (1.0805)               (1.9515)                    
      2.4317 
(1.7914) 
    2.2694*                2.6659 
  (1.1807)               (1.9515) 
     2.4317** 
   (1.2140) 
Short-term debt                        -0.0184                -0.0009 
                                                 (0.0312)               (0.0404)_     
      0.0005 
     (0.0380) 
    0.0016                 -0.0009 
  (0.0366)               (0.0404) 
     0.0005 
   (0.0375) 
Non-interest income                 -0.0095                -0.0114  
                                                 (0.0241)               (0.0200) 
     -0.0112 
     (0.0194) 
   -0.0159                 -0.0114 
  (0.0260)               (0.0200) 
    -0.0112 
   (0.0266) 
Z-score                                     -0.0001                -0.0003 
                                                 (0.0003)               (0.0002) 
     -0.0002 
     (0.0002) 
   -0.0002                 -0.0003 
  (0.0003)               (0.0002) 
    -0.0002 
   (0.0003) 
Cross-border                                             
                                                                           
    -0.0115                 -0.0168 
  (0.0259)               (0.0203)           
    -0.0142 
   (0.0266)  
Geographic diversification                          
                                                                 
Systemic importance                                
                                                                 
Bailout                                                     
                                                                 
Real GDP growth                     -0.0039               -0.0027              
                                                 (0.0033)              (0.0031)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    -0.0027 
    (0.0030) 
    0.0033                  0.0035 
  (0.0098)               (0.0112) 
  -0.0272                 -0.0283 
  (0.0184)               (0.0196) 
  -0.0007                  0.0065 
  (0.0158)               (0.0172) 
  -0.0033                 -0.0027 
  (0.0038)               (0.0031) 
     0.0036 
   (0.0100) 
   -0.0292 
   (0.0189) 
    0.0047 
   (0.0159) 
   -0.0027 
   (0.0039) 
Inflation                                     0.0044                0.0031              
                                                 (0.0035)              (0.0048)    
     0.0035 
    (0.0045) 
    0.0035                  0.0031 
  (0.0039)               (0.0048) 
     0.0035 
   (0.0040) 
Money  supply  growth            0.00001              0.00001 
                                                (0.00001)            (0.00001)   
CR5                                                             
                                                                              
Capital regulatory index                                        
                                                                                           
Official supervisory index                                                      
                                                                                          
Deposit insurer power                                           
                                                                               
Private monitoring index                                                                                            
                                                                              
    0.00001 
   (0.00001) 
       
 
    0.00001               0.00001 
  (0.00001)            (0.00001) 
   0.0003                  0.0002 
  (0.0003)               (0.0002) 
     0.00001 
  (0.00001) 
    0.0002 
   (0.0003) 
 
Obs.                                              99                        99                      
 
R2                                                                     0.1651                0.1386 
         
    99 
 
     0.1358                                                                   
  
  99                         99 
  
0.1535 0.1386              
  
  99 
 
    0.1358 
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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Table 3A-14   Determinants of Acquirers’ changes of ∆CoVaR for Cross-border M&As 
 
 
Variable                                         (1)                           (2) 
                                                  Diff(∆CoVaR)       Diff(∆CoVaR)      
                                                              IR                           IR 
                                                   DIFFERENCE3    DIFFERENCE2   
                                                          Full                       Full                                                
          (3)                         
Diff(∆CoVaR)     
 
DISPERSION3 
         Full 
       (4)                           (5) 
 Diff(∆CoVaR)      Diff(∆CoVaR)                     
          IR                          IR 
       DIFF3                   DIFF2 
  Bank-specific       Bank-specific                            
     (6) 
Diff(∆CoVaR)                     
 
DISPERSION3 
DISPERS
Banking integration            -59.5039***            1.4252 
                                             (20.4261)              (3.5951) 
Asset diversity                    -24.1939                -28.8975 
                                            (16.5158)              (20.5827) 
Non-performing loan         -164.4337*            -150.8862 
                                            (86.1474)             (100.1693) 
Tier 1 Capital                       41.0434                 25.4569 
                                            (148.895)             (168.8248) 
       -0.1202  
      (0.1864) 
      -28.5909 
     (19.6758) 
     -140.4985 
     (110.1975) 
       20.4151 
     (171.0785) 
  -48.3081**            -6.7817** 
  (16.7708)             (2.8748) 
-25.9490**            -31.4965** 
  (9.4554)              (11.5497) 
-158.00***          -164.705*** 
 (46.7210)             (48.9562) 
  -6.9668      -9.8085              
(61.1530)              (64.3022) 
    -0.1245 
  (0.1608) 
  -31.1944** 
  (11.6879) 
  -155.925*** 
  (41.4260) 
-10.3745 
  (62.3407) 
Ln(TA)                                 -5.0092                 -5.7832 
                                            (16.5231)              (18.5501) 
       -6.3149 
      (18.2928) 
    5.2104                 3.2612 
  (9.0213)              (7.4138) 
      3.7063 
   (7.5943) 
PB                                         4.0154                  5.8162** 
                                             (3.2063)               (2.5158) 
Moral hazard  index            -13.1048*             -14.2081* 
                                             (6.3537)               (6.9696) 
Liquid ratio                         -16.5120               -18.1759 
                                            (33.5009)             (32.3794)                      
        5.7740** 
       (2.4087) 
       -14.5477* 
       (7.6256) 
       -19.1656 
(35.1744) 
    1.6990                 0.2390 
  (2.0919)              (2.7795) 
   
   
  -21.4112              -23.0252 
  (25.2657)            (24.0839) 
      0.6758 
   (2.3717) 
   
   
   -22.9635 
   (22.3879) 
Equity-to-asset                   -133.4948              -85.8737       
                                           (457.5966)            (467.6245) 
       -83.1382 
       (459.093) 
   -128.7379           -130.7129 
  (1138.157)          (124.2224) 
   -141.3745 
  (128.2669) 
ROA                                    1196.876               1012.712 
                                           (1994.146)            (2025.257)                    
       970.3391 
(1978.345) 
    -593.092              -705.95 
   (931.912)           (873.5872) 
   -747.6984 
  (878.4103) 
Short-term debt                    29.1375*             31.6902** 
                                            (10.7079)             (11.8411)_     
      31.9044** 
      (11.6517) 
     29.8040               28.7219 
   (23.3830)            (20.2579) 
     29.5305 
   (20.3839) 
Non-interest income             1.3384                 -1.3940  
                                            (19.1519)             (20.7438) 
      -1.9941 
      (20.8827) 
     -4.6730                -6.3853 
   (13.1957)            (12.1451) 
     -4.8415 
   (12.2400) 
Z-score                                -0.2048                 -0.1285 
                                             (0.3433)               (0.3294) 
      -0.1001 
      (0.3491) 
     -0.2698                -0.2502 
    (0.2889)              (0.3190) 
     -0.2419 
    (0.3212) 
Cross-border                         5.3764                  6.7150 
                                             (4.8644)               (5.3976)            
       6.8809 
      (5.6196) 
    
Geographic diversification  -4.4097                 -3.6641 
                                             (5.8397)               (5.0705) 
Systemic importance           -0.2923                  0.2474 
                                            (11.8135)             (15.0854) 
Bailout                                -25.7700**           -23.7069** 
                                             (8.9643)               (8.1230) 
Real GDP growth                  2.7406                 2.8866 
                                             (6.4379)               (7.1506) 
      -3.3699 
      (4.5154) 
      -0.0993 
     (15.6199) 
   -23.6848*** 
      (7.2948) 
       2.7897 
      (7.0730) 
    
Inflation                                -8.7635*             -8.5986* 
                                             (4.4920)               (4.3327) 
      -8.3912* 
      (4.3745) 
    
Money  supply  growth         1.7545                 1.4475 
                                             (1.2089)               (1.1601) 
CR5                                       0.1334                 0.1482 
                                             (0.3839)               (0.4527) 
Capital regulatory index      -4.5294                -5.2509 
                                             (3.2397)               (4.1904)              
Official supervisory index   -5.2083                -4.8871                 
                                             (4.3680)               (3.9640)             
Deposit insurer power          14.9017               15.2312 
                                            (13.6718)             (13.3692) 
Private monitoring index     -5.1164                 -5.2164                                                     
                                             (4.4714)               (4.3831) 
       1.4306 
      (1.3290) 
       0.1687 
      (0.4794) 
      -5.2281 
      (4.0619) 
      -4.9436 
      (4.1143) 
      14.9081 
     (13.1854) 
      -4.7450 
      (4.2724) 
    
      
Obs.                                          99                          99 
 
R2                                         0.2848                              0.2588  
 
     99 
 
       0.2609 
       104                        104 
 
    0.1170                   0.1015 
   104 
 
      0.1002 
 
 
 
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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    Table 3A-15   Determinants of Acquirers’ Changes of ∆CoVaR for Cross-border M&As 
 
 
Variable                                      (1)                            (2) 
                                              Diff(∆CoVaR)         Diff(∆CoVaR) 
                                                         IR                              IR 
                                                DIFFERENCE3     DIFFERENCE2    
                                               Bank-specific         Bank-specific 
                                                Deal-specific         Deal-specific 
 
         (3)                
Diff(∆CoVaR) 
 
DISPERSION3 
Bank-specific 
 Deal-specific 
            (4)                            (5) 
Diff(∆CoVaR)          Diff(∆CoVaR) 
           IR                           IR 
        DIFF3                    DIFF2 
   Deal-specific         Deal-specific                                
  Regulatory            Regulatory                               
 
 
 
 
 
         
     (6) 
Diff(∆CoVaR) 
 
DISPERSION3 
Deal-specific 
DISPERS 
Banking integration           -56.7726**             -9.3667* 
                                            (18.5652)              (4.9461) 
Asset diversity                   -21.6984*              -28.7802* 
                                            (11.0520)             (13.7977) 
Non-performing loan         -156.8147**        -166.8325** 
                                            (53.1540)             (53.8130) 
Tier 1 Capital                      39.0420                 34.4358 
                                           (49.5517)              (49.7954) 
      -0.1016 
      (0.1672) 
     -27.7038* 
     (13.3983) 
 -154.3871*** 
     (45.3912) 
      32.8641 
     (51.3942) 
  -45.3206***            -6.4892 
  (13.9335)              (11.7536) 
  -13.7667                -20.8833 
  (11.5525)               (18.1425) 
-181.3229***         -190.4527 
  (48.7794)              (126.6472) 
   -8.4969                 -20.0417 
  (96.0741)              (157.9510) 
   -0.0946 
  (0.2185) 
 -20.2944** 
  (8.7991) 
-180.0934*** 
 (41.0249) 
 -24.2626 
(111.9469) 
Ln(TA)                                -2.4549                 -4.1118 
                                            (9.5110)                (9.5883) 
      -3.6160 
      (9.8164) 
    -3.5103                  -2.5168 
  (12.4036)                (9.3606) 
   -2.3979 
 (13.4845) 
PB                                       -2.2300                 -3.6379 
                                            (2.2579)                (3.7037) 
Moral hazard  index                                               
                                                                               
Liquid ratio                        -21.9002               -25.0000 
                                           (27.2195)             (25.8223)                      
      -3.1965 
      (3.0310) 
        
      
     -24.3183 
(26.2488) 
    -0.6320                  -2.1010 
   (1.1028)                 (6.2960) 
   12.0835                  11.2841 
   (8.3847)                 (7.2656)            
   -7.3133                   -7.9427  
  (26.2579)               (25.8968) 
   -1.7510 
  (1.9595) 
  11.4689** 
  (5.0106) 
   -9.0844 
  (25.8838) 
Equity-to-asset                  -51.2348                -56.8037       
                                          (147.3661)            (121.7495) 
      72.7306 
    (133.2628) 
    74.9104 81.7582      
(372.7551)              (238.7865) 
  104.8406 
 (384.7411) 
ROA                                  -123.7043             -293.5339 
                                          (1100.543)            (1008.306)                    
    -343.6922 
(1039.67) 
  -365.3083               -471.0617 
 (1775.898)              (850.2559) 
  -529.4548 
  (1752.82) 
Short-term debt                  14.4293**            13.9577*** 
                                           (6.0218)                (3.3012)_     
    14.6660*** 
      (3.5195) 
    59.3956**              52.9300* 
  (22.3865)               (30.5680) 
   53.3549** 
  (19.0964) 
Non-interest income           -0.5372                 -2.2692  
                                           (12.0103)             (12.0601) 
      -0.6166 
     (11.8419) 
    -6.6509                   -9.0642 
  (13.7060)               (21.0934) 
    -8.0935 
  (14.9009) 
Z-score                               -0.2412                 -0.2194 
                                           (0.3368)                (0.3593) 
      -0.2091 
      (0.3587) 
    -0.2168                   -0.0998 
   (0.3554)                 (0.3380) 
    -0.0747 
   (0.3726) 
Cross-border                      -3.3282                 -1.8413 
                                           (7.2576)                (6.1582)            
      -1.5179 
      (6.3312) 
                                                  
     
Geographic diversification -5.3893                 -6.4345 
                                           (5.7725)                (5.6700) 
Systemic importance          3.7137                   3.1061 
                                          (13.1310)              (13.7395) 
Bailout                              -20.3151**            -18.5272** 
                                           (6.8842)                (6.3008) 
Real GDP growth                                                   
                                                                               
      -5.3698 
      (5.3555) 
       4.2256 
     (13.6995) 
     -18.2027** 
      (6.2402) 
       
      
                      
                   
                      
                 
                   
 
  
Inflation                                                                 
                                                                               
      
 
    
Money  supply  growth                                           
                                                                              
CR5                                                                        
                                                                              
Capital regulatory index                                        
                                                                                           
Official supervisory index                                                      
                                                                                          
Deposit insurer power                                           
                                                                               
Private monitoring index                                                                                            
                                                                              
       
       
       
 
                       
 
 
 
  -1.3157                   -2.2476 
  (1.3064)                 (3.1913) 
   1.5636                    1.1743 
  (3.7019)                 (2.8155) 
   4.4268                    4.5832 
  (9.2853)                 (7.0938) 
  -4.6614                   -4.6819 
  (4.6238)                 (4.7320) 
  
 
 
 
  -2.1238 
  (1.2508) 
   1.3962 
  (3.6736) 
   5.2176 
  (9.3596) 
  -4.4805 
  (5.3751) 
 
Obs.                                        104                      104                      
 
R2                                                            0.1694                  0.1504 
         
        104 
 
     0.1448                                                                   
  
  100                        100 
  
0.1834 0.2143                
  
100 
 
    0.1741 
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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      Table 3A-16   Determinants of Acquirers’ Changes of ∆CoVaR for Cross-border M&As 
 
 
Variable                                    (1)                            (2) 
                                             Diff(∆CoVaR)         Diff(∆CoVaR)      
                                                         IR                            IR 
                                                DIFFERENCE3    DIFFERENCE2    
                                               Bank-specific        Bank-specific 
                                             Macroeconomic     Macro 
 
         (3)                     
Diff(∆CoVaR)  
 
DISPERSION3 
Bank-specific 
 Macro 
         (4)                             (5) 
Diff(∆CoVaR)         Diff(∆CoVaR) 
           IR                           IR 
        DIFF3                    DIFF2 
  Bank-specific      Bank-specific                               
Deal-specific          Deal-specific                      
Macroeconomic      Macro 
 
 
 
 
 
         
     (6) 
Diff(∆CoVaR) 
 
DISPERSION3 
Bank-specific 
Deal-specific 
DISPERS 
Banking integration            43.2049**            -9.4733 
                                           (16.4775)              (5.7048) 
Asset diversity                   -28.5037**           -34.1871** 
                                           (11.7341)             (14.7862) 
Non-performing loan        -183.1273**        -189.8236** 
                                           (67.4869)             (73.0163) 
Tier 1 Capital                      36.9809                33.1293 
                                          (114.6209)           (127.8219) 
     -0.0835 
     (0.1732) 
    -33.4080** 
    (14.0220) 
   -180.9251** 
    (70.7299) 
     35.6457 
   (125.5143) 
  -53.4079**             -9.7832 
 (19.5721)               (7.7011) 
 -26.1977**            -33.4296* 
 (11.6746)              (16.3517) 
-160.4366*           -169.8654* 
 (79.3650)              (88.5356) 
  71.5448 65.7296                 
(100.6406)              (116.1546) 
   -0.1036 
  (0.1992) 
 -32.0621* 
 (15.2232) 
-150.4983 
 (88.9593) 
64.7625 
(120.3234) 
Ln(TA)                                -3.1821                -0.9012 
                                           (10.6667)              (8.8116) 
      1.8589 
     (9.2664) 
   -1.2449                   -2.8301 
 (13.2367)               (14.5568) 
   -1.5830 
 (14.5568) 
PB                                        1.9744                  0.6001 
                                            (2.4877)               (3.4231) 
Moral hazard  index                                               
                                                                               
Liquid ratio                        -13.4488              -13.0916 
                                           (25.6194)             (23.1697)                      
      0.9500 
     (2.7150) 
        
      
    -14.5561 
(24.5420) 
   -2.2476                   -3.2951 
  (2.4760)                 (3.3365) 
                      
                             
 -22.1940                -22.2544  
 (39.1181)               (35.7555) 
   -3.0615 
  (2.7548) 
    
   
  -24.8700 
  (40.3969) 
Equity-to-asset                  -70.6804                76.6524 
                                          (255.5038)           (246.2924) 
     81.5010 
   (251.4015) 
  -14.0249                 -1.6375 
(287.6095)             (253.8935) 
   -10.5068 
 (270.0053) 
ROA                                  -26.2063              -149.5992 
                                          (1203.826)            (1150.19)                    
    -145.869 
(1171.253) 
  499.7028                296.7189 
(1579.718)             (1455.225) 
   308.0298 
 (1447.401) 
Short-term debt                  35.0984                35.3324 
                                          (24.3961)              (32.0293)_     
     35.4590 
    (22.4125) 
   20.0836                  22.7288* 
 (12.2976)               (11.2902) 
    21.3404* 
  (11.1682) 
Non-interest income           -6.8306                 -9.5315  
                                          (22.4947)               (20.166) 
     -6.6823 
    (21.6539) 
    1.8529                   -1.2383 
 (20.9268)               (20.0905) 
     0.7223 
  (21.0460) 
Z-score                               -0.2578                 -0.2370 
                                           (0.3089)                (0.3367) 
     -0.2352 
     (0.3326) 
   -0.2530                   -0.2323 
  (0.3581)                 (0.3675) 
    -0.2154 
   (0.3715) 
Cross-border                                             
                                                                           
    -2.6291                   -0.5228 
  (4.9200)                 (3.1273)           
    -0.5840 
   (3.1516)  
Geographic diversification                          
                                                                 
Systemic importance                                
                                                                 
Bailout                                                     
                                                                 
Real GDP growth               -1.5882                 -1.4028              
                                           (6.5160)                (6.4827)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    -1.4484 
    (6.5241) 
   -5.9050                   -6.4556 
  (5.7321)                 (5.1708) 
  -1.5858                   -2.2276 
 (19.2369)               (19.2535) 
-19.3857***          -16.4881*** 
  (3.2351)                 (2.8867) 
  -0.7126                   -0.6378 
  (6.7888)                 (7.0470) 
    -5.4616 
   (5.0347) 
   -1.5629 
  (20.3082) 
 -16.3304*** 
   (2.4847) 
   -0.8795 
   (7.0448) 
Inflation                              -2.2095                 -2.0714              
                                           (1.2287)                (1.1815)    
    -2.3709* 
    (1.1839) 
   -3.4471**              -3.2194** 
  (1.3425)                 (1.3490) 
    -3.4031** 
   (1.2775) 
Money  supply  growth      -0.5175                 -0.8066 
                                           (0.9953)                (1.1499)   
CR5                                                             
                                                                              
Capital regulatory index                                        
                                                                                           
Official supervisory index                                                      
                                                                                          
Deposit insurer power                                           
                                                                               
Private monitoring index                                                                                            
                                                                              
    -0.5761 
    (1.0175) 
       
 
    0.1502                   -0.2199 
  (1.6225)                 (1.7458) 
   0.0577                    0.0510 
  (0.3072)                 (0.3340) 
    -0.0568 
   (1.6858) 
    0.0926 
   (0.3484) 
 
Obs.                                        103                      103                      
 
R2                                                             0.1603                 0.1429 
         
        103 
 
     0.1369                                                                   
  
  103                          103 
  
0.2830 0.2167                
  
  103 
 
    0.2626 
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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4.1   Introduction 
Since the 2007-2009 U.S. Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis (SDC), major central banks utilized both expansionary conventional (e.g. interest rate 
changes and required reserve ratio changes) and unconventional (e.g. quantitative easing, (QE)) 
monetary policy instruments to lower the systemic risk and restore the financial stability of 
banking systems. The response to the 2007-2009 U.S. GFC and the European SDC led to 
historically low policy rates in most advanced economies. In the U.S., the Federal Funds target 
rate reached the zero lower bound in December 2008 and the Fed subsequently adopted 
unconventional monetary policy instruments by using three rounds of QEs. In the Euro Area, 
on 16 March 2016, the European Central Bank (ECB) announced that it would lower the main 
refinancing operations (MRO) rate to 0 and the marginal lending facility (MLF) to 0.25%. 
Meanwhile, the ECB increased its monthly bond purchases from €60 billion per month to €80 
billion per month and included more eligible assets into the program. Indeed, the conventional 
and unconventional monetary policy instruments of major central banks had played a key role 
in reducing systemic risk and maintaining financial stability of banking systems. Deev and 
Hodula (2015) illustrated that both SRISK and Systemic Risk Stress Index for Eurozone 
reached two peaks in 2009 and 2012 but declined significantly immediate (i.e. very short-term) 
after the ECB adopted both expansionary conventional and unconventional monetary policy 
instruments.   
Meanwhile, this topic attracts attention in the academic research as well. First, some previous 
studies (Fratzsher et al. 2014; Chodorow-Reich et al. 2014; Di Maggio et al. 2016; Faia and 
Karau 2018) assessed only the impacts of monetary policy changes on banks’ credit risk and 
systemic risk measures in short-run while others (Delis et al. 2010; Borio and Zhu 2012; 
Jimenez et al. 2014) examined the effects of monetary policy changes on banks’ credit and 
systemic risk-taking behaviors in long-term. In addition, only two studies (Deev and Hodula 
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2015; Lamers et al. 2016) investigated both research questions.  
Second, a large quantity of past literature (Gambocorta 2009; Delis 2010; De Nicolo 2010; 
Fratzscher et al. 2014; Brissmis and Delis 2010; Chodorow-Reich et al. 2014; Di Maggio et al. 
2016; Lamers et al. 2016; Faia and Karau 2018) investigated the channels through which 
monetary policy is expected to affect banks’ risk-taking behaviors. For example, Chodorow-
Reich et al. (2014) discussed the real spending channel, reaching for yield channel, general 
equilibrium channel and leverage channel while Fratzscher et al. (2014) analyzed confidence 
channel, bank credit risk channel, sovereign credit risk channel and international portfolio 
channel.  
Third, two recent studies (Brissimis and Delis 2010; Lamers et al. 2016) examined the 
heterogeneous response of EU banks’ risk-taking behaviors towards monetary policy changes. 
Brissmis and Delis (2010) concluded that the impact of a monetary policy change on banks’ 
risk-taking behaviors will decrease (increase) with higher (lower) levels of bank liquidity, 
capital and market power. Lamers et al. (2019) found that the expansionary monetary policy 
shock reduces systemic risk more for banks with higher asset risk.  
This study contributes to existing literature in several ways. First, most previous studies 
(Kuttner 2001; Bernanke and Kuttner 2005; Kontonikas and Kostakis 2013; Kontonikas et al. 
2013; Yin and Yang 2013; Ricci 2015; Haitsma et al. 2016) emphasized on the impacts of Fed’s 
and the ECB’s monetary policy changes on banks’ stock returns rather than banks’ systemic 
risk measures. There are only a few past literature (Deev and Hodula 2015; Lamers et al. 2016; 
Faia and Karau 2018) that focus on the impacts of monetary policy changes on banks’ systemic 
risk. Therefore, this study contributes to existing literature by providing a new study using new 
updated data. Second, Kontonikas et al. (2013) argued that the responses towards conventional 
monetary policy changes were asymmetric and state dependent. They indicated that the impacts 
of monetary policy changes on stock returns are different in crisis and non-crisis periods. 
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However, there is no previous study that examines whether there are different impacts of 
monetary policy changes on banks’ systemic risk in crisis and non-crisis periods. This study 
extends the current literature to assess whether the ECB’s monetary policies have different 
impacts on banks’ systemic risk changes in crisis and non-crisis periods.  
This chapter aims to (1) investigate the impact of ECB’s expansionary monetary policy on 
banks’ systemic risk in euro area countries; (2) examine the heterogeneity of banks response 
towards monetary policy changes. Therefore, the research questions for this chapter are:  
What are the impacts of the ECB’s monetary policies on banks’ systemic risk?  
Is there any heterogeneous response of banks towards monetary policy changes?  
What are key bank-specific variables that can affect banks’ systemic risk if the ECB 
implements the expansionary monetary policies? 
In this chapter, to find the solution of research question 1, we will first collect monthly systemic 
risk data (LRMES and SRISK) of 54 banks in euro area countries between September 2004 
and March 2017. Second, we will focus on calculating monthly monetary policy shocks. We 
first use Taylor-rule type model to calculate standard Taylor rule residuals, and then collect the 
ECB shadow rate. Thirdly, we collect the ECB monthly total asset data and calculate the log 
difference of the ECB monthly total asset. We will investigate whether systemic risk measures 
of euro area banks increase or decrease when ECB implements the expansionary monetary 
policy. To find the answer of research question 2, we include the interaction terms between 
several bank-specific variable and corresponding monetary policy shock in the main regression 
to examine whether banks that have specific characteristics will benefit more from the 
expansionary monetary policy. To find the solution of research question 3, we will focus on the 
main bank-specific variables that can significantly influence banks’ systemic risk.  
The remaining Chapter 4 is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides literature review from 
four aspects. Section 4.3 states hypotheses. Section 4.4 selected samples’ characteristics and 
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limitations, the data sources, and econometric approach. Section 4.5 presents, discusses and 
interprets key empirical results. Finally, section 4.6 provides conclusions. 
 
4.2   Literature Review 
In this section, this chapter will review relevant literatures from five aspects: (1) the 
conventional and unconventional monetary policy instruments in Euro Area; (2) monetary 
policy shocks; (3) systemic risk measures; (4) banks’ systemic risk-takings, bank heterogeneity 
and monetary policy channels 
4.2.1   Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy Instruments in Euro Area  
Before the financial crisis, the ECB mainly adopted the conventional monetary policy to 
achieve its major macroeconomic objectives. Since the 2007-2009 U.S. Financial Crisis, a 
number of studies by ECB’s researchers (ECB 2010; ECB 2011; Cour-Thimann and Winkler 
2013; Pattipeilohy et al. 2013) described how the ECB adopted the conventional and 
unconventional monetary policy instruments to respond the financial crises. For conventional 
monetary policy instruments, the ECB provides two standing facilities, including marginal 
lending facility (MLF) and the deposit facility (DF), and reduces (increases) the interest rates 
of the two standing facilities to provide more (less) overnight liquidity to financial institutions. 
In addition, the ECB uses the main refinancing operation (MRO) rate and longer-term 
refinancing operations (LTROs) as two main open market operations. Finally, the ECB changes 
the minimum reserve requirements to stabilize the market interest rates. The ECB cut MRO by 
a total of 325 basis points between October 2008 and March 2009, to a historic low of 1%. 
Meanwhile, the ECB also cut DF rate from 3.25% to 0.25%, the MLF rate from 5.25% to 1.75%. 
Since all interest rates were at historic low at that time, in October 2008, the ECB decided to 
implement the unconventional monetary policy to complement the conventional monetary 
policy to restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission. Cour-Thimann and Winkler 
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(2013) illustrated five unconventional monetary policies that the ECB adopted to resolve the 
U.S. Financial Crisis of 2007-2009: fixed-rate allotment, extension of the maturity of liquidity 
provision, extension of collateral eligibility, currency swap arrangements and covered bond 
purchase program (CBPP). They temporarily provided unlimited liquidity for more eligible 
financial institutions. For instance, fixed-rate full allotment enabled euro area financial 
institutions to have unlimited access to ECB’s liquidity at a fixed interest rate (i.e. MRO); both 
maturity and eligibility of the collateral have been extended; currency swap agreements 
enabled the Eurosystem to provide more liquidity provision in foreign currencies; CBPP was 
the first asset purchase program that enabled the Eurosystem to purchase covered bonds 
(mortgaged-backed securities, MBS) between June 2009 and 2010. ECB (2011) illustrated that 
all above-mentioned measures except CBPP were extended after the Sovereign Debt Crisis 
started in May 2010 and CBPP was replaced by the Securities Markets Program (SMP). SMP 
enabled the Eurosystem to purchase debt securities and was intended to maintain depth and 
liquidity in malfunctioning segments of debt securities markets and to restore an appropriate 
functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism (ECB 2010).  However, the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis and European banking sector strains still intensified in the summer of 
2011, the ECB announced four more monetary policy changes (three unconventional and one 
conventional) to respond the crisis on 8 December 2011: two 3-year LTROs, extending eligible 
collaterals; encouraging the development of alternative credit assessment sources for use in the 
selection of eligible collateral and reducing the required reserve ratio from 2% to 1%. They 
were intended to provide sufficient liquidity for euro area banks. Nevertheless, on 6 September 
2012, as the Sovereign Debt Crisis continuously intensified and the liquidity conditions on 
financial markets deteriorated, the ECB announced that it would implement the Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMT) program to restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission 
and the singleness of the monetary policy. The OMT program involves purchases of short-term 
220 
 
sovereign bonds under some strict conditions (Pattipeilohy et al. 2013). A necessary condition 
for OMT is strict and effective conditionality attached to an appropriate European Financial 
Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) program. Meanwhile, the ECB 
gradually decreased the interest rates to historic low: it decreased Deposit Facility rate to 0 in 
July 2012, further to -0.4% in March 2016 and lowered MRO rate to 0 and MLF rate to 0.25% 
in March 2016. Since November 2014, the ECB mainly adopted the unconventional monetary 
policy measures. On 21 November 2014, the ECB started the third  round of asset-backed 
securities purchase program (ABSPP3); on 9 March 2015, the ECB began buying public sector 
securities under the public sector purchase program (PSPP); on 10 March 2016, the ECB 
decided to expand the monthly purchase under the asset purchase program (APP) to €80billion 
per month from April 2016 to March 2017; on 2 June 2016, the ECB announced to start 
corporate sector purchase program (CSPP) on 8 June; on 8 December 2016, the ECB decided 
to reduce monthly APP to €60 billion from April 2017 to December 2017; on 26 October 2017, 
the ECB announced to further reduce monthly APP to €30 billion from January 2018 to 
September 2018. Pattipeilohy et al. (2013) summarized that the ECB’s unconventional 
monetary policy frameworks might consist of three key elements: (1) providing large-scale 
liquidity support to banks; (2) extending the historic low interest rates into longer term; (3) 
large scale asset purchases. In next subsection, we will discuss literature about monetary policy 
shocks.  
4.2.2 Monetary Policy Shocks 
Two previous papers (Clarida et al. 1998, 2000) used residuals from a Taylor-rule type models 
to calculate long-run (monthly) unexpected monetary policy changes (shocks). Clarida et al. 
(1998) illustrated the specification and estimation of the monetary policy function based on 
Taylor rule and estimated monetary policy reaction functions for two sets of countries: 
Germany, Japan and the U.S., and the U.K., France and Italy.  Similarly, Clarida et al. (2000) 
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also employed Taylor rule to demonstrate the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy reaction 
function. Both papers are the early papers that demonstrate how to use Taylor rule to compute 
monetary policy reaction function for researchers in next two decades. They also provide 
empirical evidences for the relationships between monetary policy rules and macroeconomic 
stability in the U.S., Japan and some European countries. We will calculate standard Taylor 
rule residuals to represent one measure of monetary policy shock.  
The most recent papers (Wu and Xia 2016; Faia and Karan 2018) propose new indicators to 
represent the unconventional monetary policy shocks. Wu and Xia (2016) first propose the 
shadow rate and employ term structure model to calculate the shadow rate mainly in times 
when the main interest rates are close to zero bound. The shadow rate can be negative when 
the central banks conduct the unconventional monetary policy instruments. The shadow rate 
has an advantage over central banks’ policy rates. Compared to the effective central banks’ 
policy rates, the shadow rate is not subject to zero interest rate bound and can account for real 
effects of the unconventional monetary policy tools on borrowing costs of financial 
intermediaries and firms. Faia and Karau (2018) not only use Wu-Xia and Krippner shadow 
rates but also employ log difference of central banks’ balance sheets between 2007 and 2016. 
They find that the size of ECB’s balance sheet increases in most time periods since the U.S. 
Financial Crisis and implies that the ECB conducts the expansionary monetary policy.  We will 
follow Faia and Karau (2018) to use both Wu-Xia shadow rate and log difference of the ECB 
monthly total asset to represent the other measures of monetary policy shock.    
4.2.3   Systemic Risk Measures  
Since the U.S. 2007-2009 Financial Crisis, a few studies (Acharya et al. 2010; Adrian and 
Brunnermeier 2011; Brownless and Engle 2016) focused on systemic risk measures and mostly 
utilised marketed-based measures. The most commonly used systemic risk measures are 
marginal expected shortfall (MES), Conditional Value-at-Risk (∆CoVaR), and SRISK. Acharya 
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et al. (2010) defined MES and used OLS regression and probit regression analysis to study 102 
financial institutions between July 2007 and December 2008. They defined MES as a measure 
of the individual bank’s marginal risk contribution to the overall banking system if the overall 
market experiences moderately tail risk and concluded that MES appear to be able to predict 
the financial firms with the worst contributions in the systemic crisis. Furthermore, they 
claimed that MES had two advantages over the other systemic risk measures: (1) MES is simple 
to compute and is easy for regulators to consider; and (2) ES is a coherent risk measure and is 
more robust than VaR. However, Weiss et al. (2013) claimed two disadvantages of MES: (1) it 
is only based on the left tail of the market’s marginal distribution but ignores the right tail of 
the market’s distribution; and (2) it does not capture the true tails of the return distribution 
because it only measures the moderate tail risk. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) utilized 
CoVaR to analyze a sample of 1226 institutions at least 260 weeks of asset return data (an 
average length of 645 weeks) between 1986Q1 and 2010Q4 and used quantile regression and 
time variation associated with systemic state variables to estimate ΔCoVaR. Moreover, they 
also pointed out two advantages of ΔCoVaR: (1) it focuses on the contribution of each bank to 
overall systemic risk; (2) it captures the risk spillovers from institution to institution across the 
whole financial network. Nevertheless, other scholars argue that ΔCoVaR also has several 
drawbacks. For example, Billio et al. (2012) claimed that ΔCoVaR implies lower estimates of 
systemic risk after a volatility spike occurs. Moreover, Huang et al. (2010) pointed out that 
ΔCoVaR cannot appropriately aggregate the systemic risk contributions of individual banks 
because VaR is not additive. These advantages indicate that VaR is not a coherent risk measure 
and cannot predict systemic risk timely when it is building up. Brownless and Engle (2016) 
adopted SRISK to measure a bank’s contribution to the undercapitalization of the financial 
system in case of a crisis. They pointed out three advantages of SRISK. First, the sum of SRISK 
across all banks measures the overall systemic risk in the entire financial system. Second, 
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SRISK can also be thought as the total amount if capital that government would have to provide 
to bailout the financial system. Third, SRISK improves predicting the Fed capital injections 
during the crisis and provides early warning signals of distress in indicators of real activity. 
However, they also proposed that this measure does not use off-balance sheet information and 
may not appropriately capture the true asset structure of a firm. Some of these systemic risk 
measures have been adopted as dependent variables in the most recent studies that examine the 
relationships between systemic risk measures and monetary policy changes (shocks). We will 
discuss this in more details in the following subsection.   
4.2.4 Banks’ Systemic Risk-takings, Bank Heterogeneity and Monetary Policy Channels 
Many previous studies (Gambacorta 2009; Brissimis and Delis 2010; Delis et al. 2010; De 
Nicolo et al. 2010; Brissmis and Delis 2010; Chodorow-Reich et al. 2014; Di Maggio et al. 
2016; Lamers et al. 2016; Faia and Karau 2018). Brissimis and Delis (2010) analyzed the 
heterogeneous response of the U.S. and Euro Area banks in terms of their lending and risk-
taking decisions when monetary policy changes during 1994 and 2007.  They illustrated three 
channels of transmission of monetary policy through banks: bank lending, bank risk-taking and 
bank profitability. Firstly, the bank lending channel indicates that the expansionary (restrictive) 
monetary policy increases (decreases) bank loan supply and thus increases (decreases) 
aggregate economic activity and aggregate demand. Secondly, the bank risk-taking channel 
shows that the expansionary monetary policy encourages banks to take riskier assets and boosts 
asset prices, resulting in increased aggregate economic activity and aggregate demand. Thirdly, 
the bank profitability channel shows that the expansionary monetary policy lowers short-term 
borrowing costs relative to long-term lending incomes for banks that borrow short and lend 
long and this increases banks’ net interest margins. As a result, this further increases the 
aggregate economic activity and aggregate demand. In order to investigate the heterogeneous 
impacts of monetary policy changes on bank lending, risk-taking and profitability, they 
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formulated three different hypotheses based on bank liquidity, equity capital, and market power. 
They employed the Local GMM method and set three equations with regard to bank lending, 
bank risk-taking and bank profitability to examine whether the three hypotheses are correct. 
They found that all three hypotheses are correct and concluded that the impacts of monetary 
policy changes on bank lending, bank risk-taking and bank profitability are lower for banks 
with healthier balance sheets and higher market power. These results indicate two implications. 
On the one hand, that bank activities are less sensitive to monetary policy changes for banks 
with high liquidity, equity capitals and market power. On the other hand, banks with less 
healthy balance sheets (e.g. more risky assets, fewer equity capital, and lower profitability) 
have more benefits from the expansionary monetary policy (e.g. low interest rate).  
Lamers et al. (2019) summarized five heterogeneous transmission of monetary policy channels 
to bank systemic risk. First, when the ECB implements the expansionary monetary policy, 
short-term risk-free interest rates decrease and bank’s net interest margin increases, therefore, 
bank’s profitability increases and will have higher incentives for excessive risk, and finally 
decreases bank’s systemic risk. Second, when the ECB implements the expansionary monetary 
policy, long-term risk-free interest rates decrease and bank’s net interest margin decreases, thus 
bank’s profitability decreases and will have lower incentives for excessive risk, and finally 
increases systemic risk. Third, when the ECB adopts the expansionary monetary policy, risk 
premia will decrease and asset prices will increase, therefore, banks’ capital and profitability 
will increase, and banks’ systemic risk will decrease. Fourth, when the ECB adopts the 
expansionary monetary policy shock, bank liquidity will improve, then banks will delay writing 
off bad loans, and finally bank’s systemic risk will increase. Fifth, when the ECB uses the 
expansionary monetary policy, funding risk will decrease and finally bank’s systemic risk will 
decrease. They conclude that the expansionary monetary policy actions reduce banks’ systemic 
risks in the short-run but increase banks’ risk-taking incentives in the long-run. These 
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conclusions can be interpreted by the first and second heterogeneous transmission of monetary 
policy channels, respectively.  
Fratzscher et al. (2014) proposed four monetary policy channels: confidence channel, bank 
credit risk channel, sovereign credit risk channel and international portfolio balance channel. 
Confidence channel indicates that central banks use the expansionary monetary policies to 
restore confidence in the financial markets and reduce risk premia thus increase asset prices. 
Bank credit risk channel shows that the expansionary monetary policies can lower credit risk 
therefore increase asset prices. Similarly, the expansionary monetary policies can also reduce 
sovereign credit risk and thus increase asset prices. International portfolio balance channel 
indicates that the expansionary monetary policies can rebalance portfolio across assets 
therefore change asset prices. In their paper, Fratzscher et al. (2014) found that monetary policy 
changes in the euro area influenced global markets mainly through a rise in confidence, a 
reduction of sovereign risk and a decrease in bank credit risk and confirmed that confidence 
channel, bank credit risk channel and sovereign credit risk channel hold while international 
portfolio balance channel does not hold.  
Di Maggio et al. (2016) put forward three more monetary policy channels: the portfolio-
balancing channel, the segmentation channel and the capital-constraints channel. The portfolio-
balancing channel indicates that the central bank affects the return of different assets by 
affecting their relative supply; the segmentation channel posits that LSAPs are effective when 
capital-constrained intermediaries in the secondary market are unable to arbitrage in the short 
run across different segments; The capital-constraints channel highlights how LSAPs can offset 
the decline in private lending from disruptions in financial intermediation. They conclude that 
Quantitative Easing works through a refinancing channel via reducing interest rates for 
mortgage borrowers and increasing credit availability, which lead to increase in investment and 
consumption and finally increase the aggregate demand of the real economy. They finally 
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concluded that the central banks’ purchases of large quantity of long-term assets in QE 
programs usually have spill-over effects on different sectors of the real economy when capitals 
are reallocated across different sectors (i.e. from the least efficient sectors to the most efficient 
sectors). Their conclusion supports the portfolio-rebalancing channel.  
In addition, Chodorow-Reich (2014) defined the leverage channel as low interest rates result 
in lower cost of capital and cost of holding collaterals and therefore leads to higher leverage 
for banks and increase banks’ risk-taking behaviors. Borio and Zhu (2010) defined bank risk-
taking channel as lower interest rates will result in higher liquidity and lower external 
constraints, thus further lead to higher risk tolerance for banks and finally increase banks’ risk-
takings. 
 
4.3   Hypothesis  
Since the 2007-2009 U.S. Subprime Crisis and the 2010-2012 European Sovereign Debt Crisis, 
major central banks implemented several rounds of expansionary monetary policies. One of 
the most important aims of central banks to adopt the expansionary monetary policy tools is to 
reduce credit risks and systemic risks in banking sectors. Therefore, there is an increasing 
number of studies that examine whether central banks’ expansionary policies will increase or 
decrease banks’ systemic risks in the long-term. A few previous studies (Delis et al. 2010; Borio 
and Zhu 2012; Jimenez et al. 2014; Deev and Hodula 2015; Lamers et al. 2016) investigate the 
impacts of monetary policy on banks’ risk-taking behaviors in the long-term. All these 
researches hold the same conclusion that maintaining low interest rate for too long will increase 
banks’ systemic risk-taking behavior and contribute to the buildup of systemic risk of banking 
sector in the long term. This can be explained by the “search for yield” channel. If the interest 
rates are kept low in longer time, banks will have declining net interest margins. In order to 
maintain the stable net interest margins, banks have to increase their risk-taking activities. This 
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conclusion can also be interpreted by “leverage channel”. Chodorow-Reich (2014) analyzed 
the “leverage channel” as low interest rates result in lower cost of capital and cost of holding 
collaterals and therefore leads to higher leverage for banks and increase banks’ risk-taking 
behaviors. Borio and Zhu (2010) illustrated another bank risk-taking channel: lower interest 
rates will result in higher liquidity and lower external constraints, thus further lead to higher 
risk tolerance for banks and finally increase banks’ risk-takings. Therefore, the hypothesis of 
this chapter can be formulated as follows:  
Hypothesis: The expansionary monetary policies will contribute to the buildup of 
systemic risks of euro area banks in the long term.  
 
4.4   Sample, Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
4.4.1 Sample and Data Sources 
We will select banks in euro area countries in our full sample in this chapter. Since the ECB 
was established in June 1998, and the euro was introduced in 1999, we will select banks from 
countries that were EU member countries before 1999.  Because we will use market-based 
systemic risk measures, all banks must be public listed. Due to the data availability on V-lab 
website (https://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/) and S&P market intelligence platform, the full sample of this 
chapter consists of 54 banks (6532 observations) from 11 countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) between September 
2004 and March 2017. Next, in order to examine whether banks in core countries and periphery 
countries have different responses to the expansionary monetary policy, we will follow Alfonso 
et al. (2018) to divide the full sample into banks in core countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany and Netherlands) and banks in periphery countries (Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain). Finally, to investigate whether banks in crisis period and non-crisis period 
have different responses towards the expansionary monetary policy, we will follow Alfonso et 
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al. (2018) to divide the full sample into banks in crisis period (August 2007 – July 2012) and 
banks in non-crisis period (September 2004 – July 2007 and August 2012 – March 2017).  
Alfonso et al. (2018) explain that the estimated Time-varying parameter (TVP) coefficients of 
all risk sources are zero and near-zero in the non-crisis period while the coefficients increase 
rapidly to positive and significant values in the crisis period. They also propose that the non-
crisis period covers the two pricing regimes that have low/reduced absolute values of 
coefficients of risk factors while crisis period covers the one pricing regime that have relatively 
high absolute values of coefficients of risk factors. Therefore, we combine the two crises into 
the “crisis period” and the remaining years in “non-crisis period”.  
The data are drawn from the following multiple sources: (1) the data of systemic risk measures 
LRMES and SRISK are downloaded from V-lab; (2) the bank-specific data are obtained from 
S&P market intelligence platform and Bloomberg; (3) the macroeconomic data in calculating 
monetary policy shocks (Taylor-rule type residuals) are collected from ECB Statistics Data 
Warehouse; (4) the ECB policy rate (Main Refinancing Operation rate, MRO) and annual total 
assets are obtained from ECB website; (5) the ECB’s Shadow rate is collected from Quandl 
website. Additionally, in order to evaluate the economic significance of the variables, we follow 
Bostandzic and Weiss (2018) to standardize all variables to have zero mean and unit standard 
deviation.  
4.4.2 Monetary Policy Shocks 
We will use Taylor-rule type models to calculate monetary policy shocks as follows: first, take 
the difference between the log of the current month CPI and the log of the 12th lag of the 
monthly CPI, that is,  
                                                   INF = log(CPI(t)) – log(CPI(t-12))                                    (4.1) 
to generate annual inflation (INF); second, take the logarithm and generate deviations of  
potential output (GAP) from a Hodrick Prescott trend, that is,  
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                                                  GAP = log(IP) -log(IPTrend)                                              (4.2)  
and third, follow Clarida et.al. (1998, 2000) to use the standard Taylor-rule model, that is,  
                                 MRO (t) = a +b*MRO(t-1)+c*INF(t)+d*GAP(t)+error(t)                  (4.3) 
to estimate the error terms to represent the monetary policy shocks.  
Next, we will follow Faia and Karau (2018) to employ two more measures, the shadow rate 
and the log difference of central banks’ balance sheets as proxies for monetary policy shocks.  
Wu and Xia (2016) proposed the shadow rate to account for conventional monetary policy rates 
as well as unconventional monetary policy shocks. They used the term structure model to 
calculate the shadow rate and mainly considered the monetary policy tools in times when the 
main interest rates are close to zero bound. Wu-Xia shadow rate differs from the effective 
central banks’ policy rates as it can be very negative in times of unconventional monetary 
policy tools (e.g. Quantitative Easing, QEs and large-scale asset purchase programs, LSAPs). 
Compared to the effective central banks’ policy rates, the shadow rate is not subject to zero 
interest rate bound and can account for real effects of unconventional monetary policy tools on 
borrowing costs of financial intermediaries and firms. This paper will use ECB’s level of 
shadow rate. In addition, Faia and Karau (2018) also proposed the change in central banks’ 
balance sheets for the post-2007 period when unconventional monetary policy tools are used 
more frequently.  
4.4.3   Systemic Risk Measures  
We follow Brownless and Engle (2016) to compute both LRMES and SRISK. On the one hand, 
they calculated LRMES based on the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) proposed by Acharya 
et.al. (2010). They defined MES by using net equity returns of firm i during worst 5% markets 
outcomes at daily frequency: 
                                     MESi5%:= - E[ Wi,1 Wi,0 ∣I5%]                                            (4.4) 
Then Brownless and Engle (2016) expanded MES into longer-term and defined Long-run 
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Marginal Expected Shortfall (LRMES) as the expectation of the firm equity over a longer 
period of time arithmetic return conditional on the systemic event, that is 
                              LRMES i, t  = - Et (Ri,t+1:t+h|Rm,t+1:t+h < C)                             (4.5) 
where Ri,t+1:t+h is the h-period arithmetic firm equity return between period t+1 and t+h. In this 
paper, h is 6 month (6M) and C is -40%. That means we will estimate the valuation loss a bank 
would generate conditional on a stock market decreases by 40% over a period of six months.  
On the other hand, they also defined SRISK as the expected shortfall conditional on a systemic 
event as follows:  
                                 SRISKi,t = Et(CSi,t+h|Rm,t+1:t+h < C) 
                             = k*Et(Di,t+h|Rm,t+1:t+h < C)  - (1 - k)*Et(Wi,t+h|Rm,t+1:t+h < C)    (4.6) 
They further assume that Et (Di,t+h|Rm,t+1:t+h < C)  = Di,t, then  
SRISKi,t = k*Di,t  - (1- k)*Wi,t*(1 - LRMESi,t) 
                                                     =  Wi,t*[k*LVGi,t  + (1 - k)*LRMESi,t  -1]                       (4.7) 
where LVGi,t   is the quasi-leverage ratio (Di,t +Wi,t)=Wi,t  and LRMES is the Long-run Marginal 
Expected Shortfall.  
In chapter 4, we employ different systemic risk measures from chapter 3 because (1) we aim 
at examining the short-term impact of M&As on acquirers’ systemic risk while we seek to 
investigate the long-term effect of ECB’s monetary policy changes on banks’ systemic risk 
taking behaviours; (2) we use daily data in chapter 3 and monthly data in chapter 4; (3) LRMES 
and SRISK are long-term systemic risk measures while MES, LTD and ∆CoVaR are short-
term.  
4.4.4 Descriptive Statistics   
Graph 4-1 illustrates SRISK of 11 euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, French, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain). SRISK rose significantly 
during the Global Financial Crisis and European sovereign debt crisis and arrived at the top in 
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early 2009 and early 2012. After the ECB President Mario Draghi’s “Whatever it takes” speech, 
SRISK dropped significantly.     
 
Graph 4-1     Graph of SRISK of 11 Euro Area Countries ($Billion) 
 
 
   Source: v-lab (2019)  
 
Graph 4-2 shows that SRISK for Austria increased quickly during the Global Financial Crisis 
then decreased in 2010, however, it reached at the highest systemic risk during the European 
sovereign debt crisis and finally decreased thereafter.  
 
Graph 4-2   Graph of SRISK of Austria ($Billion) 
 
 
    Source: v-lab (2019) 
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SRISK of Finland (graph 4-4) and Portugal (4-11) have similar trends. They reached at the 
highest level during the European sovereign debt crisis and decreased thereafter. These trends 
are reasonable because banks in these countries were most adversely affected by the European 
sovereign debt crisis.    
Graph 4-3   Graph of SRISK of Belgium ($Billion) 
 
 
     Source: v-lab (2019) 
SRISK of Belgium (Graph 4-3) arrived at the highest level during the Global Financial Crisis 
and then decreased gradually. This is because one of the largest Belgian bank, Dexia bank, 
failed in 2009. SRISK of Ireland (graph 4-8) has similar trend as one of largest Irish bank, 
Allied Irish bank was in trouble in the second half of 2008.  
Graph 4-4     Graph of SRISK of Finland ($Billion) 
 
   Source: v-lab (2019) 
Graph 4-5 shows SRISK of France. It is possible to note that it reached the top levels during 
two financial crises, indicating that the two financial crises affected French banks in similar 
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extents. SRISK of Germany (graph 4-6) and SRISK of Netherlands (graph 4-10) have similar 
trends as they are major core countries in the euro area.    
Graph 4-5     Graph of SRISK of France ($Billion) 
 
    Source: v-lab (2019)   
Graph 4-6   Graph of SRISK of Germany ($Billion) 
 
   Source: v-lab (2019) 
Graph 4-7 presents SRISK of Greece. Compared to the core countries, SRISK of Greece has 
relatively unique trend. SRISK of Greece rose significantly in the first half of 2010 (the 
beginning of European sovereign debt crisis and reached at the highest level in 2012 and 2013, 
then decreased in 2014 under the bailout programs and surged again in 2015 as the  
Graph 4-7   Graph of SRISK of Greece ($Billion) 
 
   Source: v-lab (2019) 
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Greek economy deteriorated again in 2015 and 2016. SRISK of Italy (graph 4-9) and SRISK 
of Spain (graph 4-12) have similar trends as they are major periphery countries that are 
adversely affected by high level of sovereign debts during 2011-2013 and 2015-2017.    
 
Graph 4-8   Graph of SRISK of Ireland ($Billion) 
 
 
   Source: v-lab (2019) 
Graph 4-9   Graph of SRISK of Italy ($Billion) 
 
 
    Source: v-lab (2019) 
Graph 4-10   Graph of SRISK of Netherlands ($Billion) 
 
    Source: v-lab (2019) 
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Graph 4-11   Graph of SRISK of Portugal ($Billion) 
 
 
    Source: v-lab (2019)  
Graph 4-12   Graph of SRISK of Spain ($Billion) 
 
    Source: v-lab (2019) 
Next, we present the graphs of the trend of three monetary policy shocks and offer some 
discussions. Then, we report the descriptive statistics of all variables included in our models 
and present the descriptive statistics. Finally, we present the correlation coefficients among all 
variables and discuss the correlation coefficients.  
           Graph 4-13    Graph of Taylor Rule Residuals 
                                      
                                             Source: author’s own calculation 
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Graph 4-13 shows the trend of Taylor rule residuals between 1999 and 2017. More negative 
Taylor rule residuals indicate more expansionary monetary policy. This graph shows that Taylor 
rule residuals are about -0.4 in 1999, 2001 and 2003, about -0.6 in late 2008 and between -0.2 
and -0.3 over 2011 and 2014. All these residuals are more negative because the ECB 
implements expansionary monetary policy to stimulate economic growth when euro area 
economy is negatively affected by some external shocks (e.g. the Russian Financial Crisis in 
1998, 9/11 terrorist attack in New York in 2001, Dot-com bubble between 2000 and 2002, the 
2007-2009 U.S. Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis between 2010 and 
2013). The residuals are positive in 2000 and 2006 because the ECB implements restrictive 
monetary policy to curb Dot-com bubble and the overheated economy.   
Graph 4-14 indicates the trend of log difference of the ECB monthly total asset between 2004 
and 2017. More positive number represents that the ECB is increasing its balance sheet thus is 
implementing more expansionary monetary policy. The numbers are more than 0.1 and less 
than 0.3 between 2007 and 2009 and bout 0.1 in 2011 and 2012, indicating that the ECB 
implements the expansionary monetary policy in the 2007-2009 U.S. Financial Crisis and the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis.   
Graph 4-14   Graph of Log Difference of the ECB Monthly Total Asset 
 
                                         Source: ECB website 
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Graph 4-15 shows the graph of trend of the ECB shadow rate in percentage. The ECB shadow 
rate in percentage turns into negative in late 2008 for the first time and in late 2011 for the 
second time and them becomes more negative thereafter. This trend can be explained as follows: 
the ECB adopts the expansionary monetary policy to make the shadow rate more negative to 
stimulate economic growth in the U.S. Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
After 2013, the ECB cuts key interest rates for several times and implements several asset 
purchase programs to make the shadow rate further negative. Therefore, the trend is consistent 
with the fact that the ECB maintains the expansionary monetary policy in the long term since 
the U.S. 2007-2009 Financial Crisis.     
 
Graph 4-15   Graph of the ECB shadow rate (%) 
                                  
                                          Source: Quandl 
 
Table 4-1 reports the descriptive statistics of variables are used in the fixed-effect model. As 
expected, the means and medians of level of LRMES (42.7461, 44.71) and level of SRISK 
(13704.61, 1332.55) are positive, indicating that European banks have positive systemic risks 
in most periods of time between September 2004 and March 2017. In addition, level of SRISK 
has much greater standard deviation (28515.04) than level of LRMES (44.71), indicating that 
SRISK is much more volatile than LRMES. This is consistent with the fact that level of SRISK 
had much greater range (170166.9 – (48604.2)) than level of LRMES had (96.08 – (-23.79)). 
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The negative values of level of systemic risk measures show that some banks have lower 
systemic risk in some periods of time.  
With regard to proxies for monetary policy shocks, the ECB’s shadow rate has negative mean  
(-0.0915) and median (-0.2230), indicating that the ECB’s shadow rate was negative in most 
periods of time between September 2004 and March 2017. This complies with the fact that the 
real effects of ECB unconventional monetary policy tools are reducing banks’ actual  
Table 4-1   Descriptive Statistics for data used in model specifications 
 
Variable   Obs. Mean Median         S.D.  Min.    Max. 
Systemic risk measures      
Level of LRMES 47    6532 42.7461             44.71        17.1891    -23.79    96.08 
Level of SRISK 6532         13704.61       1332.55     28515.04      -48604.2    176166.90 
Monetary policy shocks              
Standard Taylor Rule residuals 
Shadow rate (%) 
Log difference of ECB balance sheet 
Bank-specific variables 
Total loan/earning assets 
Non-interest income/total income                       
6532           
6532 
6532 
 
6532 
6532     
-0.0069              
-0.0915        
 0.0018        
 
 0.6413 
 0.2639 
 0.0040        0.1157          
-0.2230        2.4449           
 0.0030        0.0382            
 
  0.6974       0.1922 
  0.2564       0.1379 
   -0.5920                     
     -5.3753             
 -0.6373 
 
 0.0961 
       0.0019 
0.3124
4.2785 
  0.1104 
 
  0.9697 
  0.7232 
Non-performing loans/total loans 6532  0.0772 0.0442       0.0950  0.0013   0.6104 
Total deposits/total liabilities 6532  0.4615 0.4642       0.1785  0.0291   0.8421 
Equity/total assets 6532  0.0560 0.0604       0.0536 -0.3646   0.2755 
Total assets (Mil.Euro) 6532 3.06*1011 6.16*1010     4.85*1011 5.38*107  2.2*1012 
      
 
ECB monthly total assets has positive mean (0.0018) and median (0.0030), revealing that ECB 
expanded its balance sheet in most months between September 2004 and March 2017. This is 
consistent with the fact that ECB implemented non-standard expansionary monetary policy 
since the U.S. Financial Crisis. The other proxies for monetary policy shocks, including 
standard Taylor rule residuals, have different means and medians. Standard Taylor rule 
residuals have negative mean but positive median, indicating more positive residuals but 
greater negative residuals. Because the negative residuals indicate the expansionary monetary 
policy during financial crises, monetary policy shocks estimated by standard Taylor rule model 
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show that the ECB implemented the expansionary monetary policy between 2007 and 2017. 
With regard to bank-specific variables, total loan/earning assets has large range (0.9697 – 
0.0961), indicating that some banks have loans as their main source of earning assets while 
other banks only have more earning assets other than loans. Non-interest income/total income 
varies greatly from bank to bank (from 0.0019 to 0.7232), revealing that some have higher 
reliance on non-interest incomes than other banks do. Non-performing loans/total loans also 
has great range (0.6104 – 0.0013), showing that some banks (e.g. Greek banks) have much 
worse asset quality than other banks (0.0013). Total deposits/total liabilities has maximum 
value of 0.8421, indicating that one particular bank relies heavily on volatile liabilities as its 
main source of funds. Equity/asset ratio (capital ratio) has minimum value of -0.3636, 
indicating that a specific bank has very negative capital ratio and thus has high insolvency risk. 
Finally, bank size varies greatly (total assets range from 5.38*107 million Euro to 2.2*1012 
million Euro). These great ranges show that all these bank-specific variables have outliers, 
therefore, we conduct 1% winsorize to remove these outliers. In order to interpret the economic 
meaning of the coefficients of variables, we standardize all variables to zero mean and unit 
standard risk and use standardized variables in the fixed-effect models.  
Table 4-2 reports the correlation coefficients among systemic risk measures, monetary policy 
shocks and bank-specific variables. Most variables have low correlation coefficients with other 
variables, but there are a few exceptions. First, SRISK and LRMES have high positive 
correlation (0.5634). This is reasonable because both SRISK and LRMES are systemic risk 
measures. Second, log difference of ECB monthly balance sheet has high negative correlation 
coefficient (-0.5634) with shadow rate and standard Taylor rule (-0.5271) while shadow rate  
has positive correlation coefficient (0.6235) with standard Taylor rule residuals. These are  
also expected because lower shadow rate and standard Taylor rule residuals and higher log 
difference of ECB monthly balance sheet indicate the expansionary monetary policy. Third, the 
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high negative correlation coefficient between size and loan/earning assets is unexpected. 
Generally speaking, the correlation coefficient table demonstrates there is no multicollinearity.   
 
Table 4-2    Correlation Coefficients among Systemic Risk Measures, Monetary Policy Shocks and Bank-
Specific Variables  
                                LRMES   SRISK   Shadow rate    Log difference    Standard Taylor rule  Loan/EA     NII/TI    NPL/TL   Dep/Lia   Equity/asset   Size        
LRMES               1.0000 
SRISK                 0.5326        1.0000 
Shadow rate            0.0249*    -0.0024*     1.0000 
Log difference        0.0249*      0.0254*     -0.5634*              1.0000 
Standard Taylor rule -0.0236* -0.0632*      0.6235*             -0.5271*                   1.0000 
Loan/EA                0.0438***  0.0414***  0.0310**           -0.0169**                 0.0114**             1.0000       
NII/TI                     0.1234*** -0.1112***  0.0267**          -0.0150**                 0.0275**            -0.1073***  1.0000                      
NPL/TL              0.1868***  0.1941***   0.0483***          0.0085***               0.0153***           0.1796*** -0.1994***   1.0000  
  
Dep/Lia               0.1171***  0.1276***   0.0245**            0.0055***               0.0004***           0.2204*** -0.0561***   0.3117***   1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
                     
                     
             
                                
Equity/asset        0.1638*** 0.1342***   0.1534***          -0.0127***               0.0033***           0.1540*** -0.0592***   0.1483*** -0.1512*** 1.0000  
Size                    -0.0364**  -0.0393*** -0.0402***           0.0114***               -0.0397***         -0.5226*** -0.1475*** -0.1405*** -0.2508*** -0.1470***  1 
 
 
Note: ***   **  * indicate the correlation coefficient is significant at 1%,5% and 10% significance level.  
 
4.5   Econometric Approach  
In order to examine the impact of monetary policy shocks on the banks’ systemic risk, this 
paper follows Lamers.et.al. (2016) to employ a panel data model that accounts for banks’ 
heterogeneity. This paper estimates the following panel data model with using variables of 
monthly data: 
                        Yi,t  = α + (β0 + ∑Kk=1βkBMk,i,t)× Shockt + ∑Kk=1γk BMk,i,t + ϵi,t                                  (4.8)  
where Yi,t is systemic risk, BM is a vector of bank-specific variables and shockt  is the monetary 
policy shock in month t. This paper uses LRMES and SRISK as dependent variables, and bank-
specific variables contain loan-to-earning assets, non-interest income/total income, non-
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performing loans/total loans, total deposits/total liabilities, equity/assets and total assets as 
independent variables.  ∑Kk=1βkBMk,i,t× Shockt represent interaction terms of bank-specific 
variables and corresponding monetary policy shock. In order to interpret the economic meaning 
of all coefficients, we standardize all variables to zero mean and unit standard deviation.      
Finally, either the fixed-effect model or the random-effect model can be selected by conducting 
the Hausman test (Brooks 2008; Cameron and Trivedi 2010). They stated that the Hausman 
test can be used to test to know if the time-invariant component of error is correlated with the 
regressors. Wooldridge (2010) described that the Hausman test as follows: the null hypothesis 
and alternative hypothesis are:  
                                                            (4.9)  
and the test statistics of the Hausman test is:  
                                             (4.10) 
If H is greater than the critical value, the null hypothesis is rejected, this means the time-
invariant component of error is correlated with the regressors, then the estimators in fixed-
effect models are consistent and the fixed-effect models are preferred; if H is less than the 
critical value, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, this means the time-invariant component 
of error is uncorrelated with the regressors, then the estimators in both fixed-effect and random-
effect models are consistent but random-effect estimators are more efficient, then the random-
effect models are preferred.  
In this analysis, the test statistic of Hausman test is -888.05, which is much greater than the 
critical value and the p-value is 0.0000, therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and the fixed 
–effect model is preferred. 
 
4.6   Discussion of Results  
4.6.1 Results of the Full Sample and the Sample Excludes Greek Banks  
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To examine whether banks’ systemic risk measures increased or decreased significantly after   
the ECB implemented the expansionary monetary policy, we first calculate standard Taylor       
Rule residuals, shadow rate and log difference of the ECB monthly total assets as monetary 
policy shocks. Secondly, we compute six bank-specific variables, including loan/earning asset, 
non-interest income/total income, non-performing loans/total loans, deposit/total liabilities, 
equity/assets and total assets, to represent banks’ asset structure, income structure, asset quality, 
funding structure, capital structure and size. Thirdly, we calculate the interaction terms by 
timing bank-specific variables and corresponding monetary policy shocks.  
First, our main results in table 4-3 show that both Taylor rule residuals and shadow rate are 
negative and significant with SRISK while log difference of the ECB monthly assets is positive 
and significant. These results indicate that banks’ systemic risk increases if the ECB 
implements the expansionary monetary policy and are consistent with our hypothesis that 
posits that the ECB’s expansionary monetary policy contributes to buildup of systemic risk in 
European banking sector. In addition, these findings are also consistent with those in Lamers 
et al. (2019). Second, results from all models indicate that, with the only exception of the 
loan/earning asset ratio, SRISK is statistically significant and positively related with all bank-
specific variables, namely: (1) banks with more diversified income structure, (2) banks that 
have poorer asset quality, (3) banks that rely more on deposits funding, (4) banks that have 
more equity capital, and (5) banks that have larger size (in line with Varotto and Zhao (2018)). 
Third, only a few interaction terms have significant coefficients, revealing that they have weak 
explanatory powers and only provide limited evidence for our previous finding.  
In regression (1), the coefficient of Taylor rule residuals is -0.0677 and has economic 
significance as follows:  if the Taylor rule residuals decrease by 1%, SRISK will increase by 
approximately 0.07%. The coefficient in regressions (2) has similar economic significance. 
These negative coefficients imply that the lower the standard Taylor rule residuals, the more 
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expansionary the monetary policy, the higher systemic risk for euro area banks. These results 
can be explained by the ‘search-for-yield channel’: if the central bank keeps the interest rate 
for too long and uses unconventional monetary policy tools, bank managers will have to shift 
from safer assets into riskier assets to increase rate of return on assets.   
In regression (3), the coefficient of shadow rate is -0.0243 and has economic significance as 
follows:  if the shadow rate decreases by 1%, SRISK will increase by approximately 0.024%. 
The coefficient in regression (4) has a similar economic significance. These negative 
coefficients imply that the lower the shadow rate, the more expansionary monetary policy, the 
higher systemic risk for euro area banks. Similar to the previous case, these results can be 
explained by search-for-yield channel as well.  
In regression (5), the coefficient of log difference of the ECB monthly asset is 0.0246 and has 
economic significance as follows: if log difference of the ECB monthly asset increases by 1%, 
SRISK will increase by approximately 0.025%. The coefficient in regressions (6) has similar 
economic significance. These positive coefficients imply that the higher log difference of the 
ECB monthly asset, the more expansionary monetary policy, the higher systemic risk for euro 
area banks. These results further support our hypothesis and can be explained as follows: higher 
log difference of the ECB monthly asset reveals that the ECB implements more expansionary 
monetary policy by purchasing asset (securities) programs and injecting more liquidity into 
financial markets. Banks will receive more credits and make more new loans to increase their 
risk-taking activities. This accumulates the buildup of systemic risk in the European banking 
sector.  
With regard to bank-specific variables, results in all regressions are as expected. In particular, 
they can be interpreted as follows: banks with more diversified income structures will have 
higher systemic risks because banks rely more on non-traditional activities (e.g. fee income, 
commissions and trading income) are riskier than banks that rely more on loan-deposits 
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businesses. For instance, some types of non-interest income, including gain/losses from trading 
in securities, foreign exchange transactions and derivative securities, are more volatile when 
the global financial markets are unstable. Banks that have higher non-performing loans/total 
loans (i.e. a poorer asset quality) make greater contributions to systemic risks in the banking 
sector because (1) their stock prices are more likely to decline significantly during financial 
crises; and (2) their loan defaults are more likely to result in greater shocks on other financial 
institutions. Banks that rely more on deposit funding will have higher systemic risk. This can 
be interpreted as follows: these banks will have higher cost of funding and lower profitability 
thus will have higher systemic risks. This result is similar to that of Lamers et al. (2019) that 
deposits/total liabilities is positively and significantly associated with changes in LRMES. 
Banks that have higher capital ratios will have higher systemic risks because of moral hazard 
problems, if, they become less prudent in the risk management process. For example, banks 
that have more capital will have more risk-taking activities and fewer incentives to monitor 
borrowers because they know they have more capital to absorb unanticipated losses. This will 
make greater contributions to systemic risks. This result is also similar to Varotto and Zhao 
(2018)’s findings that tier1 ratio is positive and significant with expected shortfall. The authors 
also show that a higher tier 1 capital ratio may be related to higher systemic risk because 
regulators can exercise discretion to increase minimum capital requirements when they are 
concerned about the safety of a bank or its exposure to systemic risk of a bank. Larger banks 
will have higher systemic risks because they are usually systematically important financial 
institutions and are more connected with other financial institutions around the world. This 
finding is consistent with several previous studies including e.g. Laeven et al. (2016) who find 
strong evidence that systemic risk increases with bank size. In particular, they indicated that a 
1% increase in total assets increases the banks’ contribution to systemic risk by about 0.5% 
when measured by SRISK. Therefore, they tend to be more negatively affected by financial 
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market turmoil.  
 
Table 4-3    Results of Banks’ SRISK in Full Sample 
 
 
Variable                                         (1)                     (2) 
                                                       SRISK               SRISK      
                                                       Full sample          Full sample               
                                                                                                                         
          (3)                       
      SRISK  
Full sample 
 
        (4)                        (5) 
     SRISK                 SRISK 
  Full sample         Full sample                                         
   (6) 
     SRISK 
  Full sample 
DISPERS  
Taylor Rule Residuals                       -0.0677***        -0.0651*** 
                                                      (0.0144)            (0.0145) 
Shadow rate 
 
Log difference of ECB balance sheet  
 
Loan/earning assets                        0.0110              0.0095       
                                                       (0.0138)          (0.0139) 
Non-interest income/total income         0.0946***       0.0950*** 
                                                       (0.0117)          (0.0118) 
Non-performing loan/total loan           0.1930***       0.1945*** 
                                                       (0.0145)          (0.0144) 
       
      
     -0.0243* 
     (0.0148) 
      
      
     0.0123        
    (0.0139) 
     0.0944*** 
    (0.0118) 
     0.1933*** 
    (0.0144) 
                                
                              
  -0.0224                 
  (0.0146)                 
                               0.0246*** 
                              (0.0070)   
  0.0103                  0.0117 
 (0.0139)               (0.0139) 
  0.0932***            0.0936*** 
 (0.0118)               (0.0118) 
  0.1959***            0.1921*** 
 (0.0143)               (0.0146) 
     
   
   
   
  0.0258*** 
 (0.0080) 
  0.0118 
 (0.0139) 
  0.0930*** 
 (0.0116) 
  0.1928*** 
 (0.0146) 
Deposits/total liabilities                  0.1201***       0.1205*** 
                                                       (0.0142)          (0.0141) 
Equity/assets                                  0.0971***        0.0986*** 
                                                       (0.0132)          (0.0133) 
Total assets                                     0.0735***       0.0735*** 
                                                       (0.0124)          (0.0122)                      
     0.1209*** 
    (0.0142) 
     0.0973***  
    (0.0133) 
     0.0761*** 
(0.0124) 
   0.1209***            0.1207*** 
 (0.0142)               (0.0142) 
  0.1000***            0.0978***        
 (0.0136)               (0.0132) 
  0.0754***            0.0755***     
 (0.0123)               (0.0124) 
   0.1206*** 
 (0.0142) 
  0.0982*** 
 (0.0132)  
  0.0758*** 
 (0.0122) 
Loan/EA*MPS                                                       0.0033       
                                                                               (0.0177) 
      
      
  -0.0177            
 (0.0133)               
  -0.0034 
 (0.0120) 
Income structure*MPS                                          -0.0176 
                                                                               (0.0134)                    
        -0.0149                
 (0.0110)                
  -0.0259*** 
 (0.0097) 
NPL/Loan*MPS                                                    -0.0206 
                                                                               (0.0150)    
       
      
  -0.0478***             
 (0.0142)               
  -0.0059 
 (0.0130) 
Deposits/Liabilities*MPS                                      -0.0163 
                                                                               (0.0174) 
      
      
  0.0048                   
(0.0110)                
   0.0109 
 (0.0084) 
Equity/assets*MPS                                                -0.0188 
                                                                               (0.0197) 
  -0.0192 
(0.0126)                                         
  -0.0073     
 (0.0219)     
Total assets*MPS                                                   -0.0073 
                                                                               (0.0157) 
  -0.0182* 
(0.0098)  
                   
                      
             
                   
 
   0.0077 
 (0.0154) 
Obs.                                                6532                 6532                     
 
R2                              
                     
                                                      
0.0737              0.0749                      
     6532 
 
 
      0.0695 
   6532                     6532 
  
  
0.0726                  0.0699 
    6532 
 
     
 0.0706 
 
 
     
      
      
       Note: ***, **, *   means   statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
 
 
With regard to the interaction terms, in regression (2), we obtain no significant coefficients. 
Conversely, in regression (4), we obtain several interesting findings. Firstly, the interaction 
term between non-performing loans/total loans and shadow rate is negative and significant with 
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SRISK, indicating that banks with poorer asset quality will have lower systemic risks than 
banks with better asset quality when the ECB adopts more negative shadow rate. Therefore, 
riskier banks appear to benefit more from the expansionary monetary policy.  
This finding can be explained by the confidence channel. Banks with poorer asset quality will 
receive new credits to replace the bad loans. This should improve banks’ asset quality in the 
future as well as investors’ expectations and confidence about banks’ strength. In such scenario, 
stock prices will rise, and systemic risks will be reduced. Secondly, the interaction term 
between total assets and shadow rate is also negative and significant with SRISK at 10% 
significance level, indicating that larger banks will benefit more from the more negative 
shadow rate. This is consistent with the result in Lamers et al. (2019) and can be explained as 
follows: on the one hand, larger banks are more likely to receive more credits when a central 
bank implements more accommodative monetary policy and will have more loanable funds to 
make loans, therefore, they increase their profitability and reduce systemic risks. On the other 
hand, once larger banks receive more credits, investors will have more optimistic expectations 
about banks’ fundamentals in the future and boost stock prices of larger banks, resulting in 
lower systemic risk. Thirdly, regression (6) shows that the interaction term between non-
interest income/total income and log difference of the ECB monthly asset is negative and 
significant with SRISK, indicating that banks with more diversified income structure will have 
lower systemic risks than banks with less diversified income structure when the ECB expands 
its balance sheet. This finding can be interpreted as follows: if the ECB purchases more assets 
and expands its balance sheets, more liquidity is injected into financial markets, more loanable 
funds will be supplied and the effective interest rates will be reduced, then banks’ net interest 
margins will decline. Therefore, banks that rely more on non-interest incomes will be less 
vulnerable to the decrease in net interest margins and will have higher profitability and lower 
systemic risk.  
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Our main results in table 4-4 indicate that only the shadow rate is negative and significant with 
LRMES, while the log difference of the ECB monthly asset is positive and significant. These 
results indicate that banks’ systemic risk increases if the ECB adopts the expansionary 
monetary policy and provide further support for our hypothesis that the ECB’s expansionary 
monetary policy contributes to buildup of systemic risk in European banking sector. Moreover, 
these findings are also consistent with those in Lamers et al. (2019). Second, all regressions 
present that LRMES is positive and significant with loan/earning asset, non-interest 
income/total income, non-performing loans/total loans and deposits/total liabilities. These 
results indicate that (1) banks with riskier asset composition, (2) banks with more diversified 
income structure, (3) banks that have poorer asset quality, and (4) banks that rely more on 
deposit financing will have higher systemic risk. Third, there are four interaction terms that 
have negative and significant coefficients, providing some support for our previous findings.  
In regressions (1) and (2), the coefficient of the Taylor rule residuals is negative but not 
significant with LRMES. These results indicate that Taylor rule residuals provide weak 
explanatory powers in predicting LRMES.  
In regression (3), the coefficient of shadow rate is -0.1351 and has economic significance as 
follows: if the shadow rate decreases by 1%, LRMES will increase by approximately 0.135%. 
The coefficient in regressions (4) has similar economic significance. These negative 
coefficients imply that the lower shadow rate, the more expansionary the monetary policy, the 
higher systemic risk for euro area banks. These results can be explained by the ‘search-for-
yield’ channel as well.  
In regression (5), the coefficient of log difference of the ECB monthly asset is 0.0261 and has 
economic significance as follows: if log difference of the ECB monthly asset increases by 1%, 
LRMES will increase by approximately 0.026%. The coefficient in regressions (6) has similar 
economic significance. These positive coefficients imply that the higher log difference of the 
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ECB monthly asset, the more expansionary the monetary policy, the higher the systemic risk 
for euro area banks. These results are consistent with our hypothesis and can have the same 
explanations as the results in SRISK regressions.  
With regard to bank-specific variables, results in all regressions are as expected. However, 
compared to the results in SRISK regressions, there are three notable differences in the results 
of the LRMES regressions. First, loans/earning assets is positive and significant with LRMES 
but not significant with SRISK. This result can be interpreted as follows: banks that have more 
loans in their balance sheets are more likely to have more default loans, therefore, they may 
have greater contributions to systemic risk in European banking sector. Second, the 
equity/assets ratio is positive and significant with SRISK but loses significance when LRMES 
is dependent variable. Third, the variable total assets is positive and significant with SRISK but 
again insignificantly associated with LRMES. These results show that both capital ratio and 
size have weak explanatory powers in predicting LRMES. The can be possibly explained by 
the different measures and meanings between SRISK and LRMES. On the one hand, LRMES, 
or Long-run Marginal Expected Shortfall, is defined as the expectation of the firm equity over 
a longer period of time arithmetic return conditional on the systemic event. Therefore, LRMES 
reflects the market expectation of bank’s stock return on a specific systemic event. On the other 
hand, SRISK is defined as capital shortfall conditional on the systemic event. Consequently, 
LRMES and SRISK measure banks’ systemic risk from different aspects. The possible 
explanation of the different results between LRMES and SRISK can be: SRISK, which reflects 
the bank’s capital shortfall of a systemic event, is more sensitive to the bank-specific variable 
because bank capital is more relevant to its financial ratios. All the other bank-specific variables, 
including non-performing loan/total loan, non-interest income/total income and deposits/total 
liabilities, have same results and explanations as SRISK regressions.    
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Table 4-4     Results of Banks’ LRMES in Full Sample 
 
Variable                                         (1)                     (2) 
                                                       LRMES           LRMES      
                                                       Full sample          Full sample             
                                                                                                                         
          (3)                       
     LRMES 
 Full sample 
 
        (4)                        (5) 
     LRMES              LRMES 
    Full sample            Full sample         
   (6) 
    LRMES 
  Full sample 
DISPERS 
Standard Taylor Rule Residuals          -0.2556             -0.2556 
                                                       (0.1847)            (0.1821) 
Shadow rate 
 
Log difference of ECB balance sheet  
 
Loan/earning assets                        0.0228*            0.0229*       
                                                       (0.0132)           (0.0132) 
Non-interest income/total income         0.0550***        0.0550*** 
                                                       (0.0115)           (0.0114) 
Non-performing loan/total loan           0.1888***        0.1901*** 
                                                       (0.0111)           (0.0111) 
       
      
     -0.1351*** 
     (0.0197) 
      
      
      0.0242* 
     (0.0132) 
      0.0563*** 
     (0.0114) 
      0.1904*** 
     (0.0111) 
                                
                              
  -0.1340***                 
  (0.0198)                
                                0.0261** 
                               (0.0122)                                      
  0.0231*                 0.0228* 
 (0.0130)                (0.0132) 
  0.0541***             0.0547*** 
 (0.0112)                (0.0115) 
  0.1926***             0.1883*** 
 (0.0106)                (0.0111) 
     
   
   
   
    0.0217* 
   (0.0116)
    0.0226* 
   (0.0132) 
    0.0548*** 
   (0.0115) 
    0.1878*** 
   (0.0111) 
Deposits/total liabilities                 0.0612***        0.0609*** 
                                                      (0.0123)           (0.0123) 
Equity/assets                                 -0.0127             -0.0125 
                                                      (0.0113)           (0.0113) 
Total assets                                     0.0185             0.0183 
                                                      (0.0123)           (0.0124)                      
      0.0617*** 
     (0.0123) 
     -0.0131 
     (0.0113) 
      0.0200 
(0.0122) 
   0.0619***             0.0614*** 
 (0.0123)                (0.0124) 
 -0.0129                  -0.0123        
 (0.0117)                (0.0113) 
  0.0187                   0.0188       
 (0.0118)                (0.0123) 
    0.0615*** 
  (0.0124) 
   -0.0122 
  (0.0113)  
   0.0189 
  (0.0122) 
Loan/EA*MPS                                                       0.0128       
                                                                               (0.0136) 
      
      
  -0.0396***            
 (0.0131)               
    0.0002 
  (0.0116) 
Income structure*MPS                                           0.0154 
                                                                               (0.0112)                    
        -0.0200*                
 (0.0104)                
    0.0017 
  (0.0092) 
NPL/Loan*MPS                                                    -0.0116 
                                                                               (0.0090)    
       
      
  -0.0573***             
 (0.0118)               
   -0.0014 
  (0.0100) 
Deposits/Liabilities*MPS                                      -0.0030 
                                                                               (0.0094) 
      
      
    0.0179                   
  (0.0114)                
    0.0032 
  (0.0104) 
Equity/assets*MPS                                                 0.0009 
                                                                               (0.0105) 
     0.0108 
  (0.0122)                                         
    0.0229     
  (0.0182)     
Total assets*MPS                                                    0.0068 
                                                                               (0.0144) 
    -0.0347*** 
  (0.0120)  
                   
                      
                 
                   
 
   -0.0034 
  (0.0150) 
Obs.                                              6532                    6532                     
 
R2                              
                     
                                                    
0.0416                 0.0421                      
  6532 
 
 
     0.0553 
   6532                    6532 
  
  
     0.0595                0.0755 
     6532 
 
     
   0.0418 
 
 
     
      
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
 
 
 
With regard to the interaction terms, only a few coefficients are significant. In regressions (2) 
and (6), there are no significant coefficients. However, regression (4) reports four significant 
coefficients for interaction terms. Firstly, the interaction term between loan/earning assets and 
shadow rate is negative and significant with LRMES, revealing that banks with riskier asset 
composition will have a more reductions in systemic risk when the ECB has more negative 
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shadow rate. Secondly, the interaction term between non-performing loans/total loans and 
shadow rate is negative and significant with LRMES, indicating that banks with poorer asset 
quality will have less high systemic risk when the ECB has more negative shadow rate. Both  
findings provide evidences for our previous finding that conjectures that riskier banks will have 
greater sensitivities towards the expansionary monetary policy and indicate that riskier banks 
can benefit more from the expansionary monetary policy. Thirdly, the interaction term between 
non-interest income/total income and shadow rate is negative and significant with LRMES, 
demonstrating that banks with more diversified income structures will have a lower systemic 
risk when the ECB has a more negative shadow rate. Finally, the interaction term between total 
assets and shadow rate is negative and significant with LRMES, showing that larger banks can 
benefit more from the more negative shadow rate than smaller banks.  
We also carry out some robustness checks. It is well known that Greece was the first European 
country that claimed its government was unable to repay the government debt in 2010. In 
addition, Greek banks have been more negatively affected by the financial crises and have 
much greater systemic risks. This generates several outliers that make our statistics more 
volatile. Therefore, we removed all Greek banks from our full sample (about 406 observations 
on average per year).  
Table 4-5 presents the results of SRISK in the sample excludes Greek banks. Our main results 
in this table demonstrate similar results as regressions in table 4-3 and provide further 
evidences for our hypothesis. However, there are also some differences between results in table 
4-3 and table 4-5. First, in regression (4), the shadow rate is negative and significant with 
SRISK in table 4-5 while it is insignificant with SRISK in table 4-3. We identify evidences that 
a more negative shadow rate will contribute to the build-up of systemic risk if we exclude 
Greek banks (and no evidence if these latter are included). Second, in regressions (1), (5) and 
(6), the loans/earning assets ratio is weakly positive and significant with SRISK in the sample 
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that excludes the Greek banks while it is insignificant with SRISK in the full sample. We find 
evidences that banks with riskier asset composition may have higher systemic risk if we do not 
include Greek banks while no evidence if we include Greek banks. Third, in regressions (3) 
and (4), both equity/assets and total assets are positive and significant with SRISK in table 4-3 
while they are insignificant in table 4-5.  
Table 4-5    Results of Banks’ SRISK (Excluding Greek Banks) 
 
Variable                                         (1)                     (2) 
                                                       SRISK               SRISK      
                                                         Without                Without 
                                                             Greek banks        Greek banks                  
                                                                                                                         
          (3)                       
      SRISK  
     Without  
 Greek banks 
        (4)                         (5) 
     SRISK                  SRISK 
    Without                Without                                   
Greek banks       Greek banks                       
      (6) 
      SRISK 
Without
Greek banks 
DISPERS 
Standard Taylor Rule Residuals        -0.0682***         -0.0654*** 
                                                     (0.0196)              (0.0192) 
Shadow rate 
 
Log difference of ECB balance sheet  
 
Loan/earning assets                       0.0275*             0.0257       
                                                      (0.0159)            (0.0159) 
Non-interest income/total income       0.1137***          0.1138*** 
                                                      (0.0138)            (0.0139) 
Non-performing loan/total loan          0.2045***         0.2055*** 
                                                      (0.0160)            (0.0160) 
       
      
     -0.0910*** 
    (0.0200) 
      
      
      0.0139        
     (0.0138) 
      0.0554*** 
     (0.0123) 
      0.1838*** 
     (0.0111) 
                                
                              
 -0.0901***                 
(0.0201)                 
                               0.0230*** 
                              (0.0050)   
 0.0125                   0.0290* 
(0.0136)                (0.0160) 
 0.0533***             0.1131*** 
(0.0122)                (0.0139) 
0.1863***              0.2038*** 
(0.0109)                (0.0161) 
     
   
   
   
    0.0242*** 
   (0.0059) 
    0.0289* 
   (0.0160) 
    0.1134*** 
   (0.0139) 
    0.2039*** 
   (0.0162) 
Deposits/total liabilities                0.1298***         0.0130*** 
                                                      (0.0155)           (0.0154) 
Equity/assets                                 0.0982***        0.0992*** 
                                                      (0.0173)           (0.0172) 
Total assets                                    0.0895***        0.0887*** 
                                                      (0.0145)           (0.0143)                      
      0.0757*** 
     (0.0133) 
      0.0029  
     (0.0134) 
      0.0174 
(0.0128) 
  0.0756***             0.1304*** 
(0.0132)                (0.0156) 
 0.0043                   0.0987*** 
(0.0135)                (0.0174) 
 0.0163                   0.0918*** 
(0.0125)                (0.0146) 
     0.1308*** 
   (0.0156) 
    0.0985*** 
   (0.0174)  
    0.0923*** 
   (0.0145) 
Loan/EA*MPS                                                       0.0044       
                                                                               (0.0198) 
      
      
 -0.0334**            
(0.0136)               
    -0.0123 
   (0.0111) 
Income structure*MPS                                          -0.0191 
                                                                               (0.0147)                    
       -0.0136                
(0.0112)                
     0.0138** 
  (0.0067) 
NPL/Loan*MPS                                                    -0.0154 
                                                                               (0.0173)    
       
      
 -0.0526***             
(0.0120)               
     0.0044 
  (0.0105) 
Deposits/Liabilities*MPS                                      -0.0209 
                                                                               (0.0181) 
      
      
  0.0171                  
(0.0128)                
     0.0122** 
   (0.0062) 
Equity/assets*MPS                                                -0.0217 
                                                                               (0.0251) 
  -0.0044 
(0.0143)                                         
    -0.0051     
   (0.0100)     
Total assets*MPS                                                   -0.0109 
                                                                               (0.0177) 
  -0.0296** 
(0.0129)  
                   
                      
                 
                   
 
     0.0019 
   (0.0105) 
Obs.                                              5687                   5687                     
 
R2                              
                     
                                                    
0.0788                0.0799                     
     5687    
 
 
     0.0507 
   5687                      5687 
  
  
0.0543                   0.0753 
  5687 
 
     
     0.1149 
      
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
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Therefore, we identify strong evidences that well-capitalized and larger banks will have higher 
systemic risk if we include Greek banks while no evidence if we exclude Greek banks. Fourth, 
in regression (4), the interaction term between loans/earning assets and shadow rate is negative 
and significant with SRISK in table 4-5 while it is insignificant with SRISK in table 4-3. We 
find evidence for banks with riskier asset composition will benefit more from the expansionary 
monetary policy if we exclude Greek banks while no evidence if we include Greek banks. Fifth, 
in regressions (5) and (6), both interaction terms between non-interest income/total income and 
log difference of the ECB monthly assets, deposits/liabilities and log difference of the ECB 
monthly assets are negative and significant with SRISK in table 4-5 while they are insignificant 
with SRISK in table 4-3. We identify strong evidences for banks with more diversified income 
structure and rely more on deposit financing benefit more from the expansionary monetary 
policy if we exclude Greek banks while no evidence if we include Greek banks.    
Table 4-6 shows the results of LRMES with the sample exclude Greek banks. Our main results 
in this table present similar results as regressions in table 4-4 and confirm our hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, there are several differences between results in table 4-4 and table 4-6. First, in 
regressions (3) and (4), the shadow rate is negative and significant with LRMES in table 4-4 
while it is insignificant with LRMES in table 4-6. We find evidences for more negative shadow 
rate will contribute the build-up of systemic risk if we include Greek banks while no evidence 
if we exclude Greek banks. Second, in regressions (1), (2), (5) and (6), the loan/earning assets 
ratio is positive and significant with LRMES in table 4-4 while it is insignificant with SRISK 
in table 4-6. We find weak evidences for banks with riskier asset composition may have higher 
systemic risk if we include Greek banks while no evidence if we exclude Greek banks. Third, 
in regressions (2), the interaction term between non-interest income/total income is positive 
and significant with LRMES in table 4-6 while it is 
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Table 4-6    Results of Banks’ LRMES (Excluding Greek Banks)     
 
 
 
Variable                                          (1)                     (2) 
                                                       LRMES            LRMES      
                                                          Without                Without                    
                                                           Greek banks         Greek banks                                                              
     (3)                                     
LRMES   
Without 
Greek banks
 (4)                          (5) 
     LRMES                LRMES 
      Without                    Without 
Greek banks             Greek banks                                                      
     (6) 
   LRMES 
    Without 
Greek banks
DISPERS   
Standard Taylor Rule Residuals          -0.1832               -0.1812 
                                                       (0.1924)             (0.1899) 
Shadow rate 
 
Log difference of ECB balance sheet  
 
Loan/earning assets                         0.0128                0.0136       
                                                        (0.0138)             (0.0139) 
Non-interest income/total income         0.0543***           0.0546*** 
                                                       (0.0123)              (0.0123) 
Non-performing loan/total loan           0.1824***           0.1832*** 
                                                       (0.0112)              (0.0111) 
       
      
     -0.0159 
     (0.0157) 
      
      
     0.0290*        
    (0.0160) 
     0.1133*** 
    (0.0139) 
     0.2047*** 
    (0.0159) 
                                
                              
 -0.0132               
 (0.0155)                 
                                 0.0233** 
                                (0.0103)   
 0.0268*                   0.0131 
(0.0159)                  (0.0138) 
 0.1118***              0.0543*** 
(0.0139)                  (0.0123) 
 0.2078***              0.1821*** 
(0.0158)                  (0.0112) 
     
   
   
   
     0.0241** 
    (0.0098) 
     0.0130 
    (0.0139) 
     0.0546*** 
    (0.0122) 
     0.1821*** 
    (0.0111) 
Deposits/total liabilities                 0.0753***           0.0740*** 
                                                       (0.0133)              (0.0133) 
Equity/assets                                   0.0029                0.0032 
                                                       (0.0133)              (0.0133) 
Total assets                                      0.0163                0.0166 
                                                       (0.0129)              (0.0130)                      
     0.1306*** 
    (0.0156) 
     0.0984***  
    (0.0174) 
     0.0920*** 
(0.0146) 
  0.1303***              0.0754*** 
(0.0155)                  (0.0133) 
 0.1006***              0.0031        
(0.0175)                  (0.0133) 
 0.0912***              0.0166 
(0.0146)                  (0.0129) 
      0.0755*** 
    (0.0133) 
     0.0028 
    (0.0134)  
     0.0169 
    (0.0128) 
Loan/EA*MPS                                                           0.0097       
                                                                                   (0.0132) 
      
      
 -0.0180            
(0.0147)               
     -0.0028 
    (0.0099) 
Income structure*MPS                                               0.0293** 
                                                                                   (0.0126)                    
       -0.0136                
(0.0132)                
      0.0084* 
    (0.0050) 
NPL/Loan*MPS                                                         0.0032 
                                                                                   (0.0114)    
       
      
 -0.0490***             
(0.0160)               
      0.0087 
    (0.0109) 
Deposits/Liabilities*MPS                                          -0.0090 
                                                                                   (0.0097) 
      
      
  0.0023                   
(0.0119)                
      0.0020 
    (0.0102) 
Equity/assets*MPS                                                    -0.0001 
                                                                                   (0.0117) 
  -0.0256 
(0.0161)                                         
     -0.0078     
    (0.0151)     
Total assets*MPS                                                        0.0082 
                                                                                   (0.0141) 
  -0.0160 
(0.0126)  
                   
                      
                 
                   
 
      0.0021 
    (0.0093) 
Obs.                                                   5687                   5687                     
 
R2                              
                     
                                                         
0.0452                0.0463                      
5687 
 
 
      0.0745 
   5687                       5687 
  
  
0.0778                     0.0451 
  5687 
 
     
      0.0761 
      
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
 
insignificant with LRMES in table 4-4. Therefore, if we exclude Greek banks we identify 
strong evidence for banks with more diversified income structure will benefit more from the 
expansionary monetary policy while no evidence. Fourth, in regressions (3) and (4), both 
equity/assets and total assets are positive and significant with LRMES in table 4-6 while they 
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are insignificant with LRMES in table 4-4. We find strong evidences for well-capitalized and 
larger banks will have higher systemic risk if we exclude Greek banks while no evidence if we 
include Greek banks. Fifth, in regression (4), all interaction terms between loan/earning assets 
and shadow rate, non-interest income/total income and shadow rate, total assets and shadow 
rate are negative and significant with LRMES in table 4-4 while they are insignificant with 
LRMES in table 4-6. We identify strong evidences for banks with riskier asset composition, 
more diversified income structure and larger size will benefit more from the expansionary 
monetary policy if we contain Greek banks while no evidence if we exclude Greek banks. 
Finally, in regression (6), the interaction term between non-interest income/total income and 
log difference of the ECB monthly asset is positive and significant with LRMES in table 4-6 
while it is insignificant with LRMES in table 4-4. We identify weak evidence for banks with 
more diversified income structure will benefit more from the expansionary monetary policy if 
we exclude Greek banks while no evidence if we include Greek banks.    
Furthermore, the expansionary monetary policy may have different impacts on banks in core 
and periphery countries in the Euro Area.  This issue is investigated in the next section.  
4.6.2   Results of Core Countries and Periphery Countries 
Previous studies have explored whether the ECB’s accommodative monetary policy has 
different effects on systemic risks of banks operating in core and periphery countries (see e.g. 
Lamers et al. (2019) who recently found that the effects are more pronounced for banks 
headquartered in the periphery countries). Here we follow Afonso et al. (2018) and divide the 
full sample into two subsamples: banks headquartered in core countries and banks 
headquartered in periphery countries. Core countries include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, and Netherlands while periphery countries include Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain.  
Tables 4-7 and 4-8 present the results of SRISK of banks headquartered in core countries and 
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periphery countries, respectively. Most coefficients in the two tables have the same signs and 
significance. First, in regressions (1) - (4) in both tables, Taylor rule residuals and shadow rates 
are negative and significant with SRISK of banks headquartered in core and periphery  
 
Table 4-7    Results of Banks’ SRISK in Core Countries 
 
 
 
Variable                                         (1)                     (2) 
                                                       SRISK               SRISK      
                                                    Core countries     Core countries               
                                                                                                                         
          (3)                       
      SRISK  
 Core countries 
        (4)                        (5) 
     SRISK                 SRISK 
Core countries      Core countries 
   (6) 
     SRISK 
Core countries 
DISPERS  
Standard Taylor Rule Residuals         -0.1091***       -0.0868*** 
                                                      (0.0347)            (0.0365) 
Shadow rate 
 
Log difference of ECB balance sheet  
 
Loan/earning assets                        0.0648**         0.0558**       
                                                       (0.0270)          (0.0259) 
Non-interest income/total income         0.1856***       0.1990*** 
                                                       (0.0275)          (0.0274) 
Non-performing loan/total loan           0.2580***       0.2549*** 
                                                       (0.0240)          (0.0232) 
       
      
     -0.1175*** 
     (0.0254) 
      
      
      0.0662**        
     (0.0271) 
      0.1817*** 
     (0.0276) 
      0.2524*** 
     (0.0241) 
                                
                              
 -0.1060***                 
  (0.0245)                 
                                0.0347*** 
                               (0.0128)   
  0.0632**               0.0691** 
 (0.0276)                (0.0272) 
  0.1934***             0.1819*** 
 (0.0289)                (0.0275) 
  0.2573***             0.2561*** 
 (0.0236)                (0.0240) 
     
   
   
   
  0.1737 
 (0.1275) 
  0.0703*** 
 (0.0271) 
  0.1800*** 
 (0.0272) 
  0.2557*** 
 (0.0241) 
Deposits/total liabilities                  0.2124***       0.2205*** 
                                                       (0.0284)          (0.0283) 
Equity/assets                                   0.1421***       0.1485*** 
                                                       (0.0289)          (0.0283) 
Total assets                                      0.1152***       0.1196*** 
                                                       (0.0301)          (0.0299)                      
      0.2095*** 
     (0.0284) 
      0.1419***  
     (0.0289) 
      0.1222*** 
(0.0299) 
   0.2058***             0.2119*** 
 (0.0284)                (0.0285) 
  0.1413***             0.1424***        
 (0.0287)                (0.0290) 
  0.1314***             0.1216***     
 (0.0331)                (0.0300) 
   0.2123*** 
 (0.0286) 
  0.1424*** 
 (0.0290)  
  0.1213*** 
 (0.0300) 
Loan/EA*MPS                                                        1.4040       
                                                                               (0.9645) 
      
      
  -0.0029            
 (0.0320)               
  -0.3179 
 (0.2035) 
Income structure*MPS                                          -1.3016** 
                                                                               (0.5818)                    
         0.0242                
 (0.0252)                
   0.1203 
 (0.1607) 
NPL/Loan*MPS                                                     0.0241 
                                                                               (0.8177)    
       
      
  -0.0688*             
 (0.0358)               
   0.0293 
 (0.1622) 
Deposits/Liabilities*MPS                                      -1.6137** 
                                                                               (0.7355) 
      
      
  -0.0263                   
 (0.0285)                
   0.1750 
 (0.1662) 
Equity/assets*MPS                                                -1.1463 
                                                                               (0.8321) 
   -0.0734* 
 (0.0412)                                         
  -0.1977     
 (0.4086)     
Total assets*MPS                                                    1.3668 
                                                                               (0.8879) 
    0.0213 
 (0.0406)  
                   
                      
             
                   
 
  -0.0002 
 (0.0005) 
Obs.                                                 2709                 2709                     
 
R2                              
                     
                                                       
0.1149              0.1223                     
    2709 
 
 
      0.1181 
    2709                      2709 
  
  
 0.1227                   0.1084 
    2709 
 
     
 0.1106 
 
 
     
      
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
 
countries. These results are consistent with our previous findings and provide further support 
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for our hypothesis that the expansionary monetary policies will contribute to the buildup of 
systemic risks of euro area banks in the long term. Second, with the only exception of 
loan/earning asset ratio, in all models in both tables, coefficients of bank-specific variables are 
positive and significant with SRISK of banks headquartered in core and periphery countries. 
These results confirm our previous findings that banks with more diversified income structure, 
poorer asset quality, more reliant on deposit funding, more capitalized and larger in asset size 
are associated with higher systemic risk. Third, in regression (4) in both tables, the interaction 
terms between non-performing loan/total loan and shadow rate, equity/assets and shadow rate 
are negative and significantly correlated with SRISK of banks headquartered in core and 
periphery countries. The first result provides further evidence for our previous finding that 
conjectures that riskier banks will be more sensitive towards the expansionary monetary policy.  
However, there are also several important differences among the coefficients in the two tables. 
First, in regressions (1) and (2), the absolute values of coefficients of Taylor rule residuals are 
considerably bigger for banks headquartered in periphery countries than for banks 
headquartered in core countries. The economic significance is that SRISK of banks 
headquartered in periphery countries will increase by about 0.36%-0.38% while SRISK of 
banks headquartered in core countries will increase by only about 0.09%-0.11% if the Taylor 
rule residuals decrease by 1%. These results support the conclusion proposed by Lamers et al. 
(2019) that effects of the expansionary monetary policy are more pronounced for banks in 
headquartered in periphery countries and our previous finding. Second, in regression (2), the 
interaction term between non-interest income/total income and Taylor rule residuals, 
deposits/liabilities and Taylor rule residuals are negative and significantly associated with the 
SRISK of banks headquartered in core countries. Conversely, the interaction term between non-
performing loans/total loans and Taylor rule residuals is negative and significant with SRISK 
of banks headquartered in periphery countries. Third, in regression (4), the interaction terms 
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between non-interest income/total income and shadow rate, total assets and shadow rate are 
negative and significant with SRISK of banks headquartered in periphery countries while they 
are insignificant with SRISK of banks headquartered in core countries.  
Table 4-8     Results of Banks’ SRISK in Periphery Countries 
 
 
Variable                                         (1)                      (2) 
                                                       SRISK               SRISK      
                                                        Periphery             Periphery 
                                                               Countries             Countries               
                                                                                                                         
           (3)                       
       SRISK  
      Periphery   
      Countries            
 
       (4)                        (5) 
     SRISK                 SRISK 
    Periphery                Periphery 
    Countries                Countries 
   (6) 
     SRISK 
    Periphery 
    Countries 
DISPERS  
Standard Taylor Rule Residuals         -0.3666***        -0.3821*** 
                                                      (0.0742)             (0.0730) 
Shadow rate 
 
Log difference of ECB balance sheet  
 
Loan/earning assets                        0.0075              0.0073       
                                                      (0.0075)            (0.0075) 
Non-interest income/total income         0.0307***        0.0313*** 
                                                      (0.0058)            (0.0058) 
Non-performing loan/total loan           0.0980***        0.0997*** 
                                                      (0.0118)            (0.0116) 
       
      
     -0.0835*** 
     (0.0092) 
      
      
      0.0087        
     (0.0075) 
      0.0322*** 
     (0.0057) 
      0.0976*** 
     (0.0118) 
                                
                              
  -0.0833***                 
  (0.0090)                 
                                 0.0049 
                                (0.0043)   
   0.0071                   0.0074 
  (0.0076)                (0.0075) 
   0.0318***             0.0307*** 
  (0.0058)                (0.0058) 
   0.1018***             0.0976*** 
  (0.0111)                (0.0118) 
     
   
   
   
  0.0073 
 (0.0058) 
  0.0072 
 (0.0076) 
  0.0311*** 
 (0.0058) 
  0.0971*** 
 (0.0118) 
Deposits/total liabilities                 0.0236**          0.0237** 
                                                      (0.0092)            (0.0092) 
Equity/assets                                  0.0262***        0.0272*** 
                                                      (0.0061)            (0.0061) 
Total assets                                     0.0259***        0.0256*** 
                                                      (0.0088)            (0.0088)                      
      0.0239*** 
     (0.0091) 
      0.0256***  
     (0.0061) 
      0.0280*** 
(0.0087) 
   0.0242***             0.0240*** 
 (0.0091)                 (0.0091) 
  0.0284***             0.0264***        
 (0.0063)                 (0.0061) 
  0.0270***             0.0263*** 
 (0.0085)                 (0.0087) 
   0.0244*** 
 (0.0091) 
  0.0266*** 
 (0.0060)  
  0.0263*** 
 (0.0088) 
Loan/EA*MPS                                                       0.0120       
                                                                               (0.0080) 
      
      
  -0.0100            
 (0.0065)               
   0.0013 
 (0.0071) 
Income structure*MPS                                           0.0062 
                                                                               (0.0060)                    
        -0.0155***                
 (0.0052)                
  -0.0052 
 (0.0060) 
NPL/Loan*MPS                                                    -0.0310*** 
                                                                               (0.0117)    
       
      
  -0.0643***             
 (0.0098)               
   0.0079 
 (0.0071) 
Deposits/Liabilities*MPS                                       0.0003 
                                                                               (0.0115) 
      
      
   0.0020                   
 (0.0079)                
   0.0035 
 (0.0037) 
Equity/assets*MPS                                                -0.0098 
                                                                               (0.0086) 
   -0.0094** 
 (0.0043)                                         
   0.0109     
 (0.0070)     
Total assets*MPS                                                   -0.0034 
                                                                               (0.0110) 
   -0.0125** 
 (0.0063)  
                   
                      
             
                   
 
   0.0032 
 (0.0109) 
Obs.                                                3728                  3728                     
 
R2                              
                     
                                                      
0.0578               0.0642                      
    3728 
 
 
      0.0821 
    3728                      3728 
  
  
 0.1024                    0.0489 
    3728 
 
     
 0.0502 
 
 
     
      
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
 
Tables 4-9 and 4-10 report the results for banks headquartered in core and periphery countries 
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when the dependent variable is LRMES. As for the case of SRISK, most coefficients in the  
 
Table 4-9     Results of Banks’ LRMES in Core Countries    
 
 
 
Variable                                        (1)                      (2) 
                                                      LRMES             LRMES      
                                                           Core                      Core 
                                                               Countries             Countries               
                                                                                                                         
           (3)                       
      LRMES  
          Core   
      Countries            
 
       (4)                        (5) 
    LRMES               LRMES 
       Core                         Core 
    Countries                Countries 
   (6) 
    LRMES 
        Core 
    Countries 
DISPERS  
Standard Taylor Rule Residuals          -0.0090              -0.0141 
                                                      (0.0213)             (0.0227) 
Shadow rate 
 
Log difference of ECB balance sheet  
 
Loan/earning assets                        0.0208               0.0203       
                                                      (0.0201)             (0.0199) 
Non-interest income/total income         0.0262               0.0264 
                                                      (0.0215)             (0.0215) 
Non-performing loan/total loan           0.1147***         0.1149*** 
                                                      (0.0138)             (0.0138) 
       
      
      0.0240 
     (0.0209) 
      
      
      0.0202        
     (0.0201) 
      0.0258 
     (0.0214) 
      0.1140*** 
     (0.0136) 
                                
                              
   0.0277                 
  (0.0210)                 
                                 0.0390*** 
                                (0.0100)   
   0.0140                   0.0214 
  (0.0187)                (0.0202) 
   0.0264                   0.0257 
  (0.0213)                (0.0214) 
   0.1185***             0.1141*** 
  (0.0141)                (0.0138) 
     
   
   
   
  0.0488*** 
 (0.0174) 
  0.0225 
 (0.0197) 
  0.0256 
 (0.0214) 
  0.1142*** 
 (0.0138) 
Deposits/total liabilities                 0.0785***         0.0775*** 
                                                      (0.0177)            (0.0177) 
Equity/assets                                  0.0382**           0.0377** 
                                                      (0.0188)            (0.0187) 
Total assets                                     0.0112               0.0133 
                                                      (0.0206)            (0.0203)                      
      0.0779*** 
     (0.0177) 
      0.0381**  
     (0.0188) 
      0.0113 
(0.0299) 
    0.0773***             0.0775*** 
  (0.0177)                 (0.0177) 
   0.0392**               0.0382**        
  (0.0191)                 (0.0187) 
   0.0142                    0.0115    
  (0.0199)                 (0.0206)  
 
   0.0772** 
 (0.0177) 
  0.0388** 
 (0.0187)  
  0.0124 
 (0.0203) 
Loan/EA*MPS                                                        0.0135       
                                                                               (0.0249) 
      
      
   -0.0640***           
  (0.0169)               
  -0.0105 
 (0.0349) 
Income structure*MPS                                           0.0287 
                                                                               (0.0202)                    
          0.0280                
  (0.0186)                
   0.0201*** 
 (0.0140) 
NPL/Loan*MPS                                                     0.0216* 
                                                                               (0.0123)    
       
      
   -0.0359**             
  (0.0167)               
   0.0056 
 (0.0145) 
Deposits/Liabilities*MPS                                       0.0219 
                                                                               (0.0166) 
      
      
    0.0129                   
  (0.0159)                
   0.0043 
 (0.0248) 
Equity/assets*MPS                                                -0.0155 
                                                                               (0.0169) 
    -0.0252 
  (0.0209)                                         
  -0.0027     
 (0.0270)     
Total assets*MPS                                                    0.0784*** 
                                                                               (0.0247) 
    -0.0103 
  (0.0218)  
                   
                      
             
                   
 
  -0.0063 
 (0.0324) 
Obs.                                                2709                  2709                     
 
R2                              
                     
                                                      
0.0379               0.0445                      
    2709 
 
 
      0.0389 
      2709                       2709 
  
  
   0.0489                     0.0387 
    2709 
 
     
 0.0390 
 
 
     
      
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
 
two tables have the same signs and significance. First, in regressions (1) and (2) in both tables, 
Taylor rule residuals are negative and insignificant with LRMES of banks headquartered in 
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core and periphery countries. These results are slightly different from our  
previous findings. Second, in all regressions in both tables, non-performance loan/total loan, 
deposits/total liabilities and equity/assets are positive and significant. These results confirm our 
previous findings that banks with poorer asset quality, more rely on deposit funding, more 
capital will have higher systemic risk. Third, in regression (4) in both tables, the interaction 
terms between non-performing loan/total loan and shadow rate is negative and significant with 
LRMES of banks headquartered in core and periphery countries. This result provides further 
evidence for our previous finding of riskier banks will have greater sensitivities towards the 
expansionary monetary policy.  
There are however, several key differences among the coefficients in the two tables. First, in 
regressions (3) and (4), the log difference of the ECB monthly asset is positive and insignificant 
with LRMES of banks headquartered in periphery countries while it is negative and significant 
with LRMES of banks headquartered in core countries. These results are similar to previous 
findings in SRISK regressions and have similar explanations. Second, in all regressions, the 
interaction term between non-interest income/total income and monetary policy shocks is 
positive and significant with LRMES of banks headquartered in periphery countries while it is 
negative and insignificant with LRMES of banks headquartered in core countries. Third, in 
regressions (3) and (4), the interaction term between total assets and shadow rate is positive 
and significant with LRMES of banks headquartered in periphery countries while it is 
insignificant with LRMES of banks headquartered in core countries. Fourth, in regressions (2), 
(4) and (6), the signs and significance of many coefficients are different in these two tables. 
For example, in regression (4) in table 4-10, shadow rate is negative and significant with 
LRMES of banks headquartered in periphery countries. Conversely, in regression (4) in table 
4-9, shadow rate is positive and insignificant with LRMES of banks headquartered in core 
countries. This different result reflects that LRMES of banks headquartered in periphery 
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countries is generally more sensitive to the accommodative monetary policy (e.g. more 
negative shadow rate) than LRMES of banks headquartered in core countries. Moreover, the 
more expansionary monetary policy  
 
Table 4-10    Results of Banks’ LRMES in Periphery Countries    
 
 
Variable                                        (1)                      (2) 
                                                      LRMES             LRMES      
                                                        Periphery             Periphery 
                                                               Countries             Countries               
                                                                                                                         
           (3)                       
      LRMES  
      Periphery 
      Countries            
 
       (4)                        (5) 
    LRMES               LRMES 
    Periphery                Periphery 
    Countries                Countries 
   (6) 
    LRMES 
    Periphery 
    Countries 
DISPERS  
Standard Taylor Rule Residuals         -0.3250               -0.3604 
                                                      (0.2753)             (0.2716) 
Shadow rate 
 
Log difference of ECB balance sheet  
 
Loan/earning assets                        0.0225               0.0236       
                                                      (0.0174)             (0.0172) 
Non-interest income/total income         0.0728***         0.0745*** 
                                                      (0.0178)             (0.0176) 
Non-performing loan/total loan           0.2356***         0.2368*** 
                                                      (0.0166)             (0.0164) 
       
      
     -0.2789*** 
     (0.0234) 
      
      
      0.0243        
     (0.0173) 
      0.0758*** 
     (0.0177) 
      0.2364*** 
     (0.0165) 
                                
                              
  -0.2776***                 
  (0.0231)                 
                                 0.0224* 
                                (0.0124)   
   0.0233                   0.0223 
  (0.0180)                (0.0174) 
   0.0764***             0.0731*** 
  (0.0175)                (0.0178) 
   0.2386***             0.2350*** 
  (0.0152)                (0.0166) 
     
   
   
   
  0.0313*** 
 (0.0110) 
  0.0224 
 (0.0173) 
  0.0746*** 
 (0.0178) 
  0.2339*** 
 (0.0165) 
Deposits/total liabilities                 0.0324**            0.0321** 
                                                      (0.0151)             (0.0152) 
Equity/assets                                  0.0550***          0.0543*** 
                                                  (0.0144)             (0.0146) 
Total assets                                     0.0282                0.0277 
                      (0.0186)   (0.0186) 
Loan/EA*MPS                                    0.0204 
   (0.0145) 
Income structure*MPS                                             0.0275* 
                                                                                 (0.0149)                    
      0.0239*** 
     (0.0091) 
      0.0256*** 
     (0.0061)       
      0.0280*** 
     (0.0087) 
       
    0.0242***             0.0329** 
  (0.0091)                (0.0152) 
   0.0284***            -0.0546*** 
  (0.0063)                (0.0144) 
   0.0270***             0.0285 
  (0.0085)                (0.0186) 
  -0.0100 
  (0.0065) 
  -0.0485***                
  (0.0157)                
   0.0338** 
 (0.0152) 
 -0.0539*** 
 (0.0144) 
  0.0284 
 (0.0185) 
  0.0026 
 (0.0203) 
 -0.0192 
 (0.0167) 
NPL/Loan*MPS                                                      -0.0194 
                                                                                 (0.0145)    
       
      
   -0.0828***             
  (0.0146)               
  -0.0003 
 (0.0138) 
Deposits/Liabilities*MPS                                         0.0045 
                                                                                 (0.0128) 
      
      
    0.0025                   
  (0.0145)                
   0.0043 
 (0.0119) 
Equity/assets*MPS                                                   0.0023 
                                                                                 (0.0158) 
     0.0305** 
  (0.0131)                                         
   0.0351     
 (0.0264)     
Total assets*MPS                                                     -0.0030 
                                                                                 (0.0153) 
    -0.0610*** 
  (0.0171)  
                   
                      
             
                   
 
   0.0164 
 (0.0225) 
Obs.                                                3728                   3728                    
 
R2                              
                     
                                                      
0.0426                0.0442                      
    3728 
 
 
      0.1076 
     3728                        3728 
  
  
   0.1167                     0.0422 
    3728 
 
     
 0.0433 
 
 
     
      
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
 
contributes to the buildup of systemic risk in long-term for banks headquartered in periphery 
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countries. This can be possibly explained as follows: banks headquartered in periphery 
countries have poorer fundamentals than banks headquartered in core countries and are more 
sensitive to more accommodation monetary policy.  
4.6.3 Results of Crisis and Non-crisis Period  
Prior to the financial crises, major central banks adopted the conventional monetary policy (e.g. 
changes in interest rate and required reserve ratio). However, they implemented more 
expansionary unconventional monetary policy tools in crisis period (e.g. quantitative easing or 
asset purchase programs). European banks may respond to the expansionary monetary policy 
differently. In order to examine whether this difference holds, we will divide our full sample 
into two subsamples: banks in crisis and non-crisis period.  
In order to investigate the different effects of monetary policy shocks on banks’ systemic risk 
measures, we follow Afonso et al. (2018) to divide the full sample into banks in crisis period 
(August 2007 – July 2012) and banks in non-crisis period. This latter covers the two pricing 
regimes (September 2004 – July 2007 and August 2012 – March 2017) that have low/reduced 
absolute values of coefficients of risk factors while crisis period covers the one pricing regime 
that have relatively high absolute values of coefficients of risk factors. Then we will analyze 
the results of banks’ SRISK and LRMES in crisis and non-crisis periods. 
Tables 4-11 and 4-12 present the results of banks’ SRISK in crisis period and non-crisis period, 
respectively. On the one hand, most coefficients in the two tables have the same signs and 
significance. First, in all regressions in the two tables, Taylor rule residuals and shadow rate 
are negative and significant with banks’ SRISK while log difference of ECB monthly 
total assets is positively and significantly related with banks’ SRISK in crisis and non-crisis 
periods. These results are consistent with our previous findings and provide further evidence 
for our hypothesis that the expansionary monetary policies will contribute to the buildup of 
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Table 4-11     Results of Banks’ SRISK in Crisis Period 
 
Variable                                         (1)                     (2) 
                                                       SRISK               SRISK      
                                                           Crisis                    Crisis               
                                                                                                                         
          (3)                       
      SRISK  
        Crisis 
        (4)                        (5) 
     SRISK                 SRISK 
       Crisis                      Crisis 
   (6) 
     SRISK 
       Crisis 
DISPERS  
Standard Taylor Rule Residuals          -0.0200*           -0.0193* 
                                                       (0.0107)            (0.0115) 
Shadow rate 
 
Log difference of ECB balance sheet  
 
Loan/earning assets                        0.0058              0.0102       
                                                       (0.0246)           (0.0247) 
Non-interest income/total income         0.1036***        0.0977*** 
                                                       (0.0222)           (0.0227) 
Non-performing loan/total loan           0.2236***        0.2234*** 
                                                       (0.0237)           (0.0232) 
       
      
     -0.0730*** 
     (0.0270) 
      
      
      0.0068        
     (0.0246) 
      0.1031*** 
     (0.0222) 
      0.2235*** 
     (0.0232) 
                                
                              
  -0.0701***                 
  (0.0256)                 
                                0.0283*** 
                               (0.0053)   
  0.0248                   0.0056 
 (0.0265)                (0.0248) 
  0.1055***             0.1025*** 
 (0.0287)                (0.0220) 
  0.2632***             0.2220*** 
 (0.0275)                (0.0236) 
     
   
   
   
  0.0252*** 
 (0.0051) 
  0.0053 
 (0.0250) 
  0.1026*** 
 (0.0220) 
  0.2215*** 
 (0.0239) 
Deposits/total liabilities                  0.1488***       0.1474*** 
                                                       (0.0276)          (0.0282) 
Equity/assets                                   0.1189***       0.1156*** 
                                                       (0.0243)          (0.0245) 
Total assets                                      0.0769***       0.0826*** 
                                                       (0.0243)          (0.0254)                      
      0.1505*** 
     (0.0276) 
      0.1185***  
     (0.0245) 
      0.0811*** 
(0.0244) 
   0.1358***             0.1501*** 
 (0.0364)                (0.0275) 
  0.1461***             0.1192***        
 (0.0320)                (0.0244) 
  0.1190***             0.0776***  
 (0.0311)                (0.0242) 
   0.1514*** 
 (0.0277) 
  0.1190*** 
 (0.0253)  
  0.0777*** 
 (0.0242) 
Loan/EA*MPS                                                        0.0148       
                                                                               (0.0227) 
      
      
  -0.0395                   
 (0.0389)               
  -0.0106 
 (0.0095) 
Income structure*MPS                                           -0.0177 
                                                                               (0.0185)                    
        -0.0064                
 (0.0321)                
   0.0046 
 (0.0106) 
NPL/Loan*MPS                                                     -0.0015 
                                                                               (0.0195)    
       
      
  -0.0796**             
 (0.0371)               
   0.0080 
 (0.0145) 
Deposits/Liabilities*MPS                                      -0.0075 
                                                                               (0.0241) 
      
      
   0.0307                   
 (0.0360)                
   0.0118* 
 (0.0063) 
Equity/assets*MPS                                                -0.0115 
                                                                               (0.0335) 
   -0.0487 
 (0.0344)                                         
  -0.0001     
 (0.0076)     
Total assets*MPS                                                    0.0098 
                                                                               (0.0199) 
   -0.0704** 
 (0.0316)  
                   
                      
             
                   
 
  -0.0028 
 (0.0071) 
Obs.                                                2529                  2529                     
 
R2                              
                     
                                                      
0.0729               0.0738                      
    2529 
 
 
      0.0741 
    2529                      2529 
  
  
 0.0786                   0.0736 
    2529 
 
     
 0.0741 
 
 
     
      
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
 
systemic risks of euro area banks in the long term. Second, in all regressions in both tables, all 
coefficients of bank-specific variables except loan/earning assets ratio are positive and 
significant with banks’ SRISK in crisis and non-crisis periods. These results confirm our 
previous findings that banks with more diversified income structure, poorer asset quality, more 
rely on deposit funding, more capital and larger size will have higher systemic risk. 
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Table 4-12     Results of Banks’ SRISK in Non-Crisis Period 
 
Variable                                         (1)                     (2) 
                                                       SRISK               SRISK      
                                                      Non-crisis              Non-crisis               
                                                                                                                         
          (3)                       
      SRISK  
  Non-crisis 
        (4)                        (5) 
     SRISK                 SRISK 
    Non-crisis               Non-crisis 
   (6) 
     SRISK 
    Non-crisis 
DISPERS  
Standard Taylor Rule Residuals          -0.0592***      -0.0539*** 
                                                      (0.0169)            (0.0157) 
Shadow rate 
 
Log difference of ECB balance sheet  
 
Loan/earning assets                         0.0115             0.0170       
                                                       (0.0163)           (0.0179) 
Non-interest income/total income         0.0857***        0.0882*** 
                                                       (0.0131)           (0.0140) 
Non-performing loan/total loan           0.1649***        0.1753*** 
                                                       (0.0176)           (0.0177) 
       
      
     -0.0762*** 
     (0.0093) 
      
      
      0.0152        
     (0.0161) 
      0.0895*** 
     (0.0130) 
      0.1692*** 
     (0.0174) 
                                
                              
  -0.0740***                 
  (0.0092)                 
                                0.0223** 
                               (0.0090)   
  0.0087                   0.0165 
 (0.0163)                (0.0168) 
  0.0812***             0.0899*** 
 (0.0135)                (0.0132) 
  0.1572***             0.1684*** 
 (0.0159)                (0.0180) 
     
   
   
   
  0.0215** 
 (0.0085) 
  0.0170 
 (0.0167) 
  0.0896*** 
 (0.0133) 
  0.1691*** 
 (0.0179) 
Deposits/total liabilities                  0.1025***       0.1072*** 
                                                       (0.0150)          (0.0148) 
Equity/assets                                   0.0832***       0.0894*** 
                                                       (0.0150)          (0.0150) 
Total assets                                      0.0696***      0.0797*** 
                                                       (0.0128)          (0.0130)                      
      0.1025*** 
     (0.0150) 
      0.0822***  
     (0.0151) 
      0.0708*** 
(0.0128) 
   0.0979***             0.1009*** 
 (0.0149)                (0.0150) 
  0.0788***             0.0832***        
 (0.0143)                (0.0150) 
  0.0659***             0.0731**     
 (0.0136)                (0.0128) 
   0.1001*** 
 (0.0150) 
  0.0828*** 
 (0.0150)  
  0.0715*** 
 (0.0131) 
Loan/EA*MPS                                                      -0.0277       
                                                                               (0.0275) 
      
      
  -0.0127            
 (0.0119)               
  -0.0202 
 (0.0133) 
Income structure*MPS                                          -0.0177* 
                                                                               (0.0172)                    
        -0.0233**                
 (0.0119)                
   0.0066 
 (0.0099) 
NPL/Loan*MPS                                                    -0.0398** 
                                                                               (0.0156)    
       
      
  -0.0572***             
 (0.0134)               
  -0.0129 
 (0.0103) 
Deposits/Liabilities*MPS                                      -0.0208 
                                                                               (0.0173) 
      
      
  -0.0147                   
 (0.0112)                
   0.1713*** 
 (0.0057) 
Equity/assets*MPS                                                -0.0198* 
                                                                               (0.0118) 
   -0.0230* 
 (0.0125)                                         
   0.0149***    
 (0.0047)     
Total assets*MPS                                                   -0.0486** 
                                                                               (0.0208) 
   -0.0122 
 (0.0103)  
                   
                      
             
                   
 
   0.0112* 
 (0.0058) 
Obs.                                                4003                  4003 
 
R2                              
                     
                                                      
0.0716               0.0740                      
        4003 
 
 
      0.0781 
    4003                      4003 
  
  
 0.0855                    0.0723 
    4003 
 
     
 0.0738 
 
 
     
      
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
 
 
Third, in regression (4) in both tables, the interaction term between non-performing loans/total 
loans and shadow rate is negative and significant with banks’ SRISK in crisis and non-crisis 
periods. Fourth, in regression (6) in both tables, the interaction term between deposits/liabilities 
and log difference of the ECB monthly total assets is positive and significant with banks’ 
SRISK in crisis and non-crisis periods. These results provide further evidences to support our 
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previous finding that riskier banks will be more sensitive to expansionary monetary policy than 
their less risky counterparts.  
On the other hand, there are still several critical differences among the coefficients in the two 
tables. First, in regression (2), the interaction terms between non-interest income/total income 
and Taylor rule residuals, non-performing loans/total loans and Taylor rule residuals, 
equity/assets and Taylor rule residuals, total assets and Taylor rule residuals are negative and 
significant with banks’ SRISK in non-crisis period while they are negative and insignificant 
with banks’ SRISK in crisis period. The former result supports for our previous finding of 
riskier banks will be sensitive to expansionary monetary policy while the latter one does not. 
These different results reflect that riskier banks benefit more from expansionary monetary 
policy in non-crisis period than in crisis period. This can be interpreted as follows: in crisis 
period, the marginal effect of the more accommodative monetary policy on riskier banks 
declines. On the one hand, riskier banks receive more loans and capital from banking regulators 
(and lower capital shortfall) and make more loans to small and medium-sized enterprises. On 
the other hand, however, small and medium-sized enterprises have more non-performing loans 
due to poor macroeconomic condition in crisis period. Therefore, riskier banks may incur more 
losses and thus have more capital shortfall. The two effects are offset with each other and result 
in the lower marginal effect of expansionary monetary policy on riskier banks. Second, in 
regression (4), the interaction terms between non-interest income/total income and shadow rate, 
equity/assets and shadow rate are negative and significant with banks’ SRISK in non-crisis 
period while the interaction term between total assets and shadow rate is negative and 
significant with banks’ SRISK in the crisis period. Third, in regression (6), the interaction terms 
between equity/assets and log difference of the ECB monthly total assets, total assets and log 
difference of the ECB monthly total assets are positive and significant with banks’ SRISK in 
non-crisis period while they are negative and insignificant with banks’ SRISK in crisis period. 
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These results reflect that banks with higher equity ratio and larger size seem to have higher 
systemic risk in non-crisis period but not in crisis period.   
Table 4-13 and table 4-14 report the results of banks’ LRMES in crisis period and non-crisis 
period, respectively. On the one hand, most coefficients in the two tables have the same signs  
Table 4-13     Results of Banks’ LRMES in Crisis Period 
 
Variable                                         (1)                     (2) 
                                                       LRMES            LRMES      
                                                           Crisis                    Crisis               
                                                                                                                         
          (3)                       
      LRMES  
        Crisis 
 
        (4)                        (5) 
     LRMES              LRMES 
       Crisis                      Crisis 
   (6) 
    LRMES 
       Crisis 
DISPERS  
Standard Taylor Rule Residuals          0.0114               0.0116 
                                                      (0.0227)            (0.0224) 
Shadow rate 
 
Log difference of ECB balance sheet  
 
Loan/earning assets                        -0.0009            0.0015       
                                                       (0.0207)          (0.0205) 
Non-interest income/total income         0.0273             0.0303* 
                                                       (0.0172)          (0.0171) 
Non-performing loan/total loan           0.1777***       0.1758*** 
                                                       (0.0160)          (0.0164) 
       
      
     -0.2481*** 
     (0.0410) 
      
      
     -0.0006        
     (0.0206) 
      0.0271 
     (0.0171) 
      0.1781*** 
     (0.0158) 
                                
                              
  -0.2458***                 
  (0.0408)                 
                                0.0335* 
                               (0.0196)   
  0.0054**              -0.0015 
 (0.0250)                (0.0208) 
  0.0402*                 0.0271 
 (0.0237)                (0.0172) 
  0.2096***             0.1775*** 
 (0.0198)                (0.0160) 
     
   
   
   
  0.0325* 
 (0.0192) 
 -0.0017 
 (0.0207) 
  0.0263 
 (0.0170) 
  0.1777*** 
 (0.0162) 
Deposits/total liabilities                  0.0688***       0.0650*** 
                                                       (0.0195)          (0.0208) 
Equity/assets                                  -0.0198            -0.0217 
                                                       (0.0156)          (0.0166) 
Total assets                                     -0.0039            -0.0033 
                                                       (0.0165)          (0.0174)                      
      0.0694*** 
     (0.0196) 
     -0.0205  
     (0.0157) 
     -0.0017 
(0.0165) 
   0.0479*                 0.0692*** 
 (0.0266)                (0.0196) 
 -0.0232                  -0.0200        
 (0.0204)                (0.0156) 
  0.0077                  -0.0044 
 (0.0221)                (0.0166) 
   0.0690*** 
 (0.0199) 
 -0.0197 
 (0.0164)  
 -0.0048 
 (0.0168) 
Loan/EA*MPS                                                        0.0074       
                                                                               (0.0149) 
      
      
  -0.0146            
 (0.0267)               
  -0.0165* 
 (0.0087) 
Income structure*MPS                                           0.0076 
                                                                               (0.0117)                    
        -0.0257                
 (0.0226)                
  -0.0183*** 
 (0.0070) 
NPL/Loan*MPS                                                    -0.0123 
                                                                               (0.0120)    
       
      
  -0.0633***             
 (0.0195)               
   0.0059 
 (0.0060) 
Deposits/Liabilities*MPS                                      -0.0088 
                                                                              (0.0122) 
      
      
   0.0447                   
 (0.0273)                
   0.0033 
 (0.0071) 
Equity/assets*MPS                                                -0.0081 
                                                                              (0.0173) 
    0.0072 
 (0.0238)                                         
   0.0031     
 (0.0049)     
Total assets*MPS                                                   0.0024 
                                                                              (0.0165) 
   -0.0177 
 (0.0237)  
                   
                      
             
                   
 
  -0.0084 
 (0.0068) 
Obs.                                                2529                 2529                     
 
R2                              
                     
                                                      
0.0448              0.0455                      
     2529 
 
 
      0.0765 
    2529                      2529 
  
  
 0.0786                    0.0477 
    2529 
 
     
 0.0489 
 
 
     
      
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
 
and significance. First, in regressions (3)-(6) in the two tables, shadow rate and are negative 
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and significant with banks’ SRISK while log difference of the ECB monthly total assets is 
positive and significant with banks’ SRISK in crisis and non-crisis periods. These results are 
consistent with our previous findings and provide further evidence for our hypothesis of the 
expansionary monetary policies will contribute to the buildup of systemic risks of euro area 
banks in the long term.  
Second, in all regressions in both tables, most coefficients of non-interest income/total income, 
non-performing loans/total loans, deposits /total liabilities are positive and significant with 
banks’ LRMES in crisis and non-crisis periods. These results confirm our previous findings 
that banks with more diversified income structure, poorer asset quality, more rely on deposit 
funding will have higher systemic risk. Third, in regression (4) in both tables, the interaction 
term between non-performing loan/total loan and shadow rate is negative and significant with 
banks’ SRISK in both crisis and non-crisis periods. This result provides further evidence for 
our previous finding of riskier banks will have greater sensitivities towards the expansionary 
monetary policy.  
On the other hand, there are some important differences among the coefficients in the two tables 
as well. First, in regressions (1) and (2) in both tables, Taylor rule residuals are negative and 
significant with banks’ LRMES in non-crisis period while they are positive and insignificant 
with banks’ LRMES in crisis period. The former results support for our hypothesis that 
expansionary monetary policies will contribute to the buildup of systemic risks of euro area 
banks in the long term while the latter results do not. Second, in all regressions in both tables, 
most coefficients of loans/earning assets and non-interest income/total income are positive and 
significant with banks’ LRMES in non-crisis period while most coefficients are insignificant 
with banks’ LRMES in crisis period. The former results provide further evidences for our 
previous findings that banks with poorer asset quality and more diversified income structure 
will have higher systemic risk while the latter results only provide limited evidences.   
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Third, in all regressions in both tables, the total assets is positive and significant with banks’ 
LRMES in non-crisis period while it is insignificant with banks’ LRMES during the crisis 
period. Fourth, in regression (4), the interaction term between loan/earning assets and shadow 
rate, total assets and shadow rate are negative and significant with banks’ LRMES in  
Table 4-14      Results of Banks’ LRMES in Non-Crisis Period 
Variable                                         (1)                     (2) 
                                                       LRMES            LRMES      
                                                        Non-crisis            Non-crisis               
                                                                                                                         
          (3)                       
      LRMES  
      Non-crisis 
        (4)                        (5) 
     LRMES              LRMES 
     Non-crisis             Non-crisis 
   (6) 
    LRMES 
    Non-crisis 
DISPERS  
Standard Taylor Rule Residuals          -0.0818***       -0.0830*** 
                                                       (0.0292)            (0.0293) 
Shadow rate 
 
Log difference of ECB balance sheet  
 
Loan/earning assets                        0.0365**          0.0344*       
                                                       (0.0171)           (0.0190) 
Non-interest income/total income         0.0719***        0.0672*** 
                                                       (0.0150)           (0.0170) 
Non-performing loan/total loan           0.1945***        0.1990*** 
                                                       (0.0151)           (0.0165) 
       
      
     -0.1474*** 
     (0.0202) 
      
      
      0.0388**        
     (0.0169) 
      0.0745*** 
     (0.0148) 
      0.1972*** 
     (0.0150) 
                                
                              
  -0.1446***                 
  (0.0202)                 
                                0.0353*** 
                               (0.0093)   
  0.0241                   0.0355** 
 (0.0164)                (0.0172) 
  0.0684***             0.0719*** 
 (0.0150)                (0.0150) 
  0.1830***             0.1945*** 
 (0.0132)                (0.0151) 
     
   
   
   
  0.0375*** 
 (0.0078) 
  0.0342** 
 (0.0174) 
  0.0713*** 
 (0.0149) 
  0.1947*** 
 (0.0151) 
Deposits/total liabilities                  0.0576***       0.0542*** 
                                                       (0.0163)           (0.0169) 
Equity/assets                                  -0.0082            -0.0103 
                                                       (0.0156)           (0.0170) 
Total assets                                      0.0329*           0.0342* 
                                                       (0.0171)           (0.0185)                      
      0.0579*** 
     (0.0162) 
     -0.0090  
     (0.0155) 
      0.0339** 
(0.0170) 
   0.0613***             0.0560*** 
 (0.0155)                (0.0163) 
 -0.0056                  -0.0085        
 (0.0145)                (0.0157) 
  0.0196                   0.0314* 
 (0.0161)                (0.0173) 
   0.0548*** 
 (0.0164) 
 -0.0082 
 (0.0156)  
  0.0313* 
 (0.0173) 
Loan/EA*MPS                                                        0.0104       
                                                                               (0.0309) 
      
      
  -0.0435***            
 (0.0161)               
   0.0085 
 (0.0063) 
Income structure*MPS                                           0.0163 
                                                                               (0.0257)                    
        -0.0087                
 (0.0131)                
   0.0167*** 
 (0.0046) 
NPL/Loan*MPS                                                    -0.0185 
                                                                               (0.0176)    
       
      
  -0.0590***             
 (0.0142)               
  -0.0077 
 (0.0048) 
Deposits/Liabilities*MPS                                       0.0150 
                                                                               (0.0168) 
      
      
   0.0111                   
 (0.0133)                
   0.0165 
 (0.0102) 
Equity/assets*MPS                                                 0.0084 
                                                                               (0.0126) 
    0.0163 
 (0.0139)                                         
  -0.0023     
 (0.0089)     
Total assets*MPS                                                   -0.0061 
                                                                               (0.0318) 
   -0.0374** 
 (0.0153)  
                   
                      
             
                   
 
  -0.0012 
 (0.0072) 
Obs.                                                4003                  4003                     
 
R2                              
                     
                                                      
0.0417               0.0421                      
    4003 
 
 
      0.0586 
     4003                      4003 
  
  
  0.0637                    0.0424 
    4003 
 
     
 0.0434 
 
 
     
      
      
       Note: ***  **  *  =  statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively 
         Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
 
non-crisis period while they are negative and insignificant with banks’ LRMES in crisis period. 
Finally, in regression (6), the interaction term between non-interest income/total income and 
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log difference of the ECB monthly total assets is negative and significant with banks’ LRMES 
in crisis period while it is positive and significant with banks’ LRMES in non-crisis period. 
These results indicate that banks with more diversified income structure will benefit more from 
the expansionary monetary policy in crisis period while they will not benefit from the 
expansionary monetary policy in non-crisis period. 
 
4.7   Conclusions and Policy implications 
4.7.1 Conclusions 
The aims of this study are: this chapter aims to (1) investigate the impact of ECB’s 
expansionary monetary policy on banks’ systemic risk in euro area countries; (2) examine the 
heterogeneity of banks response towards monetary policy changes; (3) identify the key bank-
specific variables that affect the banks’ systemic risk if the ECB implements the expansionary 
monetary policies.  
We formulate and test empirically main hypothesis by using data for banks headquartered in 
11 countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain) between September 2004 and March 2017. Data are drawn from (1) the data 
of systemic risk measures LRMES and SRISK are downloaded from V-lab; (2) the bank-
specific data are obtained from S&P market intelligence platform and Bloomberg; (3) the 
macroeconomic data in calculating monetary policy shocks (Taylor-rule type residuals) are 
collected from ECB Statistics Data Warehouse; (4) the ECB policy rate (Main Refinancing 
Operation rate, MRO) and annual total assets are obtained from ECB website; (5) the ECB’s 
Shadow rate is collected from Quandl website. The main methodology we use is fixed effects 
panel data model. Our empirical evidence offers support to our hypothesis that postulates that 
expansionary monetary policies will contribute to the buildup of systemic risks of euro area 
banks in the long term. Moreover, our results indicate that banks that poorer asset quality will 
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have higher systemic risks. We also identify some evidences for banks that are riskier (e.g. 
riskier asset composition, poorer asset quality) will benefit more from the expansionary 
monetary policy. These results support our previous finding of riskier banks will have a greater 
sensitivity towards the expansionary monetary policy compared to their less risky counterparts.  
These results can be explained as follows: if the ECB adopts expansionary monetary policies, 
riskier banks will have improvements in asset composition and asset quality, thus they will 
have be able to obtain higher profits and lower profitability of default. This will likely will have 
a favorable impact on their stock prices and lower their systemic risks. However, we do not 
find sufficient evidences that banks headquartered in core countries have heterogeneous 
responses towards the expansionary monetary policy from banks headquartered in periphery 
countries. Similarly, we do not identify sufficient evidences that banks in crisis period have 
different responses to the accommodative monetary policy from banks in non-crisis period.   
4.7.2   Policy Implications 
The evidence produced in this paper offers some useful policy implications. First, our main 
results support our hypothesis and provide implications for bank supervisors and regulators 
that they should not keep the expansionary monetary policy for too long. Central banks could 
use the accommodative monetary policy to achieve financial stability in short-term but should 
gradually quit from the accommodative monetary policy once financial stability is achieved. 
Second, our other main results give bank supervisors, regulators and managers some important 
policy implications that they should use the expansionary monetary policy to improve the 
financial conditions of riskier banks (or less healthy banks).  
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Appendix:  
Table A4-1 Result of Standard Taylor Rule Model 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic Prob.  
Constant -0.0311 0.0211 -1.4748 0.1417 
MRO(-1) 0.9764 0.0076 127.8188 0.0000 
INF(12) 3.8237 1.1121 3.4382 0.0007 
GAP 1.8739 0.3695 5.0710 0.0000 
     
R2: 0.9907           F-statistic: 7612.43     Prob(F-statistic): 0.0000 
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5.1 Introduction  
This thesis offers three separate but related studies on the European banking sector focusing on 
various important topics including M&As, operating performance, financial integration, 
systemic risk and monetary policy. The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the 
background of the whole thesis, it highlights the contributions to the literature and the chapters 
preview. Chapter 2 examines (1) the determinants of acquirers’ performance changes of bank 
M&As in Europe; (2) whether there is any positive or negative relationship between acquirers’ 
performance changes of cross-border bank M&As and banking integration in Europe; and (3) 
the impacts of the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis on acquirers’ performance changes after M&As. 
Chapter 3 seeks to investigate (1) the determinants of acquirers’ systemic risk changes of bank 
M&As in Europe ; (2) whether there is any positive or negative relationship between acquirers’ 
systemic risk changes of  cross-border M&As and banking integration in Europe; and (3) the 
impacts of the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis on acquirers’ 
systemic risk after M&As. Chapter 4 mainly aims to (1) investigate the impacts of the ECB’s 
expansionary monetary policy on banks’ systemic risk; (2) whether there is any heterogeneous 
response of euro area banks towards monetary policy changes; and (3)  identify the key bank-
specific variables that affect banks’ systemic risk if the ECB implements the expansionary 
monetary policies.  
 
5.2   Summary of Findings and Policy Implications 
In chapter 2, we examine the determinants of acquirers’ performance changes after M&As 
between 1997 and 2003. We find robust that evidences for acquirers with lower insolvency 
risks and that operate in less concentrated banking markets may have greater profitability ratios. 
Additionally, we obtain some results that confirm our finding of acquirers can benefit from 
geographic diversification to raise ROE after M&As. Other determinants of acquirers’ changes 
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in net interest income after M&As, including larger size, liquidity ratio, efficiency; and lower 
leverage. In terms of market-specific variables, significant determinants include: banking 
market concentration and less stringent capital regulation. These results provide implications 
for the bank managers and regulators about how they can use M&As (both domestic and cross-
border) to boost acquirers’ operating performances in European banking markets. We then test 
whether the relationship between acquirers’ performance changes and banking integration 
indicators. To measure this latter, we first employ PCA method to select some important 
financial integration indicators and then contain them in main regressions. We find that interest 
rate difference between distressed and non-distressed countries in the euro area is negatively 
and significantly associated with several performance change measures. Second, we use 
Granger-causality tests for different performance measures and find that increased integration 
in European banking markets has a positive impact on acquirers’ operating performance after 
M&As. Third, we investigate the determinants for acquirers’ performance changes in cross-
border M&As and discover that acquirers that are headquartered in countries with less stringent 
supervisory power and less powerful deposit insurance may have higher ROE and NIM. Fourth, 
we find some supports that the main characteristics that affect ROA and NIM are size and asset 
quality while those influence profits after M&As are capitalization, growth rate, asset quality, 
capital regulatory power, supervisory power and deposit insurers power. These results provide 
bank managers and regulators with further implications about how they can use cross-border 
M&As to increase acquirers’ operating performances after M&As. Finally, we adopt some t-
tests to examine to what extent the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis had a negative impact on 
acquirers’ performance after M&As. Our evidence reveals that acquirers in pre-crisis could 
increase their profitability through M&As while acquirers in post-crisis period could decrease 
their profitability ratios and increase fewer profits through M&As. We further conduct mean-
comparison t-test and find, as expected, that the difference between the average performance 
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change in post-crisis period and the average performance change in pre-crisis period are 
negatively and statistically significant.  
In chapter 3, we first calculate the average changes of acquirers’ MES, LTD and ∆CoVaR and 
use t-tests to investigate whether systemic risk increased or decreased significantly after M&As. 
We identify that acquirers’ MES, LTD and ∆CoVaR increased significantly after M&As. These 
results provide evidences that acquirers’ systemic risks increase significantly after M&As. In 
order to identify more evidences, we then compute the average changes of competitors’ MES, 
LTD and ∆CoVaR. We find that both MES and LTD of competitors increase significantly while 
change of ∆CoVaR increases the coefficient is insignificantly. We employ t-test again and 
demonstrate that merging banks and their competitors suffer the same extent from the increase 
in systemic risks.  
This study provides useful implications for bank managers, regulators and supervisors as we 
find evidence that (1) M&As may boost acquirers’ systemic risks; and (2) some factors other 
than M&As may also contribute to the buildup of systemic risk in European banking markets. 
Our results are robust as we use t-tests as well as more sophisticated propensity-score (p-score) 
matching techniques. For this latter, we match merging banks with non-merging banks based 
on total assets and market-to-book ratio and compute the average changes of three systemic 
risk measures for acquirers, combined banks and non-merging banks. We find that all three 
systemic risk measures increase significantly for acquirers and combined banks while they 
decreased significantly for non-merging banks. These results further confirm our previous 
findings that acquirers increase systemic risks due to bank M&As. In order to check whether 
acquirers with different characteristics will have different systemic risks, we divide the full 
sample into different sub-samples based on different characteristics. We find that (1) large 
acquirers have higher systemic risks after M&As than small and medium-sized acquirers; (2) 
acquirers that engage in cross-border M&As have higher systemic risks after M&As than 
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acquirers that engage in domestic M&As; (3) acquirers from core countries have higher 
systemic risks after M&As than acquirers from periphery countries. Next we employ fixed-
effect models to identify more determinants of acquirers’ systemic risk changes after M&As. 
First, we find strong evidences that acquirers with higher asset diversity will have lower 
systemic risks after M&As. This important finding implies that product diversification can 
contribute to lower bank-specific risk and help achieve greater financial stability. Second, we 
find evidence for the hypothesis that larger acquirers will have higher systemic risks post 
M&As. This gives support to safety-net subsidies hypothesis whereby large acquirers can 
engage in M&As to become even larger and become “too-big-to-fail”, a situation that allows 
them to receive safety-net subsidies. This worsens moral hazard problem and enables banks to 
take on more risks, and finally, leads to banks’ higher systemic risk contributions to banking 
system. Third, we obtain some evidences that acquirers from operating in more integrated 
banking markets will have higher systemic risk post M&As. This gives support to the 
destabilizing effect of banking integration to some extent exists, at least in the short-run. 
Besides these findings, we further identify some evidences for acquirers (1) with lower asset 
quality in previous year; (2) with lower capital ratio in previous year; (3) with lower price-to-
book ratio; (4) that not rely much on short-term debt; (5) that receive bailouts; (6) from 
countries whose deposit insurers have more authorities and (7) from countries that more 
encourage investors to engage in private monitoring will have lower risks after M&As. These 
findings provide implications for European banking regulators what types of bank mergers are 
more likely to contribute to financial stability. Finally, for robustness, we use a variety of tests, 
like post-crisis and pre-crisis sub-samples and include and exclude banking integration 
indicators. We identify that some explanatory variables have opposite signs with three systemic 
risk measures. These results imply that those variables have significantly different effects on 
acquirers’ systemic risks in post-crisis period, compared with those in pre-crisis period. 
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Therefore, banking regulators, supervisors and managers should scrutinize changes of those 
variables and take different actions to reduce acquirers’ systemic risks before crisis and after 
crisis.  
In chapter 4, we first use Taylor rule type model to compute the standard Taylor rule residuals, 
collect ECB shadow rate and calculate log difference of ECB monthly balance sheet to 
represent different monetary policy shocks. Second, we collect monthly LRMES and SRISK 
of euro area banks from V-lab website and calculate the standardized LRMES and 
standardized SRISK as systemic risk measures. Third, we use fixed-effect model to examine 
whether banks will have higher or lower systemic risks when the ECB implements the 
expansionary monetary policy. We find some evidence that the expansionary monetary policy 
will contribute to the buildup of systemic risk in euro area banking sector in the long-term.              
These findings provide bank regulators, supervisors and managers with useful pointers as to 
what factors other than M&As are relevant for systemic risk, such as the expansionary 
monetary policy, and may impede the long-term financial stability in European banking 
markets. Moreover, our results indicate that banks that have more diversified income 
structure, poorer asset quality, more deposit funding, more equity capitals and larger sizes will 
have higher systemic risks. We also observed that riskier (e.g. riskier asset composition, 
poorer asset quality) seem to benefit more from the expansionary monetary policy. These 
results can be explained as follows: if the ECB adopts the expansionary monetary policy, 
riskier banks will have more improvements in asset composition and asset quality, thus they 
will have higher profits and lower profitability of default, and they will have higher stock 
prices and lower systemic risks. All these findings and explanations have shed light on how 
bank regulators and supervisors can use the expansionary monetary policy tools (both 
conventional and unconventional) to reduce systemic risks significantly for riskier banks. 
However, we do not find sufficient evidences that banks headquartered in core countries have 
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heterogeneous responses towards the expansionary monetary policy. Similarly, banks in crisis 
and non-crisis periods have different responses to the accommodative monetary policy.  
 
5.3   Importance of Findings 
In addition to policy implications, there is some importance of the empirical findings that 
emerge from each chapter of the whole thesis. First, the main findings of chapter 2 indicate 
the benefits of bank M&As and higher level of banking integration as well as the main factors 
that influence acquirers’ operating performance after M&As. Second, the main findings of 
chapter 3 show the risks of bank M&As and higher degree of banking integration as well as 
the main determinants that affect acquirers’ systemic risk after M&As. Third, the main 
findings of chapter 4 demonstrate that the negative impacts of ECB’s expansionary monetary 
policy on financial stability in European banking market as well as banks’ heterogeneous 
responses towards ECB’s monetary policy changes.  
 
5.4 Limitations and Possible Improvements 
This study is not free from limitations. There are several aspects of limitations in this thesis. 
First, all samples of these three papers are limited in small geographic area (i.e. only the EU 
countries). Specifically, in chapter 4, the sample only contains 11 euro area member countries. 
We can solve this limitation if we include banks headquartered in more euro area member 
countries in the sample. Second, all samples of these three papers have limited time periods. 
Due to the data inavailability, the sample only covers part of euro’s history. We can solve this 
limitation if we data during longer time period. Third, we have to reduce the original sample 
size due to data inavailability. Moreover, some results, e.g. in tables 3-20, 3-23. 3-25, are 
based on small sub-samples of only about 50 observations. Results that based on small sample 
sizes may be less reliable. We can find a sample with larger size to improve this limitation in 
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the future researches. Fourth, we mainly employ the fixed-effect panel data models. We will 
improve this limitation if we can use various types of models to conduct more robustness 
checks and obtain more confirming evidences. Finally, in chapter 2, we should match merging 
banks with non-merging banks (as control group) and conduct further empirical analysis (e.g. 
propensity score matching) to find more confirming evidence for the 2007-2009 U.S. 
Financial Crisis had negative impacts on acquirers’ operating performance changes after 
M&As.  
 
5.5 Possible Researches in the Future  
One of potential applications to practice and policy in terms of banking integration in 
European market is to identify main determinants of banking integration indicators. This will 
give bank regulators and supervisors what are key factors that influence banking integration 
indicators. Another potential application can be: how ECB’s monetary policy change affects 
level of banking integration in Europe? This provides bank regulators and supervisors with 
policy implications about the effects of monetary policy changes on banking integration.  
 
 
